Assisted Dying Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Falconer of Thoroton and Lord Howarth of Newport

Friday 7th November 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My reason for not putting that in the Bill is that so many cases are much more complex than the simple case I gave, where I would not wish for there to be an assisted death—where one’s motive for wishing to have an assisted death will be a mixture of “I don’t want to be dependent on other people, I don’t want the lack of dignity, I don’t want to be a burden”, a whole mixture of motives that make clear “I do not want to go on living for the last week or month”. I am very unkeen to isolate just one factor in what is a much more complex issue than the example I gave. That is why I am against putting that in the Bill.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

Will my noble and learned friend say a word or two about how he envisages that the judge or the doctors should know, ascertain and satisfy themselves that the decision has been taken voluntarily?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

They must conduct in-depth discussions with the patient and the other doctors. The judge must call such evidence as he or she considers appropriate to be satisfied—the burden is to be “satisfied”—that the decision is voluntary. “Voluntary” means “this is what the patient wants”: he or she is not being forced into it either by coercion or by the sort of guilt that we referred to earlier. Although that will give rise to complex issues, it is not a job that is beyond judges or, indeed, some doctors.

The noble Baroness, Lady Howe of Idlicote, said that a person should have to be resident for a year immediately before the declaration is agreed. I think that is the Bill’s effect, because as it is drafted it says,

“on the day the declaration is made … has been ordinarily resident in England and Wales for not less than one year”.

The patient has to have been here for a year. However, she has a second point, which is that it should be two years rather than one. Until the noble Lord, Lord Howard, suggested it, it had not occurred to me that this was about immigration. I had thought it was about a desire to prevent tourism for this purpose, which is how the noble Baroness put it. I think it is quite difficult to judge between one year and two years. My inclination is to stick with one year, but I will take soundings to see whether two years seems right. People coming to be resident for a year before the declaration is made looks like considerable forward planning. I am not minded to accept her amendment.

The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, made a point about the 18 to 25 year-old age group. I completely agree with him that they need especial care, but this right is for anybody aged over 18. I do not think it should be taken away from them. We need to consider what should go into a code of practice to ensure that the particular needs of 18 to 25 year-olds are borne in mind.

I think that has dealt with all of the amendments that were suggested.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Falconer of Thoroton and Lord Howarth of Newport

Tuesday 29th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, I tabled an amendment in exactly the same terms as the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth. As he is your Lordships’ leading constitutional expert, I felt very good that I had arrived at the same idea, and I am extremely happy to appear on the Marshalled List as having signed up to his amendment.

The provision is so vaguely drafted as to be almost entirely without meaning. I know that it is borrowed from the Parliament Act 1911 but that does not mean that it is an appropriate precedent, particularly, as the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, has just pointed out. In that Act, there is a clear definition of a money Bill, but there is no clear definition of a no confidence motion in this measure. The Clerk of the House of Commons, in giving evidence to the Select Committee in the other place, was of the opinion that the question of whether consultation was practicable would become a legal question. It would be open to legal challenge in so far as anything in the Bill is liable to be open to legal challenge. We had a full discussion of that in an earlier debate.

One observes that judicial reviews have been upheld again and again against the Government on the grounds that Governments had failed to consult properly. If it is a question of whether the Speaker may or may not have consulted properly according to the requirements in the Bill, I suppose that that, if anything, might give an opening to judicial intervention, although I am not seriously afraid that that is the case. The real concern about this provision is that it is almost meaningless. What does “so far as practicable” mean? What would be proper consultation in these circumstances? The requirement to consult does not oblige the Speaker to agree with the Deputies. The Deputies themselves might disagree. In fact, one might surmise that they are rather likely to disagree in the circumstance of a no confidence vote that will occur in the most fraught and complex political circumstances. There will be enormous pressure not only on the Speaker of the House but also on the Deputy Speakers if they are to be involved formally in this process. The Deputy Speakers have disclaimed their party allegiance in their new capacities but, none the less, it is only realistic to anticipate that they would come under immense political pressure from members of their own political parties. They would need to be very sturdy to ignore all that. In the previous debate, the noble Lord, Lord Martin of Springburn, and the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, described how they would imagine the atmosphere to be in the House on the occasion of a no confidence vote. They gave us to understand something of the sort of pressures that would be brought to bear not only on the Speaker but, if this provision remains in the Bill, on the Deputy Speakers, too.

In the end, the Speaker will be on his own. It seems that this provision gives him no useful cover or protection against the political storm. A very sensible conclusion of the Constitution Committee, contained in its report at paragraph 159, was that, whether or not this turns out to be a legal question, an obligation on the Speaker to consult with the Deputy Speakers should be a matter of internal House of Commons procedure, should not be contained within the statutory provisions of the Bill and therefore should be omitted. Rather regrettably, the Government rejected this advice in their response to the report of the Constitution Committee at paragraph 60. The Government are quite keen to pray the Constitution Committee’s recommendations in aid when they agree with them. They have not done so on this occasion, however. They cite the precedent of the Parliament Act 1911, which, they say, has worked well. As we suggest, it is not a terribly useful precedent; certifying a money Bill is a matter of ascertaining fact and hardly contentious. Certifying a vote of no confidence would be a very different thing.

I hope that the Minister will agree to look again at this sensible recommendation of the Constitution Committee and that he will agree to the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, and myself.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

On the face of it, this seems an unwise provision. First, the similar provision in the Parliament Act is about the Speaker having to certify whether something is a money Bill. That has become a legal, constitutional issue where there is not much discretion; it is simply a question of law. I can see that assistance is important for this. Secondly, I imagine that the application of the Freedom of Information Act would mean that any document containing the advice given by the Deputy Speakers to the Speaker of the House of Commons in relation to this issue would become available very quickly. Thirdly, it does not help the constitution if there is disagreement between the Deputy Speakers and the Speakers and a doubtful Motion of no confidence. Fourthly, what is the purpose of the provision when the critical issue raised by the Bill is: what is a motion of no confidence? Though the procedure is very tight and closed, the Bill leaves that completely open.

It is not something that the courts will want to get involved in. However, it is not good for Parliament that divisions will become apparent and technical processes that need to be gone through might not be. Quite separately from the issue of whether this is a motion of no confidence—on which view there is wide discretion—the phrase, “so far as practicable”, is one to which any reasonable person can give a very substantial meaning. Two reasonable people can take two entirely differing views as to what is practicable and what is not.

I ask, in parenthesis, what do the Government envisage as making it impracticable to consult a Deputy Speaker? Is it only the illness or incapacity of one of the Deputy Speakers or do the Government have something else in mind? It seems to be extraordinarily unlikely that, apart from illness or incapacity, the tabling of a motion that might be one of no confidence, the indication by the Speaker or the debate on the motion, will happen so quickly that there will be no possibility of getting to speak to a Deputy Speaker. Perhaps the Minister can help us on that.

Like my noble friend Lord Howarth and the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, I ask what the purpose of this is once it is accepted, as it is by everybody, that an exercise of judgment may well be required by the Speaker. The judgment is his and his alone, and who he or she consults is inevitably a matter for him or her. For example, one would reasonably expect that if there is any room for doubt, he or she should consult senior representatives of all the political parties about what they think in relation to it, yet the Bill specifies only one group of statutory consultees. I can see the precedent in the Parliament Act, but the way that this is drafted is much more suitable, almost, to the exercise of a discretion by a Minister, which is then challengeable, rather than to the exercise of difficult judgment by a Speaker in the context of the House of Commons where to specify statutory consultees, apart from in the Parliament Act, is extraordinarily unusual. I do not know of any other example, and I would be interested in the other examples that the Government relied on apart from the Parliament Act, which is very different.

It feels as if this has not been thought through, and I invite the Minister, having heard the debate, to ask what we are getting out of this provision. Does it make it worse rather than better? The superficial attractions of asking the Speaker to get advice are, when you think about it, probably not real, particularly when there is nothing to stop the Speaker getting that advice if he wants to, yet here it is made compulsory. Why? What is the benefit? There does not seem to be any, and there seems to be quite a lot of disbenefits.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, it is me again, but this is the last time. The Bill abolishes the monarch’s power to dissolve Parliament but not the monarch’s power to prorogue Parliament. If the monarch is removed from the dissolution process, should she continue to exercise other prerogative powers, such as the power of prorogation or the power to summon Parliament? It is a question worth pausing on and it would be helpful to hear the Government’s account of why they have sought in this Bill to remove one very important prerogative power but to leave others in place.

I am not a great believer in consistency in constitutional matters. A constitution breathes and relaxes through its anomalies and is able to be responsive to the complex circumstances of the different parts of a country through the very existence of anomalies. I am rather of the view of Ralph Waldo Emerson who said:

“A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen”.

I think that we would all reject such consistency—I hope so.

At a practical level, the Bill leaves a loose end. The continuing power of prorogation is, in principle, open to abuse. If a Prime Minister were to be defeated on a vote of no confidence he could, under the terms of the Bill, ask the Queen to prorogue Parliament to get around the 14-day constraint. There was such an incident in Canada not very long ago. Following his re-election, the Canadian Prime Minister asked the Governor General to prorogue Parliament. The Prime Minister was seeking to avoid losing a threatened vote of confidence. Parliament was prorogued for two months. By the time it came back, the threat of that vote of confidence had pretty well gone away, so his continuing lease on power was ensured. The Constitution Select Committee thought that the likelihood of such an abuse occurring in the circumstances of this country was very low, with which I agree. I think that if any Prime Minister were to attempt to manipulate and abuse the power of prorogation, it would certainly backfire on him politically.

This amendment seeks to provide a safeguard against prolonged prorogation if a Prime Minister did seek to avoid the consequences of a no-confidence vote and get the election deferred to benefit himself or his party. The amendment should probably have been framed to guard equally against an abuse of the power of adjournment. Without such an amendment, the only safeguard that would remain would be the refusal of the monarch to accede to a request for prorogation. I think that we would all take the view that it is not a good idea to place the monarch in a politically contentious position. There is a loose end to be tidied up here and I should like the Minister to explain why the Government have left the power of prorogation as it is. I beg to move.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, I have absolutely nothing to say on prorogation but I would like to mention the significant contribution that my noble friend Lord Howarth of Newport has made to the Committee stage. I also congratulate the noble and learned Lord who has conducted Committee stage completely alone on behalf of the Government. Although I have disagreed with very much of what he said, he has done an absolutely first-class job.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Falconer of Thoroton and Lord Howarth of Newport

Tuesday 29th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

The Minister is absolutely right in relation to that. I took the 1940 example because I felt that one has to deal with the position. Suppose that Chamberlain had lost the vote of confidence; what then would have been the position? We have to test it against that but I accept what he says: it would not have been engaged.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, if I may say so, that was another worthwhile exchange. It would not be my intention to prevent the possibility of resignation. This clause could be amended fairly easily to incorporate that possibility. One would simply have to say that a parliamentary general election may also take place if the Speaker of the House issues a certificate. Against that background and against the noble and learned Lord’s undertaking to reconsider the specific drafting of the subsection, I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Falconer of Thoroton and Lord Howarth of Newport

Monday 21st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

I have two amendments, to enable the House to consider both possibilities. I am not sure that we need to legislate at all. We could simply proceed on the traditional basis that a 51 per cent vote was required. However, in the context of a Bill creating fixed-term Parliaments, we perhaps do have to specify in law that a majority of one would be sufficient to trigger an early general election. I am not very happy with that, but I am not very happy with the two-thirds requirement, for the reasons that I have indicated. Therefore, I have suggested that the House might like to consider a different figure to provide a safeguard against exploitation of this particular escape-hatch which would give the Government of the day an opportunity to escape from the ordinary provisions of the legislation on fixed-term Parliaments. For these reasons, I have tabled the amendments. I beg to move.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, again, Mr Laws explains how we got here. But when you see how we got here, it is difficult to understand why we are here. Perhaps I may read a paragraph that has not yet been quoted:

“There was a debate for thirty minutes or so on arrangements for dissolving a parliament before the end of its five-year term. This was an issue which we raised, but William Hague soon realised that the main risk lay with the Conservatives. Without a super-majority for dissolution being required, the smaller party could leave the coalition and dissolve parliament almost at will”.

He continues:

“Huhne originally suggested that there should be a 66% threshold for dissolving parliament before its full term was up, in line with the situation in Scotland. George Osborne said he thought that 66% was rather high and that 55% or 60% was closer to the mark. After some work on Ed Llewelyn’s calculator, and consideration of by-election risks, it was decided that a 55% vote of MPs would be required to provide for a dissolution. This was just greater than the combined opposition and Lib Dem parliamentary parties, thereby safeguarding the Conservative position”.

It is absolutely plain from what Laws is saying there that they were trying to guard against Dissolution, including a no-confidence vote. There is no doubt about that, because he says:

“Without a super-majority for dissolution being required, the smaller party could leave the coalition and dissolve parliament almost at will”.

That must be referring to a vote of no confidence. It is therefore plain from Laws’ book that it was envisaged that you could not get rid of the Government with an ordinary vote of no confidence and that the only provision intended to allow for an early end—that is, before the five years—was if the super-majority was satisfied, and that could not be delivered by the Lib Dems coalescing with Labour.

I think that that was to be put into a binding resolution, whatever that may mean, in the House of Commons. Pressure was then placed on the Government in the public debate which followed, and they changed this in two respects: the figure of 56 per cent became two-thirds, and they agreed to a vote of no confidence as a way of getting rid of the Government. Why are they both there? Which two separate situations are they trying to cover? It looks as though the coalition agreed to the 56 per cent to prevent the possibility of being voted out on a vote of no confidence. I am pretty sure that that is what happened, but they were pushed off it by public pressure and had to agree to a vote of no confidence. They retained the super-majority as a fig leaf in order to try to give some justification for it. That is what Mr Laws’ book is suggesting. Could the Minister say whether I am wrong about that analysis? No other factual analysis is being offered for why we are in the extraordinarily unusual position where both a simple majority and a super-majority can get rid of the Government by way of a vote in the House of Commons. It looks as if the analysis that I have given is the reason.

We are entitled to an explanation for this. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, who is respected throughout the House as a constitutional expert, is significant: no other national parliament has this extraordinary provision in it. If it is in there only because it was part of a negotiation that then got shot away by public pressure, why are the Government keeping it in? It is important that the noble and learned Lord gives us some information about it, because at the moment the only explanation on the record is the one that I have given. It is discreditable for the Government to reform our constitution simply on the basis that an idea that was floated in the coalition agreement got shot away but they kept it in, in order to preserve I am not sure what.

A second and separate point that the Minister needs to deal with is: what happens when the Government resign and no one else wants to form a Government? On the basis of the Bill, it appears—again, the noble Lord, Lord Norton, has made this point and I have not heard an answer to it—that you have no Government and no Dissolution. I would be grateful to know what happens to our nation’s Government at that point.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Falconer of Thoroton and Lord Howarth of Newport

Wednesday 9th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, this is about the size of the Executive. The effect of this amendment would be to reduce the size of the Executive in proportion to the reduction in the number of MPs. There is no issue that it should not happen. Not surprisingly, Mr Nicholas Clegg declared before the election:

“I want to be clear: I am talking about a major reorganisation of Whitehall … As a result of our restructure the number of Ministers and government whips would be reduced from 119 to 73”.

Mr David Cameron, now the Prime Minister, in a lecture entitled “Rebuilding Trust in Politics”, sounded a similar note, promising:

“We’d want to reduce the power of the executive and increase the power of Parliament … We’ve got to give Parliament its teeth back so that people can have pride in it again—so they can look at it and say ‘yes: those MPs we elect—they’re holding the government to account on my behalf’”.

The effect of reducing the number of MPs by 50 without decreasing the number of officeholders entitled to sit and vote in the House of Commons by the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975 is to increase the size of the government Front Bench proportionate to the number of Back-Benchers.

In Committee the noble Lord the Leader of the House said that,

“there is a very serious underlying point and that is the fear that the proportion of the Executive will increase as the number of Members of Parliament falls. I understand that there is an impatience in this Committee to know how the Government will address that fact. I am trying to be as helpful as I can but there is a limit to the helpfulness.”

You can say that again. He went on:

“We have said that we will address this issue and we will, but there is plenty of time to legislate before 2015 if we need to. The Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform told the Constitution Committee, of which my noble friend and the noble and learned Lord are members, that we will bring forward proposals during this Parliament. That is in good time as the reduction in the size of the other place will not yet have taken effect. I hope that is a sufficient reassurance”.—[Official Report, 26/1/11; col. 1058.]

No; that is, on the scale of reassurance, nil. Do we trust this Government to introduce measures to reduce the number of Ministers in the other place? No we do not. The only way to deal with that is if Parliament is prepared to do it by saying, “Let’s reduce the number of Ministers”, as Mr Nicholas Clegg, Mr David Cameron and the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde—the triumvirate on which the Government are based—said they would. I do not trust them to do it in 20 years. In those circumstances, I invite the House to do it. I beg to move.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, my Amendment 27FA would insert a new clause after Clause 11, and after the new clause inserted by the amendment of my noble and learned friend. His new clause relates to the size of the Executive—the number of Ministers. My new clause is intimately related to that and deals with the number of Parliamentary Private Secretaries. I propose that their number should also be reduced commensurately with any reduction in the size of the House of Commons. We are talking here of the so-called payroll vote—the payroll which consists not only of salaried Ministers and one or two unsalaried Ministers, but of Parliamentary Private Secretaries. Although they are unpaid, they are always somewhat sardonically referred to as being members of the payroll vote.

In Committee, noble Lords on all sides of the House expressed their concern that the capacity of the House of Commons to hold the Executive to account would be further enfeebled if the size of the payroll vote were not to be reduced in proportion to the reduction of the size of the House of Commons. An important amendment on that matter moved by the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, attracted a great deal of interest and support on all sides. Since then, I have learnt that the Speaker of the House of Commons himself has expressed concern that reducing the number of MPs without a commensurate reduction in the number of Ministers would skew the Westminster playing field in favour of the Government, as has the steady expansion of the payroll. Those sentiments were attributed to Mr Speaker Bercow in an article in the House Magazine.

Mr Cameron has appointed a lavish number of Parliamentary Private Secretaries, considerable numbers of party vice-chairmen and special representatives. His latest appointment in that genre is a defence envoy for Gibraltar. The Member of Parliament who has been appointed to that distinguished role is someone for whom I have the highest personal regard, but the important point is that she will be bound into the patronage system and lose her capacity to express an independent point of view—certainly in terms of voting. Richard Hall, writing in the House Magazine, said that patronage sucks in more and more Back-Benchers, leaving fewer to hold the Government to account.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Falconer of Thoroton and Lord Howarth of Newport

Tuesday 8th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, Amendment 18F would replace the current provision of the Bill to fix the House of Commons at 600 seats with an alternative rule that would anchor the size of the Commons at its current membership of 650. We have touched down on this a few times this afternoon.

We contend that the Government have failed properly to explain why the figure of 600 seats has been identified as the optimum membership in the other place. They began by claiming that the House of Commons is a “bloated” Chamber and that the UK suffers from overrepresentation, but those arguments were quickly disproved. The claim that Britain is overrepresented in comparison with other similar-sized countries is based on a simple international comparison of numbers of elected representatives per head of population. In fact, the extent to which the UK has more representatives in the national legislature per head of the national population can be exaggerated.

As a briefing note from the House of Commons Library makes clear, the UK has roughly the same ratio as France and Italy. Of course, those calculations take account only of national legislatures and do not include reference to levels of representation beneath that tier. If we look below the national level, we see that the UK has far fewer elected officeholders per head of population than almost all comparable countries. One academic study found that, at the level of local government, the population per elected member is 2,603 in the UK, 350 in Germany and 118 in France. When subnational elected representatives are factored in, it is apparent that the UK does not suffer from overrepresentation.

In any event, there is a fundamental problem in seeking to draw simple comparisons between numbers of elected representatives in different national legislatures. Some countries are unitary states; others are federal. Some have a Westminster model; some have a presidential system. As a consequence, comparison is difficult.

A more sensible basis on which to decide what level of representation is right for the UK is to examine how the size of the House of Commons has changed over time. If the number of MPs was inexorably growing out of all proportion to the size of the electorate, there would clearly be a problem. The evidence shows that that is not the case. The Commons has not grown disproportionately in recent years. It has increased by about 3 to 4 per cent—that is, 25 Members—since 1950. However, the electorate and therefore the average size of constituencies have increased by approximately 25 per cent. That has produced a significant increase in the workload of MPs, which has in any event grown out of all proportion to the increase in population as a consequence of changing social norms, political developments and new forms of communication.

There is no evidence that having fewer MPs will reduce the demand for their services. Assuming that that remains the same, the pressure on the remaining Members and their staff will increase. If the service that MPs provide to their constituencies is not to deteriorate, they will no doubt need greater resources—employing people as caseworkers and those assisting them. The savings made by a reduction of 50 Members of Parliament are then likely to be lost, or reduced, undermining the argument that this is worthy as a cost-cutting measure.

As the initial justifications for the proposed reduction in the other place have broadly collapsed, the government Front Bench has adopted other numbers: a nice round number, now famous in this House. No wonder your Lordships’ Constitution Committee said in its report on the Bill:

“We conclude that the Government have not calculated the proposed reduction in the size of the House of Commons on the basis of any considered assessment of the role and functions of MPs”.

That is now confirmed by the Marshalled List of amendments, which includes, on page 14, Amendment 28A, which provides for a review into the proposed reduction in the number of constituencies. Your Lordships may note that the review is not due to begin until after the election, when the reduction will have happened.

The reduction in the number of MPs is a gamble based on no proper evidence, but it will be pursued anyway. The timeline was explained to us in discussion with the Government on the basis that it would be pointless to try to assess the impact of the proposed reduction on MPs before it had happened. If the reduction turns out to have a very negative impact, it will be too late to prevent it.

In most organisations, you consider the decision first on the evidence and then you take the decision. This Government take the decision, set up a body to look at it and then decide whether it was the right decision. Their approach to whether it affects our national Parliament to the total detriment of the people is, “Who cares?”. Surely the more sensible approach would be to assess the workload and responsibilities of MPs now, with a House of Commons of 650 seats, before making a change of the sort now proposed.

We believe that the case for a 650-seat Commons has not changed since the current Prime Minister, Mr David Cameron, spoke in its favour—indeed, in favour of a slightly larger elected Chamber—at the 2003 Oxfordshire boundary inquiry. Opposing proposals to alter his constituency boundaries at one of the last public inquiries to be allowed into constituency boundaries, he told that inquiry—what a valuable inquiry it was:

“Somebody might take the view that at 659 there are already too many Members of Parliament at Westminster. They may take the view, depending on what happens in the European constitution, that Westminster has less to do, with less MPs—I certainly hope that is not the case”.

Our amendment stems from a conviction that the current Commons of 650 is the most appropriate basis on which to stabilise the size of that Chamber.

Put simply, under our proposals for alternative rules, an initial UK quota would be calculated by dividing the total UK electorate by 650. That would stabilise the House at about 650, but, with a mathematical rounding up or down involved in the calculation of seats in the four parts of the United Kingdom, it would enable minor fluctuations of up to one or two seats either side of 650, which would help the Boundary Commission to deal with remainders. That will give the Boundary Commission flexibility. That seems to be plain common sense. Unfortunately, the Government have struggled to respond positively to those common-sense views.

This is an incredibly important part of the Bill. We are being asked to cut 50 seats from the primary national political body in the United Kingdom. We are being asked to fix its size in statute in perpetuity at 600 and we are not being given any proper explanation as to why that is the most appropriate size for the House of Commons. Does anyone here honestly think that that is the right way to enact such fundamental constitutional change? I beg to move.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, my noble and learned friend, as the House has come to expect of him, has laid out all the relevant issues with magisterial authority. However, I suggest that there is one issue that he may have overlooked, which is that the population of this country is projected to grow very rapidly in the next few decades. If we fix the number of constituencies at 600, or even at 650, we will shortly find that the average number of constituents is unmanageably large. My noble friend Lady McDonagh made an interesting and thoughtful speech on the subject in Committee. We will quickly find ourselves with constituencies of 100,000 voters, trending upwards. Something has to give. You cannot have a fixed quota and a fixed number of constituencies. If the fixed number of constituencies is to be the paramount consideration, the quota will have to jump up at frequent intervals. That is unsatisfactory.

That leads me to my second point, on which I slightly take issue with my noble and learned friend. I question whether it is appropriate for the Government to invite Parliament to determine the precise number of Members that there should be in the House of Commons. That has not been our practice in the past. The Boundary Commissions have had the discretion to recommend the number of constituencies that they judge to be appropriate, which I think is more practical and more proper. If we were to look at the case of a country in Africa—it might be Zimbabwe, Kenya or Rwanda, one of those countries whose political conduct we are quite apt to criticise and where the regime wins less than universal admiration from all of us around the House—

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I think that the noble Lord slightly mischaracterises my argument. The effect of my proposal is that it will be for the Boundary Commission to determine the precise number of MPs, which might not be 650. That is the same as the current position.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

I am hugely relieved as a result of my noble and learned friend’s intervention. However, I do not think that we should lean particularly on the Boundary Commission; it is not for Governments or politicians to suggest a desirable norm for the precise number of constituencies. Just as we would deplore the regimes of other countries whose practices we considered to be seriously illiberal determining the number of constituencies, so we should not do so here. I acquit my noble and learned friend of any such exact intention, but it is important that no one should suffer from the same misapprehension of his purposes as I did.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Falconer of Thoroton and Lord Howarth of Newport

Monday 31st January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

It was a word used by the Minister, I think the noble Lord will find.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

If I might interrupt this momentary and rather fascinating debate about statutory drafting, my experience of Bills passed before 1997, and post-1997, is that legislators sometimes resorted to exhortatory language in Bills when they thought it was appropriate. I do not feel able to give the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, the comfort that he seeks because, for reasons that I cannot adequately explain to the Committee, that was often the way that deals were done on legislation, so one cannot be quite categoric about that.

My point, if I might revert to it, was: without in any way interfering with the discretion of the Boundary Commissions, if we were able to get some indication about how it would be done that would be helpful to show that it can be done and, just as importantly, it would help the other groups—in particular, the political parties—to prepare their resources for what everybody agrees to be a quite testing process. Secondly and separately, resources provided by the state for this are important to get the requisite high standards and to ensure that consultation will be proper. When we return to this on Report, it would also be of value if there were some indication of how the resources have been worked out and how we are to be satisfied that those resources are adequate. However, I will not stand in the way of Clause 12 standing part at this stage.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

It seems to me that what is proposed in this amendment is the more important if one takes the view, as I do—but contrary, I think, to the view of the noble Lord, Lord Baker—that there will be extensive public interest in, at any rate, certain proposals for boundary changes. In recent days and weeks, the people of Cornwall and the Isle of Wight have given us to understand in no uncertain terms that they have very strong views about how constituencies should be drawn in their parts of the world. Given the radical and wholesale changes that the provisions of the legislation will entail, I think that we should be prepared for considerable strength of feeling and for vigorously expressed representations not just on the part of the political parties but, certainly in controversial cases, on the part of many members of the public. It is, as my noble friend Lord Wills suggested, important that people have feedback and that they should know that their representations have been listened to, gathered up and presented for careful consideration by the boundary commissioners through the activity of assistant commissioners, as my noble friend Lord Lipsey has proposed.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, this is quite an important amendment because it relates to what happened earlier this afternoon. My noble friend Lord Lipsey is proposing that an assistant commissioner should look at all the written representations relating to a particular provisional recommendation and publish the effect of those written representations. That is important because it means that the representations are being considered and the public as a whole can see them all in context. It also seems to be of relevance in determining whether a public inquiry is appropriate. If a proper analysis is carried out, which is what an assistant commissioner will do if the proposal of my noble friend Lord Lipsey is adopted, it will be easier to see whether a public inquiry is appropriate or helpful. The effect of the amendment in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is that, even if the technical requirements are satisfied, there will be a public inquiry only where it is helpful—that is, the Boundary Commission will have the discretion to say no if a public inquiry will not help in any way.

Therefore, I respectfully suggest that the proposal of my noble friend Lord Lipsey will be of value, first, in ensuring that written representations are properly considered and that that is apparent; secondly, in properly analysing what issues there may be in relation to a particular provisional recommendation; and, thirdly, in deciding whether, in exercising its discretion to have a public inquiry, there are sufficient issues for the Boundary Commission to bite on to be sure that such an inquiry will be useful. I respectfully suggest that the noble and learned Lord considers this amendment in the context of the public inquiry amendment and comes back on Report to tell us what conclusions he has reached.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

The noble Lords are not moving their amendments, so I will not comment on them.

My noble friend Lord Lipsey’s amendments give the House the opportunity to think again. They give Parliament an additional check on the changes that the Minister can bring forward by order. In the context of the lack of pre-legislative scrutiny and consultation that the Bill received, such checks are unarguably a good thing.

There is an issue of whether recourse to the super-affirmative procedure might be appropriate in all cases of orders being moved under the terms of the Bill. This affirmative procedure has significance in the context of a later amendment, Amendment 102AB, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Williamson. That amendment says that Clauses 10(2) and 11, which are in effect the operative clauses for changing the rules and for changing the number of Members of Parliament from 650 to 600,

“shall come into force on a date to be appointed under subsection (1B) following reports from the Boundary Commissions, made as if section 11 of this Act were in force, being laid before Parliament by the Secretary of State”.

As I understand the noble Lord’s amendment, the Boundary Commissions would do their work, Clause 11 would not formally be in force and it would then be for Parliament—that is, both Houses—to vote on whether Parliament wanted to bring Clause 11 into force. Parliament would then be deciding before implementation whether it was the appropriate thing to do.

If Parliament were taking such an important decision, then, in my respectful submission, that decision should be taken in accordance with the super-affirmative procedure proposed by my noble friend Lord Lipsey. There is real merit, although we will debate this more fully later, in what the noble Lord, Lord Williamson, is saying, because it would give the House the opportunity to consider not only the effect of what is being done but what an independent body—for example, a commission set up to look at the size of the House of Commons—had said about whether it was appropriate to reduce the size of the House from 650 to 600 and, if that was not appropriate, what the appropriate figure, if any, was to reduce the House to.

Those of us who have been enjoying the provisions of Committee have come to know well the views expressed by the cross-party committees in both Houses on the lack of proper constitutional process on the Bill. I know that noble Lords enjoy hearing me repeat old favourites, so I say again that the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee in the House of Commons and our Constitution Committee have said that there should have been a public consultative process before the Bill came to the House and pre-legislative scrutiny to enable it to be properly considered. Those points are added to by the fact that it has been very difficult for the Government to justify precisely how they get to the figure of 600. The Leader of the House saying that it is a nice round figure perhaps lacks the intellectual and constitutional justification that one looks for in this significant change in the House of Commons. The lack of intellectual justification and of proper process goes to an important constitutional point. The House genuinely feels uneasy about a majority in the House of Commons and a political majority in the House of Lords—that is, a political majority of the Liberal Democrats and the Tories over the other parties in the House—being able to push through a change in the size of the House of Commons, which reputable independent experts think has been chosen as a means of favouring the governing party.

It is worth quoting a statement that Mr Mark Field, the Conservative MP for Cities of London and Westminster, endorsed on Second Reading in the other place. Mr Straw quoted from the statement put on the Conservative website by Mr Field. Referring to Mr Field, Mr Straw said:

“He says that ‘the current proposals for AV and the reduction in number of parliamentary constituencies are being promoted by Party managers as an expedient way to prevent our principal political opponents from recapturing office’”.—[Official Report, Commons, 6/9/10; col. 47.]

Therefore, there is a legitimate argument that this is being done for party-political advantage. The importance, therefore, of my noble friend proposing the super-affirmative procedure is that if, as I hope, we adopt the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Williamson, a process will be in place that will ensure that the Government can undertake proper arrangements to look at whether the figure is right, and that when we pass that amendment—I hope that we do so—and debate whether we bring Clause 11 into force, we will be informed by a report of a body that is beyond reproach. I hope that the noble and learned Lord will consider my noble friend’s amendment in that context.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, the amendment of my noble friend Lord Lipsey is self-evidently proper. The legislation provides for seismic constitutional and political change but has been all too little considered hitherto. There was not only the lack of public consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny to which my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer has referred but the reality of the way in which the Bill was transacted in the House of Commons is that the Committee stage was entirely perfunctory.

At Second Reading in another place some Members of the other place expressed considerable anxiety about the way in which things were being done. For example, Mr Simon Hart, a Conservative Member of Parliament, said:

“I wish to address the issue of honesty. Let us not try to fool people about this Bill. Let us not pretend that it is a response to some kind of great public desire or thirst”.

He did not necessarily want the Bill to fail because he accepts the foundations on which it was constructed, but he continued:

“It is the process, not the principle to which I object”.

He went on to say that,

“there is a fine line between political reform and political vandalism”.—[Official Report, Commons, 6/9/10; col. 120.]

If the House of Commons passed this legislation in the pretty shallow and perfunctory way in which it did—with a very brief Committee stage and very important sections of the Bill, including Clause 11, not being thoroughly examined in Committee—it follows that the other place must have the opportunity in due course to consider again whether it has done the right thing. If the orders made under the Bill were in effect to go through simply on the nod under the negative resolution procedure, that would not be good enough and the House of Commons would not be performing its proper constitutional role. Therefore, the simple affirmative procedure is probably the right procedure to be adopted for decisions on orders made under this legislation.

I have some reservations that the super-affirmative procedure would create too much scope for obstruction and too much scope for the intervention of party- political interest in the eventual decision-making.

However, it is imperative that, when the other place comes to make decisions on orders under the Bill, it should do so consciously and deliberately, which the affirmative resolution procedure would enable it to do. In that way, the other place might slightly make up for the pretty neglectful and haphazard way in which it considered the primary legislation.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Falconer of Thoroton and Lord Howarth of Newport

Tuesday 18th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

I am sorry that the noble Earl thinks that. He is being a little too impatient, if I may say so. The point that I am making is that the relationship between the structures of local government and the system of parliamentary representation is very important. It needs to be intimate. Members of Parliament and elected members of local authorities need to work together. This system should be an organic whole, which is one more very important reason why the rules that the Government propose to govern the designing and drawing of the boundaries of parliamentary constituencies need to be sensitive to the realities of local government. I say no more than that, but these considerations genuinely matter.

I welcome the Minister’s tone and hope that his department will examine the practical implications of not moving beyond the 5 per cent tolerance either side of the norm, and consider whether it would produce anomalies and offensive manifestations in the way in which our constituencies are drawn that we would be very much wiser to avoid.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, it may assist if I indicate the Opposition’s position. I am grateful for what the noble and learned Lord said. On that basis, I rather read him as saying that he did not rule out—indeed might consider—a 5 per cent barrier with exceptions up to 10 per cent, but 10 per cent being an absolute barrier either way. The Minister is giving no assurances but he is willing to consider it. I am happy with that and I will not press it. Perhaps the appropriate course would be for myself and the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, who rather favoured the argument of my noble friend Lord Lipsey, to come along with us. I am more than happy for the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to come, and if the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, would be kind enough to grace us with his presence, that would be helpful as well. If we could meet quite quickly, that might be of assistance.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Falconer of Thoroton and Lord Howarth of Newport

Wednesday 12th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

Presumably a large part of the purpose of parliamentary reform is to refresh our parliamentary democracy, re-animate it, and re-engage the citizens of this country with it. My noble friend Lady Thornton’s amendment is particularly helpful because it addresses a problem that we all recognise to be real and disturbing, which is the poor propensity of people in the 18 to 24 year-old age group to vote. There is some evidence that the attitudes that people bring to their first opportunity to vote as young adults tend to persist through life. We must all agree that it is extremely important that we make a determined effort to ensure that there is a much fuller participation of young people in our parliamentary democracy and that they take up their right to vote.

My noble friend has tabled a helpful amendment in enjoining a particular duty on the Secretary of State. We had some discussion on Monday about our fear that local authorities, because of the reductions in their funding, will be unable to pursue electoral registration as vigorously as they should. My noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours made a powerful speech on that problem. If local authority funding is to be cut by some 28 per cent over the next four years, it must follow that any activity that is not statutorily required of local authorities will be in jeopardy. My noble friend’s amendment would insist that at least the Secretary of State was able to certify that every effort is made to bring 17 to 24 year-olds on to the register. That points in a direction that implies that the Secretary of State himself must take steps to ensure that the registration process is carried on vigorously, effectively and thoroughly.

It would be helpful if the noble and learned Lord would say something about the Government’s view on the practical prospects for improving the proportion of registration in all age groups, but particularly in this one, the behaviour of which will be so crucial to the future of our democracy. We can change the voting system and constituency boundaries, but if we fail to re-engage people to vote, those reforms are little better than a sham.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I do not think that there is much dispute about either the facts or the outcome sought. In March 2010, the Electoral Commission produced a report entitled The Completeness and Accuracy of Electoral Registers in Great Britain. In a sample of areas that it examined in detail, 56 per cent of 18 to 24 year-olds were missing from the electoral register. In the 2005 general election, 37 per cent only of those between 18 and 24 voted, so there is a more than 50 per cent underregistration, and only just over a third of that age vote.

We have heard repeatedly in the debate and outside that if young people are not registered and do not vote, they set a trend in their lives that distances them from democracy. I do not think that anyone in the House disagrees with any of those propositions. We on the Front Bench of the Labour Party support the amendment because we have heard nothing from the Government about what they propose to do about it. If they had some proposal that could assist, we would be interested to hear it, but this proposal, made by my noble friend Lady Thornton and supported by my noble friend Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, builds into the system the requirement for work to be done on the issue, which is something that the noble and learned Lord himself has said in previous debates that he wants to do. He should tell us what the Government will do about what they have already agreed is a problem. If it is not as good as this amendment, maybe this is the way forward.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Falconer of Thoroton and Lord Howarth of Newport

Wednesday 15th December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

Does my noble friend agree also that the fact that the Bill has been added to on such a massive scale by the Government during its passage through the House of Commons—indeed, we have just been examining a new government amendment—indicates that it was prepared in great haste? Yet at the same time, the Government are insisting that the Bill must move very fast indeed towards the statute book. Can it be right to prepare a Bill so hastily that large-scale improvisations have to be made by the Government in extending it, even as they insist that it is rushed through and therefore skimpily scrutinised?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, I have to rise in relation to the rather casual accusation made by the noble Lord, Lord McNally, that it was just time-wasting down the Corridor. As the noble Lord will know, because he has been a Member of Parliament himself down there, the effect of the guillotine Motion—although he was perhaps not there when there were guillotine Motions—is that certain amendments are not reached because there is not enough time. The idea that they talked on and on to make it last seems to be misplaced. The worry about what the noble Lord said is that that casually dismissive remark is the sort of remark that is then used to dismiss parliamentary scrutiny of Bills—“we can dismiss what is being said because it is all time- wasting”. I thought one of the principles on which his party and the other party with which he is now in coalition put to the electorate was that we would respect Parliament more rather than treating it with the contempt he has just shown.