Resettlement of Vulnerable Syrian Refugees

Debate between Lord Dodds of Duncairn and James Brokenshire

Wednesday 10th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for highlighting the incredible work of so many charities and non-governmental organisations. I pay tribute to the work of the organisation in her constituency. We should remember the incredible risks that so many people take to provide such help and assistance. It is important to underline that, as well as to recognise their supportive work with DFID and other partners.

[Mr Nigel Dodds (Belfast North) (DUP)]

We know that the Minister has the scheme that he has outlined—it is the subject of this urgent question—and that Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey are doing an enormous amount to help in the refugee crisis, but what more can the Government do to put pressure on other Governments in the region, such as the Gulf states, to open their doors to more refugees from Syria?

[James Brokenshire]

I understand from the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), that that matter is being raised at international bodies and in international discussions. The right hon. Gentleman is right to emphasise the work done by countries such as Jordan and others. We are providing more than £300 million in aid assistance outside Syria to some of the countries on which the displacement of people is most directly having an impact.

Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism

Debate between Lord Dodds of Duncairn and James Brokenshire

Thursday 8th May 2014 Ministerial Corrections

[Mr Nigel Dodds (Belfast North) (DUP)]

Paragraph 12 of the explanatory memorandum states:

“If a proscribed organisation…applies to the Secretary of State for deproscription, the proscription of the organisation will be reviewed.”

How does that work in practice? If an organisation and its members are illegal—proscribed—how do they have the locus to apply to be have the proscription reviewed?

[James Brokenshire]

Under the current regime, the organisation or person affected by a proscription can submit a written application to the Home Secretary requesting that she considers whether they or a specified organisation can be removed from the list of proscribed organisations. There is a process for this. The application should also state the grounds on which it is made, and the Home Secretary is required to determine the application within 90 days.

If the Secretary of State agrees to de-proscribe that organisation, she has to lay an order before Parliament removing it from the list of proscribed organisations. In practice, all the evidence and intelligence have to be considered across Whitehall. The order is then subject to the affirmative resolution process. In other words, it is a similar process to a proscription application. I have to say to the House that no de-proscription applications have been received since June 2009.

[Official Report, 2 April 2014, Vol. 578, c. 951.]

Letter of correction from James Brokenshire:

An error has been identified in the response given on 2 April 2014.

The correct response should have been:

Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism

Debate between Lord Dodds of Duncairn and James Brokenshire

Wednesday 2nd April 2014 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

The orders are made after careful consideration, part of which involves input and consideration from the Foreign Office. That might or might not include co-operation or contact with individual Governments or authorities. I can tell the right hon. Gentleman that such broad consideration is always given to these orders, in the light of the factors that I have identified, including the impact that they could have here in the UK and on British citizens overseas. There is a need to send out a clear message in relation to a number of these terrorist organisations.

I shall expand a little on the steps that are being undertaken. They include research into and investigation of open-source material, intelligence material and advice that reflects consultation across the government, including with the intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The Home Secretary is supported in her decision-making process by the cross-Whitehall proscription review group. The decision to proscribe is taken with great care by the Home Secretary, and it is right that the case for proscribing new organisations must be approved by both Houses. Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary believes that ABM, Al Murabitun and Ansar al Sharia-Tunisia are currently concerned in terrorism. Hon. Members will appreciate that I am unable to comment on specific intelligence, but it might help the House if I provide a brief summary of their activities.

Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis—ABM—is an al-Qaeda-inspired militant Islamist group based in the northern Sinai region of Egypt. The group is said to recruit within Egypt and abroad, and it aims to create an Egyptian state ruled by sharia law. ABM is assessed to have been responsible for a number of attacks on security forces in Egypt since 2011. The attacks appear to have increased since the overthrow of the Morsi Government in July 2013. The group’s reach goes beyond the Sinai region, in that it claims responsibility for a number of attacks in Cairo as well as cross-border attacks against Israel.

ABM has undertaken attacks using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and surface-to-air missiles. I shall give the House some examples of attacks for which the group has claimed responsibility. They include an attack on the Egyptian Interior Minister in September 2013 in which a UK national was seriously injured; an attack on a police compound in Mansoura on 24 December 2013 that killed at least 16 people, including 14 police officers; an attack on an Egyptian police helicopter in the northern Sinai on 25 January 2014; the assassination of General Mohammed Saeed, an official in the interior ministry, on 28 January 2014; and an attack on a tourist bus in which three South Koreans and their Egyptian driver died on 16 January 2014.

The second group, Al Murabitun, resulted from a merger of two al-Qaeda in the Maghreb splinter groups that are active in Mali and Algeria: the Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa, and Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s group, the Al Mulathamine Battalion, which included the commando element known as “Those Who Sign in Blood”. The merger was announced in a public statement in August 2013. The group aspires to unite Muslims from the Nile to the Atlantic, and has affirmed its loyalty to the al-Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the emir of the Afghan Taliban, Mullah Omar. Al Murabitun’s first statement threatened France and its allies in the region, and called on Muslims to target French interests everywhere.

Belmokhtar has announced that he will not continue to lead the group to allow a new generation of jihadist leaders to come to the fore. Reports indicate that the new commander has fought against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and against the international intervention in Afghanistan in the 2000s. Although the group has not claimed responsibility for any terrorist attacks since the merger, both precursor groups participated in a number of terrorist attacks and kidnapping for ransom in the past 13 months. Belmokhtar’s group was responsible for the attack against the In Amenas gas facility in January 2013 that resulted in the death of more than 30 people, including Britons. In May 2013, the two groups targeted a military barracks in Agadez in Niger and a uranium mine in Arlit which supplies French nuclear reactors. The suicide attack in Agadez resulted in the deaths of at least 20 people. Shortly after the attacks, Belmokhtar indicated that they had been carried out as a form of revenge for the death of Abdelhamid Abou Zeid, an al-Qaeda in the Maghreb commander who was killed by French forces in northern Mali earlier in 2013. Despite previously separating themselves from al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, citing leadership issues and the desire to expand their control, both precursor groups continued to co-operate and fight alongside AQM fighters in Mali and other regions of west Africa—that activity has continued since the merger.

The Sahel region continues to see high threats of kidnap and terrorist attacks, which were further heightened following the French military intervention in Mali. Hostages are currently held in the Sahel and surrounding regions, which includes Algeria, Cameroon, Libya and Nigeria. The Canadians designated Belmokhtar’s group in November 2013 and the US designated it in December 2013, specifying Al Murabitun as an alias.

The third group, Ansar al Sharia-Tunisia—AAS-T—is a radical Islamist group founded in April 2011. The group aims to establish sharia law in Tunisia and eliminate western influence. Between 5,000 and 10,000 individuals may be attracted to rallies organised by the movement. The group is ideologically aligned to al-Qaeda and has links to al-Qaeda-affiliated groups. It is reported that the group announced its loyalty to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in September 2013.

AAS-T’s leader, Seif Allah Ibn Hussein, also known as Abu Ayadh al-Tunis, is a former al-Qaeda veteran combatant in Afghanistan. He has been hiding following the issue of a warrant for his arrest in relation to the allegation that he incited the attack on the US embassy in Tunis that killed four people in September 2012. Salafists believed to have links with AAS-T are assessed to be responsible for the attacks in October 2011 on a television station and the attack in June 2012 on an art exhibit. AAS-T is assessed to be responsible for the attacks on the US embassy and American school in Tunis in September 2012. The Tunisian Government believe AAS-T was responsible for the assassinations of two national coalition Assembly Members, those of Chokri Belaid in February 2013 and Mohamed Brahmi in July 2013. Additionally, elements of the group are believed to have been involved in the attempted suicide attack, in October 2013, at a hotel in a tourist resort in Sousse, where a significant number of British tourists were staying. More than 400,000 British tourists visited Tunisia last year. The Tunisian Government listed AAS-T as a terrorist group in 2013 and the US did so in January 2014.

Subject to the agreement of this House and the other place, the order will come into force on Friday 4 April. It is, of course, not appropriate for us to discuss specific intelligence that leads to any decision to proscribe.

[Mr Nigel Dodds (Belfast North) (DUP)]

Paragraph 12 of the explanatory memorandum states:

“If a proscribed organisation…applies to the Secretary of State for deproscription, the proscription of the organisation will be reviewed.”

How does that work in practice? If an organisation and its members are illegal—proscribed—how do they have the locus to apply to be have the proscription reviewed?

[James Brokenshire]

Under the current regime, the organisation or person affected by a proscription can submit a written application to the Home Secretary requesting that she considers whether they or a specified organisation can be removed from the list of proscribed organisations. There is a process for this. The application should also state the grounds on which it is made, and the Home Secretary is required to determine the application within 90 days.

If the Secretary of State agrees to de-proscribe that organisation, she has to lay an order before Parliament removing it from the list of proscribed organisations. In practice, all the evidence and intelligence have to be considered across Whitehall. The order is then subject to the affirmative resolution process. In other words, it is a similar process to a proscription application. I have to say to the House that no de-proscription applications have been received since June 2009.[Official Report, 8 May 2014, Vol. 580, c. 3MC.]

Eurojust and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office

Debate between Lord Dodds of Duncairn and James Brokenshire

Tuesday 29th October 2013 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (James Brokenshire)]

I beg to move,

That this House takes note of European Union Documents No. 12566/13, a draft Regulation on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Co-operation (Eurojust), and No. 12558/13 and Addenda 1 and 2, a draft Regulation on the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO); agrees with the Government that the UK should not opt in to the draft Regulation on the Eurojust at this time and should conduct a thorough review of the final agreed text to inform active consideration of opting into the Eurojust Regulation, post adoption, in consultation with Parliament; and further agrees with the Government that the UK should not participate in the establishment of any European Public Prosecutor’s Office.

On 17 July, the European Commission formally proposed the establishment of a European public prosecutor’s office and reforms to the existing European Union body, Eurojust. This triggered the UK’s opt-in protocol. The Government have been clear that we will not participate in the EPPO. As is clear from the motion, the Government also recommend that we should not opt into the new Eurojust proposal at the start of negotiations, but should conduct a thorough review of the final agreed text to inform active consideration of opting in post-adoption.

As the coalition agreement makes plain, we will put the United Kingdom’s national interest at the heart of every decision that we make on whether to participate in new European Union crime and policing measures. Our law enforcement and prosecution agencies must work closely with their counterparts in other European countries to combat the threat of cross-border crime. That does not mean, however, that we should sign up to new EU legislation that is not in the UK’s national interest.

I am sure that the House is clear about our position on the European public prosecutor’s office. As was established during a thorough debate in the House only a week ago, the Commission’s EPPO proposal is fundamentally flawed on many levels, not least in failing to pass the subsidiarity test. I am pleased to say that there has now been a sufficient number of votes in member states’ national Parliaments—including the House of Commons last week and the other place last night—to result in the issue of what is termed a yellow card, which means that the Commission is now required to review its proposal.

[Mr Nigel Dodds (Belfast North) (DUP)]

I welcome what the Minister has just said about the number of votes that will ensure that a review will take place. Will he confirm that, if the Government were minded to proceed with the opt-in—which I am glad they are not—that would require the endorsement of the British people, given the provision that any extra powers going to Brussels requires their endorsement through a referendum?

[James Brokenshire]

That is absolutely correct. The proposal for the creation of a European public prosecutor was framed specifically in those terms, and it would therefore require the endorsement of the public. I think that that is because, owing to the significant impact that it would have on the criminal justice system, the change would be so significant and fundamental—for reasons that I shall explain shortly—that it would require the backing not just not of Parliament but of the public.

The flaws in the EPPO proposal frame the context in which we must also consider the Eurojust proposal. The reforms proposed to Eurojust would involve deep connections with the EPPO, because the legal base for the EPPO requires it to be created “from Eurojust”. The Commission has sought to reflect that by creating operational, management and administrative links between the two bodies. That includes the exchange of data, including personal data; automatic cross-checking of data held on each body’s IT system; and Eurojust’s treating any request for support from the EPPO as if it had been received from a national competent authority.

At a time when we do not know what the EPPO will look like—given that the Commission must now review its proposal following the yellow card—let alone how the relationship between it and Eurojust might ultimately be defined in either text, it would be irresponsible in the extreme for us to risk binding ourselves to the European public prosecutor through our participation in the new Eurojust proposal. That would be a needless risk, given that we can review our place in Eurojust on its adoption.