Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between Lord Etherton and Lord Murray of Blidworth

Report stage
Monday 3rd July 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, it was remiss of me not to say a little about Amendment 126 and the other government amendments in this group, so I will do so now. These amendments, as I am sure Members of the House have realised, replace a “factual suspensive claim” with a “removal conditions suspensive claim”. Clearly, I and the department listened carefully to the contributions from noble Lords in Committee on these topics about these suspensive claims, in particular those helpful contributions from the Cross Benches. The changes in the category of suspensive claim are a direct reflection of what was said during those debates.

Currently, a factual suspensive claim can be raised where a mistake of fact has been made in deciding that a person meets the four removal conditions in Clause 2. This definition would prevent a claim being raised where a person had been incorrectly identified as meeting the four removal conditions due to a mistake of law. A removal conditions suspensive claim will instead provide for a claim to be raised where a person who has been given a removal notice informing them that they are subject to the duty to remove does not consider that they meet the removal conditions in Clause 2. The Secretary of State’s or Upper Tribunal’s consideration of a removal conditions suspensive claim will be on whether or not the removal conditions were met. I trust these amendments will be welcome, in particular to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who queried the scope of these claims in Committee.

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lords, Lord Etherton and Lord Hope, for setting out the case for the other amendments in this group. A serious harm suspensive claim is a claim that a person would, before the end of the relevant period, face a real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm if they were removed from the United Kingdom to a country other than their country of origin. The serious and irreversible harm test is designed to be a high threshold and reflects the test applied by the European Court of Human Rights when considering whether to indicate an interim measure under Rule 39 of the rules of court. “Serious” indicates that the harm must meet a minimum level of severity, and “irreversible” means the harm would have a permanent or very long-lasting effect. These amendments seek to change how Clause 38 of the Bill defines the risk of harm, lowering the threshold for a serious harm claim to succeed.

Amendment 130 would remove the requirement for the harm to occur in the period it will take for any human rights claim or judicial review to be determined from the safe third country. I suggest it is reasonable to expect the harm to occur over a defined period. The very purpose of the suspensive claim process is to prevent those persons subject to the duty to remove suffering serious and irreversible harm during the same period that their human rights claims are considered. Without this requirement, it would be difficult for decision-makers properly to assess the likelihood of any risk materialising. It would also risk abusive suspensive claims being made on the basis of a risk of harm that does not currently exist or that may not materialise until months or even years after a person has been removed from the United Kingdom.

Amendment 130 would also remove the requirement for the risk of harm to be irreversible. This would significantly lower the threshold for a serious harm suspensive claim to succeed and undermine the purpose of the Bill to deter illegal entry to the United Kingdom. Again, I would point out that the test applied by the Strasbourg court when considering applications for Rule 39 interim measures is one of serious and irreversible harm. So, the serious harm condition and requirement for the risk of harm to be both serious and irreversible reflects that test.

Lastly, Amendment 130 would also remove specific examples of harm that do not or are unlikely to constitute serious and irreversible harm. Setting out a clear approach regarding the interpretation of serious harm on the face of the Bill will, I suggest to noble Lords, ensure that decision-makers and the courts take a consistent approach in their consideration of what amounts to a risk of serious and irreversible harm. The examples in Clause 38(5) reflect existing case law and go no further than how we currently approach the consideration of these issues when raised in protection claims.

Amendment 131 would prevent amendments to the examples of harm that constitute serious and irreversible harm set out in Clause 38(4), as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, so eloquently set out. I assure the House that the Government do not intend to diminish or remove the examples of harm listed in Clause 38(4).

Amendment 132 would remove the regulation-making power in Clause 39 to amend the meaning of “serious and irreversible harm”. This would result in the Secretary of State being unable to make amendments which reflect developments in case law. It is worth again pointing out that the Delegated Powers Committee raised no issue with this power in its report on the Bill.

Amendment 133 would alter the requirement for a serious harm suspensive claim to include “compelling” evidence of the risk of harm that a person would face if removed to a third country and replace it with a requirement to provide evidence that is “reliable, substantial and material”. I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his remarks on the clarity of those three words, which, of course, will be available in Hansard should any questions arise as to what might amount to “compelling”.

However, although evidence that is compelling may also be defined as evidence that is reliable, substantial and material, a requirement for evidence to be compelling is more appropriate and succinct, given that it is the overall impact of the evidence provided, not any particular element or feature of it, that is relevant. The term “compelling” is sufficiently clear and well understood by decision-makers, and should remain unaltered. It is a term that has use in this area of the law. For example, evidence provided by people raising suspensive claims may differ dramatically in terms of volume and substance, but it is the overall impact of such evidence that is crucial when determining whether any claim has merit. For those reasons, the term “compelling” is more appropriate, providing decision-makers and the courts with the right degree of flexibility when making decisions on suspensive claims and appeals.

Finally, the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, seek to extend the claim and decision periods provided for in Clauses 41 and 45. We consider the periods specified in the Bill to be fair and equitable, affording sufficient time to submit and determine claims, commensurate with the Bill’s objective to remove people swiftly from the United Kingdom. However, I remind the noble Baroness that, where the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to do so, it will be possible to extend both the claim period and the decision period.

For the reasons I have outlined, I respectfully ask that the noble Lords do not press their amendments.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for his reply. I am afraid he has not answered my request for an assurance at all, so I wish to test the opinion of the House.

Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between Lord Etherton and Lord Murray of Blidworth

Report stage
Wednesday 28th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, before the Minister replies, can I mention that I have two amendments in my own name, which are consequential? They relate to the ability to have judicial review if the amendment to Clause 1 succeeds.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has set out, Amendment 5 seeks to replace Clause 1 with a new clause that provides that nothing in this Bill requires an act or omission that conflicts with the five international agreements specified in the amendment. This includes the European Convention on Human Rights. Amendment 4, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is focused on compatibility with the ECHR. As I have repeatedly said in the debates on the Bill, and to reassure my noble friends Lady Helic and Lord Cormack, the Government take their international obligations, including under the ECHR, very seriously, and there is nothing in the Bill that requires any act or omission that conflicts with UK international obligations. Amendment 5 is therefore, on one level, unnecessary. But what might be viewed as a benign amendment takes a wrecking ball to our long-established constitutional arrangements, with uncertain consequences, as outlined by my noble friend Lord Wolfson.

Along with other countries with similar constitutional arrangements to the UK, we have a dualist approach, where international law is treated as separate to domestic law and incorporated only by domestic law passed by Parliament through legislation. We have, of a fashion, reproduced in domestic law aspects of the text of the ECHR through the Human Rights Act 1998, but that is not generally the case with other international instruments listed in the amendment.

The effect of this amendment would be to allow legal challenges based on international law in the domestic courts. As my noble friend Lord Wolfson has eloquently explained, this amendment would incorporate these instruments into our domestic law by the back door, thereby making substantive changes to the Bill. I therefore have to disagree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, on the effect of Amendment 5. As my noble friend said, this is wrong in principle and far from being an academic point for the lawyers. There is a legitimate case to be made for incorporation but this is not the Government’s intention, and we should not make such a fundamental change to our domestic law on the basis of a two-hour debate in Committee and a rather shorter one again today.

The noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, hit the nail on the head in her insightful contribution in Committee. In the Bill we are legislating to prevent and deter the small boats by putting in place a scheme that makes it unambiguously clear that if you arrive in the UK illegally, you will not be able to stay; instead, you will be detained and returned to your home country or removed to a safe third country. That is the proposition we are seeking to put on the statute book. That is the proposition which Parliament will have endorsed and, having done so, that is the proposition that our courts should give effect to. As the noble Baroness said, we risk undermining the reputation of this place and the elected House if the clear intent of Parliament can be unravelled by this misguided amendment.

On the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, the Government have published two memoranda addressing issues arising under the ECHR, and I remain unpersuaded of the case for statutory guidance on how the Bill’s provisions are to be implemented compatibly with convention rights. It will undoubtedly be necessary to provide Home Office staff and others with appropriate guidance to support the implementation of the Bill. In the Government’s view, it would not be appropriate for such routine operational guidance on the implementation of a particular Act to be subject to parliamentary approval.

Amendments 13 and 16, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, would strike out Clause 4(1)(d), which makes it clear that the duty on the Home Secretary to make arrangements for the removal of a person who meets the conditions in Clause 2 applies regardless of any judicial review challenge to their removal. The noble and learned Lord’s explanatory statement for Amendment 13 describes it as consequential on Amendment 5. It may well be the noble and learned Lord’s intention to provide for judicial review challenges to removal—whether on ECHR grounds or otherwise—to be suspensive of removal, but that is not the Government’s stance, and I do not accept that his amendment is consequential on Amendment 5. We need a scheme that will enable removals in days and weeks, not, as now, in months and years. Clause 4(1) is critical to achieving that objective and I cannot support its evisceration.

Finally, as regards Amendments 1 to 3, I simply remind the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that it is an offence to knowingly enter the United Kingdom without the required leave or to arrive without valid entry clearance or electronic travel authorisation. That being the case, Clause 1(1) quite properly refers to “unlawful migration” and “illegal routes”.

In response to the point raised by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford, I point out that the refugee convention is clear that states can still operate controls on illegal migration. Under Article 31, it is indeed expressly permitted to disadvantage those who have arrived illegally from safe countries, which is true of all who come from France. This embodies the first safe country principle, in the sense that Article 31 protections apply only to those who have come directly from unsafe countries. The first safe country principle is widely recognised internationally, including in the common European asylum system, which is a framework of rules and procedures operated by the EU countries together, based on the refugee convention.

These amendments, particularly Amendment 5 but also Amendment 13, go to the heart of the workability of the Bill. Your Lordships’ House has a choice: either we can continue to accept the status quo, which could see the £3.6 billion spent on supporting asylum seekers in 2022-23 mushroom to £11 billion a year, or £32 million a day, by 2026, or we can back the Bill, retain Clause 1 and Clause 4(1)(d), and stop the boats. The House should be in no doubt that these are wrecking amendments. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, not to press his Amendment 4, and ask the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, not to press her amendment. However, were she to do so, I would have no hesitation in inviting your Lordships’ House to reject the amendment.

Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between Lord Etherton and Lord Murray of Blidworth

Committee stage
Monday 12th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am grateful for that suggestion from the noble and learned Lord. If I may, I will take a moment to reflect on that and will revert to him in relation to it.

Amendments 114 and 115 would significantly increase the timescales for making and deciding a serious harm suspensive claim, undermining the fast-track process that we have created in the Bill and our ability swiftly to remove illegal entrants. Where the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to do so, it will be possible to extend both the claim period and the decision period. Legal aid will be available to assist a person in receipt of a removal notice in making a suspensive claim. With these safeguards, I suggest to the Committee that it is reasonable to expect a person to bring a suspensive claim within the time periods set out in the Bill. I hope that that addresses the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford.

The purpose of the Bill is to ensure that illegal entrants are removed as quickly as possible. Extending the decision and claim periods to a total of 60 days for all cases increases the risk that immigration bail would be granted by the First-tier Tribunal and, where bail is granted, that a person would disappear into the community in order to frustrate their removal. The use of detention is therefore necessary to make sure that they are successfully removed from the UK, and our ability to detain a person is dependent on any suspensive claim being both considered and decided quickly. The timeframes outlined in the Bill send a clear message that if you arrive in the UK illegally you will be swiftly removed.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, referred to the Constitution Committee’s recommendation that the regulation-making power in Clause 39 should be removed from the Bill. We are considering that committee’s recommendations and will respond before Report stage. I would, however, comment that the Delegated Powers Committee did not comment on this power.

The amendments put forward would undermine the suspensive claims procedure and the timeframes outlined in the Bill, where what this Government need to do is send a clear message that if you arrive in the UK illegally you will be swiftly removed. For the reasons that I have outlined, I ask that noble Lords do not press their amendments.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

Before the Minister sits down, there were two specific questions that I raised at the end of what I said that I would like an answer to. I do not believe that he has answered them at the moment.

The first is confirmation that there is nothing in the Bill that in any way derogates from the decision of the Supreme Court in HJ (Iran) that a person qualifies as a refugee under our jurisprudence if they would face persecution living openly as an LGBT person. This is relevant to the question of serious irreversible harm, the question being whether it is the Government’s view that you would have to, if necessary, act discreetly and that, if you acted discreetly, the harm would not be suffered. Is it intended, through the Bill, to undermine this landmark decision of the Supreme Court?

The second point on which I would like a specific answer was similarly in relation to the UNHCR’s latest advice—from 2023, I think—about what constitutes an appropriate flight alternative. Where would it be appropriate to deny refugee status because there is a place within a territory or country where there would be no persecution and where it would be reasonable for the person in question to live in an ordinary way?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I thank the noble and learned Lord for repeating those questions. He is entirely right that I should have answered them; I apologise for not doing so.

The short answer is that this is a separate strategy regime to the one that the case of HJ (Iran) was decided under. Of course, although the findings in that case and the line of cases concluding in that case would be relevant, the decision will always be taken on the facts of each case. I cannot, I am afraid, give the noble and learned Lord an undertaking on what he might perceive to be an inconsistent decision in relation to that case. I am happy to look into it further and will write to him about that, but that would certainly be my instinctive reaction.

In relation to the further report from the UNHCR, again, each of these matters is fact-sensitive to each serious harm suspensive claim. It would not be right for me to try to predicate at this Dispatch Box what the outcome might be.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I am sorry to come back on this, but it is important. The Government must give some guidance to the judges of the Upper Tribunal who try these cases with these novel and, if I may say so—I am adopting the approach of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile—complicated provisions. These are new provisions that are not found anywhere else in our jurisprudence or in anybody else’s. We are talking about a special type of irreversible harm that has to be predictable. Any guidance that we can give on how the existing jurisprudence and UNHCR advice would still apply will be extremely important for the actual mechanics of delivering justice in these cases.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I can only repeat that the Supreme Court decision in HJ (Iran) and the other documents provided by the UNHCR are not relevant in this context because they do not deal with the same mechanics. Those cases were asylum or protection claims, whereas this deals with the specific statutory category of serious and irreversible harm. Of course, although there may be some crossover in the arguments deployed, ultimately they address a different issue. I cannot provide the type of assurance that the noble and learned Lord seeks, I am afraid.

Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between Lord Etherton and Lord Murray of Blidworth

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I asked whether confirmation could be given that the Government will adhere to the 18 minimum conditions in the UNHCR Detention Guidelines. It would be very helpful for the Committee to know specifically which ones they intend to comply with and which they do not.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As I have already indicated, the standards that will be adhered to are those prescribed already in legislation. While the points set out in the UNHCR’s document map on in some respects, there is no exact overlap. The regime which will be applied is that which I have already described.