Eurojust and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office

Lord Dodds of Duncairn Excerpts

Tuesday 29th October 2013 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (James Brokenshire)]

I beg to move,

That this House takes note of European Union Documents No. 12566/13, a draft Regulation on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Co-operation (Eurojust), and No. 12558/13 and Addenda 1 and 2, a draft Regulation on the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO); agrees with the Government that the UK should not opt in to the draft Regulation on the Eurojust at this time and should conduct a thorough review of the final agreed text to inform active consideration of opting into the Eurojust Regulation, post adoption, in consultation with Parliament; and further agrees with the Government that the UK should not participate in the establishment of any European Public Prosecutor’s Office.

On 17 July, the European Commission formally proposed the establishment of a European public prosecutor’s office and reforms to the existing European Union body, Eurojust. This triggered the UK’s opt-in protocol. The Government have been clear that we will not participate in the EPPO. As is clear from the motion, the Government also recommend that we should not opt into the new Eurojust proposal at the start of negotiations, but should conduct a thorough review of the final agreed text to inform active consideration of opting in post-adoption.

As the coalition agreement makes plain, we will put the United Kingdom’s national interest at the heart of every decision that we make on whether to participate in new European Union crime and policing measures. Our law enforcement and prosecution agencies must work closely with their counterparts in other European countries to combat the threat of cross-border crime. That does not mean, however, that we should sign up to new EU legislation that is not in the UK’s national interest.

I am sure that the House is clear about our position on the European public prosecutor’s office. As was established during a thorough debate in the House only a week ago, the Commission’s EPPO proposal is fundamentally flawed on many levels, not least in failing to pass the subsidiarity test. I am pleased to say that there has now been a sufficient number of votes in member states’ national Parliaments—including the House of Commons last week and the other place last night—to result in the issue of what is termed a yellow card, which means that the Commission is now required to review its proposal.

[Mr Nigel Dodds (Belfast North) (DUP)]

I welcome what the Minister has just said about the number of votes that will ensure that a review will take place. Will he confirm that, if the Government were minded to proceed with the opt-in—which I am glad they are not—that would require the endorsement of the British people, given the provision that any extra powers going to Brussels requires their endorsement through a referendum?

[James Brokenshire]

That is absolutely correct. The proposal for the creation of a European public prosecutor was framed specifically in those terms, and it would therefore require the endorsement of the public. I think that that is because, owing to the significant impact that it would have on the criminal justice system, the change would be so significant and fundamental—for reasons that I shall explain shortly—that it would require the backing not just not of Parliament but of the public.

The flaws in the EPPO proposal frame the context in which we must also consider the Eurojust proposal. The reforms proposed to Eurojust would involve deep connections with the EPPO, because the legal base for the EPPO requires it to be created “from Eurojust”. The Commission has sought to reflect that by creating operational, management and administrative links between the two bodies. That includes the exchange of data, including personal data; automatic cross-checking of data held on each body’s IT system; and Eurojust’s treating any request for support from the EPPO as if it had been received from a national competent authority.

At a time when we do not know what the EPPO will look like—given that the Commission must now review its proposal following the yellow card—let alone how the relationship between it and Eurojust might ultimately be defined in either text, it would be irresponsible in the extreme for us to risk binding ourselves to the European public prosecutor through our participation in the new Eurojust proposal. That would be a needless risk, given that we can review our place in Eurojust on its adoption.