Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Lord Eatwell and Lord Phillips of Sudbury

Wednesday 27th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

Before the noble Lord sits down, why does he not propose extending his fiduciary liability to all banks rather than just the ring-fenced entities?

[Lord Eatwell]

That is because I think the distinction between commercial banking and investment banking is relevant in this case. One would expect investment bankers to behave honestly and in an appropriate manner in their business transactions. I would not expect an investment banker necessarily to display a duty of care and certainly not a fiduciary responsibility whereas I really would expect a commercial banker to exercise those responsibilities in all circumstances when dealing with families and small businesses.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Lord Eatwell and Lord Phillips of Sudbury

Tuesday 26th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury (LD)]

My Lords, my name is on the 18 amendments in this group and I am the sole signatory on eight of them. I endorse entirely what the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, said. He speaks from great experience, which is of great help to the House.

One of the scandals—I think one can fairly use that word—of the past five years in terms of financial failings has been the extreme paucity of prosecutions for some of the greatest criminal failings, to use a neutral word, in the history of our or any country. It is rather staggering to think that over the past five years you can count on the fingers of your two hands the number of City malefactors who have been prosecuted, when during that time probably 20,000 or 30,000 people have been prosecuted for shoplifting at an average of £25 a time.

I tabled these amendments not in any spirit of vindictiveness—one can also say that, I am sure, of the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, and the other signatories—but to try to give real teeth to a very important clause, Clause 27, which is designed and put forward on the basis that it will be a significant deterrent to conduct arising in the future which is comparable to the conduct that has occurred in the past five or six years. The wording of Clause 27(1) in particular seems to those of us who have tabled these amendments to be so narrow—to cite the word used by the noble Lord, Lord Brennan—that the prospects of getting a conviction before a jury, or, indeed, starting to prosecute at all, will be remote. To give a simple, direct example of that point, Clause 27(1)(b) makes plain that a conviction can be secured only if the implementation of a single decision—“the decision”—causes,

“the failure of the group bank”.

When, except in the rarest of circumstances, did a single decision cause the failure of a bank? Life is much more complicated. Very often a series of decisions is involved and even then you cannot say that the decision or decisions cause the failure but rather that they,

“contribute directly and significantly to”,

the failure of a group bank, as I have put it in my amendment.

We have tabled these amendments to give practical effect to Clause 27 and other clauses. They are important clauses and we must not shackle them with such a narrow set of requirements that they will not serve their purpose. We should never forget that British criminal law is rightly strictly construed, and construed against the prosecution. If you think of that and you think of the wording in the clause, you will realise that it is not fit for purpose. I hope that if my noble friend the Minister does not accept the wording of these amendments—they could be drafted differently—he will at least undertake to come back at Third Reading with wording that the Government find acceptable and which will serve the purpose that we seek to serve in putting these amendments forward.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, having listened to my noble friend Lord Brennan and the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, I found this discussion quite disturbing. The creation of a criminal offence is one aspect of the Bill that pushes forward the regulatory regime in the UK and creates an environment more suited to the somewhat cavalier nature of finance in a global marketplace—in particular by identifying those activities that have inflicted enormous harm upon our fellow citizens. What I heard was that, as drafted, the probability of securing a conviction or even a prosecution, as the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, put it, is vanishingly small. Unless the terminology is clarified in a way laid out so clearly by my noble friend, this part of the Bill will simply bring that aspect of regulation into disrepute because it will be worthless. That is why I regard the remarks that I have heard from the two distinguished lawyers who have just spoken to be very disturbing. It is incumbent upon the Government not simply to produce a pat answer here this evening but again to produce a carefully written assessment of the case for an appropriate criminal regime and its implementation in order that the whole House has an opportunity to assess this important aspect prior to Third Reading.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Lord Eatwell and Lord Phillips of Sudbury

Tuesday 26th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, Amendment 21, and Amendments 50 and 51 from the commissioners, refer to the professional standards to be required in the banking industry—particularly to licensing bankers who have attained the required professional standards and, of course, not licensing those who have not. With respect to the conduct and skills of members of the banking industry, the Bill currently refers to “rules of conduct”. Amendments from the commissioners use the words “licensing regime”, but continuously refer to the adherence to rules.

The notion of a licence surely refers to some level of professional competence or professional standards. The Co-operative Bank may have obeyed the rules, but we now know it would have failed even the simplest test for professional competence. Rules may require the attainment of professional qualifications, but we cannot be sure and, as the Government regularly argue, certainty is important in this legislation. The clause in the Bill as drafted refers to rules of conduct. The commissioners’ amendment refers to,

“training in the effect and application of the rules of conduct”.

However, neither of them seem to convey the true context of professional standards.

As an academic, I am perhaps rather overly keen on examinations and the attainment of professional standards. Doctors have professional standards because they are required to pass examinations, undergo rigorous professional training and be thoroughly trained in ethical standards. Lawyers have professional standards because they are required to pass examinations, undergo rigorous professional training and be thoroughly trained in ethical standards. Of course, doctors and lawyers may, on occasion, not maintain the standards we would expect.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I hate to interrupt the noble Lord but I cannot resist saying that, unfortunately, the training of solicitors at this time does not involve rigorous ethical training. In fact, it involves little ethical training at all.

[Lord Eatwell]

I am sure that the noble Lord, as a distinguished solicitor, would attest to that, as indeed he has done. It seems to me that if members of the professions are required to pass examinations to show professional competence and to undertake rigorous training, bankers should do the same. That is what Amendment 21 seeks to achieve. For example, proposed new Section 65A(2)(b) says that the licensing regime must,

“specify minimum thresholds of competence including integrity, professional qualifications, continuous professional development and adherence to a recognised code of conduct and revised Banking Standards Rules”.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Lord Eatwell and Lord Phillips of Sudbury

Wednesday 23rd October 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury (LD)]

My Lords, Amendments 98A and 98B stand in my name. They seek to tease out a little more detail in relation to the amendment just moved by the noble Lord, Lord McFall, on whistleblowing. I say at once that I am wholly in favour of that amendment. The position of whistleblowers in our country is not satisfactory. Amendment 98 would widen the portal to offer assistance and compensation for whistleblowers by giving the appropriate regulator the power of initiative with regard to getting appropriate compensation for whistleblowers.

My amendment is designed to widen the scope of that initiative as, at present, I feel that it is unnecessarily limited in that the whistleblower is defined by proposed new subsection (2) in Amendment 98 as a person who gives information directly to the appropriate regulator or gives it to a colleague. I notice that the amendment does not define “colleague”. Suffice it to say that many of the circumstances in which whistleblowers are sometimes encouraged—and feel morally compelled—to speak out are extraordinarily complex.

I have had the good fortune to do work for the charity Public Concern at Work. Indeed, I set it up 20 or so years ago. That charity continues to do extremely valuable work. I spoke to people at the charity a couple of days ago and, believe it or not, they had been approached by roughly 2,500 whistleblowers in the past year. Astonishingly, I think that scarcely any of the whistleblowers were from the City. There are particular issues around that and we can underestimate the extraordinary pressure that a whistleblower or would-be whistleblower feels under in the context of the City, particularly as it is a very tight community in many ways. At the moment, the only recompense that a whistleblower can get, if he or she is discriminated against and suffers loss, is by using the provisions of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. However, the whistleblower has to take the initiative. This amendment, as I say, gives the initiative to the regulator, which can be of enormous help and assistance to the whistleblower.

The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 scores over this amendment by having a much wider entrée to the remedies than is provided by the amendment. In particular, my amendments put the words “directly or indirectly” into the beginning of the two subsections that define how a whistleblower gets into the circle of potential compensation when they talk about giving information to the appropriate regulator or to a colleague. This is because—and I have checked this with Public Concern at Work—a lot of those who want to speak out are really anxious, if not fearful. What very often happens is information gets to the regulator in a really indirect, round-the-houses way, sometimes anonymously. My simple amendment is designed to open up the door but it is also a probing amendment in the hope that between now and Report we can have discussions with the Government on the optimum way of finding the remedy which the amendment seeks to supply.

I finish by giving some idea of how much wider the Public Interest Disclosure Act is regarding “getting into the remedy”. Clause 1 of the Act inserts a four-page amendment into the Employment Rights Act 1996 and provides a multiplicity of definitions of who is a whistleblower for the purposes of the remedy. An example of its sensible provisions is that a “qualifying disclosure” is one that is made in good faith, is substantially true, is not made for personal gain and,

“in all the circumstances of the case, it is reasonable for him to make”,

and so on.

It may be possible, at the next stage of the Bill, to import some of the language of the 1998 Act or, indeed, insert this amendment as an amendment to the 1998 Act.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I am sure that the Treasury has studied carefully the experience of a measure developed in the United States which is very similar to this and which has been remarkably successful over the past three or four years in bringing forward very important information to the regulatory authorities. When the noble Lord replies, perhaps he would reflect on the American experience and say how valuable it might be to replicate it here.

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[Lord Eatwell]

Surely the point is that by establishing a fiduciary duty a regulated entity would be expected to pursue exactly those duties. Therefore a regulated entity or other authorised person would be deemed by the regulator to be required to follow exactly those duties. If the noble Baroness thinks that this is too weak, I will be very happy to bring a stronger duty of care back on Report.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, asked an extraordinary question because there is no more onerous duty than the fiduciary duty. It is a novel and maybe a highly effective way of dealing with a great many of the concerns that have occupied this House over the last few days in Committee. An important part of the amendment is that the core activities and services are subject to a fiduciary duty, and other services to a duty of care. Given the big difference in responsibility, is it sufficiently clear what is and what is not a core duty?

[Lord Eatwell]

Core duties are defined in the Bill.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I thank the noble Lord.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Lord Eatwell and Lord Phillips of Sudbury

Wednesday 23rd October 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, in this amendment. It seems a modest amendment, calling for a review in three years’ time when the appropriate information from the United States will be available. It will be valuable to have this clause in the legislation to ensure that that review takes place, because it is so easy—given the exigencies of the moment—for major issues, which were recognised as major in the past, to be neglected because of day-to-day pressures. Therefore, having done all our work on banking in the Bill, if we set this process in motion so that the review happens, we will be performing a valuable service.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, I, too, support the amendment. I moved Amendment 91B at the close of our second day in Committee, which overlapped to a considerable extent with this amendment. In my amendment, I also talked about looking at the cultural as well as economic effects of this mass of gambling, as it is, within the financial markets. I hope that the Government will smile upon this; it may be that if it comes back on Report I will try to amalgamate my amendment and this one.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Lord Eatwell and Lord Phillips of Sudbury

Tuesday 15th October 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for introducing these amendments. However, can we reflect a little on the rush towards competition? A competitive system, if it is working effectively, is likely to result in the elimination of institutions from time to time, a process that was famously described as “creative destruction”. That sort of process can be seen quite clearly in countries that have large numbers of relatively small banks. Banks fail regularly in the United States—it is quite a common process. The process is, of course, managed effectively because these banks are relatively small. Has some thought been given to the relationship between the size of banking institutions in Britain and the effectiveness of competition? If competition were truly enhanced, one bank managed to eliminate another and both were relatively large, that could be extremely disruptive. This is not to argue against a competitive process but simply to say that it should not be regarded as an exclusive guideline with respect to what are desirable policies. Has the FPC been consulted on these clauses, and what is its view?

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury (LD)]

My Lords, there is an assumption that competition is essentially and necessarily good and that more competition is better. We have had manifest evidence in the past six years in the City—and indeed much longer than that— that there is a point at which competition turns in on itself. Indeed, the values of out-and-out aggressive competition are inimical to the values of integrity and honesty. I want to strike a note of caution, because this word is overdone in terms of its necessary public benefit.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Lord Eatwell and Lord Phillips of Sudbury

Tuesday 15th October 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Brennan has made some powerful points. I draw the attention of the House to the fact that, as in the previous group of amendments we were discussing, these offences will apply only to institutions that accept deposits. It therefore leaves out a whole series of institutions that I believe the noble Lords, Lord Turnbull and Lord Lawson, would also feel should be included under these offences.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, I commend the Government on bringing forward Amendment 58. It has been a source of great public disaffection that over the past few years the number of people in the City responsible for some really gross acts of criminality who have been brought to book could be measured on the fingers of two hands; indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, referred earlier to the pathetic enforcement statistics. This provision is therefore vital. However, I have two thoughts regarding the way in which this is framed: first, that it is too severe, and secondly, that it is too light, or slight.

The title of the clause is:

“Offences relating to decision”—

I suppose they mean “a decision”—

“that results in bank failure”.

I note that in two places in the clause itself it talks about a decision that “causes” a bank failure. There is a difference in the meaning of the words, “resulting” in a bank failure and “causing” it. The word “causing” is absolutely direct in a way that “resulting” is not. Perhaps the Minister might like to look at that.

The other point that strikes me about the wording of this clause is in Amendment 58(1)(c) and (d). Paragraph (c) says,

“in all the circumstances, S’s conduct in relation to the taking of the decision falls far below what could reasonably be expected of a person in S’s position”.

The noble Lord, Lord Brennan, has already made points on this. That is unsatisfactory in another sense. However, if we are—as we are—making criminal offences out of the conduct defined in this new clause, there should be a clear indication that no one can be convicted unless there is a want of integrity or honesty on the part of the person convicted. That is a fundamental principle of British criminal law. However concerned we are, and I certainly am, to bring to book the many malefactors who have ruined the reputation of the City in recent years, one cannot do it at the cost of changing or undermining that fundamental test of criminality, intent, bad faith, dishonesty or want of integrity—call it what you like. The language here does not clearly require that intent and want of integrity. There are cases that would fall within Amendment 58 that would not satisfy the normal test of mens rea in criminal offences.

I will refer briefly to Amendment 60 in this group, which is about the institution of proceedings. Subsection (4) says:

“In exercising its power to institute proceedings for an offence, the FCA or the PRA must comply with any conditions or restrictions imposed in writing by the Treasury”.

Those are the words. I cannot see anywhere, in this amendment or elsewhere, a requirement for the conditions or restrictions imposed in writing by the Treasury to be made public. Surely it is a fundamental requirement of restrictions or conditions that will potentially lead firms and individuals into the criminal courts that those conditions or restrictions be made public.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Lord Eatwell and Lord Phillips of Sudbury

Tuesday 6th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, once again, we return to an issue that we discussed in Committee and I promised at that time to return to it on Report. I am keeping that promise. Subsection (6) of new Section 9A requires the court to review the financial stability strategy once every three years. That is far too long. Let us consider what has happened over the past three years. Since 2009 there has been a fundamental change to the overall economic environment, a radical change in government policy, and a double-dip recession. Really significant things have happened, which should be taken on board in assessing the strategy. The idea that, over that period, the court would not review the financial stability strategy in the light of events is, I believe, inconceivable. If the court really is going to review the strategy in the light of events, the markets need to know that. A regular report once a year would be a significant reassurance, even if that report says no change. Indeed, that would be a significant reassurance to the markets that the financial stability strategy is unchanged.

I quite understand that strategies are not designed to be the creatures of current events, but it is important to learn from events and not plough on regardless when the facts change. An annual review would provide the court with ongoing insights into the systemic risks associated with the financial stability strategy. That is far better than a review which is postponed, as facts change, for three years.

Let us then suppose that something really dramatic happens so that there has to be a review before the three-year time limit is up. What effect will that have on confidence? How much better to pursue the reasonable strategy of an annual review, both to ensure that the financial stability strategy is up to date and to provide appropriate confidence that the Bank’s strategy deals with matters with which the markets are concerned. I beg to move.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, has taken sufficient account of the provision in proposed new Section 9A(1)(b) that allows the court to review the strategy at any time. There is reference later in the proposed new section to revision of the strategy. I would have thought that those provisions covered precisely the concern that he correctly raised.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, we are debating two things at the same time. I will refer first to my amendment dealing with the timing of reviews of the financial stability strategy. Writing into the Bill that there should be a backstop of three years is a major mistake because it creates the possibility—even probability—that a review will have to take place in a shorter timeframe, as the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, pointed out. If that is done, what will be the effect on confidence? It will give the impression that the Bank is panicking and is not willing to go to its three-year period; it has suddenly had to shorten things. The reaction will be: “My gosh, something is really going wrong”. That is why the notion of an annual review has solidity and regularity. It fits in with the publication of the financial stability review, which is twice per year. So every year there would be a review, even if it endorsed a policy of no change to the financial stability strategy. Including the three-year figure is a major mistake because it will tend to excite apprehension when reviews take place more frequently.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

Is the noble Lord not assuaged by the wording of the Bill, which seems to be extraordinarily wise? It calls for a strategic review, which it later defines as coming every three years. It then states that the court of directors must,

“from time to time review, and if necessary revise, the strategy”.

Surely that is exactly what the noble Lord was talking about. If circumstances take an unexpected and dramatic turn, that stipulation is precisely germane. I do not see why the noble Lord is not satisfied with what seems to be an extremely sensible arrangement: a report every three years, but also a power of review.

[Lord Eatwell]

I am sorry that I did not make myself clear. I was referring to a review taking place other than at three years and the effect that that might have on the confidence of the markets. They might feel that the Bank is not sticking to its usual three-year timetable but is bringing things forward because something is going badly wrong that it knows about and perhaps the markets are not fully informed about. An annual review is embedded in so many companies. The annual away-day where everybody goes off and does the annual review is such a standard procedure that I think the three-year business is a mistake.

I want to return to the noble Lord’s revisionist comments on the position that he took on the earlier amendment when we were referring to the business of the oversight committee and the public interest notion of publication. I asked the noble Lord whether in this section Bank meant court. I think that I made clear that if it did mean court, the best option would be for it to say so. Therefore, the best option would be for him to come back at Third Reading and say, “Look, the word Bank occurs all the way through the Bill. It is used in different contexts in different places and let us be absolutely clear who is responsible. We will amend this clause at Third Reading to say ‘court’ because that is what I mean. It is not what I say; it is what I mean”. Let us now say that the noble Lord means court.

I was quite deliberately saying that if the noble Lord really wants the word Bank to mean court throughout the Bill I would read through it. I was confident that I would have no difficulty finding a number of cases where he did not want it to mean court. That is why he has now stood up, having received the advice of his officials, to correct what he said earlier.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Lord Eatwell and Lord Phillips of Sudbury

Tuesday 26th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 2 and 201. Before addressing the amendments, I crave the indulgence of the Committee in making a few general comments on the Bill and our procedures.

This is a very important Bill. Yet, as we know, it is a dog’s breakfast of amendments to earlier legislation and is, accordingly, extraordinarily and disproportionately difficult for the House to assess properly. The Treasury Committee of the other place has objected to the current construction and argues that there should be a new Bill to replace earlier legislation. Only then can that committee and, indeed, the regulated community gain a proper overview of the full import of the measures before us.

Most importantly, the Bill as currently drafted severely limits effective scrutiny by this Committee. Not only is there the question of excessive complexity in drafting but many of the most important debates on Bills take place on the Motion that Clause “X” stand part of the Bill. As this Bill is constructed, this is just about impossible, as failure to agree, say, that Clause 3 or Clause 5 stand part would not only wreck the entire Bill but render it completely meaningless by taking about 40 pages out of it. The drafting is a mess.

Secondly, there are fundamental problems with the overall structure of the Bill, identified by the Joint Committee and the Treasury Committee, which could better be addressed by proper redrafting rather than by piecemeal amendment.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, for interrupting at this early stage. I am sympathetic to the point that he has just made, but is not the problem one of standing orders rather than the drafting of the Bill?

[Lord Eatwell]

I think the answer is no. The issue is the straightforward drafting of the Bill. The problems, as I said, could be better addressed by proper redrafting rather than by piecemeal amendment. For example, the appropriate structure of the governance of the Bank of England in the 21st century, a matter to which the Treasury Committee paid particular interest, should be dealt with by a full rewrite of the Bank of England Act 1998 rather than by the cumbersome and opaque clauses before us.

Thirdly and most importantly, the Treasury Committee of the other place has raised a number of major objections to the content of the Bill with respect not only to Bank of England governance but to a number of other crucial issues of economic management, especially at times of crisis. Before today, few of these had been taken on board by the Government, although we will consider their proposal of an oversight committee later today.

I was delighted to read in the Financial Times yesterday that amendments derived directly from the Treasury Committee’s report of 24 May have been tabled by my noble friend Lord McFall, a distinguished former chair of the Treasury Committee, and by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, perhaps the most tenacious opposition speaker on Treasury affairs for many a long year—my noble friend Lord Myners has the scars to prove it. Your Lordships’ House has a fundamental responsibility to pass those amendments so that the other place has the opportunity to consider amendments proposed by its own committee. This is a valuable constitutional innovation.

I recognise that a fundamental rewrite of the Bill would take some time, but the Treasury Committee has faced up to this issue, too, arguing that the legislation is proceeding with undue haste. I agree. I recognise that the planning blight that hangs over the FSA is causing problems, but the performance of the shadow committees and authorities has already been such as to give us confidence that delay will not be disproportionately damaging.

All this adds up to the fact that the Bill as drafted is a barrier, not an aid, to effective macroprudential regulation. This is not a party political issue. I say with all due respect that the noble Lord, Lord McFall, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, are not natural political allies. This is about getting the legislation right, which is what we on this side will endeavour to do.

The noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, and I worked well together to improve the Bill that established the Office for Budgetary Responsibility, and I hope that we can work well together to improve this Bill, although I would not start from here. When the Minister first speaks, I think he owes the Committee an explanation as to why the Government have consistently ignored the advice of the Joint Committee and the Treasury Committee on the structure of this legislation.

I turn—to the relief of the Committee, I am sure—to the amendments in this first group. Their fundamental objective is, I hope, clear: to set in train a wide-ranging restructuring of the governance of the Bank of England. The Bill gives the Bank remarkable new powers in macroprudential and microprudential regulation and in the assessment and management of financial crises. The structure of governance and levels of accountability should be appropriate to these new powers.

A key element in the structure of governance of the Bank is the court. As many commentators have noted, the current constitution of the court, its powers and resources are simply not up to the job. The Treasury Committee has paid particular attention to the role of the court, which is currently responsible for managing the Bank of England’s affairs other than monetary policy. The committee’s evidence sessions have exposed doubts, expressed by many witnesses, as to the court’s fitness for purpose as presently structured. A distinguished former member of the Monetary Policy Committee, in evidence to the Treasury Committee, described the court as,

“an historical legacy institution that now serves no useful purpose and creates the appearance or illusion of accountability or oversight where none exist”.

These concerns are especially important because of the role that the Financial Services Bill, as currently drafted, envisages for the court with respect to determining the UK’s financial stability strategy. In the context of monetary policy, where the Bank of England’s objective is to maintain price stability HM Treasury is required to write to the Monetary Policy Committee at least once a year to specify price stability and the Government’s economic policy. The annual Treasury remit letter fleshes out the concept of price stability in practical operational terms while avoiding undue rigidity. It strikes a balance between operational independence and democratic accountability.

A quite different model is proposed for financial stability. It is envisaged that the primary responsibility for determining and keeping under review the strategy for achieving the financial stability objective will reside with the court, although the court will be required to consult the Financial Policy Committee and the Treasury, and the Financial Policy Committee can, at times, make recommendations.

However, here we have a crucial difference in views—given the court’s role in determining the financial stability objective—on whether the court is up to the job. The view that the court should be abolished and replaced by a supervisory board was advanced by the Treasury Committee. In the face of the powerful arguments advanced by the Treasury Committee, the Government replied that they were not,

“at this time, minded to pursue the more radical changes to Bank of England governance recommended by the TSC, including the replacement of Court with a supervisory board. In general, the Government considers that the governance of the Bank should primarily be a matter for the Bank itself”.

This is astonishing. Indeed, it is nonsensical. As the Treasury Committee points out, the Government are the sole shareholder of the Bank, and many of the Bank’s responsibilities, functions and powers are defined by legislation. The Government do not regard the governance of private sector companies as a matter just for those companies. They really cannot wash their hands of this central issue.

Finally, the Bill grants major new powers to the person of the governor. It is important that the governor is backed up by a powerful supervisory committee to which he is accountable and is not an individual exposed on his or her own, so why a supervisory board? What is in a name? The whole point of this proposal is to recognise this necessary break with the past if we are to have a modern, effective structure of governance at the Bank of England. In the convoluted context of amendments to this Bill, we have been able to present only a sketch of what we on this side of the House have in mind, but we shall return to the matter on Report.

By accepting this amendment, the Government would acknowledge that the new Bank, with its new powers, would have a board to whom the executive is responsible and that is capable of performing an effective supervisory function. That should be its job: to supervise, to set strategy, to advise and review, not to run the Bank on a day-to-day basis and certainly not in the context of a crisis. These amendments are a signpost towards the new Bank with a new regulatory structure, and hence towards a truly effective regulatory system. I beg to move.

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[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I am grateful for that, and I apologise for the error. However, I want to reinforce the importance of extending the power of delegation under new Section 3B. That could be very important to the work of the committee and strengthen it because it would bring in outside voices and give strength to its deliberations. I hope, therefore, that the Government may review this and decide to extend the power of delegation, not just to members but to outsiders as well. Subsection (3) already provides that outsiders can attend and speak at meetings of the committee, but to be members of a delegated body is crucial, as, indeed, in the review structure under new Section 3C, it would be helpful on occasions to have more than a single person appointed to conduct a review. If it is a complex review, there could be a lot of point in having a small team of three. At the moment that is not permitted by the wording of new Section 3C.

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, I welcome Amendment 11, which is the Treasury Select Committee amendment, put down by my noble friend Lord McFall and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I also welcome the government amendment, which is taking us forward on this vexed issue of the governance of the Bank of England. I regard that as a general welcome, notwithstanding any criticisms or questions I may later have about some particulars of the amendment.

However, before getting into the discussion of Amendments 11 and 13, I reiterate the question raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, with respect to Section 241 of the Banking Act 2009, where it appears that the chair of the court is in the gift of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. There is nothing in that clause to suggest that the chair must be one of the non-executive members.

Taxation: Avoidance

Debate between Lord Eatwell and Lord Phillips of Sudbury

Thursday 26th January 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, the issues raised by the noble Lords, Lord Dykes and Lord Phillips, have recently been the subject of two important reports. First, the report of the Public Accounts Committee into tax disputes, published on 20 December last year, revealed what can only be described as a scandal. It demonstrated a quite extraordinarily cosy relationship between HMRC and major companies, particularly international companies, in the determination of tax liabilities. It also demonstrated a failure to follow proper procedures in the resolution of tax disputes, and a consistent bias towards the favourable treatment of large companies compared with small companies and the ordinary taxpayer.

Everyone in this country who is settling their tax assessment this month, knowing that they will incur a fine and interest charges if they do not pay up on 31 January on the dot, will be astonished to discover that large companies may be given 10 years to settle their tax obligations. They will also be furious that up to £20 million in interest has been lost because of HMRC errors, while, for reasons that are still not clear, the department decided it would not reopen negotiations with the relevant company—a decision that it appears was taken without legal advice. The PAC report says that,

“the Department did not even take the most basic step of making its own note of meetings with the company concerned, relying instead on the record kept by the company”.

To compound this record of complacency and connivance, the department failed to be open with the PAC investigation and was,

“less than clear and consistent in the evidence”,

given to the PAC and to the Treasury Select Committee in another place.

It is important to remember that HMRC is, quite rightly, a non-ministerial department, thereby removing Ministers from any suspicion of involvement in individual taxpayers’ affairs, but this scandal goes beyond matters that can be remedied at arm's length by more effective management and the appointment of extra Revenue commissioners. It strikes at the very heart of the fair and impartial management of the tax system. It reveals systemic failures that have resulted in unfair and partial treatment verging on favouritism, and it demands the exercise of ministerial responsibility, for it undermines public confidence in the probity of government and the integrity of the Revenue.

If the failings exposed by the PAC were an isolated set of events—an aberration—the measures taken so far by HMRC to put its house in order just might be regarded as sufficient. Regrettably, this is not the case. As we have heard from the noble Lords opposite, it is a widely held view that tax avoidance is rife in this country, and that wealthy individuals and large companies that can afford sophisticated tax advisers can avoid attacks by abusive means.

The term “abusive means” has been defined by Mr Graham Aaronson QC as,

“contrived and artificial schemes which are widely regarded as an intolerable attack on the integrity of the UK’s tax regime”.

This quotation is taken from a report entitled A Study to Consider whether a General Anti-Avoidance Rule should be Introduced into the UK Tax System, published in November last year, which was authored by Mr Aaronson and commissioned, to give them due credit, by Her Majesty’s Government. I applaud the initiative. Mr Aaronson concludes that a general anti-avoidance rule should be introduced, and proposes practical means by which this might be done. In his report, he argues that certainty in the tax system makes an important positive contribution to the economic and business environment. The presence of tax loopholes, and their exploitation by the unscrupulous, undermines that certainty. Moreover, competitive pressure forces firms to adopt more and more elaborate tax avoidance measures.

Competitive advantage can be gained by companies that go down the tax-abusive route, and hence firms that attempt to take a high moral stand, as the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, points out, are placed at a competitive disadvantage and may be eliminated from the marketplace. All must join the race to the bottom. Tax avoidance by businesses therefore undermines certainty, forces firms to adopt the tax-avoidance policies of the lowest common denominator, undermines any perception of fairness in the tax system and imposes a dead-weight loss on the economy by spawning a socially useless tax avoidance industry. It is damaging not just to the Revenue, but to the performance of the economy as a whole.

The source of this pernicious burden on our economy, the foundation of the tax avoidance industry, is the complexity of the tax system. It is complexity that by its very nature creates the exceptions and loopholes that can be legally exploited by the enthusiastic, well resourced tax avoider. If we are to tackle the disease rather than the symptoms, complexity should be the target. An important reason for the complexity of the tax system is that Governments attempt to manipulate behaviour via tax allowances and reliefs to incentivise people to behave in a particular way—to invest in new businesses or to undertake more R&D, or to recycle waste, or whatever. What is remarkable is that years of academic study have demonstrated that very few of these incentives actually work. Tax allowances to stimulate investment, for example, do not tend to result in more investment. Instead, they are a subsidy to investment that would have taken place anyway.

Another important source of complexity is a government belief that it is appropriate to differentiate between revenues from different sources, so that benefit deemed to derive from capital gains, or, more scandalously, from carried interest, is taxed differently from benefit derived from income. The treatment of interest on debt as a cost, and hence being tax deductible, is a major factor distorting the funding of business in this country. All this is a rich source of tax avoidance. Then of course there are the tax benefits handed out to specific social groups with the most powerful lobbying voices—the non-doms come immediately to mind.

Whether it derives from good intentions, perceived policy objectives, or mere cowardice and/or patronage in the face of the powerful and well funded, complexity is the fundamental source of avoidance. Without tackling complexity, the avoidance industry will never be significantly reduced. I therefore applaud the establishment by the Government of the Office of Tax Simplification and look forward, in hope rather than expectation, to its efforts bearing fruit. In the mean time, while we wait for the simplified promised land, Mr Aaronson concludes that all current approaches to curb tax avoidance,

“are not capable of dealing with some of the most egregious tax avoidance schemes”.

He might have added, if he had had the PAC report before him, that all attempts to limit tax avoidance are undermined if there exists the cosy relationship between the HMRC and big business identified in the PAC report.

With the PAC report and Mr Aaronson's report before him, the Minister must address a number of questions. First, when did Ministers first know of the matters identified in the PAC report? Were they fully informed, or have they made further investigations? What have their investigations, if any, revealed about further abuse and, if so, what sort of abuses? What action do the Government intend to take to correct the systemic deficiencies in the HMRC? Is it not time for a full investigation into the practices and substance of the taxation of large companies, in order to re-establish public confidence in the probity of government and of the Revenue? Secondly, do the Government accept the conclusions of Mr Aaronson's report? When do they intend to introduce a general anti-avoidance rule, with the institutional support outlined by Mr Aaronson? Thirdly, when can we expect a report from the Office of Tax Simplification that deals specifically with business taxation and tax avoidance?

Confidence in the tax system is, as noble Lords opposite have said, fundamental to our democracy. If confidence in the fairness and probity of the state is lost, effective revenue raising is undermined—colourful examples, perhaps from the Mediterranean, can be imagined. The issues identified in the Public Accounts Committee report and in Mr Aaronson’s report demand an urgent response. I hope we will hear from the Minister today the concrete steps that the Government intend to take to curb abusive behaviour towards the tax system. If practical steps are not forthcoming, the Government will have some explaining to do to this House and to the British people.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

The noble Lord raised some extremely pertinent points about HMRC, but does he agree that the Government reducing the staffing at HMRC over the next few years by 12,000 is scarcely likely to increase the effectiveness of tax collection?

[Lord Eatwell]

I think I shall say yes.