European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Elystan-Morgan and Lord Mackay of Clashfern

Committee: 6th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 12th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments introduced by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, might be perfectly okay from the point of view of the UK Government. The only change likely under Clause 7 is to something where it says “EU law”; it would have to be changed to something else. The powers in Clause 7 are intended to enable the knitting together of existing UK law and existing EU law which is not already part of it. That is a difficult job. These descriptions are meant to cater for that. I do not see it as likely that much will be required in relation to Scotland in that respect.

The main question is what happens under Clause 11. The Government promised that it would be brought before the House of Commons and hoped that it would be agreed. Your Lordships may or may not remember that I was keen at Second Reading to stress the need for agreement, because it is the only answer. Intense negotiations have gone on at official level over the last while. It now appears sadly possible—I do not make it any stronger than that—that the Governments may not be able to reach agreement. Therefore, it is important before anything further happens that your Lordships get a chance to apply your great experience to the problems separating the two parties. I greatly regret that there is no proper representation for Northern Ireland. I had the responsibility of being a Minister in Northern Ireland for 10 years; I feel very sad that the present situation has been reached and only wish that it could be resolved. From what I hear, I fear that it may not be very easy until after Brexit. In any case, agreement is essential if it is possible. I do not want to say or do anything that would impede the reaching of such agreement.

As for Clause 7, to retain a power to amend the Scotland Act seems unimportant in this situation, although I think the number of amendments generated by a proposal of this kind would be very small and the Government may feel it worth while to forgo such a power in the interest of making peace and progress.

The Clause 11 procedure is much more difficult. It is important to bear in mind that the Scotland Act—this goes for the Wales Act as well—was set up and legislated within the European Union. Therefore, the only powers that were dealt with were the powers that existed in the Parliament of the United Kingdom when these Bills became law. That did not involve the powers that the EU had and therefore I think it is not determinative of how these powers should be distributed on return to look at what was decided in the original Acts setting up the devolved Administrations, because the powers are now wider. It is therefore very much a matter of trying to resolve the issues between the parties by agreement. If we can help in that respect, so be it: I very much hope that we can. Certainly, I hope we do not do anything to hinder it. So far as I am concerned, I am prepared to trust all the parties to do their best to reach an amicable solution.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan (CB)]

The contributions already made make it perfectly clear how fragile and in many respects how insubstantial is the basis of devolution as we know it. The sovereign Parliament of Westminster has created a sub-Parliament in respect of Scotland and Wales. The sovereign authority that created that Parliament can undo that Parliament any day that it wishes to do so. If it did so I have no doubt that the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, would agree with me that it would be the best recruiting sergeant that Plaid Cymru ever had. Be that as it may, the power is there to do exactly that. It is, of course, utterly understandable that nobody expects that power to be used. In fact, in Clause 1 of both the Scotland Act and the Wales Act of last year there is written in what is intended to guarantee the permanence of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. In terms of law, it has no restriction whatever; it is purely cosmetic but well intentioned. I do not think that, in so far as any legal interpretation is concerned, there is a different view held, but I will be corrected on that point.

Nevertheless, those two Parliaments exist at the mercy, as it were, of this sovereign Parliament. I do not know whether one can change the situation, because the concept of sovereignty means that it can be withdrawn at any time. Unless, of course, one has some self-abnegative discipline—for example, to say that there is a convention. In the Miller case that came before the Supreme Court some time ago, the argument was raised that there was a basic authority that related to each of the Parliaments. No, said the Supreme Court, it is a convention. However, nobody had defined a convention. If Parliament went out of its way to define a convention and said, “In this context a convention means a, b, c and d”, that might get us somewhere. It is a suggestion.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Elystan-Morgan and Lord Mackay of Clashfern

Wednesday 17th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Elystan-Morgan (CB)]

My Lords, I do not have anything to add to give force to the argument that has been put so forcefully by my noble and learned friend and the noble Viscount. All I will do, if I may, is add an anecdotal note. In 1936, I believe, a former Attorney-General and former Lord Chief Justice, Lord Hewart, wrote a book called The New Despotism. He was worried about the very powers that we are talking about today being delegated in a dictatorial way to Ministers. If it was a new despotism then, what is it now?

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, the scope for regulation under the provisions that are in issue is very wide. It is an area in which there is, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said, a great deal of legislation already. I therefore hope that my noble friend the Minister will be able to indicate some form of restriction that might be acceptable in relation to this particular power. In the debate that we had on Monday, he pointed out that the power would be used only in restoring, in effect, what might be lost as a result of our leaving the European Union and that, in particular, there is power under the European Communities Act 1972 to do a good deal under statutory provision that is not by primary legislation. I thought that, if that were the case, it would be a justification for using this particular method. In this case, however, there does not appear to be justification for anything like that. I therefore invite my noble friend to indicate, as far as he can, what restriction he has in mind and whether that restriction could be embodied in the terms of the legislation.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Elystan-Morgan and Lord Mackay of Clashfern

Report stage (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 15th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Elystan-Morgan (CB)]

My Lords, the arguments have been put clearly and attractively by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Faulks. Indeed there can, apparently, be a conflict between two very important and sovereign authorities of law—international law and domestic law. However, one has to favour the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick; in other words, however much the attitude of the rule of law in Britain might respect international comity, it would be morally ultra vires to be prepared to perpetrate an injustice in the name of that loyalty. That would be utterly wrong. That, I think, is the answer to the whole question. In other words, as regards the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, our respect for international comity is very considerable but is not absolute. It is ameliorated and qualified by that condition, save and in respect of a situation of perpetrating a blatant injustice. That would be beyond our authority ultra vires.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, this is an extremely difficult question which amounts to whether or not the courts of this country have an authority to set aside a decision of the United Nations. We are under a clear obligation to follow a sanction decision imposed by the United Nations. However, I wonder whether the courts of this country, without absolutely challenging the decision of the United Nations, could give force to the Secretary of State’s attempt to change that decision: in other words, a system could be adopted under which the fault that is found with the United Nations procedure is endorsed by our courts in a way which reinforces the attitude of the Secretary of State in seeking to set aside that sanction rather than just going ahead with a decision which seems to fly in the face of our international obligations under the treaty to which my noble friend referred. I would like to believe that it might be possible for our Secretary of State to go to the United Nations in a case of this kind, with support from the courts of this country, to say that, so far as they can see, the decision of the United Nations is incorrect according to the circumstances narrated in a judgment of the courts here. That might be a way of handling this situation.

I understand the position so far as Europe is concerned. I am not sure whether this situation has ever arisen in that context. That can be looked at but I think there is a question about that. A slightly different situation arises for a group bound by treaty—as the European Union is—as against that for single nations, because if we can do it, who else cannot? We do not necessarily think that the rule of law is observed in the same way in every other country in the world but we cannot make a judgment on that point as a justification for this move. I wonder whether something of this sort should not be done.

Financial Guidance and Claims Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Elystan-Morgan and Lord Mackay of Clashfern

Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Tuesday 24th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Elystan-Morgan (CB)]

My Lords, I am full of respect for and sympathy with the amendments and the spirit in which they have been moved. We are facing massive social abuse that is complicated and extremely extensive. I doubt very much whether in the complicated and convoluted society in which we live it is humanly possible to rid us of all of it. I am sure that is beyond us.

The remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, triggered two thoughts in my mind. The first relates to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and how well that Act has served society. We are still dealing with it day in and day out in the courts, and with the help of judicial interpretation it is as fresh in many respects as it was the day it was passed. In so far as the offence of assault occasioning actually bodily harm—Section 47—is concerned, the noble Lord is absolutely right. There should be a parallel offence that is not confined to an assault and does not concentrate upon a physical consequence. There have been attempts in the past to widen that offence, but they have been rather vague and less than totally successful. It has to be revamped completely so that the concept of assault is not basic to it and it is not confined to bodily harm.

My other point relates to the higher end of the scale with regard to cold calling. At the very bottom of the scale there is the fishing exercise, the hopeful prospect that something might come of what is not of itself a criminal act. At the other end of the scale, there is a very serious criminal act where A says to B “Let us pretend that an accident occurred—we know nothing like that ever took place—and you are the claimant in regard to that matter and that you are prepared to put forward a statement of facts about a fact that you know to be totally false. I will support you, and we will split the profits between us. You should be prepared, of course, to commence an action in the courts”. The moment you do that, you have probably committed a very serious offence. You have attempted to pervert the course of justice. I believe that as a proposition of law, exceptional to the usual law of attempts, every attempt to bring about a perversion of the course of justice is of itself a perversion of the course of justice. It is at that end that we should start concentrating. Very few of these cases are brought to court, and very few of them are successful, but it would be marvellous to be able to make an example of some of the very worst cases, and by such example a very considerable social lesson would be taught.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

I would like to ask whether the “direct approaches” referred to in proposed subsection (3E) need to relate to financial matters.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Elystan-Morgan and Lord Mackay of Clashfern

Monday 28th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

If that were necessary. I regard it as something that could happen under the existing clause because the outcome for the applicant could include a declaration, in my judgment. It is a question of whether the court thought a declaration appropriate. If it did, it could do so, notwithstanding the provisions of Clause 64.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan (CB)]

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, makes the very proper point that there is ample precedent for Parliament to deal with the issue of judicial review. Indeed, he traced historically how prerogative writs developed, how they were placed on an administrative basis and how, ultimately, they became the subject of specific legislation. One point must be made, however, and I am not sure that the noble and learned Lord did not touch upon it in his powerful address: that when legislation intervened in this area, it did not diminish to the slightest degree the rights of the individual, or, indeed, any of the relative positions in relation to the various powers that judicial review seeks to deal with equitably. In other words, the boundary was not moved a single inch.

My second point has already been touched on: it is about the rule of law. Many here will have read the excellent treatise by the late Lord Bingham, in which he reminded us that there are two boundaries in relation to the rule of law. The most obvious is whether a law has been technically and lawfully passed through both Houses of Parliament and received Royal Assent. However, Lord Bingham went on to make it perfectly clear that if a law was unconscionably wrong, even though it had proceeded through all those stages in a thoroughly proper and technical way, it would still be in breach of the rule of law.

The point that Lord Bingham makes is that there are two boundaries: one is the technical parliamentary boundary; the other, of course, is a boundary beyond that. Indeed, it is in that context that this whole debate is taking place. The boundary that we are talking about is the boundary of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, something which has been built up over many centuries and not spelt out by Parliament but which is nevertheless a very real and massive boundary.

If I am right—and I suggest that it most certainly is the case—that Clause 64 breaches that boundary and undermines it, there is a very strong case for changing it. That is the real relevance of the excellent debate that we have had today.

Many speakers have made the point about Clause 64 in the context where the result would have been no different. I would ask in how many cases the following situation applies. A party is elected to government after a hard-fought election. It has set out very clearly in its manifesto exactly what legal changes will be brought about in various fields of law. It will invoke procedures which are already set out in statute to make those changes. Those proceedings will, of course, involve consultation. However, every thinking person knows that that is something entirely chimerical. There will be consultation, yes, but the consultation will make no difference to the determination and resolve of that new Government to bring about that change. If you say that that consultation does not really matter, what can you do? You do not challenge the ultimate right of that party to bring about that legislation, but you can challenge the right of that party to make a mockery of the procedures of law. That is exactly what is entailed here.

Consultation does not, of course, mean that you have to weigh in the balance the views that are tendered to you, but it does mean that you have to look carefully at what is said and give a reasonable period and a reasonable prospect for people to be able to make such representations. The idea that those count for nothing is, I suggest, utterly inimical and utterly contrary to our concept of the law as we have it.