Financial Services Bill

Debate between Lord De Mauley and Lord Eatwell

Tuesday 10th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, we broadly welcome these amendments, in the sense that they are adding to the overall scrutiny and assessment of the activities of the FPC and thereby reinforcing, we believe, its general acceptability and strength of purpose. However, I want to raise a warning flag with respect to new Section 9QA(3), in which it is argued that the FPC will have to prepare,

“an estimate of the costs and an estimate of the benefits that would arise from … the direction or recommendation in question”.

These are macroeconomic measures. It is virtually impossible to provide a simple numerical estimate of the cost or benefit of a macro measure. There will be either a tendency to overestimate the costs, or a tendency to overestimate the benefit, in this particular case. Presenting an assessment in quantitative terms will give spurious precision and, indeed, spurious credibility to a particular measure. I assure the Minister that for any macro measure, I could write an entirely credible report saying that the costs exceeded the benefits and an equally credible report saying that the benefits exceeded the costs. This is simply extending the whole notion of cost-benefit analysis beyond the range in which it can effectively operate. It would be valuable to take account of an attempt to describe in broad qualitative terms the costs and benefits. However, please let us not have the spurious precision of numerical calculations of variables which, by their very nature, cannot be expressed in precise terms.

[Lord De Mauley]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for those questions. The noble Lord, Lord Myners, says that effectively there will always be a recommendation that is extant. He is probably right about that. The requirement is to review regularly any recommendations that have a continuing effect, and that includes any recommendations to set or maintain any particular level of leverage or capital, as the noble Lord suggests. I broadly agree with him, actually.

The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, is right to say that a cost-benefit analysis is a difficult thing to do. That does not mean that the committee should not attempt it, so that at least interested parties have an opportunity to review it and make their comments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord De Mauley]

I will, if I may, respond on that point. The noble Lord, Lord Myners, is right, and my noble friend Lord Sassoon acknowledged earlier, that previously the Bank was slow to recognise the MPC external members’ need to have access to dedicated support. The Bank has learnt its lesson.

[Lord Eatwell]

Gosh, that is a bold statement. In replying to the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, I would point out that he has overlooked two crucial elements that underpin the logic of this amendment. First, there are indeed highly skilled and independent members of the Financial Policy Committee, but they are involved in making the decisions and the recommendations. They are the organised part of the organisation which will in due course be responsible for what happens. They are not in any sense an evaluative mechanism. They are adding grist to the mill of a decision-making mechanism; an evaluative mechanism is a different thing altogether.

Secondly, the noble Lord referred to the role of the new oversight committee. I would remind Members of the Committee that the oversight committee will be composed of members of the court; it will not be anybody outwith the internal structure of the Bank. I am enormously disappointed—the most disappointed I have been with anything I have done in relation to this organisation—that the Government have not taken this on board. We are trying to formalise a continuous process of debate, review and assessment by people who have high levels of skill in this area but who are not otherwise involved. That is what a truly effective advisory panel should do. I was struck by my noble friend Lord Liddle’s comments on what is happening at the European Systemic Risk Board. As the noble Lord, Lord Stewartby, said, we want people with the right sort of skills doing this sort of assessment. He is absolutely right.

I ask the Government to think again on this issue. This area can contribute significantly to the overall success of the FPC. I assure the Government that I will return to this matter at later stages, but for now I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Lord De Mauley and Lord Eatwell

Tuesday 26th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eatwell]

Perhaps I may clarify that point. It is a term of art to say that you consult the public. When an institution such as the Bank of England or the Financial Services Authority initiates a general consultation and publishes a consultation document, they consult the public. In fact, it tends to be the financial services industry and other immediately interested parties who are consulted, not the gentleman on the Clapham omnibus.

[Lord De Mauley]

My Lords, as I said in the debate on the last group of amendments, the Government recognise the need for transparency and accountability in financial regulation. The Bank also places great value on transparency and openness. It uses a variety of methods to engage with the public on issues of policy, including FPC and MPC meeting records, financial stability and inflation reports, public speeches, policy papers, consultations, regional agencies and various forms of social media. The Bank and the FPC further demonstrated their commitment to transparency in their work on macroprudential tools by publishing a discussion document in December that invited public opinion.

The Bank’s court will be responsible for setting the Bank’s strategy in relation to its financial stability objective. The Bill requires that the court consults the Treasury and the Financial Policy Committee about a draft of the strategy before determining or revising it. The Bill does not prohibit the court seeking the opinions of others. For example, the court might wish to consult the European Systemic Risk Board to get is opinion on the outlook for financial stability in the European Union; it might wish to consult the International Monetary Fund or the Financial Reporting Council, as the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, mentioned; it would almost certainly want to consult the PRA board and perhaps the FCA too. The list goes on. The Bill is drafted in a flexible way which allows the court to consult anyone on its strategy.

As to Amendment 16 specifically, the current drafting of the Bill already allows the court to consult the public on its financial stability strategy. The Bank’s financial stability strategy is currently published annually in the Bank’s annual report and is available on the Bank’s website. It is open to any organisation or member of the public to send the Bank comments on its financial stability strategy if they wish. I would expect the Bank to take seriously any contributions from the public and, where appropriate, to take them into account when revising the strategy. Given that revisions to the financial stability strategy will be less frequent—every three years—the court may well choose to undertake a public consultation process in advance of revising its strategy, particularly if the Bank were considering making any significant changes to it.

Such a public consultation process may not be necessary or even possible on every occasion. For example, the changes being made might be minor and technical and so not warrant a public consultation. In other cases, the changes to the strategy may be urgent and so there may be inadequate time for public consultation.

While I entirely support the sentiment behind the amendment, I do not think that it would be appropriate to put in the legislation a prescriptive requirement for public consultation in all cases. On that basis, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, I was very struck by the Minister’s speech because it was rather better than mine in support of my amendment. He said that the public would typically be consulted. The only slightly off-base comment that he made was that the financial stability strategy would be revised every three years. That is not according to the Bill, which says,

“complete a review … before the end of each relevant period”.

“Before the end” could be one month, six months, two years, 11 months or 30 days, whichever is relevant. The notion that revisions will take place irregularly—in fact, on a three-yearly basis—is not what is in the Bill.

The Minister then shot his fox by saying that urgent revisions might have to be made. In that case, given that revisions can take place at differing intervals depending on the exigencies of the time—let us remember that financial markets can change their character and behaviour quite rapidly and unexpectedly—and if this impinges on strategy, it should be appropriate that consultation takes place. My amendment provides that variations in strategy be widely consulted on, including among the public. A public consultation would take place, and the relevant authorities listed so accurately by the Minister would no doubt participate.

I do not understand the Minister’s rejection of what I would think is an extremely helpful amendment given what he had to say. However, we will come back to this matter on Report. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Eatwell]

The amendment relates to what I think is a mistake in drafting because there is failure in symmetry between the two new subsections. We have just discussed new Section 9A(2), which states that the Court of Directors must consult the Financial Policy Committee and the Treasury. New Section 9A(3) states:

“The Financial Policy Committee may at any time make recommendations to the court of directors as to the provisions”.

Why is the Treasury included in subsection (2) but not in (3)? Surely, if the Court of Directors must consult the Financial Policy Committee and the Treasury about a draft of the strategy, then if, from time to time, the Financial Policy Committee or the Treasury wishes to make recommendations to the court, the Treasury should be able to do so on the same terms.

I think that there is just a mistake in drafting here. If subsections (2) and (3) are to be symmetrical, my amendment should be accepted. I beg to move.

[Lord De Mauley]

My Lords, there are already a number of measures in the Bill relating to the Treasury’s involvement with the setting and revision of the Bank’s financial stability strategy. The court must, for example, consult the Treasury before setting or revising the strategy. In addition there is nothing to stop the Treasury making proactive recommendations to the court on the content of the strategy on a non-statutory basis. I believe that these arrangements strike the right balance between insulating the Bank from political pressure while ensuring that the Treasury’s voice will be heard.

I am not sure that this goes entirely to address the specific question from the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, but the Treasury can at any time, if it wants to, make recommendations to the court as to its strategy. Express provision is needed for the FPC to make such recommendations since the FPC is a creation of statute and its functions need to be set out in statute. The Treasury is not a creation of statute and has the ability under common law to provide advice to anyone. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Eatwell]

I am sorry—once again, I really do not understand. New Section 9A(2) is absolutely clear that the Court of Directors must consult the FPC and the Treasury in developing a proper financial stability strategy. That is good—after all, this particular strategy is a very complex thing and it is going to involve direct intervention in the growth, or limitations of the growth, of credit in the economy. New Section 9A(3) states that the Financial Policy Committee may at any time make a recommendation, which is perfectly reasonable. It is doing its research, it comes up with an idea, it finds that something has been left out that is terribly important, and so it goes along to the Court of Directors to say that it really needs to consider it.

Surely the Treasury should have the symmetric right as from new Section 9A(2) to new Section 9A(3). Unless the noble Lord can point to somewhere else in the Bill where this right is available to the Treasury, then this is the point at which to include the Treasury’s ability to make a recommendation on its observations on changing circumstances. After all, it has the widest observation of changes in economic circumstances, both domestic and international. If the noble Lord can point to another part in the Bill which I am overlooking then I will certainly withdraw my amendment. At present, I am not convinced. I would be grateful if he could enlighten me.

[Lord De Mauley]

I understand the question from the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, but I do not have an answer for him now. It is an important question so perhaps I may look into it and write to him.

[Lord Eatwell]

It would be churlish to say no. On that basis, I shall leave the question on the table and, for the moment, beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord De Mauley]

My Lords, Amendments 18 and 19 would require the court to review the Bank’s stability strategy annually. The extant legislation, the Bank of England Act, requires the court to determine and review the bank’s strategy in relation to the financial stability objective. That legislation does not set out how regularly the strategy should be reviewed. In practice, the court has recently revised the financial stability strategy annually. That is understandable given the sheer volume of legislative and other changes to the system of financial regulation in the past three or so years.

However, a strategy ought to be something for the long term. If the strategy is revised annually—ad infinitum, I contend—there is a risk that the short timeframe would lead to focus on short-term issues, reading more like what one might call a business plan than a genuine strategy. That is why new Section 9A will require the court in future to revise the Bank’s stability strategy at least every three years—more in line, I suggest, with a long-term strategy. Of course, if circumstances mean that the strategy must be changed in a shorter timeframe, new Section 9A allows the court the flexibility to revise the strategy earlier, as the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, pointed out in an earlier debate.

We believe that a long-term financial strategy should provide vision, purpose and certainty for the Bank, its staff and the industry alike. That is why I believe that a three-year timeframe for a strategy is appropriate, so I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his Amendment 18.

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, once again, I thought that the noble Lord was making a better speech than me in support of the amendment. As he pointed out, the significant changes which have taken place over the past three years have required annual revision. Once one gets into a sequence of annual revisions, some of which can be looking back quite a long way—there is no reason why they should focus on the short-term—that creates an environment in which the regulated community knows what to expect every year, can consider the report, and if it says that the strategy is unchanged, that provides a great deal of comfort to the regulated community.

If there is no report, the regulated community is left hanging in the air, thinking, “Yes, it is all the same, but is something going on that is not quite so important but that they do not want to reveal to us?”. Surely, if there is a regular annual report, that provides a decision-making environment optimal for the financial services industry. Once one goes to three years and then is forced to do things once a year because so much is changing, think of the pessimism that one creates, think of the loss of certainty created in such circumstances. The industry wonders, “Why are they changing their three-year cycle? Why are they moving to one year? There must be something going on that we do not really know about. Perhaps something really bad is happening”.

If one sticks to a steady one-year cycle, apart from emergencies—to which the noble Lord referred, and on which I entirely agree—that creates the comfort and certainty which the financial services industry really needs with respect to, let us remember, the utilisation of instruments, such as leverage collars and countercyclical provisioning, which will have a major impact on business plans and performance of the whole financial services industry.

I really would press the Government to take this under advisement and to think carefully about it. We will return to this on Report because leaving the period at three years is not the way to effectively manage confidence and expectations in an industry in which confidence and expectations are paramount in decision-making. In the mean time, I hope that the Government will take it away and think about it, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Economy: Budget Statement

Debate between Lord De Mauley and Lord Eatwell

Thursday 22nd March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, a year ago the Chancellor of the Exchequer presented a Budget for “enduring growth and jobs” and published a plan for growth that would,

“put fuel in the tank of the British economy”.

That was some fuel. Growth collapsed and unemployment rose by 150,000, and more than 1 million young people are now unemployed. This year, once again, the Chancellor has presented a Budget that he claims,

“helps those looking for work”,

and supports growth.

The auguries are not good. The OBR’s forecast for the growth of business investment this year is down from 7.7 per cent in November to nearly 0.7 per cent now. The forecast for growth of exports and for house-building is down. As for unemployment, another 150,000 are on the dole in 2012. No wonder that the OBR states that it has made no,

“material adjustments to our economy forecast”,

as a result of the Budget 2012 policy measures. In other words, the policy impact of the Budget on the prospects for growth and jobs is nil.

Why is the Government’s growth strategy such a spectacular failure? Why did last year’s plan for growth vanish without trace? Why does the plethora of encouraging-sounding micro-measures on energy, exports and science not make a scintilla of difference to the OBR’s growth forecast? The answer is provided by the Institute of Directors in its response to the Budget:

“The key factor blocking implementation of these”—

investment—

“plans is not cash, but confidence”.

How right it is. The Government simply do not seem to understand that it matters not how cheap finance might be, or even what the corporate tax rate might be; if companies believe that investment will yield no return, they will not invest. What is the point of investing if you have no confidence in the prospect of sales? You are simply going to lose your money.

The source of the Government’s central policy failure is revealed in a chart published in the Budget Statement. Chart 1.5 on page 20 shows what has happened to public sector net borrowing—the deficit—since 2005. Those of your Lordships who have had to suffer the interminable repetition by the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, of the record deficit—we heard again today that the Government inherited it—may be somewhat surprised by this chart, for it shows that from 2005 to 2008 the deficit was falling from £40 billion a year to around £32 billion a year. Then, following the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the financial crisis devastated the public finances. A veritable financial tsunami cut revenues and increased spending, driving net borrowing to the peak, which we hear so often from the noble Lord, of £157 billion in May 2010.

In fact, the Government inherited a composite position: a perfectly sound financial stance, overlain by the financial consequences of the crisis. They chose to treat a unique post-war event as if it were due to policy excess. They threw the economy into reverse, devastated business confidence and cut the growth they inherited from 2 per cent to zero. That is the growth rate they inherited, and that is the consequence of their policies.

As an illustration of the Government’s folly, let us suppose that instead of a financial tsunami Britain had been hit by a real tsunami that destroyed 6 per cent of productive capacity, resulting in a sharp fall in tax revenues and an equally sharp rise in government expenditure. Would they then have chosen the path of austerity to restore the public finances? Of course not; they would have set about funding reconstruction. A sinking fund would have been established to spread the cost of restoring the economy, and would in consequence have restored the public finances, over a lengthy period. No one would have recommended bearing all the cost in just a few years, and no one would have imagined that reconstruction could be guided by market forces alone. What is the difference between this hypothetical tsunami and the all too real financial tsunami that the country has suffered? There is none, other than the Government’s failure to distinguish between a unique shock and a normal policy stance.

However, perhaps my characterisation of coalition policy as folly is a little too harsh. After all, the supposed need for austerity has provided the Government with the opportunity to dismantle the welfare state with a zeal that would never have been tolerated in normal times. To assess the impact of this budget on the bottom 50 per cent of incomes, it is necessary to include all those measures that were announced over the past year, in the 2011 Budget and in the Autumn Statement, which will come into effect next month—measures that the Institute for Fiscal Studies estimates will cost families with children an average of £530 per year.

Now set that figure of £530 against next year’s increase in the personal tax allowance announced in the Budget. Taking people out of tax sounds like a laudable goal until you remember that the poorest do not pay tax. Then consider the consequences carefully. As a result of this measure, the poorest 10 per cent of households will gain £10. The richest 10 per cent of households will benefit to the tune of £111. Indeed, of the overall cost of this measure, 70 per cent goes to the top half of the income distribution. Yet that is what Liberal Democrats call “progressive”.

Compare these crumbs thrown to the poor to the £1.6 billion of cuts to the working tax credit about to hit them this April—cuts that are supposed to increase the incentive to work, when there are no jobs. Yesterday, in addition to what has been done already, the Chancellor announced, and the noble Lord confirmed, that the coalition is planning a further £10 billion of cuts to the welfare budget. I never cease to be amazed at the savage pleasure that Tories and Liberal Democrats take in attacking the living standards of the poor. However, my credulity has been stretched to breaking point by their naked pandering to their rich friends.

It is worth examining in some detail the coalition’s case for the pre-announced cut in the 50p tax rate. HMRC’s evaluation of the impact of the tax is based on one year’s data—a sample that no self-respecting economist would ever rely on. Moreover, the self-assessment figures are clearly distorted by income being brought forward in the preceding tax year—a predominantly one-off effect.

Next, let us consider the Chancellor’s claim that as a result of changes to stamp duty and capping unlimited tax reliefs, which will yield about £500 million in a full year,

“we will be getting five times more money each and every year from the wealthiest in our society”.—[Official Report, Commons, 21/3/12; col. 806.]

The origins of this claim can be found in Table A2 of the HMRC review. The table shows that the 50p tax without what is politely called “behavioural impact”—tax avoidance—would yield £3 billion in a full year. However, extraordinarily the 45p tax will result in revenues of £2.9 billion, as the 5p difference will be enough to reverse the behavioural impact. So, while 50p triggers almost complete avoidance, 45p is paid with equanimity. If you believe that, you’ll believe anything.

There is more to come. A Government who quite rightly declare tax avoidance to be “morally repugnant” have created the perfect tax avoidance scheme. Everyone knows that the top rate will fall from 50p to 45p next year, so all those who shifted their income back to avoid the 50p rate last year will shift their income forward to avoid the 50p tax this year. This is a stealth subsidy on a grand scale. To pay for the stealth subsidy, there is the stealth tax on pensioners. Never can a £1 billion a year tax grab have been explained as “simplification” that helps the poor old dears who find the forms too complicated.

Table 2.1 of the Budget Statement provides a helpful guide to the cumulative effect of the measures taken by the Chancellor since assuming office. As of today, 90 per cent of his planned benefit cuts are still to come, resulting in a cumulative 6 per cent taken out of aggregate demand over the next four years. That is the government headwind that business in this country has to battle against.

So what are the overall effects of the Government’s policies? With total output still 4 per cent below the peak achieved in 2008, we will not return to the level of 2008 for another three years. They have transformed a shock as large as that experienced in 1930 into a depression that will last two years longer than the 1930s depression. It is no excuse to argue that everyone else is adopting the same policy. There is only one prize for the quickest lemming.

This country needs policies for growth and jobs. The coalition believes that the rich must be made richer to encourage them to work and the poor must be made poorer to encourage them to work. In the mean time, the economy stagnates, the prospects of growth retreat before our very eyes and the pain of fiscal consolidation intensifies. The Government’s stance, echoed in this mean little Budget, is fundamentally misconceived. Without measures to boost confidence in the growth of demand, supply side reforms, however worthy, will have a negligible impact. A new approach is needed. This Budget illustrates that the coalition has neither the imagination nor the will to meet that challenge.

[Lord De Mauley]

My Lords, perhaps I may respectfully remind noble Lords that this is a time-limited debate and that contributions, other than that of my noble friend the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham, are limited to 10 minutes.

[Lord Eatwell]

The noble Lord is mistaken. The Opposition have 12 minutes to reply to the opening statement by the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon.

Banks: Mutual Ownership

Debate between Lord De Mauley and Lord Eatwell

Wednesday 2nd March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord De Mauley]

My Lords, I will certainly take my noble friend’s comments back to the department.

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, the noble Lord on a couple of occasions has referred to the Independent Commission on Banking. Will he confirm that in recent weeks there have been threats of resignation from the commission if its remit is in any way constrained?

[Lord De Mauley]

My Lords, I am not fully aware of that and I will come back to the noble Lord on the matter.

Budget Responsibility and National Audit Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord De Mauley and Lord Eatwell

Thursday 9th December 2010 Grand Committee

[Lord De Mauley]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, and his noble friends for their amendment and to the noble Lord, Lord Burns, for his contribution. The Government recognise the importance of external expert challenge, which is the issue that the noble Lords have raised. Indeed, the fact that the OBR analysis is publicly available means that it is open to scrutiny.

On a previous occasion, we debated whether the OBR should produce an assessment of forecast accuracy. This process needs expertise in forecasting, which the OBR clearly has. The Government argue that this expertise will be difficult, although not impossible, to find elsewhere. It also requires a full understanding of the data underpinning the forecasts. Again, the OBR has this, and a similar level of knowledge is scarce elsewhere, although, I acknowledge, not unobtainable.

Assessing previous performance provides a very valuable opportunity for the OBR to learn and understand what has driven diversions from accuracy. It is clear that it is the OBR’s intention to use the report in this way and that it has the right skill set to do so. The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, mentioned the Congressional Budget Office. I understand that, although it does indeed have a panel of external advisers who meet twice a year, the CBO carries out its own analysis of previous forecasts. I think that our proposed design is in line with discussions with international organisations.

The proposals in the amendment raise a number of issues that we need to consider. The Government, for example, believe it is difficult to envisage that the committee could get into the detail needed to produce a comprehensive and meaningful assessment. Like the noble Lord, Lord Burns, we share the concerns about a body of five people being needed to scrutinise this work. We are not sure whether the noble Lord envisages that they would be paid and, if so, how much. We also feel that there is an issue of focus and that it might be appropriate to look at a larger section of the OBR’s work, because perhaps all parts of its work could benefit from external expertise.

In general, in a broader context there is nothing to stop any person or organisation assessing the OBR’s forecast accuracy by looking at its forecasts and comparing them with the actual outturn data. Where value can be added is in making sure that the OBR uses all the best information. That is why we put an emphasis on transparency across the piece. None the less, we accept that bringing in external expertise could be very useful. We believe that it is consistent with the Bill as drafted but that it is important to take a more proportionate approach. Of course, the OBR already has the power to convene advisory panels to provide external perspectives if it sees fit, and Robert Chote indicated his interest in that in his evidence to the Treasury Select Committee. The OBR is already drawing on external expertise, as noted in its autumn forecast statement.

In conclusion, the Government will reflect on whether additional steps are needed in the light of this very helpful debate and suggestion. In particular, I am interested in the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Burns, which I should like to take away and think about.

[Lord Eatwell]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. Perhaps I may take up a couple of the points to which he referred, as did the noble Lord, Lord Burns. First, there is the question of whether there would be enough people to do the job. The Treasury sends out a compendium of about 40 independent forecasts, so at least 40 independent forecasting organisations are doing this job. It seems to me that within those organisations, as well as within universities and research organisations such as the national institute, there is a sufficient pool of talent to draw on over the years to ensure that this job is well done.

Secondly, in suggesting that there should be a team of five, I was not recommending that they all commit themselves to do the job in any one year; rather, I was proposing that they act as a committee, perhaps assigning a couple of its members to do the job each year. The group of five would provide continuity over the piece.

There was then the question of how much the committee members should be paid. I should tell the noble Lord that academics, in particular, are so obsessive and competitive that they will do this in exchange for a good lunch. Given the amount that they are paid, they are not so well fed these days, and I do not think that there would be any difficulty in finding suitable people at a reasonable level of remuneration.

The key issue is bringing in external experts who are committed to doing the job. As I conceded in my opening speech, the transparency with which the OBR is to operate will attract outside commentators. What is needed is a group of people who have suitable expertise, in whom the Chancellor and the Select Committee of another place have confidence, and whose responsibility it would be to comment on the two major forecasts per year that the OBR is required under the Bill to make. However, I am heartened by the Minister’s response and look forward to further discussions on this matter. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

European Union: Debts

Debate between Lord De Mauley and Lord Eatwell

Tuesday 8th June 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord De Mauley]

My Lords, I quite agree with my noble friend. We must be alive to the risks that the current uncertainty poses because of financial-sector linkages well beyond the euro area. The UK’s support for the €60 billion euro element of the package represents a sensible position that strikes a balance between UK support and the need for the euro area to take the lead in resolving these problems.

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, as the noble Lord is undoubtedly aware, the exposure of British financial institutions to the heavily indebted southern states of the eurozone is estimated at more than £100 billion. In those circumstances, if the European authorities asked for British financial participation in an activity that would strengthen the security of British banks, would the Government participate? Yes or no?

[Lord De Mauley]

My Lords, I am not in a position to answer a hypothetical question today.

Economy

Debate between Lord De Mauley and Lord Eatwell

Monday 7th June 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord De Mauley]

My noble friend is, of course, absolutely right.

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, does the Minister recall that the Prime Minister referred in his speech to the need to expand manufacturing industry? Does he agree with the Financial Times that the recent recovery in manufacturing industry—it is now growing faster than at any time since 1987—has been aided by the significant fall in the pound? Does he also agree that this illustrates the importance of maintaining demand to stimulate investment and growth?

[Lord De Mauley]

My Lords, I cannot find fault with the noble Lord’s argument that the fall in the pound has helped our exports. It is important that we maintain all efforts to promote our manufacturing industries and, indeed, exports.