Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord De Mauley Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 5th January 2026 Lords Chamber

This Bill is, as we have said many times, a political choice. Ministers could have chosen not to do it, and they could have done the right thing. Ministers could have chosen to consult the Chagossian people before they agreed this treaty. They could have held a referendum of the Chagossian people, and again they chose not to. The Government should stop hiding behind the potential decisions of international courts and take ownership of the treaty for which they are responsible. They have chosen not to consult the Chagossians before proceeding. We disagree with that in the strongest possible terms and we will support amendments that would deliver the referendum that the Chagossian people morally deserve. I beg to move.

[Lord De Mauley (Con)]

My Lords, it might help the House if I were to provide a brief overview of the International Relations and Defence Committee’s recent report, which my noble friend Lord Callanan referred to, on Chagossian views on the agreement concerning the Chagos Archipelago. What I will cover touches on many of the amendments in this group.

On 11 November last year, we were asked by the Government and Official Opposition Chief Whips to undertake a short piece of work on the impact of the Bill, including on the Chagossian community. In Committee, the Government also invited us to, and I quote the Minister,

“engage a range of Chagossians to ascertain their views on the implications of the Diego Garcia treaty, and to produce a report”.—[Official Report, 11/11/25; col. 227.]

We accepted the invitation because we thought it important to allow Chagossians to have their say and believed that our previous work on the agreement meant that we were well placed to do so.

Time, however, was very much against us. Within about a month, we had to launch a mechanism to gather views from a globally dispersed population, allow Chagossians time to respond and leave us sufficient time to analyse the responses and produce a report in time for the debate today. This time pressure shaped how we designed and conducted this exercise, leading to our decision to conduct an online survey. Had circumstances allowed, we would also have held a series of round table discussions directly with Chagossian community members, an approach we used in our previous work on the agreement.

In the end, the online survey was imperfect, but it was the only practical option available given the constraints, and it was no substitute for a proper consultation or referendum. We recognised the challenges it would pose, including potential language barriers, limited digital access and reliance on people submitting responses in good faith. Throughout the process, we have sought to mitigate these challenges, including through direct promotion of the survey among Chagossian community groups, providing translated versions in both French and Mauritian Creole, and adopting a post-collection data-checking process to strengthen the robustness of our survey results.

Our survey received over 3,000 responses from Chagossians in the United Kingdom, Mauritius, the Seychelles and beyond. This is an extraordinary response rate given the short time available and shows a high level of engagement from the global Chagossian diaspora, which is believed to number around 10,000. While we cannot claim to have provided a scientific measure of the collective will of the Chagossian people, the high volume of responses gives us confidence that the results provide meaningful insights into Chagossian perspectives on the agreement. Before going into detail on our findings, it is worth saying that, had successive United Kingdom Governments conducted a more comprehensive engagement exercise with Chagossians during the negotiations, our survey would not have been necessary.

I turn to our key findings. Our survey revealed several strikingly consistent themes. First, there was a profound and enduring sense of injustice. Many Chagossians describe the multigenerational hardships they and their families have experienced as a result of their forcible removal from the islands. Across responses, there was a powerful sense of the economic, cultural and emotional loss. Many spoke of the need for meaningful compensation to address the injustices experienced and a deep desire to return to the islands, whether to visit or to live, to reconnect with their homeland.

Secondly, the survey revealed widespread distrust of the Mauritian Government and a scepticism over their willingness and ability to meet Chagossian needs. While not universal, this sentiment was strongest among UK-based Chagossian and was shared by a significant number of respondents in Mauritius and the Seychelles. Many highlighted previous ill-treatment by the Mauritian Government and expressed concerns that Mauritian-led resettlement, financial support and environmental stewardship would not reflect Chagossian priorities.

Thirdly, Chagossians expressed a clear desire for greater agency, autonomy and voice in decisions that affect them and the future of the islands. Many felt sidelined by the negotiation process and lacked trust that the agreement would allow their needs to be met. Despite the fact that self-determination was not a subject of the survey, it was raised frequently, particularly by UK-based Chagossians who felt strongly that the Chagossian people should have a decisive say over the sovereign status of the islands.

For me, one of the starkest revelations from the survey is reported at paragraph 44. I should say before I refer to the detail that, because we did not want to raise false expectations, we deliberately asked no questions about sovereignty; indeed, there is no mention of it in the survey document we published. However, a very substantial proportion of UK respondents, and indeed some from Mauritius, used the free text boxes to make the point strongly that they would prefer the archipelago to remain under British sovereignty. What makes this so compelling is that the point is consistently and clearly made despite the appalling treatment the British Government have meted out to these people. If they would prefer British sovereignty in these circumstances, what does that say about the Government’s decision to grant sovereignty to Mauritius? I will come back to the Government’s recent Statement later, but it contained yet another example of the Government, with Mauritius, making decisions directly affecting Chagossians without involving them.

Our survey provided insights into Chagossian views on the technical aspects of the agreement. On resettlement, respondents asserted the importance of employment opportunities and infrastructure as key enablers for resettlement. The absence of healthcare, education, housing and other basic services were seen as significant obstacles. The exclusion of the island of Diego Garcia, the only island with any real infrastructure, was a particular source of frustration for some.

On financial support mechanisms, respondents emphasised the need for direct financial support and for Chagossian-led oversight of the £40 million trust fund established under the agreement. Respondents were clear that meaningful financial support for the Chagossian community is not simply a matter of easing material hardship but a moral obligation. Chagossians see financial payments as a way to deliver justice and provide redress. In that context, many felt that the £40 million allocated to the trust fund falls short of the scale of harm endured and does not represent adequate reparation. There was scepticism that Chagossians living in the UK, but also those living elsewhere, would be able to benefit from the fund, given that it is to be administered from Mauritius.

On marine conservation, respondents advocated strongly for approaches that include Chagossian co-stewardship of marine resources. The importance of integrating traditional Chagossian knowledge into modern conservation frameworks was highlighted.

We offer a cautious welcome to the Government’s Statement of 15 December. It addresses some of these concerns but by no means all, and I am sure that the remaining ones will surface in the debates to come. The Statement confirms Chagossian stewardship of the trust fund, albeit with just one UK representative on the 12-member board, which in my personal opinion, given the likely relative distribution of the Chagossian diaspora, does not seem fair.

The Statement clarifies the resettlement criteria, which will extend resettlement rights to Chagossians born on the islands and their children but not their grandchildren, and confirms that Chagossians will be able to hold British and Mauritian citizenship. Nevertheless, full-scale resettlement remains a distant prospect, so heritage visits will continue to be a vital means for Chagossians to be able to re-establish a connection to the islands and should therefore be reinstated without delay. It is essential that the Government continue to explore ways to increase support for Chagossians in the UK and ensure that they too really can access the benefits of the trust fund.

Finally, I thank my fellow committee members and all the committee staff, who worked hard to deliver this challenging piece of work against such a difficult timeframe. Most importantly, the committee thanks the Chagossian people who engaged with our survey. We hope that, in a small way, we have provided them with a long overdue opportunity to have their voices heard.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 11, 12, 13 and 16, in the name of my noble friend Lord Lilley, who is detained by difficult transport situations in France—he is perhaps not the only person in that situation—and, in the interest of brevity, to my own Amendments 24 and 25. Some of them would make Mauritius responsible for any outstanding reparation claims—it seems odd that that needs to be said, but such is the asymmetry of this deal in every other regard that it is worth setting out that it would be very strange if Britain remained liable despite having handed away the territory—while some ask for ratification to be delayed until after we have heard from your Lordships’ International Relations and Defence Committee.

In the interests of brevity, I shall talk about just three points in this group. The first is the timing of the ratification process. A judicial review was brought on 26 October by some diasporan Chagossians, some of them born on the Chagos Islands and some born in exile. Lengthy and detailed arguments were heard that day, and the judgment was initially expected on the same day. Then we were told that the ruling would come the following week, and then that it would come before Christmas, and now that it will come on 12 January. So why are we breaking with precedent and convention and rushing ahead with Third Reading without the customary lapse of at least three days between Committee and Third Reading?

It seems to me unfortunate that we are creating the appearance of collusion. We are creating the appearance of rushing through the Bill so that the judicial review will be ineffective. That criticism could easily have been anticipated—the noble Baroness, Lady Anderson, said she had never heard about prebuttal, but there will be a lot of prebuttal and rebuttal and some fairly crucial “buttal” in all this, I suspect—by our observing our normal timetables and allowing a reasonable time to elapse.

The second is the point referred to by my noble friend Lord Callanan: the decision on 8 December by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which called on

“both Mauritius and the United Kingdom to suspend ratification of the agreement, and to engage immediately in a renewed dialogue to ensure the free, prior and informed consent of the Chagossian people”.

Given that the entire Bill is predicated on this Government’s exaggerated deference to non-binding opinions by courts that have no jurisdiction, that alone ought to have put an end to the entire business. If we are so in hock to UN bodies—without jurisdiction, in this case—telling us what they think, which we treat as final and binding, why did we do so on the first but not on this?

Strategic Defence Review 2025

Lord De Mauley Excerpts

Friday 18th July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord De Mauley (Con)]

My Lords, I offer my congratulations to the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, for his role in leading the strategic defence review team and for delivering such a thoughtful and important contribution to UK defence policy. I am particularly grateful to the review team for appearing last week before the International Relations and Defence Committee, which I chair, to discuss the findings and recommendations of the review. Before I go further, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord McCabe, on his maiden speech, to which I listened carefully.

I welcome the Government’s recognition that national security and defence must be the first duty of government and that today’s threat landscape requires an integrated response. The SDR’s recommendations come with serious financial indications, but defence is the best insurance policy we have. As General Sir Richard Barrons convincingly told the committee, the costs of war, both in human and economic terms, are considerably higher than the price of preparedness. If we fail to invest now in deterrence, resilience and technological advantage, we risk being outpaced by adversaries who will not wait for us to catch up.

The committee welcomes the ambition and breadth of the SDR, and we are pleased to see it echoes many of the conclusions in our report, Ukraine: A Wake-up Call. However, laudable ambition must be matched by credible delivery. There is, as yet, no comprehensive funding profile aligned to the SDR’s recommendations, or clear pathway to the Government’s ambition to spend 3% of GDP on defence, let alone to the Prime Minister’s NATO pledge of 5%. Without this, delivery of the SDR’s recommendations is at best uncertain. The defence investment plan due this autumn must address this and set out the trade-offs involved if the 3% of GDP target is not achieved.

The SDR rightly commits to a NATO first posture. Meeting NATO’s evolving investment benchmarks, enhancing interoperability with allies and reinforcing our forward presence in eastern Europe and the high north must follow. Domestically, the SDR’s emphasis on home defence and resilience is timely, but can the Minister set out what the Government will do to ensure that the

“more substantive body of work”

needed to the UK’s critical national infrastructure will be undertaken promptly?

Regarding the billion-pound commitment to homeland air and missile defence and the creation of a new cyber and electromagnetic command, how can the Minister be confident that this funding will be sufficient for the SDR’s objectives?

The SDR’s focus on innovation and digital skills is essential. The war in Ukraine has shown the importance of rapid procurement cycles and scalable technologies. We welcome the £400 million identified for defence innovation and the doubled investment in autonomous systems, yet SMEs still face major challenges in engaging with the Ministry of Defence. Radical procurement reform is essential, and concrete timelines for this are still lacking.

To return to the essential theme of resilience, defence in the 21st century is no longer confined to the battlefield; it requires the full mobilisation of society—an integrated approach that connects the population, industry, infrastructure and education. While there is much in the SDR that reflects a broader understanding of defence as a collective national effort, which the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, referred to, the MoD continues to show its complete misunderstanding of Reserve Forces, such an important part of connecting to wider society, and the pressures on those who seek to train while holding down civilian jobs. Can the Minister guarantee that the Reserve Forces will not be singled out, as they so often have been in the recent past, for cuts and so-called in-year savings?

The MoD is persisting in its efforts to neuter the Reserve Forces and cadets associations, whose council I chair, which could and would, if encouraged, rather than deliberately constrained as is proposed by converting them into a more costly NDPB, do so much to promote the resilience that the country so desperately needs. I know that Ministers simply do not understand the damage that they will be doing, especially to the SDR’s aspirations for the reserves and national resilience, if they follow what their officials are pushing them into, and I ask the Minister to look again at that.

To conclude, notwithstanding what I have just said, the shift in the strategic approach set out by the SDR is welcome. To turn its ambitions into reality will require strong and continuing commitment, especially on funding but also on improved relations with industry and sustained engagement with the public. I emphasise, though, the need for a fully costed road map and ask the Minister what plans he has to keep Parliament updated on the implementation of the SDR’s recommendations.

Diego Garcia Military Base

Lord De Mauley Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I know that the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, will have negotiated in good faith. I know too that if there had been an agreement that he felt was in the national interest then he would have recommended to his Government that it should be supported.

The point that I am making is that the principle was established that negotiations were happening to see what arrangement or agreement, if any, could be made between the UK and Mauritius with respect to Diego Garcia. This Government’s judgment is that we have reached such an agreement. The noble Lord is quite right to point out the security guarantees that we have. He will know that in the treaty there is a 24-mile buffer zone around the island, and the US and the UK can veto any development within that zone. He will also know that there is a further exclusion zone beyond that encompassing the rest of the islands, which means we can prevent development that we are opposed to there as well. That is why we felt we could sign an agreement containing the sorts of security guarantees that the noble Lord himself sought but did not manage to achieve, and therefore did not feel there was an agreement that he could come to or recommend we agree to. We feel that we have guarantees that will protect the integrity of the base by excluding others who would seek to undermine it.

[Lord De Mauley (Con)]

My Lords, the Statement twice refers to guaranteeing the UK full continued control over Diego Garcia for the next 99 years and beyond. What is the exact legal position that the Government have negotiated regarding the situation beyond the year 2124, which, after all, is little more than a single lifetime away? What concerns me is that the wording available to the public suggests that any extension depends entirely on obtaining the agreement of the Mauritian Government at the time, which does not sound much like a guarantee of full UK control of Diego Garcia beyond 99 years.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The noble Lord will know that, in addition to the 99 years, there is in the treaty an option for a further 40 years. He will know the importance of respecting a treaty, which is a legally binding agreement between two Governments, whether through an international court, national courts or sovereign Governments themselves. The important principle is that what is in the treaty is what has been negotiated. As far as I am concerned, we will ensure that the treaty is respected, and that is the legal basis on which we go forward.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I will reflect on that—I note that the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, was shaking his head when I answered. I will see whether I can add anything further to the points made by the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley. Clearly, the treaty lays out 99 years, with the 40-year further option on that. If the noble and learned Lord is asking me what happens at the end of 139 years, I will reflect on that so that others who may follow me can consider their options in 139 years’ time.

[Lord De Mauley (Con)]

I will clarify my question. My understanding, from what I read—which is available to the public—is that the Mauritian Government have to agree even to the 40-year extension, let alone what happens at the end of that 40 years.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I will clarify that. I tried to be open and frank in answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. I will reflect on that and whether I need to write to the noble Lord to ensure that we have correct factual information. We may differ on opinions, but it is important that we have factual information in front of us. If I need to, I will write to the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, and put a copy of that in the Library, as well as giving a copy to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, just for clarity’s sake.

Strategic Defence Review

Lord De Mauley Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

That is a good suggestion, and I will look at it and try to take it forward.

[Lord De Mauley (Con)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as chair of the Council of Reserve Forces’ and Cadets’ Associations, with a bit of a history with the Reserve Forces. I thank the Minister for his call yesterday, and I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, and his team. My welcome of the SDR is caveated slightly on the apparent gulf between the ambition, which it is difficult to fault, and the funding, which is more concerning. There are a number of issues that I would like to debate, but I will pick just one for this evening. The SDR places a welcome emphasis on home defence and resilience, yet it also acknowledges that:

“A more substantive body of work is necessary to ensure the security and resilience of critical national infrastructure … and the essential services it delivers”.


The Minister mentioned just now that he would address the issue of timelines. I am asking him to include in that thinking about and telling us about the timelines for that important piece of work.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

In a similar vein to my answer to my noble friend Lord Reid, some of these timelines will need to be discussed and worked out to ensure that they are deliverable. Let me say to the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, that his point is well made; clearly, we need to get on with that task. There is an urgency to much of this, and we need to address that and ensure that we make much of this happen as soon as possible.

Ukraine (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

Lord De Mauley Excerpts

Thursday 6th March 2025 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord De Mauley]

That the Grand Committee takes note of the Report from the International Relations and Defence Committee Ukraine: a wake-up call (1st Report, HL Paper 10).

[Lord De Mauley (Con)]

My Lords, I speak today as chairman of the International Relations and Defence Committee to introduce our report, Ukraine: A Wake-up Call. The report provides a sobering, and now urgent, assessment of the implications of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine for United Kingdom defence policy and the broader security of Europe. Before delving into the detail of the report, I thank the members of the committee, including my predecessor as chairman, the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde; the excellent clerk and staff, who put a huge amount of work into the report over the summer; and the witnesses who appeared before the committee.

The findings in our report are stark. The war in Ukraine has shattered the assumptions underpinning western defence thinking since the end of the Cold War. This is indeed a wake-up call not just for us but for the whole of Europe. The war has exposed critical gaps in our capabilities and the fragility of our defence industrial base—all because of our assumption, now revealed as wrong, that future conflicts would be short and limited.

The first conclusion of the report is that NATO deterrence failed. President Putin calculated that the West lacked the political will and the military capability to stop him. This calculation, tragically, was in part correct: our deterrence posture has been found wanting. We must rebuild deterrence through improved military capability, clear messaging and a united front with our allies. This has taken on a new significance following the rift created by the heated exchanges between President Trump and President Zelensky last week and the continuing developments this week.

Another significant development since the publication of our report has been the Prime Minister’s recent announcement of an increase in defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2027 and the ambition to increase it to 3% in the next Parliament. While welcome, our report concluded that 2.5% of GDP may not be enough to meet the UK’s growing defence needs or plug existing gaps. Subsequent events have underlined that point.

This leads me to the current state of our Armed Forces. The Army in particular has already shrunk to its smallest size since the Napoleonic era, and it is questionable whether it will be able to field sufficient fighting forces beyond an initial deployment. The Prime Minister has said that he is willing to put troops on the ground in Ukraine to help guarantee the country’s security. While I fully understand his objective, it is difficult to imagine how the Army would be able to maintain a credible deterrent force in Ukraine, for any extended length of time—let alone fulfil its other obligations, which seem likely to grow—without increasing in size significantly.

Crucially, we must rebuild the appeal of military service to the next generation. We also need to revitalise our reserves. Ukraine has shown that well-trained and properly equipped reserve forces can, literally, make all the difference. Ours are woefully underfunded. We must ensure that they are ready to mobilise at scale, when needed, and that numbers are boosted so that they can also be deployed to protect critical national infrastructure at home.

Critical national infrastructure deserves a specific mention, because the experience of Ukraine provides a clear warning to the United Kingdom: Russia has relentlessly attacked Ukrainian energy systems and communication networks. We are already witnessing a troubling shift towards more aggressive hybrid tactics being deployed, in the UK and nearby, by Russia and others. We must up our game in countering hybrid attacks. If not, our enemies will realise that they can get away with it, placing us in an ever more vulnerable position.

Defence is not just about soldiers and capabilities; it is also about cybersecurity, the security of our supply chains and resilience within our communities. The concept of total defence, long practised by nations such as Sweden and Finland, must be adopted here. We must move beyond the notion that defence is the sole responsibility of the military. Total defence entails a high state of readiness by both the state and society to defend themselves in case of threat of war, crisis or natural disaster.

I will now speak in my personal capacity rather than as a member of the committee. There is a little-known but influential organisation, which is critically poised to play a leading role in helping the United Kingdom achieve a total defence stance, called the Council of the Reserve Forces and Cadets Association. I declare an interest in that I am currently its chairman. The CRFCA has strong and embedded relations throughout the United Kingdom, with local and devolved Administration politicians, business leaders and opinion influencers through the extensive nationwide membership of the Reserve Forces and cadets’ associations. The RFCAs are the only defence-related organisations that reach all the regions and devolved nations, and the membership connects with all sectors and communities in society.

The Minister recently commented in answer to a Written Question:

“The RFCA has an extensive volunteer membership … bringing a wide breadth of expertise and community links. The RFCAs’ extensive network of volunteer members, based within communities across the UK, enable the RFCAs to … connect to society … While the number of hours volunteered is not formally recorded either for the volunteer membership or non-executive board members, it is estimated that this figure is around 69,000 hours per year”.


In answer to another, he said:

“The vast majority of active members make no claims, reflecting their sense of service and deep connection with the UK’s Reserve Forces and Cadets”.


There is a move afoot in the Ministry of Defence to dispense with this organisation, first created by Haldane in 1908 when it was realised that, to be efficient, while command and training of the Reserve Forces should be centralised, conversely, the raising and administration of those forces could be efficient only if decentralised, this being deemed essential to the encouragement of local effort and the development of local resources in time of peace. This is what the RFCAs, the successor to what were the county associations, provide today with their wide membership; they are local in origin and situation, cognisant of local capabilities and requirements and thoroughly integrated into their communities.

In its stead, the MoD wishes to create a non-departmental public body with one centralised board of paid non-executive directors with little or no experience of, or commitment to, reserves or cadets. There is a significant risk that this, as well as the proposal that the current membership should be retained merely in an advisory or associate capacity, will disenfranchise the members when they recognise that they will have little ability to have a say on how central government directives are implemented in the regions from which they come and on the support they give to sustain the reserve.

At a stroke, the MoD will have lost a body of natural supporters with deep links into the society of their communities and regions, just as the strategic defence review may well place a greater reliance on the reserve for the total defence of the United Kingdom. To quote a former commanding officer tasked with raising a new reserve battalion: “My experience of raising a new battalion has convinced me that the associations are essential to look after the interests of the Reserve Forces as a whole, not just a harmless institution that has to be humoured. It therefore concerns me that there is a view among some civil servants and regular officers of the MoD that the RFCAs are anachronistic and expensive bodies which work against the established chain of command and are positively detrimental to the ‘one Army’ concept”. The RFCAs are here to help and can make a significant contribution to the defence of the nation.

To return to the committee’s report, yet another urgent lesson from Ukraine concerns our defence industrial base. Decades of budget cuts and reduced industrial capacity since the end of the Cold War have left the UK’s defence industry unprepared for high-intensity prolonged conflict. Our procurement processes are too slow and risk averse. Ukraine has, by necessity, embraced a model of rapid innovation, working hand in glove with commercial technology companies and adapting in real time on the battlefield. This is the agility we need. To achieve this, the Government must rebuild trust with the defence industry, whose leaders repeatedly told us that it needs clear, long-term commitments—not shifting goalposts—to enable it to scale up production.

We must also broaden our partner base, including those we may not traditionally think of as military suppliers, in order to provide the cutting-edge capabilities our Armed Forces require. Recent events have underscored the critical need to strengthen our industrial engagement with our European partners. We found that increasing collaboration in integrated air and missile defence should be high on the list of priorities for the Government. The report also highlights the importance of nurturing partnerships. Of course, it did not predict the schism in the western alliance we are witnessing right now, but that only serves to make it even clearer that the UK Government must now use all their diplomatic skills—as I think the Prime Minister seems to be doing, and I commend his efforts—to ensure the unity of the western alliance in support of UK and European security efforts.

Finally, we must acknowledge an uncomfortable truth: the UK is a medium-sized regional power. This may not be a bad thing, but it requires hard choices to be made and a realistic narrative from the Government about what our Armed Forces can deliver. Our report calls for a coherent model that leverages technology, industry, the reserves, diplomacy and society itself to rebuild our deterrence posture and make sure that it is credible. This should be at the heart of the strategic defence review, and the Government must ensure that their response to the review is swift and provides a clear road map for how this can all be achieved. The hard-earned lessons from the war in Ukraine are our wake-up call, and the time to act is now. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord De Mauley (Con)]

My Lords, I am sure that noble Lords all want to rush away and catch their trains, so I will only be a couple of minutes. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken. There was an unusual convergence of views among the vast majority of those who spoke, which I think should be encouraging to His Majesty’s Government and to us all. I do not have time to give credit to all noble Lords who have spoken but, save for the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, and my noble friend Lord Balfe, there was little I heard that I disagreed with. Even with them, I am sure there are things that we can find to agree on.

The noble Lord, Lord Liddle, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, and others, concurred that increasing defence spending to 2.5% of GDP will not be enough. As we said in the report, it is not just that we spend more, but that we spend more astutely. I agreed strongly with the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, on the need for the MoD to sort out recruitment. The Minister told us a bit about how that will be done.

My noble friend Lord Howell of Guildford spoke specifically about reserve numbers. He is right that it would not be difficult to increase reserve numbers dramatically, and we should. I will not go into detail, but I have the experience of recruiting reservists based on 50 years of close involvement. I joined the Territorial Army in April 1975, and I am the honorary colonel of the reserve unit that I joined then. I know exactly what needs to be done. It does not need to be hugely expensive. I am available on call to the Minister. I beg him not to rely entirely on the counsel of regular soldiers in the MoD; I respect them hugely, but point out that reservists’ motivations are different to those of regular servicepeople who have shown, time after time, that they misunderstand the motivations and needs of reservists.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, gently chided us, pointing out that we forecasted a gradual shift of US priorities. I hope the Grand Committee will forgive us our optimism. I think the views expressed by most noble Lords today suggest that the vast majority of the report is, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, said, as valid today as it was when we wrote it. I thank the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, and my noble friends Lord Soames, Lady Fraser and Lady Goldie, for echoing my concerns about the future of the RFCAs. I say to the Minister that we want to help; please do not tie one hand behind our back.

I thank the Minister for his response to the debate. I am pleased that we agree on so much. It is often said that we always plan and prepare to fight the last war, rather than the next. We must break that mould.

Motion agreed.

Strategic Defence Review

Lord De Mauley Excerpts

Wednesday 9th October 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord De Mauley (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, for bringing this important debate today. I thank him particularly as a former member of the International Relations and Defence Committee—which I now have the honour of chairing—for his contributions to the committee’s work. I also declare my interest as chairman of the Council of the Reserve Forces and Cadets Association.

The strategic defence review provides a welcome opportunity for the Government to rethink their approach to defence. I will focus my remarks largely on the role that Reserve Forces could play in that.

Over the last couple of years, the global security environment has changed dramatically. As other noble Lords have said, we are witnessing a period of growing instability. Russia’s illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has been a turning point for European security and has raised serious concerns about Russian intentions elsewhere in Europe. In the Middle East, the conflict between Israel, Hamas and Hezbollah threatens to escalate into a wider regional war, potentially drawing in Iran. Tensions in the South China Sea are escalating, and a wave of coups in the Sahel is plunging millions into physical and economic insecurity. This raises the question as to whether our Armed Forces are equipped to deal with this new reality.

The International Relations and Defence Committee recently published a report, which the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton, referred to, and which we have submitted to the SDR team, on the implications of the war in Ukraine for UK defence. We found that years of strategic neglect have left our forces stretched thin and limited in size. We are underprepared to respond to the worsening global threat environment, and in particular to meet the very real and growing threat from Russia.

Our Armed Forces lack the necessary mass, resilience and coherence to sustain prolonged, high-intensity conflict at scale. This of course also weakens their deterrent effect. If we are to prevent conflict with Russia, deterrence is our best insurance. After all, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine itself represented a failure of NATO’s deterrence posture. We must therefore restore the credibility of our deterrence posture, which has to include, as other noble Lords have said, increasing troop numbers.

Yet even apart from the well-documented challenges of recruitment and retention, increasing troop numbers comes at a significant cost. This is where my own submission to the SDR comes in; the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, and the noble Lord, Lord West, may be glad to hear that it is a tri-service proposition. Ukraine has shown that recruitment of the rank and file of a second or third echelon force need not be the problem. It recruited half a million from a population about two-thirds the size of ours in six months in 2022. What it could not do was provide the experienced people to train them. We, and other nations, had to step in and help.

My concept, in simple terms, is based loosely on the very successful Home Service Force of the early 1990s. It is that we should utilise some of the quite large number of experienced people who have recently left the regular and Reserve Forces to form cadres of about 50, as the nucleus each of a battalion-sized unit, 500 strong, the bulk—the other 450—of which would be recruited only at a time chosen by the Government when the threat level warranted it. I hope the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, and the noble Lord, Lord West, will forgive me for using army language, but I do it for simplicity. The cadres would need, say, 10 to 15 days of training a year to maintain and update their skills. I ask only that this concept—the submission goes into considerably more detail—is given thorough consideration, and I would of course be delighted to discuss the detail with the SDR team and/or the Minister.

I turn to our Reserve Forces as they are currently constituted. As my committee’s inquiry into Ukraine revealed, their capability has been eroded over recent years. Successive Governments have failed to articulate a clear vision for how the reserves can effectively supplement and support our Armed Forces. It is time to reverse this. Our report says that the Reserve Forces, whose numbers have declined over recent years—largely because of reduced funding and a broken recruiting system—need a co-ordinated approach, including addressing clarity of purpose, demanding training, appropriate logistical and administrative support, equipment and proper funding. I know that the Reserve Forces and cadets associations have specific attributes that are able to help, and they stand ready to help.

I ask the Minister for his assurance that the Government will give due consideration to enhancing the role of the reserves. What plans are there, if any, to respond to the recommendations made by General Sir Nick Carter in his Reserve Forces review?

This is not just about troop numbers; the whole of society has a role to play in defence. We need to move beyond the idea that defence is solely the military’s responsibility, become better at conveying the significance of national security to the wider public and set out how they can contribute to a more resilient society. The volunteer reserves are part of the answer, but the Government must also draw the wider public into a conversation about defence—including the potential for higher, and especially better and cleverer, defence spending—as well as greater civic responsibility.

One useful lever available would be to involve the signatories to the Armed Forces covenant, especially the gold award holders, who ought to have a predisposition to help. There needs to be a greater sense of urgency and awareness about the risks facing the UK. An honest dialogue about the country’s vulnerabilities and what is required to keep it safe is essential. The Government must develop a compelling value proposition that resonates with citizens, emphasising the importance of national security in their daily lives and moving beyond the notion that defence is solely the military’s responsibility. There is much we can learn from our Scandinavian partners and their concept of total defence, which integrates civilians into national security. The Government should build on this framework to create a similarly compelling vision for the UK.

We are at a crossroads. The choices we make now will determine whether we can restore our nation’s credibility and remain an influential player on the global stage. Alternatively, we risk the fate of being relegated to reactive crisis management rather than playing a proactive role in preventing conflicts. The war in Ukraine has moved this debate from theoretical speculation to urgent reality. Complacency in defence is no longer an option.