Extradition (Provisional Arrest) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Deben and Baroness Hamwee

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 5th March 2020 Grand Committee

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 6; I also have Amendments 7, 9 and 10 in this group. I start with Amendment 9, which I think is the most important. This amendment would restrict additions to Schedule A1 to one territory at a time. Orders are not amendable; one says either yes or no—and it is rarely no—to the whole thing. Let us consider an order seeking to add, say, Turkey and the Netherlands—it might not happen but I am thinking of two very different states—where one might want more protections than are proposed by the Government, but one would not want to reject an order to add the Netherlands. I think that is a sufficiently stark pairing to enable your Lordships to understand why I am concerned about this. I have written myself a note about the delegated powers memorandum. I cannot now find it but I am sure that it said something quite relevant. I might be able to find it by the end of the debate. Anyway, that is my particular concern. I do not think that I need to expand on it any further. I am grateful to the noble Lord and the noble and learned Lord for adding their names to this.

Amendment 6 is to probe how a territory can be varied, as distinct to being added or removed. It did not seem to me that one could vary a territory to make it part of a state. If it is about a change of name—some states do change their names—surely legislation here is not necessary. Amendment 7 is to take out the provision in new Section 74B of the Act that regulations can amend new Section 74C consequential on the addition, variation or removal of reference to a territory. New Section 74C is about the validity of requests for an arrest, which have to be made in an approved way; so, again, I am probing. What could be amended other than that the request comes from an authority with the requisite function? I table this because I am uncomfortable that there might be regulations in contemplation that widen the category of authorities entitled to make the request.

Amendment 10 would deal with the basis on which the Secretary of State may add a territory. The Minister at Second Reading said that we would apply the provisions only to

“alerts from countries that do not abuse Interpol systems, that respect the international rules-based system and that have criminal justice systems we trust; and only to alerts relating to sufficiently serious offences.”—[Official Report, 4/2/20; Col. 1727.]

I do not quarrel with a word of that. This amendment seeks to transfer those words into the legislation. I beg to move Amendment 6.

[Lord Deben]

My Lords, I very much support this Bill. My Amendment 11B relates to the names of territories that were not in the original legislation but are in this Bill. My noble friend perfectly reasonably suggested that I might be objecting to our extradition system in general and that that would not be suitable. I agree with her. However, this Bill has a list of “trusted partner” countries. That is true of all but one of them. All the others have a system of justice that is removed as far as humanly possible from politics. In this country, we are proud of that. That would not matter if one could not show—as I hope to—that the United States, because of its different kind of legal system, is using the extradition arrangements in a way that my noble friend rightly objects to, and why quite a number of other countries are not this list. The problem is that, by putting the United States on this list, we are making a statement about its use of extradition which seems unjustified. I will explain why.

We know that, unlike with the other countries, there is no reciprocal arrangement because the United States has said that it is contrary to its constitutional arrangements to have reciprocity. Our original Act is not reciprocated by the United States. I find that difficult anyway, but we are not discussing that issue here. In the case of the United States, unlike many other countries with which we have had and probably will have reciprocity after negotiation, we accept that it will not extradite people to us in circumstances in which we are extraditing people to it. We are confirming that by saying that we will extend our extradition procedure—perfectly properly in other circumstances, I think—to enable us to arrest people in the circumstances that this Bill makes clear.

We are very fortunate in this country because the whole system is overseen by the judiciary. It would be arguable that it does not matter because the new arrangements will mean that the judiciary will still be able to oversee that. After all, we are not putting every country on the list. We are not saying that the judiciary oversees everybody; we are saying it about these countries and distinguishing them from others.

I will remind your Lordships about two cases that show why I think that this is very real. We have the case of a woman who killed a British boy in Britain, has admitted it and has not been extradited although we have asked for that extradition. Not only has she not been extradited but the United States has refused to reveal what it claims are the special and secret arrangements under which the extradition cannot take place because the person is supposedly covered by diplomatic immunity. However, the United States will not publicly explain the special arrangement. Not only is the lady not extradited, although we have asked for it, but it is on a basis that the United States has refused to reveal. Were this Turkey, Bangladesh or another country, this would be a very good reason for not putting the name on this list.

There is a second reason: the use of the extradition arrangements to pursue a political or commercial end. For the United States it is very often a commercial end. In this I speak of the case of my former constituent Dr Mike Lynch, chairman of one of our most successful companies. He sold his British company to an American company; it was sold under British law in Britain, bought by an American company and operated in Britain. After a bit, the American company had so badly mucked up the running of this business that it wanted an excuse for the sum it had paid, so it called on the British authorities to prosecute Dr Lynch, saying he had misled it. That may or may not be true. It had done very extensive due diligence before, so it is difficult to believe that so great an American company with so much opportunity to look beforehand should have been misled, but that is what it said.

The British authorities investigated and found that there was no case to answer. Therefore, they declined the prosecution. The American company, Hewlett Packard, perfectly rightly—I have no objection to this—went to the civil courts to claim its case. That case has now been heard at great length. It is probably the longest case of this kind ever held in this country. Dr Lynch was cross-examined for many days. The case is over as far as the evidence is concerned, but there has so far not been a judgment, so we do not know whether the civil courts in this country will find my former constituent guilty or innocent. Hewlett Packard is clearly worried about this case. Indeed, to read it one might be worried oneself if one were on that side. But still, we do not know. It is for the judge to decide.

British justice is known internationally as the fairest system in the world. That is why lots of companies that are not here agree with other companies that are not here for their court cases, should they come up, to be decided in British courts; they know that they will get a fair deal. Hewlett Packard has however demanded that Dr Lynch be extradited from Britain to have the case heard not in this country but in the United States. I am quite sure the reason is that it feels a United States court is more likely to make a decision which pleases it—particularly given the geographical position of the court calling for the extradition and its long-standing relationship with Hewlett Packard—and more likely to accept its case than the British one.

We all know that there are many situations in which British companies have found that courts in the United States make decisions that we would find, let us say, commercially political rather than judicially objective. Here we are, saying that this “trusted partner” should be treated in the same way as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland and Liechtenstein, all of which have systems that any of us in this Room would be happy to be tried before, but how many of us would genuinely say that, if we had a commercial disagreement with an American company with power and political punch, we would wish to be charged before an American court? That is a different situation.

I have tabled the amendment not because I seek to undermine the original Act, although I think it was a mistake to allow a non-reciprocal arrangement with the United States. I am merely saying that I do not think that the United States should be one of those countries that benefits from a perfectly proper extension of our laws.

My noble friend said that she would not want to have this kind of arrangement with anyone whose judicial system was subject to political influence. President Trump has pointed out that he has changed the judges in the Ninth Circuit because it was

“a big thorn in our side”.

He has now appointed judges who will not be a big thorn in his side. He has made, I think, 181 judicial appointments and encouraged the majority Republican Senate to change as many as possible while he is there so that they get the judges who will to make the sort of judgments that suit the right-wing Republican that he is.