Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 8th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin by drawing attention to my interests listed in the register. The financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 left lasting scars on the UK financial system. The costs of that crisis have reverberated in the form of embedded risk aversion, particularly among financial services regulators.

Yet, risk aversion has its uses. Since the 2009 crisis, the financial services industry has been battered by further successive crises: Brexit, Covid and the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. It is to the credit of the Bank of England and the financial services regulators that the industry has displayed a remarkable level of financial stability throughout these storms.

Yet there remains a persistent dissatisfaction with the performance of the regulators. The costs of compliance are excessive. A PwC study puts the sector’s annual compliance bill at nearly £35 billion—roughly 13% of total operating costs. Regulators are said to take excessive time over crucial decisions, such as authorisations. There is no consistent cost-benefit analysis of regulatory measures, despite the fact that the 2023 FSMA required the FCA and the PRA to establish cost-benefit panels. Regulatory decisions often create uncertainty, stifling innovation and discouraging investment.

The fact that the Bill addresses some of these concerns is certainly to be welcomed. The simplification of the senior managers regime and other administrative requirements should reduce costs. The new provisional licences should speed up effective authorisation. The changes to the relationship between the FOS and the FCA will perhaps reduce regulatory uncertainty, although it may have other effects, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, suggested. Moreover, the increased flexibility provided to the FCA and the PRA in several sections of the Bill must be used with care, lest flexibility generates uncertainty.

While I welcome these measures, I am concerned by the changes to ring-fencing. The claim in the Explanatory Notes that,

“updating the statutory framework underpinning the ring-fencing regime as part of a wider programme of ring-fencing reforms”,

sets alarm bells ringing. Updating may well be the origin of increased systemic risk. The protection of activities within the ring-fence must be a primary objective. Weakening the ring-fence in the name of financial innovation would be unacceptable.

Moreover, the claim that:

“These reforms will unlock more finance for the UK economy”,


sets alarm bells ringing even louder. When he sums up, could the Minister enlighten us about the content of the,

“wider programme of ring-fencing reforms”?

What exactly do the Government have in mind?

The Explanatory Notes claim that Bill,

“modernises how the financial services sector is regulated, supporting it to grow and to lend more to businesses”,

but overall, the Bill gives the impression of tidying up, rather than embedding greater financial commitment to investment and growth. Of course, the emphasis on investment and growth is surely correct. It is necessary for the economic well-being of the people of this country. In this vital respect, for many years the financial services industry has failed, and it is continuing to fail.

Since 2000, the share of financial services in GDP has grown by 50% from 6% to 9% of GDP. Over the same period, the share of investment in GDP has not grown at all and, indeed, has tended to decline and has been persistently lower than in other major industrial countries.

We have to reflect on the fact that the prosperity of the UK’s financial services sector is not solely a success of private enterprise; it is a success of a particular institutional framework in which public authorities and the market are deeply intertwined. The prosperity of the City of London depends upon the global prestige of English law and the public institutions that enforce it. Similarly, financial services depend on the public provision of a stable monetary framework and a respected code of financial regulation, ranging from the role of the Bank of England as lender of last resort and guardian of systemic stability to consumer protection and the prevention of financial crime.

Public provision defines the environment within which financial services prosper. In return, financial services should work in a way that serves society by funding the investment in innovation, productive capacity, research and skills that the country needs. That is the settlement between the public realm and financial services.

That settlement is not working. A new settlement is required but what might that look like? It should begin with a framework of financial institutions that are committed to the needed investment. I do not mean greater flows of funds into stocks, shares and bonds in secondary markets. Britain needs financial institutions that fund real investment, new research, new products and services, new infrastructure, new homes, new international competitive industries. The Government have made an attempt at this by creating the National Wealth Fund. However, that fund will invest only if a firm that seeks funds from it has already acquired private sector funding. In other words, an institution that exists because private markets have failed defers to those failing markets to guide its own investment decisions. That is just not good enough. The new settlement must not rely solely on government, regulators or even politicians. The financial services industry itself must play its part, building on current initiatives such as the Capital Markets Industry Taskforce, convened by the London Stock Exchange.

The Bill before us is not part of this new settlement to which I refer. It is worth while and sensible, but the task of building a financial services industry that truly serves our society needs to go a lot further.