Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism

Lord Dodds of Duncairn Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd April 2014 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

The orders are made after careful consideration, part of which involves input and consideration from the Foreign Office. That might or might not include co-operation or contact with individual Governments or authorities. I can tell the right hon. Gentleman that such broad consideration is always given to these orders, in the light of the factors that I have identified, including the impact that they could have here in the UK and on British citizens overseas. There is a need to send out a clear message in relation to a number of these terrorist organisations.

I shall expand a little on the steps that are being undertaken. They include research into and investigation of open-source material, intelligence material and advice that reflects consultation across the government, including with the intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The Home Secretary is supported in her decision-making process by the cross-Whitehall proscription review group. The decision to proscribe is taken with great care by the Home Secretary, and it is right that the case for proscribing new organisations must be approved by both Houses. Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary believes that ABM, Al Murabitun and Ansar al Sharia-Tunisia are currently concerned in terrorism. Hon. Members will appreciate that I am unable to comment on specific intelligence, but it might help the House if I provide a brief summary of their activities.

Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis—ABM—is an al-Qaeda-inspired militant Islamist group based in the northern Sinai region of Egypt. The group is said to recruit within Egypt and abroad, and it aims to create an Egyptian state ruled by sharia law. ABM is assessed to have been responsible for a number of attacks on security forces in Egypt since 2011. The attacks appear to have increased since the overthrow of the Morsi Government in July 2013. The group’s reach goes beyond the Sinai region, in that it claims responsibility for a number of attacks in Cairo as well as cross-border attacks against Israel.

ABM has undertaken attacks using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and surface-to-air missiles. I shall give the House some examples of attacks for which the group has claimed responsibility. They include an attack on the Egyptian Interior Minister in September 2013 in which a UK national was seriously injured; an attack on a police compound in Mansoura on 24 December 2013 that killed at least 16 people, including 14 police officers; an attack on an Egyptian police helicopter in the northern Sinai on 25 January 2014; the assassination of General Mohammed Saeed, an official in the interior ministry, on 28 January 2014; and an attack on a tourist bus in which three South Koreans and their Egyptian driver died on 16 January 2014.

The second group, Al Murabitun, resulted from a merger of two al-Qaeda in the Maghreb splinter groups that are active in Mali and Algeria: the Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa, and Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s group, the Al Mulathamine Battalion, which included the commando element known as “Those Who Sign in Blood”. The merger was announced in a public statement in August 2013. The group aspires to unite Muslims from the Nile to the Atlantic, and has affirmed its loyalty to the al-Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the emir of the Afghan Taliban, Mullah Omar. Al Murabitun’s first statement threatened France and its allies in the region, and called on Muslims to target French interests everywhere.

Belmokhtar has announced that he will not continue to lead the group to allow a new generation of jihadist leaders to come to the fore. Reports indicate that the new commander has fought against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and against the international intervention in Afghanistan in the 2000s. Although the group has not claimed responsibility for any terrorist attacks since the merger, both precursor groups participated in a number of terrorist attacks and kidnapping for ransom in the past 13 months. Belmokhtar’s group was responsible for the attack against the In Amenas gas facility in January 2013 that resulted in the death of more than 30 people, including Britons. In May 2013, the two groups targeted a military barracks in Agadez in Niger and a uranium mine in Arlit which supplies French nuclear reactors. The suicide attack in Agadez resulted in the deaths of at least 20 people. Shortly after the attacks, Belmokhtar indicated that they had been carried out as a form of revenge for the death of Abdelhamid Abou Zeid, an al-Qaeda in the Maghreb commander who was killed by French forces in northern Mali earlier in 2013. Despite previously separating themselves from al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, citing leadership issues and the desire to expand their control, both precursor groups continued to co-operate and fight alongside AQM fighters in Mali and other regions of west Africa—that activity has continued since the merger.

The Sahel region continues to see high threats of kidnap and terrorist attacks, which were further heightened following the French military intervention in Mali. Hostages are currently held in the Sahel and surrounding regions, which includes Algeria, Cameroon, Libya and Nigeria. The Canadians designated Belmokhtar’s group in November 2013 and the US designated it in December 2013, specifying Al Murabitun as an alias.

The third group, Ansar al Sharia-Tunisia—AAS-T—is a radical Islamist group founded in April 2011. The group aims to establish sharia law in Tunisia and eliminate western influence. Between 5,000 and 10,000 individuals may be attracted to rallies organised by the movement. The group is ideologically aligned to al-Qaeda and has links to al-Qaeda-affiliated groups. It is reported that the group announced its loyalty to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in September 2013.

AAS-T’s leader, Seif Allah Ibn Hussein, also known as Abu Ayadh al-Tunis, is a former al-Qaeda veteran combatant in Afghanistan. He has been hiding following the issue of a warrant for his arrest in relation to the allegation that he incited the attack on the US embassy in Tunis that killed four people in September 2012. Salafists believed to have links with AAS-T are assessed to be responsible for the attacks in October 2011 on a television station and the attack in June 2012 on an art exhibit. AAS-T is assessed to be responsible for the attacks on the US embassy and American school in Tunis in September 2012. The Tunisian Government believe AAS-T was responsible for the assassinations of two national coalition Assembly Members, those of Chokri Belaid in February 2013 and Mohamed Brahmi in July 2013. Additionally, elements of the group are believed to have been involved in the attempted suicide attack, in October 2013, at a hotel in a tourist resort in Sousse, where a significant number of British tourists were staying. More than 400,000 British tourists visited Tunisia last year. The Tunisian Government listed AAS-T as a terrorist group in 2013 and the US did so in January 2014.

Subject to the agreement of this House and the other place, the order will come into force on Friday 4 April. It is, of course, not appropriate for us to discuss specific intelligence that leads to any decision to proscribe.

[Mr Nigel Dodds (Belfast North) (DUP)]

Paragraph 12 of the explanatory memorandum states:

“If a proscribed organisation…applies to the Secretary of State for deproscription, the proscription of the organisation will be reviewed.”

How does that work in practice? If an organisation and its members are illegal—proscribed—how do they have the locus to apply to be have the proscription reviewed?

[James Brokenshire]

Under the current regime, the organisation or person affected by a proscription can submit a written application to the Home Secretary requesting that she considers whether they or a specified organisation can be removed from the list of proscribed organisations. There is a process for this. The application should also state the grounds on which it is made, and the Home Secretary is required to determine the application within 90 days.

If the Secretary of State agrees to de-proscribe that organisation, she has to lay an order before Parliament removing it from the list of proscribed organisations. In practice, all the evidence and intelligence have to be considered across Whitehall. The order is then subject to the affirmative resolution process. In other words, it is a similar process to a proscription application. I have to say to the House that no de-proscription applications have been received since June 2009.[Official Report, 8 May 2014, Vol. 580, c. 3MC.]