Civil Aviation (Consumer Protection and Regulatory Reform) Bill [HL]

Lord Empey Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 18th June 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I repeat my declaration of interest that I made on Tuesday as the non-exec chair of RVL Aviation.

I will say a word or two about the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, and strongly support what he and the noble Baroness, Lady Bray, said. I wanted to ask the Minister to flesh out a bit the answer to the question that I asked at Second Reading. There are already consultation processes, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bray, mentioned. There is no specific one for the exercise of the direction power. I am keen that, if there are extra processes, they fit well together; we do not want one set of consultations at one stage and then, if the Minister decides to do some direction, another set. When the Minister responds and, I suspect, urges the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, not to press his amendment, I would welcome a clear exposition of how the current position works, how it would dovetail with any use of the power of direction that Ministers are taking in Clause 4, how they would expect to use it and how that would fit with the existing consultation mechanism. I am keen that we do not invent another consultation mechanism.

If that power of direction is taken and is used—although the Explanatory Notes say that they do not expect the Government to use it very much, as it is a backstop power—it is almost certainly going to be used in difficult or controversial circumstances, because it would not be needed otherwise. That is the position set out in the Explanatory Notes. It would be helpful to understand how that end-to-end process works. It may be that the Minister should come forward with an amendment on Report that sets out how the power would be used and consulted on, or at least how it will dovetail with existing consultation mechanisms. I am not clear about how that would currently work.

Finally, I back up the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, and the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, about the charging mechanism. I want to set out some of the views from the International Air Transport Association. IATA strongly supports, as I do, and welcomes the Government’s intention to do airspace modernisation but has concerns about the charging regime. It thinks that the drafting is too broad and ambiguous, and risks undermining the international charging principles that exist.

IATA is also concerned—a concern shared by the noble Lords, Lord Kirkhope and Lord Moylan—about replacing the words

“operators or owners of aircraft”

with the undefined “persons”. It thinks that that significantly expands the pool of liable entities and breaks the link with service provision. It understands the need for flexibility for future entrants but think there should be a narrower definition that encompasses those but is not as broad as the one that exists.

IATA is also concerned about revised Section 75(7), which allows charges to be levied on the basis that services are merely

“available for use or benefit”,

irrespective of the actual use. That represents a fundamental shift away from usage-based charging, which is the agreed international regime.

IATA has a number of concerns, not about the principle of what the Government are doing. It recognises that there will be new users and technologies, and the need to change how charging is done, but there are some accepted principles about the user paying for these things. As the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, and the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, said, that should be done proportionately, but it is not sufficiently backed up by the broad wording in the Bill as currently set out.

It would be helpful if the Minister could say what the thinking was behind the drafting; whether the Government agree with IATA’s views about whether the Bill is in accordance with existing principles; and whether the Bill would be improved by a tighter definition that absolutely encompassed new technologies such as drones and other potential things in the future but was not so broad, and explicitly reintroduced the link between the usage of airspace and the charging, rather than simply the theoretical benefit. The Bill would be improved if those changes were made, and I look forward to the Minister setting out the Government’s thinking about how its wording was arrived at.

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

My Lords, there are some positive amendments in this group. Amendments 60 and 61 are trying to get to the same place. If there are new arrangements for the management of airspace, that is code for motorways in the sky. But it also means that if there are new routes or a material intensification of a route, it is only right and proper that local people are consulted about it, because it can have a significant material impact on their lives.

Where perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, has the essence of the matter is that he specified a time. We could argue about whether 28 days is right, but the fundamental principle that he is pointing out is that consultations can be endless and open-ended and never reach a decision. Something needs to be put in to tie it down, provided consultees have adequate notice and there is an understanding. It is a bit like neighbourhood notification and planning applications. There are specific groups of people who need to be approached about this: the people over whom these aircraft will be flying, and those affected by other intensification activities, whether traffic or whatever. The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, gets to the essence of this. Whether we settle on a specific number of days is another matter, but the principle has to be established.

I agree with the principle of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, but I also accept that it would be inappropriate to specify a particular trade union, because they may change. There are pilots represented by other unions and some represented by none. That could change over time. If you specify the union in your legislation, that would be awkward. As the noble Lord said, we can find a form of words but the principle is the same. However technology may change, having air traffic controllers in the frame for that is common sense. These are the people who, day to day, have to do it. Also, as has been made clear, computer systems break down. We had a long debate on Tuesday over NATS and the breakdown there. The noble Lord is right. Pilots earn their money when the systems do not work, which is a regular occurrence.

By and large, there are some positive amendments in this group. However, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, that I would not specify a particular trade union. Other than that, I support these amendments. There are some positive ones.

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[Lord Grayling (Con)]

My Lords, we now move on to the slots regime. My two amendments in this group, Amendments 66 and 68, are designed to press the Government to understand what they are trying to achieve and where the limits to that are.

I had always expected that, when we left the European Union, we would be able to have a less regulated slots regime, particularly once we and the European Union had taken the view that we would not stay part of the EASA. Fundamentally, we are talking about a private sector market, with privately owned airports or airports owned by third-party bodies—such as the local authorities in Manchester—and independent airlines. So the question is this: what do the Government actually need to do? What is the role of the Government in this space? Should the Government be determining how many airlines fly to an airport, how many slots are available to it and the circumstances in which slots can transfer between one organisation and another?

It seems to me that there are three things that the Government should be doing. I see the role of the Government in this as referee rather than regulator. I am concerned that the content of the clauses that relate to the slots regime give the Government extraordinarily sweeping powers. If I have a slight regret, it is that I did not provide for the removal of new subsection (4), which says:

“The regulations may make different provision for different purposes”.


What on earth does that mean? The Government are taking on to their own shoulders blanket powers to manage the whole of the slots regime between a commercially run airport, a commercially owned airport and a commercially owned airline. To me, that feels like many steps too far.

What I have sought to do with these two amendments is, first, on the principal amendment, focus on the things that the Government need. The first is all about acting as arbiter and referee, where there is genuinely a problem. We are talking about our key airports here. Where there is genuinely a problem—a dispute that cannot be resolved—I understand that the Government may, for strategic reasons for the benefit of the United Kingdom, need to have put in place some form of arbitration mechanism. Proposed new paragraphs (a) and (b) are designed to achieve that. It is topical because of the Iran war, as we have seen. We had the debate last week over the change to the slot regime resulting from that conflict and the need to take away from airlines the requirement to use a slot at a particular time. There may be circumstances in which, in a period of international crisis, the Government need to have a role in the slot regime.

I should also say that, on reflection—I look at the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Empey—I agree that there is an element, although we might not agree about the scale of it, of a need to make sure there is connectivity within the United Kingdom. In part, the market delivers that anyway. If you are a major international airline flying from Heathrow to another part of the world, you need the feeder flights to fill your planes. If you do not have flights from Belfast, Glasgow, Edinburgh and Manchester, you are losing a whole chunk of your market—probably losing a whole chunk of it to Schiphol. It is not, therefore, necessary for the Government to take an absolute view about this. But in much the same way that the Government provide and subsidise key strategic routes within the United Kingdom that may not be economically viable but are socially necessary, I understand that there may be a case, in some circumstances, for making sure that a particular route and slot is available to the airline. Therefore, I am not sure I agree with the full detail of the noble Lord’s amendment, but I have some sympathy with what he is trying to achieve.

What we do not need to do—this is my fear about elements of the Bill—is try to micromanage the market that is the independent aviation sector. This part of the Bill feels like it is treading into that territory. I am looking for the Minister to provide some clear justifications for the steps being taken here. Particularly, Clause 68 is designed to address, effectively, a criminal provision within the slots regime. I do not quite understand that. Why on earth does there need to be a criminal context to the management of the slots regime? I understand that there can, on occasions, be a need for regulatory enforcement or enforcement in the civil courts—but the criminal courts? My amendment would take out that provision. Frankly, I would take some persuading by the Minister before we come to Report that we need a criminal provision in the management of slots at our key airports. That feels like a bridge that goes much too far.

I need to hear from the Minister an explanation for why all this is necessary: why the slots regime needs to be as all-encompassing as it is, and why the Bill comes up with extraordinary provisions of interference. I refer again to proposed new subsection (4). The Bill does much more than is necessary to provide a sensible framework simply for protecting the strategic interests of the United Kingdom. It amounts to interference, not strategy, and should take a step back from where it is.

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

My Lords, I instinctively agree with a lot of what the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, has said but there are situations in extremis that could arise regarding access to hub airports, which is a critical—not only socially but economically—necessity. It has nothing to do with subsidy. There are some modest PSOs in operation. We had them when we were in the European Union. Cornwall was involved at one stage and had a subsidised air route. But that is not what I am getting at here. It is nothing to do with subsidy because all the main regional airports going to hub airports, primarily Heathrow, are perfectly economically viable. It is not a question of subsidy.

--- Later in debate ---

Finally, I turn to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, on attaching environmental conditions to the holding and use of airport slots. The Government fully recognise the importance of reducing aviation emissions and supporting the sector’s transition to net zero. However, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Foster of Oxton, that the slots regime is not the right mechanism for imposing emissions-related conditions on individual carriers. The Government are addressing aviation emissions through the appropriate policy levers, including the UK Emissions Trading Scheme, CORSIA and the sustainable aviation fuel mandate. The international slots regime is built on clear and predictable rules, including historic rights where slots are used sufficiently. Requiring carriers to retain slots by reference to separate emissions metrics would cut across that framework and create uncertainty for airlines and airports. I will return to wider environmental issues in the relevant group. For now, I ask the noble Lord not to press his amendment.

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

In the Minister’s response to my Amendment 67, he responded to a point that I had not made. I had not asked for domestic slots to replace international slots. Mine is a probing amendment, but it is a very simple proposition: in extremis, does the Secretary of State have the power to ensure regional connectivity, or does he not? It is not a complicated issue in essence, even though the operational issues are. He anticipated something that I had not actually proposed, and I assure him that on this issue, while I shall not move my amendment today, I do not intend to go away. Perhaps his team could engage with me before Report.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

If I may, I shall respond to the noble Lord by saying that, if I have not understood his point clearly, I shall indeed go away and have a further discussion with him.

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[Lord Barber of Ainsdale (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin by recording my registered interest as the president of BALPA. I strongly echo the point made so clearly by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, about the importance of engagement with the pilot community on many of the key issues in the Bill. I very much welcome the recognition that I have heard from just about everyone in the Room of the vital expertise that BALPA members can bring to the consultations required by both the Government and the CAA in key provisions in the Bill.

I will speak briefly to Amendments 89 and 95 in my name, which are supported by the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope. Amendment 89 seeks to remove the apparent veto given to the CAA over the document to be issued by the Secretary of State setting out their priorities and objectives for the exercise of the CAA’s rule-making functions; the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, touched on this point in his remarks. It seems a curious piece of drafting in this part of the Bill. The amendment also strongly emphasises the importance of consultations on these issues with organisations and persons with relevant interests and expertise who would be affected by the new or amended proposed rules; that will clearly include pilots.

Amendment 95 would require the Secretary of State not only to publish any directions issued to the CAA, as the Bill currently requires, but to lay any such directions before Parliament, thus allowing parliamentarians the opportunity to probe and scrutinise them. This would provide greater openness and transparency without being overly burdensome. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, has conducted a forensic examination of many parts of the Bill, to which I am sure we will return at a later stage.

I shall commence by referring to Amendment 78 from the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe. I agree entirely with the substance and strength of it but I will apply the same remarks to it as I did to a previous amendment he tabled, in that it is not appropriate to specify a particular trade union when it does not necessarily have a monopoly—never mind now; who knows whether it would in future. However, the sentiment is right, and I support it.

I have tabled Amendment 118. Perhaps the Minister could write to me on it before Report. We have here a situation where the CAA is getting a lot of powers and, if I interpreted one part of the Bill correctly, is almost in a position to veto a decision made by the Secretary of State. I might have picked that up wrong, but it seems to be accruing an exceptional amount of power.

One issue—it is a health and safety issue, apart from anything else—is flight-time limitations. A number of years ago, there was a major change to the relevant European directives that apply here, but, of course, flight-time limitations apply not only to airlines that operate or are based in the United Kingdom but to airlines in other jurisdictions that carry UK passengers and use our airspace. That is important. There are international agreements but, with all the changes taking place around who is regulating this area, it would be most helpful if the Minister could write to me before Report clarifying what his department believes the situation to be. This is one of the most difficult issues to deal with because safety is vital. At the same time, there is competition between the desire to have the safest possible environment and airlines pressurising for the maximum amount of efficiency. There is an in-built tension there.

Circumstances arise, be they weather-related or incident-related, in which an airport has to close and crews overshoot their time. We understand the practicalities of flying, but I want clarity on who is setting the rules for the operation of flight crews of not only UK-based airlines but airlines that use UK airspace. Those of us who fly have an investment in ensuring that the right conditions apply. We know that fatigue is a regular cause of accidents and fatalities: it has been well documented in reports, and air crash investigations frequently come up with it as a major issue. So it is important to know precisely where we stand now, given that our rule-making regime is undergoing so many changes and the CAA is accruing so many powers. We had a European arrangement prior to our departure from the European Union. I would be grateful to ensure that we have clarity on who does what and who sets the regulations.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Moylan in two of his amendments.

On Amendment 76, my noble friend made some very good points about making sure that we have a proper parliamentary process. From a combination of listening to him and looking at the Delegated Powers Committee’s report, I am not against his argument that very technical rule changes should be done by the CAA, but that distinction is not made in the Bill. Clearly, rules that have more impact than that should remain with Ministers—obviously, with the CAA advising them—so that they are made through parliamentary procedure and receive appropriate scrutiny in the House. If there is a backlog of non-technical ones, we can put processes in place, even for a limited period, to deal with it, if that is required. That has happened before: it happened when we were putting through the various changes that were required as a result of Brexit. Both Houses set up processes to deal with the one-off process of changing our legislation. It can be done.

What I want to hear from the Minister is: what powers do the Government intend to give to the CAA, and what powers do they intend to keep for themselves? How will they make a judgment on which powers to make rules it is appropriate for the CAA, which will have no parliamentary oversight, to have? Where Ministers will retain parallel powers, what will they be used for? As far as I can tell, that is not set out anywhere; it would be helpful if it were.

My final point is small but important. My noble friend Lord Moylan’s Amendment 91 deals with the extraordinary idea that, when the Government are issuing guidance to the CAA, the CAA somehow has a veto over whether the Government can issue the guidance. That does not make any sense to me at all. It is clear that, although the CAA rightly has operational independence in its regulatory and safety responsibilities, the Secretary of State sets out its objectives—she did so as recently as 20 April—in the letter that she sends to the chair of the CAA. Ultimately, she has the ability to hire and fire members of the board.

So it is clear who is in charge here. It seems very odd that, with this drafting, the CAA will be able to stop the Government issuing the guidance. I do not understand why that is there. It might simply be a drafting error, in which case the Minister should bring forward an amendment on Report to deal with it. If not, he should give us a clear explanation of what it is there for; I genuinely do not understand it. My noble friend Lord Moylan has done us a service by spotting this and highlighting it to the Committee.

With that, I draw my remarks to a close. I look forward to hearing from the Minister in due course.