Civil Aviation (Consumer Protection and Regulatory Reform) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Empey and Lord Grayling

Committee stage
Thursday 18th June 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Grayling (Con)]

My Lords, we now move on to the slots regime. My two amendments in this group, Amendments 66 and 68, are designed to press the Government to understand what they are trying to achieve and where the limits to that are.

I had always expected that, when we left the European Union, we would be able to have a less regulated slots regime, particularly once we and the European Union had taken the view that we would not stay part of the EASA. Fundamentally, we are talking about a private sector market, with privately owned airports or airports owned by third-party bodies—such as the local authorities in Manchester—and independent airlines. So the question is this: what do the Government actually need to do? What is the role of the Government in this space? Should the Government be determining how many airlines fly to an airport, how many slots are available to it and the circumstances in which slots can transfer between one organisation and another?

It seems to me that there are three things that the Government should be doing. I see the role of the Government in this as referee rather than regulator. I am concerned that the content of the clauses that relate to the slots regime give the Government extraordinarily sweeping powers. If I have a slight regret, it is that I did not provide for the removal of new subsection (4), which says:

“The regulations may make different provision for different purposes”.


What on earth does that mean? The Government are taking on to their own shoulders blanket powers to manage the whole of the slots regime between a commercially run airport, a commercially owned airport and a commercially owned airline. To me, that feels like many steps too far.

What I have sought to do with these two amendments is, first, on the principal amendment, focus on the things that the Government need. The first is all about acting as arbiter and referee, where there is genuinely a problem. We are talking about our key airports here. Where there is genuinely a problem—a dispute that cannot be resolved—I understand that the Government may, for strategic reasons for the benefit of the United Kingdom, need to have put in place some form of arbitration mechanism. Proposed new paragraphs (a) and (b) are designed to achieve that. It is topical because of the Iran war, as we have seen. We had the debate last week over the change to the slot regime resulting from that conflict and the need to take away from airlines the requirement to use a slot at a particular time. There may be circumstances in which, in a period of international crisis, the Government need to have a role in the slot regime.

I should also say that, on reflection—I look at the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Empey—I agree that there is an element, although we might not agree about the scale of it, of a need to make sure there is connectivity within the United Kingdom. In part, the market delivers that anyway. If you are a major international airline flying from Heathrow to another part of the world, you need the feeder flights to fill your planes. If you do not have flights from Belfast, Glasgow, Edinburgh and Manchester, you are losing a whole chunk of your market—probably losing a whole chunk of it to Schiphol. It is not, therefore, necessary for the Government to take an absolute view about this. But in much the same way that the Government provide and subsidise key strategic routes within the United Kingdom that may not be economically viable but are socially necessary, I understand that there may be a case, in some circumstances, for making sure that a particular route and slot is available to the airline. Therefore, I am not sure I agree with the full detail of the noble Lord’s amendment, but I have some sympathy with what he is trying to achieve.

What we do not need to do—this is my fear about elements of the Bill—is try to micromanage the market that is the independent aviation sector. This part of the Bill feels like it is treading into that territory. I am looking for the Minister to provide some clear justifications for the steps being taken here. Particularly, Clause 68 is designed to address, effectively, a criminal provision within the slots regime. I do not quite understand that. Why on earth does there need to be a criminal context to the management of the slots regime? I understand that there can, on occasions, be a need for regulatory enforcement or enforcement in the civil courts—but the criminal courts? My amendment would take out that provision. Frankly, I would take some persuading by the Minister before we come to Report that we need a criminal provision in the management of slots at our key airports. That feels like a bridge that goes much too far.

I need to hear from the Minister an explanation for why all this is necessary: why the slots regime needs to be as all-encompassing as it is, and why the Bill comes up with extraordinary provisions of interference. I refer again to proposed new subsection (4). The Bill does much more than is necessary to provide a sensible framework simply for protecting the strategic interests of the United Kingdom. It amounts to interference, not strategy, and should take a step back from where it is.

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

My Lords, I instinctively agree with a lot of what the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, has said but there are situations in extremis that could arise regarding access to hub airports, which is a critical—not only socially but economically—necessity. It has nothing to do with subsidy. There are some modest PSOs in operation. We had them when we were in the European Union. Cornwall was involved at one stage and had a subsidised air route. But that is not what I am getting at here. It is nothing to do with subsidy because all the main regional airports going to hub airports, primarily Heathrow, are perfectly economically viable. It is not a question of subsidy.