Lord Falconer of Thoroton
Main Page: Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Falconer of Thoroton's debates with the Wales Office
(12 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI shall come on to the issue of redacted judgments in a moment. As to whether the press should be notified at the point of application for a CMP, it may well be informed, but it will not be informed if the issue is related to national security. That is the clear distinction between this kind of case and a PII case because, if the Secretary of State is making an application under CMP, she is doing so because she considers national security to be at risk.
The important points of principle for certainty are generally dealt with on the face of the open judgment. When that is published, the certainty that the noble Lord looks for will be provided. Sensitive details of the case may not be released but this does not mean all details will be placed in closed judgments. Judges are well accustomed to considering what material is published in a final judgment. At the moment the media and the public do not get this information. Instead, they are left with accusations that have not been investigated.
From what the Minister said, I am not clear whether it is envisaged that the fact of an application being made for a closed material proceeding should be kept secret. I had not understood that that was the purpose of the Bill or that any rules of court could be made to make the fact of the application secret. What is the Government’s intention towards that process? Is it intended that there will be certain circumstances when even the fact of an application under Section 6 is to be kept secret?
As I understand it, in some instances the fact of the application will not be made public because that is also what happens now under PII. If the knowledge that the application has been made could give rise to concern about national security, it would not be made public, but that does not mean that all applications would be kept secret. If necessary, I will come back to clarify that point for the noble and learned Lord.
On the points covered in proposed new paragraphs (d) and (e), to which all noble Lords have referred, about closed judgments and the point at which they may no longer be considered classified or secret and could be made public, I refer noble Lords to the extended debate in Committee last week when my noble and learned friend made the following point:
“The Lord Chancellor's code of practice on the management of records, issued under Section 46 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, provides guidance on the management of records held by bodies subject to the Public Records Act 1958. Authorities are required to identify records worthy of permanent preservation and transfer them to the National Archives”.—[Official Report, 17/7/12; col. 209.]
However, we are considering this matter and will continue to do so between now and Report.
My noble friend Lady Berridge referred again to the database of closed judgments. I responded to her last week, I believe, that that issue is now in hand because of the useful contributions from the JCHR on this matter. She went on to ask whether it could go beyond the head notes to form cases. I do not have an answer for her at the moment but I will, of course, come back to her. As to the very specific points raised about the same issue by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I believe that I have already covered those in the remarks that I have just made.
In conclusion, we are discussing points of fundamental importance concerning freedom of the press and public trust in the justice system. I will come back to the noble and learned Lord on his point, but I hope that I have been able to demonstrate that the Bill will help to enhance transparency and public trust rather than undermine them, and in doing so we will reinforce the principles of open justice while protecting the UK’s national security.
I noticed the noble and learned Lord looking at me rather sceptically then. Before I sit down, I think that it is worth repeating that during this process only some material will be considered in closed proceedings. The material that will be in open proceedings will be accessible to the media, and there will be more than there is at this time. The arrangements being considered will ensure that the media will have access to the cases in a way that is consistent with their responsibility to report and to hold the Government to account, but, as I said at the start, they do not have a formal role in that process. Primarily what we are looking for in this Bill is that we are allowed to ensure that justice is done where it has not been seen to be done previously. That is an essential part of what we are trying to achieve. I hope that my noble friend feels able to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, Amendments 71 to 75, 77 to 79 and 81 to 87 all have my name on them. As the detail of those amendments has already been outlined by my noble friend Lord Lester and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I will follow the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, and focus on the core purpose of Amendments 85, 73A and 77A, which is to introduce limited grounds for the disclosure of information received in confidence by the intelligence services and amend what would otherwise be a complete ban on disclosure under Clause 13.
These amendments are required, as David Anderson QC pointed out to the Joint Committee on Human Rights in his evidence, when he said that,
“you are not going to get away with a blanket exclusion of all evidence in the hands of the security service, or even all evidence in the hands of the Government, as they suggest at one point”—
he means in the context of the Green Paper.
Although the disclosure jurisdiction that we deal with today began in the intellectual property field, it is completely by accident that the principles behind the jurisdiction were first applied there. On considering these amendments, I reread the judgment of the noble Lord, Lord Reid, in the Norwich Pharmacal case. It is clear that the jurisdiction is based on sound principle. It is important to consider that principle as it goes to the heart of why these amendments are required.
It is best understood by a threefold division of cases—and I would term myself a Championship not a Premier League lawyer here. First, there are cases where the person, usually the UK Government, is directly responsible for the wrongdoing and a civil case is brought directly against them as the defendant. Clause 13 leaves those actions completely unaffected. Secondly, there are cases where the person in question is a bystander, spectator or mere witness to the wrongdoing. In those circumstances, no action can be brought against that person, they are not even complicit and Norwich Pharmacal will fail.
However, there is a small, narrow group of situations—which are, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has outlined, even narrower after the case of Omar—where, although not directly responsible for the wrong, there is sufficient connection to the wrongdoing that a requirement attaches to you to disclose information or material in your possession that helps the victim of the wrongdoing to seek redress; that is, more often than not, court proceedings. This obligation is based on the limited culpability that attaches as one is mixed up, even innocently, in the wrongdoing. I would term it a bit like moral velcro. Being mixed up in wrongdoing sticks you with certain limited responsibilities.
The kind of mixing up by the UK Government, in cases such as that of Binyam Mohamed, is questioning a man after you should have, at the very least, been aware that he had been tortured. When I read of the injuries to Binyam Mohamed it was rather disturbing. According to the findings in that case, the UK took some of the fruits of that torture by questioning him, although it is important to emphasise clearly that the UK Government were in no way involved in that torture.
I accept, of course, the evidence of the Joint Committee on Human Rights that the intelligence services in the United States, for example, are disclosing less intelligence to the United Kingdom because of the fact, or perception, that the information could be disclosed through our courts. But the first caveat is the Government’s own Green Paper, which outlines that there is no suggestion that key threat-to-life intelligence would not be shared. The second caveat is whether this fact or perception is justified. As the UK courts have never ordered the disclosure of such material, and any Norwich Pharmacal application that could be made subsequent to the case of Omar would be followed by a PII application as well, the risk is minimal. Allowing limited Norwich Pharmacal applications as outlined in these amendments would be a proportionate response to that minimal risk.
It is also interesting to note the change of position by the United States concerning whether the control principle was breached in the case of Binyam Mohamed, as outlined by the ISC report for 2009-10, in which the United States does not seem to think that there has been a breach of the control principle. In the 2010-11 report, the United States seemed to think that there had been one. It is interesting to note that it is the same time period which saw the mass of WikiLeaks disclosures. I would be saddened if the mistaken perception of our judicial processes or an understandable oversensitivity to the control of its own intelligence material could lead to a change in our law to exclude this jurisdiction from human rights cases, especially when, unfortunately, the alleged wrongdoer may also be the United States.
I would expect that the mere receipt of intelligence information that discloses wrongdoing, even information obtained by torture, is being a witness. Can my noble friend the Minister explore whether the requirement that in national security cases a greater culpability of connection to the wrongdoing other than being innocently mixed up would satisfy the concerns of the United States? If complicity by the United Kingdom is needed, cases where Norwich Pharmacal would apply should be very rare.
In essence, the argument from the Government is that our intelligence services lack certain information and therefore our national security could be at greater risk. I expect the Government to oppose the amendments, especially as it is the first duty of the Government to protect their citizens. I agree that it is the first duty, but it is not the first principle—otherwise protecting national security could justify torture, and it is crystal clear from the Reith Lecture from the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, that the UK does not. Protecting national security and even going to war must still be conducted within certain ethical and moral constraints, which include that if you get mixed up in the wrongdoing you may—subject to five stringent tests in the Norwich Pharmacal case, and following a PII application—have to disclose material to help the victim defend himself against a capital charge. I fully accept that the United Kingdom is the junior partner in this situation, and is probably more reliant on intelligence material from the United States than vice versa. But your ethical and moral principles are often tested—or perhaps only tested—when you are the less powerful person in the situation, not when you are in command.
I end with a very simplistic point. The remedy may not even need to be legislation. If the UK does not get mixed up in, as opposed to merely receiving information about, other countries’ wrongdoing and, a fortiori, if the United States ceased this kind of wrongdoing, it can rest assured that the veil of the control principle cannot be pierced by Norwich Pharmacal. The remedy to some extent lies in the hands of the United States, and it is regrettable that President Obama did not fulfil his election promise to close Guantanamo Bay, which might have provided a line in the sand in this group of cases. I am pleased to live in a place with the high ethical constraints of Norwich Pharmacal and that we have a mechanism to release such information in situations that could literally save a man from the electric chair. The door to such information should be hard to open, but not absolutely barred. I support this group of amendments.
My Lords, it has been a very powerful debate. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Lester and Lord Pannick, for maybe seeing a way through a very difficult issue. Both issues that the Bill raises are difficult, but this is the more difficult. The first one, about fairness and making sure that one sticks to fair procedures, necessarily involved a solution whereby the courts made the balance. Ultimately, if there was damage to national security, the intelligence services would be able, if they wanted, to withdraw the case and there would be no damage to national security. This is a much more difficult one because the intelligence services do not have the option of withdrawing from the case.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, and the noble Lord, Lord Lester, explained, in a Norwich Pharmacal application, when no proceedings are afoot you go to court and say that either the British Government or the intelligence services have either committed wrongs or got mixed up in wrongdoing, and you ask them to disclose documents that show their involvement, not necessarily with the intention of suing the British Government but because you may wish to sue someone else. The courts have dealt with that by saying, “Okay, we’ll consider these Norwich Pharmacals”. If it is concluded that the position is made out whereby one would, prima facie, make a Norwich Pharmacal, the courts then say to the Government, “Okay, we are going to make a Norwich Pharmacal subject to the Government making a PII application”. Then the courts have to balance whether national security outweighs the interests of the individual. I do not know how that balance is to be struck, because it is not easy to strike it as it would be in ordinary litigation. Indeed, except in two cases, it has never been struck. It is not open to the Government to say, “Okay, we’re going off the field at this point”. If the court makes the order and overrides the public interest, it is disclosed.
That process has unquestionably caused some of our allies concern. The effect of the Binyam Mohamed case was that, even though two out of the three judges said that the control principle had not been broken because the intelligence material was no longer secret—I refer to the principle that if one country gives another country intelligence, the other country cannot use that intelligence without the first country’s consent—the United States Government now give us less information than they did previously. That is what Mr David Anderson said in his supplemental memorandum for the Joint Committee, which expressly said that it did not know whether it was right or wrong and that all it had to go on was what Mr Anderson said. However, he was clear that the effect of the court making it clear that a balance had to be struck, as unquestionably is the case, was that people did not feel so secure about the intelligence that they gave and so gave less. However, as the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, and other noble Lords have said, they will give us intelligence when there is an immediate threat to life.
The effect of the current position is that we get less intelligence material from the United States of America and maybe our other allies because they are worried that the English courts might order their disclosure. The Joint Committee on Human Rights took the view in the light of that—this is my reading of it—that the minimum should be done to give the reassurance required to get the maximum protection in relation to intelligence. If you took that approach, is what the Bill proposes the minimum that can be done to provide protection?
The noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, described a typical Norwich Pharmacal stripped of any complication about intelligence. It would involve me going to have a cup of tea in a cafeteria in Thames House or Vauxhall Cross and me slipping on the floor, breaking my leg and saying that I would sue whoever owns the building, which is the intelligence services—but they say, “Actually, an independent contractor cleans the floor and it is absolutely their fault that you slipped”.
I could bring a Norwich Pharmacal order if the intelligence services did not tell me who the contractor was in order to bring my action for a broken leg because it had inadvertently got mixed up in wrongdoing. The effect of Clause 13(3) of the current Bill is that, because the information was held by an intelligence service, it would not be able to say, “No, you cannot have the information about who cleans the floor”. It would be the same if I were run over by a van carrying papers to the FCO and I wanted the maintenance records held by someone else; it could say no.
It is plain that the Government do not intend to cover those sorts of cases. What they do intend to cover are the cases where there is a genuine threat to the control principle and you cannot deal with it because the courts are absolutely right in saying that if the courts are going to make a decision they must have a balance.
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord has expressed his opinion so clearly that I find it very difficult to ask him a question. The burden of what he is saying is that he thinks that the solution is an absolute ouster clause—something that makes the Minister’s certificate conclusive in all circumstances. My understanding is that that is not the position under the law of the United States. Even with its State Secrets Protection Act and its Patriot Act, it does not go that far.
The evidence in the Binyam Mohamed case that was given by Mr Morton Halperin was that intelligence services in both countries recognised that there are some rule-of-law exceptions. What troubles me is that there are cases now pending in the European Court of Human Rights with names such as al-Nashiri, I think, where the court is requiring States parties to disclose information where there are allegations of rendition and torture. Will the noble and learned Lord at least accept that the Bill could limit the power of the Secretary of State to certify so as to exclude the grossest cases of human rights violations so that it is not completely absent, that being an obligation on the Secretary of State that might or might not be traditionally reviewable?
There are two points. First, I am seeking to say what the dilemma is for the House. It is necessary for the House first to come to a conclusion about whether there is a difficulty in relation to the flow of information. If it comes to the same conclusion as the Joint Committee on Human Rights came to, based on Mr Anderson’s evidence, the question is: what is the right solution? I think that everyone around the House agrees that it should be proportionate.
On the specific questions, I am not in favour of a complete ouster and, as I understand it, neither are the Government, because they are saying that any certificate given by the Secretary of State is subject to judicial review, so it would not be an ouster of a sort that other Ministers tried on previous occasions. This would leave in the ability to say, “Could a reasonable Minister have given such a certificate?”. There are two bits to that. The approach of the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, is to cut out of the approach that is being suggested anything that might make an allegation of human rights abuse. I can see the attraction of that, but the consequence is probably that Norwich Pharmacal is left untouched, and you have the problem of less intelligence coming. I do not want to sound too dramatic but the indications from the intelligence services, which I do not question in any way, tend to be that that might have a significant effect on the Executive’s ability to protect more individuals. I can see the former head of one of the intelligence services behind me correcting me on this, but it is quite a significant part of the ability to protect ourselves.
If one took the route of the noble Baroness, Lady Williams—if I may call it that—that would avoid giving any protection at all. The route of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, is, “Take the approach that is being suggested. Have the ability to certify. Limit it to the control principle. Cut out everything else. Make it judicially reviewable but accept that there are occasions when there will be gross breaches”. I think he is suggesting in his Amendment 85 that it is something more than a judicial review balance, something else apart from judicial review, because it says in effect that the principles of judicial review will apply to considering where the public interest lies, including considering whether there have been gross breaches of international law. That is not quite the wording but that is what it amounts to. That still seems to me like judicial review, so it is for the Minister to decide whether there is a basis for concluding that it might affect the control principle. If he comes to that conclusion, the certificate is not attackable. That appears to be what is being proposed.
My Lords, this is obviously one of the trickiest bits of the Bill and I am very grateful for the analysis of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, because he has forced the Committee to focus on some of the key issues. This was not a problem when I was director-general. Norwich Pharmacal was not being used in national security cases, so it is a relatively new phenomenon.
If the Committee will allow me, I should like to make a slight deviation on the question of public interest. I accept that there have been occasions when Governments of all persuasions have used secret certification to label things secret when they have not been secret at all. I acknowledge that that has happened. However, I hope that the Committee will really accept—some speakers appear not to have done so—that there are real and serious secrets that, if exposed, will cause substantial risk to the public interest. I know that I keep saying that and I hope that noble Lords will forgive me if I repeat it.
The noble Lord, Lord Reid of Cardowan, made a speech about the threat. I shall not go into that because I retired five years ago and I think—in fact, I know—that the nature of the threat has changed. However, the practicality of intelligence work is that you have to work with a great many other services. If he were in his place, I would contradict the noble Lord, Lord Reid, saying that you trust them all, because of course you do not. In some cases, you are dealing with countries with very different standards of law and different attitudes to human rights and so on. On the other hand, as I said in my Reith lecture, you cannot just talk to the Swiss, however nice that would be. We are facing a global threat. We need to talk to the parts of the world that have an understanding of and familiarity with that threat, and the security and intelligence community does so with caution and care. It will not always get it right but it is tuned into the problems.
The reality is that we do not deal just with the United States. The noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, is right that we are the net receiver of intelligence from the United States—naturally enough, as it spends squillions on its intelligence community and it is very much bigger. However, we also deal with people around the world, including our European allies, with whom intelligence is exchanged extensively every day of the week. We deal with people in the Middle East and the Far East and all around the world. Therefore, we have a difficulty because we will not always know where the intelligence that we are given is derived from and we immediately run into the issue of how it has been obtained. Questions will not resolve that—you will not get the answers. If we have a reduction in intelligence, we will begin to lose insights, and according to David Anderson that is already happening.
It is no consolation to me at all to be told that the Americans will still give us life-saving intelligence. How will one know that it is life-saving? The nature of intelligence work is putting together information from perhaps five or six different countries and 20 different organisations—little bits and pieces of a jigsaw that, together, might save lives. If something tells us, “This is going to happen tomorrow, so you can do something about it”, that is fine, but intelligence is very rarely obviously life-saving when it is first received. Therefore, if that intelligence is reduced or rationed for reasons that, if the noble Lord, Lord Lester, is right, may be mistaken in some cases, that will be a very serious problem for the United Kingdom.
I should also like to point out an irony here. Some of these problems might not have arisen if we had had a closed material procedure, which we talked about on an earlier part of the Bill, at an earlier stage. Putting much more material into the court—albeit through the, as I absolutely accept, not entirely satisfactory arrangement of CMPs—means that there is a chance for HMG to defend themselves and for the claims of a claimant to be scrutinised and judged by an independent judge. I suggest that not being able to defend themselves has been very damaging for the Government and for the intelligence and security community. Anecdotal allegations have assumed the status of facts. Some have been, and are being, investigated as crimes, and obviously it would be inappropriate for me to mention those in any detail on this occasion. However, others are left in limbo, unresolved and under damaging clouds of accusation. Therefore, if in future we can resolve those, that will be very helpful. If we can reach a solution to the difficulties of Norwich Pharmacal that protects other people’s intelligence from this sort of exposure, we will still be in business. If we cannot protect it, it will not just be the Americans who reduce the flow of intelligence, as David Anderson described in his evidence, but many other people as well.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, has made a very powerful intervention—if that is what it was—on my speech. I just want to summarise where I had got to and finish my speech. I think that the issues for the Committee are as follows. First, is the Committee satisfied that there would be a significant loss of intelligence? I found the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, very powerful in that respect. Secondly, if there were a significant loss of intelligence, what would the right course be? In my respectful submission, the right course would be to do the minimum required to protect the intelligence. It may well be that the minimum is the certification process. However, a question arises from that. The noble Baroness said that there are real secrets and I accept that. The real secrets may not only come from somebody else; they may be ones that we find ourselves. Finally, do not ask the courts to make these decisions. By all means subject them to judicial review but ultimately let the responsibility rest where it rests, which is with the Secretary of State, who should certify on the advice of the intelligence services.
My Lords, I sense that it would be convenient for the Committee if we finished this debate before the dinner hour, so I shall confine myself to just two or three sentences. I think that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has made all the points that I want to make, as has my noble friend Lady Manningham-Buller.
I am one of your Lordships’ representatives on the Intelligence and Security Committee. We visited the United States and our experience would endorse what Mr David Anderson said—that the flow of intelligence from the United States is being limited. I do not want to exaggerate this but the point is that the trust of the US has been weakened and we need to restore that trust. It matters not that the grounds for the breaking of that trust may not be justified. It has been diminished and, unless we can respect the control principle completely and unless other countries believe that information that they give to us will be protected in all circumstances, that trust cannot be restored. So I absolutely agree with the noble and learned Lord. We do not want to give the courts let-outs and we do not want to have a balance; if we have any exceptions, we will not be completely trusted. The responsibility must rest on the Secretary of State and only if that happens can other countries be assured that their confidences are safe with us.