Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 28th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

Could I just ask the noble and learned Lord to ask his question, please?

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My first question is: does the Minister not agree that that is quite different from the case that the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, raised, where a person is not from a country listed in Section 80AA(1) but from another country? There is a separate provision for that in relation to removal to a Schedule 1 country. Does the Minster not agree that, although Clause 5(5) deals with the Section 80AA point, there is no equivalent to that exception in relation to a situation where somebody comes from a non-EU country that is a non-safe place and the consideration is now to move that person to a Schedule 1 country? What my amendment is dealing with is not the Section 80AA situation but the situation categorised by the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, where a person from a non-safe European state comes here and is threatened to be removed to a Schedule 1 country. All I said—and I am asking the Minister to acknowledge this—is that there should be a similar provision for that situation, for the exclusion of those countries that are facing proceedings under Article 7. That is it.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 10th December 2020 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

50: Clause 1, page 3, line 2, at end insert—
“(8A) A person may grant a criminal conduct authorisation to authorise criminal conduct that has already been committed if the following requirements are met—(a) the conduct by or in relation to the person who is specified or described as the covert human intelligence source to whom the authorisation relates was necessary on grounds falling within subsection (5), in the view of the person granting the authorisation, to avert or mitigate a threat to the physical safety of the person specified or described as the covert human intelligence source, or to avert or mitigate a threat to the physical safety of some other person engaged in the conduct;(b) the conduct was brought to the attention of the authorising officer immediately or at the first available opportunity, by the person who is specified or described as the covert human intelligence source to whom the authorisation relates;(c) the person granting the authorisation is satisfied that the threat to the physical safety of the person specified or described as the covert human intelligence source, or a threat to some other person engaged in the conduct, could not have reasonably been averted or sufficiently mitigated by other conduct which would not have constituted crime.(8B) Subsection (8A)(c) is without prejudice to the need to take into account other matters so far as they are relevant (for example, the requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998).”

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con) [V]]

My Lords, this amendment in my name seeks to address the current inadequacies in respect of protection afforded to undercover operatives. I apologise at the outset to the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, but I intend using the word “CHIS”, which I also find unsuitable—I prefer the phrase “undercover operative”, but I will refer to CHIS throughout my speech.

I seek to address the current inadequacies in respect of the protection afforded to an undercover operative when faced with a potentially life-threatening situation while engaged in an operation by inserting new subsections (8A) and (8B) into the new Section 29B of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. The effect of this new insertion would be to allow authorisation in certain circumstances after the event, and I will explain the circumstances as I progress.

It seems clear to me from noble Lords’ contributions to the Committee—I say this acknowledging the many and varied concerns expressed by noble Lords in their contributions—that there is a tendency, indeed more than a tendency, to overlook the threats and dangers that these undercover operatives are faced with at crucial times during their deployment. It is that, and that alone, which I seek to call attention to and address with this amendment.

We have heard a great deal from noble and learned Lords who have considerable experience at unravelling the machinations of the criminal law, and we have, quite understandably, also heard a great deal from noble Lords who have concerns for human rights. However, little has been said that provides for the security and protection of the undercover operative, and I suggest that the operational safeguards for a CHIS are not being addressed in this Bill. We now have an opportunity to do so.

I should add at this point that I am of course very mindful of the criminal conduct authorisation requirements, which are set out in subsection (5) of new Section 29B, and the amendment recognises that. The amendment does not for one moment propose or recommend that a CHIS should be given carte blanche to commit serious crime—given a free ticket, as it were. It is intended to ensure that those who are prepared to risk themselves for the benefit of the state should be afforded the comfort of knowing that, when they embark on a particularly serious operation, they have the full support of the law behind them at the outset, given that they may be operationally forced into a situation where they are required to take a course of action to avert or mitigate a threat to their physical safety or that of some other person which results in them committing a criminal offence not previously authorised or foreseen.

It will doubtless be maintained that the law caters for and provides protection at present—we have heard during the course of the Bill that prosecutors and the courts offer a degree of protection in such situations—but I maintain that that is not good enough.

We have also heard, with good reason, during Second Reading and in Committee, of the need to respect the requirements of the Human Rights Act. I say that it should apply collectively and that we should be very clear that the legislation applies to all, and so we must demonstrate that in the Bill. To rely on a prosecutor’s decision or a judges’ disposition on a particular day, in the hope that, after the event, they will support any previously unauthorised but necessary and vital action by an undercover operative taken to protect him or herself, or another, is just unacceptable to my mind.

Having managed quite a number of successful CHIS operations in my 32 years as a front-line detective, I have seen at first hand informants, agents and undercover operatives place themselves at incredible risk. While I do not doubt for one moment that the view of those currently at the head of organisations responsible for conducting such operations has been sought and will have perhaps influenced the course of the Bill, that does not alter the reality of the situation for the operative on the ground when challenged with the protection of life.

Unlike many policing procedures and operations that can be fine-tuned, undercover operations can be very unpredictable, to say the least. These operations present themselves in a variety of ways. It may be the activity of a drug-related gang—perhaps so-called county lines gang activity, where, sadly, juveniles are invariably involved as couriers; it may be an imminent threat of harm during a kidnap scenario requiring an instantaneous response; it could be an armed gang involved in robberies on high-profile celebrities while at home with their families; or it could just be a straightforward test purchase scenario that takes an ugly turn in order to test the veracity of the CHIS. These are not hypothetical cases: they are real-life scenarios that I can vouch for. Frankly, the list is endless. However, one thing is for sure: these organised criminals are, in the main, extremely violent people, often under the influence of extremely dangerous drugs which render them devoid of any sense of responsibility or fear.

My concern is that we should not tie the hands of undercover operatives. We should not allow them to undertake these extremely dangerous, often life-threatening roles with one hand tied behind their backs, in the sense that they fear prosecution if they follow a particular course of unanticipated action in order to protect life or prevent serious harm. They should not have the sword of Damocles hanging over them.

Of course, undercover operatives will be briefed and tasked; they will know what is before them, as well as can be expected on the available intelligence. However, once in theatre, as it were, they are on their own. Yes, there will be back-up not too far away, but this will not be instantaneous and will not allow for the situation where a CHIS, whether part of the criminal gang or a deployed undercover operative, may be put to an immediate test of their genuineness by organised criminals through circumstances that were not foreseen or allowed for in the planning, briefing and authorising stages.

Organised criminals are not, in the main, rational-thinking people. I can think of many scenarios, such as a test purchase, whereby an undercover operative is forced to partake in a class-A substance as proof of being genuine and, in the ugliest of scenarios, perhaps has a knife pressed to his or her body, with unthinkable consequences, for failing to surrender to the test. Surely, in situations such as that, where the CHIS must retain his or her credibility, they must be afforded support in the Bill. The operative should not have to rely on the good will of a prosecutor or the court. On the one hand, we are seeking in the Bill to legitimise criminal activity, yet, on the other, failing after the event to acknowledge and support the actions of a CHIS in life-threatening situations. There could be, say, an ambush attack from a rival gang, during which the undercover operative must take some immediate and previously unauthorised action to avert or mitigate a threat to life. The scenarios are endless and allowance should be made in the Bill for such eventualities in order to provide protection through law for CHIS. The question as to who authorises such previously unauthorised action is perhaps a matter for further consideration. I accept fully that that decision may rest with a person other than the initial authorising officer.

It is therefore my belief that human rights and our obligation to provide a duty of care would be properly served by the amendment. I beg to move.

[Lord Morris of Aberavon (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I will be brief. In earlier consideration of the Bill, the House has been concerned with prior authorisation—I repeat, prior. I do not resile for a moment from the importance of prior authorisation and I hope that we will have the opportunity to consider it in due course.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies, who has considerable experience in these matters, raises a narrow point relating to post-authorisation for the protection of officers. I should be interested in the Minister’s reply. My understanding is that the noble Lord seeks to deal with threats to the physical safety of the persons named in the amendment in narrow and possibly important circumstances. Its thrust, while dealing with another aspect, is in the spirit of your Lordships’ consideration of authorisation—in this case post, as opposed to prior, authorisation. Hence, my understanding is that he seeks to plug a possible gap by urging upon noble Lords the need for a statutory requirement for speedy, post-hoc authorisation in certain circumstances.

I have two questions for the Minister. First, how likely is such a situation to arise? Secondly, can we properly be told whether such situations have arisen in the past? In the circumstances, while I pay tribute to the noble Lord for raising this matter, I should like to hear the Minister’s reply on the need for the amendment and its practicalities.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Stewart of Dirleton) (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Davies has called for the Bill to enable an authorising officer retrospectively to authorise conduct in certain situations. The noble Lord referred to his experiences in the field, as it were, and it will have been obvious to all noble Lords that he drew on a considerable wealth of practical wisdom which informed his thoughtful contribution to this debate.

We on this side thank him also for his thoughtful engagement with the Minister in the other place on this matter. However, while I understand the concerns behind this amendment, it is not the intention of the Bill to allow any retrospective authorisations. All criminal conduct authorisations are granted by an experienced authorising officer, who will scrutinise each authorisation to ensure that it has strict parameters, that it is necessary and proportionate to the threat it seeks to disrupt and that the criminality authorised is at the lowest level possible to achieve the aims of the operation.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, and other noble Lords asked for an outline of the Government’s position. It is clear that this must be a matter of balancing. We consider that, by allowing retrospective authorisations, we remove the ability of the authorising officer to scrutinise the criminal conduct before it takes place, or we remove from the centre of our consideration that advance consideration. While I share the sentiment that we would not want undercover operatives to be placed in difficult positions simply for acting in the public interest, none the less, one of the key components in the present arrangement is control. The authorising officer must have confidence that proper thought has been given to the consequences of the authorisation, and we do not believe that an after-the-fact analysis, when the activities were not under the control of the public authority, should be retrospectively authorised where an authorisation has such an important legal effect.

As now, in the rare situation described here, authorities will make their assessment of the public interest in relation to the actions of the CHIS, the undercover operative, and rely upon prosecutorial—and, ultimately, judicial—discretion, which is no small thing, if I may draw on my own experience and set it against the experiences of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, proposing this amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and others who have spoken. I repeat that it is a matter of balance of important considerations. We consider it important—indeed, essential—to emphasise that illegal criminal conduct should be authorised in advance of any actions.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, sought to explore two questions in particular: how likely a situation is to arise where conduct would be sought to be justified retrospectively, and how often has it arisen in practice? To address those matters, it is appropriate to refer again to the code of practice, which has been a matter of discussion before your Lordships earlier in Committee. Referring to the code of practice, which has the force of law, your Lordships will see that while criminal conduct authorisations must be specific in nature and contain clear parameters, they will not be granted in terms that are too narrow. I refer your Lordships to chapter 7 of the code of conduct in that regard. As to how often these matters have been raised in the past, I cannot provide the noble and learned Lord with specifics on the matter, but I will undertake to explore the matter with him in writing.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, presented a highly specific example, drawn no doubt from his experience in the field, in the same way that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, drew on his. There is a sense that such a very specific example itself allows us to emphasise the need for discretion in the matter, to acknowledge that the situations in which CHISs will be exposed to danger are very broad and to allow me to reply with a degree of confidence that the very breadth of the situations which may possibly be encountered is such as to necessitate the anticipatory use of the authorisations we seek to put in place.

I say further that, in the course of preparation of the Bill, the matter was discussed with operational partners who would control and handle the operation of such persons in the field. They have told us that they are content that the approach which we seek to take is the correct one.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am very grateful to those who have contributed to this short debate and am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, for the points he made. As he says, it is a narrow but very important issue. I am grateful to the Minister for responding to that. I accept that it is a matter of balance, but I am also very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who speaks with authority on this matter and has great experience of such issues. For the time being, I am content with the Minister’s response. Therefore, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 50 withdrawn.

Prisons: Overcrowding

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Thursday 14th May 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, Gold Command has taken control of the movement of prisoners, which is extremely limited between prisons. Where it happens, that cohort is dealt with in the same way as new prisoners, so they are isolated for a period to see whether they become symptomatic. On testing, prison officers and attendant staff are key workers in the present circumstances. We have referred something like 3,000 prison officers and staff for testing. For prisoners, some who have become symptomatic may be subject to testing in prison, but otherwise there is no testing.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, Swansea prison houses twice the number of prisoners it was designed for in the mid-19th century. A Welsh Affairs Select Committee inquiry into prison provision last year heard evidence that between 2013 and 2018 there was a 475% increase in the number of drug crimes in Welsh prisons compared with a 200% increase in English prisons. One of the key challenges faced was violent behaviour caused by the drug Spice, which is exacerbated by overcrowding. Evidence was heard about the intention of the then Prisons Minister to introduce scanners in some prisons by August, which are expected to be running in all Welsh prisons by December 2019. Can my noble and learned friend confirm that these have now been installed and are operational in all Welsh prisons?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, my noble friend makes a very good point as regards Swansea prison. It is one of our Victorian prisons and, as such, has a large number of cells that are certified to hold two prisoners, and indeed some which are certified to hold three. As of 1 May this year, the operational capacity of HMP Swansea was reduced from 479 to 396, with a prison population of about 379. Nevertheless, that can still be regarded as crowded accommodation because of the number of cells that are certified to hold two prisoners. We recognise that this is a challenge not only in Swansea but in many other local prisons from the Victorian era. On drug testing, I cannot confirm that such equipment has been rolled out in all prisons in England and Wales, but I will take steps to confirm the position and will advise my noble friend.

Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 24th February 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Blair; we were colleagues quite some years ago. I am not a lawyer—indeed, I spent most of my years delivering defendants into the hands of lawyers—and I will leave the more detailed legal arguments to the lawyers and the noble and learned Lords.

Our first duty as a Government is to keep the country safe. The 2019 Conservative manifesto said:

“We will keep our country safe from terrorism. We will invest in the police and security services and give them the powers they need to combat new threats”.


That is very good news and clearly an issue that the electorate wanted the new Conservative Government to deliver on.

Terrorism is challenging and terrorists fall into a unique category. They are committed criminals and murderers who, in the main, are ideologically disposed towards a particular following of some description. While the vast majority may never reoffend, the challenge we all face and which this legislation seeks to address is that if we cannot be sure, we must, in the interests of safety, err on the side of caution in order to protect the public at large and safeguard through robust and effective legislation.

The National Counter Terrorism Security Office recently advised that the direct risk of violence posed by former terrorist prisoners on release should be kept in proportion. It described reoffending rates as “relatively low”, stating that only 9% of terrorist prisoners released since 2012 had been reconvicted for any type of offending. This was contrasted with an overall reoffending rate of almost 50% for adults released from custody. Of 200 or so terrorist offenders released from custody since 2012, only six had been convicted of further Terrorism Act offences at that point.

That said—I make no apology for repeating the details of these facts—let us remind ourselves that on 30 November 2019, Usman Khan killed two people at Fishmongers’ Hall near London Bridge before being shot by police. Khan had been released from prison in December 2018, having been convicted of terrorism offences in 2012. He was released from prison automatically at the halfway point of the custodial part of an extended sentence for public protection. Khan was serving an extended public protection sentence of 21 years, comprising a custodial term of 16 years and an extended licence period of five years. For an extended public protection sentence imposed after 14 July 2008, as Khan’s was, release was automatic at the halfway point of the custodial period. The Parole Board was therefore never involved in Khan’s release.

On 2 February 2020, as we know, Sudesh Amman attacked two people with a knife in Streatham before being shot by police. Amman had been released from prison in January 2020, having been convicted of terrorism offences in November 2018. He was given a standard determinate sentence of three years and four months, and was released from prison automatically at the halfway point. The Parole Board was not involved in his release.

We also know that on 9 January 2020 a convicted terrorism offender, Brusthom Ziamani, along with another prison inmate, was reported to have attacked a prison officer at HMP Whitemoor. Both were reported to have been wearing fake suicide vests. A prison officer was slashed and stabbed, and several others were injured. The Metropolitan Police confirmed that the incident was being treated as a terrorist attack and investigated by officers from Counter Terrorism Command.

It is worthy of note that between March and June 2017 there were four terrorist attacks in London and Manchester in which vehicles, knives and explosives were used to kill and injure members of the public. Thirty-six people were killed in the attacks and almost 200 were injured. In addition, as your Lordships will recall only too well, on 22 March 2017 Khalid Masood killed five people, including a police officer on duty here at the Palace of Westminster, before being shot by armed police.

During my police career, I served for a number of years in Counter Terrorism Command in the 1980s when London and other cities were being blown apart by terrorist activity, creating carnage and crimes scenes far too distressing to recount. I never want to see that happen again. I believe that this Bill will help in some measure to deter such future slaughter. This legislation is needed urgently to put appropriate safeguards in place for further terrorism offenders on release from prison. As we sit here debating the Bill, your Lordships will be only too aware of the urgency of ensuring that it receives Royal Assent this week.

It is, as we have heard, a significant Bill that will change the release point for offenders who have committed a relevant terrorism offence and refer them to the Parole Board at the two-thirds point of the sentence. The changes will apply to those offenders who are currently serving a custodial sentence for terrorism offences, as well as future terrorism offenders who receive a standard determinate sentence.

Public safety is paramount, and the Government have a duty to consider the tragic events that I have already outlined to protect those going about their daily lives from terrorists who fall within the scope of the Bill. As I have just outlined, I firmly believe that the Bill should apply to all serving prisoners, as well as to those sentenced in the future. However, that will not work unless the Parole Board consists of suitably qualified and sufficiently trained personnel. Faith in the parole system has wobbled slightly in recent times, but there can be no room for error where terrorism is concerned, and I too ask that the Parole Board be properly resourced. At this juncture, I mention the cost of surveillance in manpower and resources in relation to suspected terrorists. It is exceptional and has accompanying risks, as appears to have been the case with Sudesh Amman in the Streatham attacks.

In preparing for this debate, I read and was much impressed by the 2015 Acheson review. I noted Mr Acheson’s recent warning concerning the ability of the Prison Service to manage terrorism offenders. He stated that he was unconvinced that the Prison Service had the “aptitude or attitude” to assertively manage terrorist offenders. I am sure I am not alone in being somewhat worried by his remarks and would welcome the Minister’s comments on the Government’s plans to improve this to ensure that the Bill’s objectives are met.

To my thinking, this is one of the most important pieces of legislation that your Lordships will ever have to consider in relation to the safety of the public. On that basis, I support the Bill.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Wednesday 8th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con) (Maiden Speech)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Farmer; it is a pleasure to follow him. I am grateful to be able to give my maiden speech during this gracious Speech debate. I begin my maiden speech by sharing with your Lordships my delight at both the opportunity and privilege of becoming a Member of your Lordships’ House—a place I have always held in high esteem. It is, without any doubt, an integral part of our legislature and provides the much-needed checks and balances on the work of Parliament. Long may it continue to do so.

To say that my elevation to your Lordships’ House was a surprise would probably count as the understatement of the decade, but my introduction here just a few weeks ago in October must surely count as one of the most notable days, if not the most notable, of my life—something I never expected but am truly honoured to accept. At this point, I must pay tribute to the clerks, the doorkeepers for their help with the geography and all the staff who made that such a memorable occasion; I thank them very much.

Maiden speeches are something of a hazard for me. On the last occasion, during my maiden speech upon entering the House of Commons, I rose to my feet on being called by Mr Speaker and immediately set off, dutifully informing the House how wonderful my new constituency was, when I suddenly noticed the date on the outside of the folder containing my notes. It was 3 June, my wedding anniversary. I was so engrossed in the preparation of my maiden speech that I had committed the cardinal sin of forgetting to send a card or to phone home that day. In a state of sudden and total panic, my immediate reaction was to apologise publicly during my speech and to foolishly suggest that a mention in Hansard would hopefully heal the wound. It will come as no surprise to your Lordships to learn that it was a hopeless attempt and failed miserably. I am pleased to report that I have now been forgiven.

Being introduced was a unique experience and I take this opportunity to thank my two supporters, my noble friend Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth and the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington. Both have distinguished themselves in their chosen professions and indeed, to a certain extent, have at times influenced my opinion on matters of politics and, in respect of the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, issues of policing. The noble Lord, Lord Bourne, of course, led the Conservative group in what was then known as the National Assembly for Wales and was instrumental in modernising and reshaping the Conservative brand during the early stages of Welsh devolution. I was extremely proud to become a member of that group at Cardiff Bay for several years. The noble Lord, Lord Stevens, among other senior policing roles, is of course a former commissioner of our great capital police force in London—a much-respected and popular Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, steering and refocusing the Met after the difficult days that followed the Stephen Lawrence inquiry. It was here in London that I was privileged to serve with him in my role as a senior detective in what I regard to be the greatest police service in the world.

On a personal note, I had a wonderful and enjoyable upbringing in the small seaside village of Port Eynon on the south coast of the Gower peninsula in south-west Wales. I am very proud to boast that it was the first area to be designated an area of outstanding natural beauty in the United Kingdom. Having attended and received a solid education at the local Gowerton Boys’ Grammar School—incidentally, a school that produced many well-known international sports men and women, particularly rugby players, together with leading scholars in the fields of medicine and the law—I decided to follow in my father’s footsteps and join the police service. I am very proud of that, choosing to police in London as opposed to the tranquillity of rural Wales.

It will therefore come as no surprise to noble Lords that I regard the criminal justice system and devolution as extremely important aspects of government. I therefore take this opportunity to touch on a couple of issues. An area that frequently causes concern—it has already been spoken of—is the police power to stop and search. I am pleased to see that the Home Office has grasped the nettle on this, and I applaud the fresh approach adopted to stop and search by the Home Secretary in recent times, which hopefully has restored confidence for its use by front-line officers. It is, without any doubt, the one vital tool that operational officers have in their crime-reducing toolbox. I say “concern” because there is apprehension among operational officers that they may be criticised for using these powers in certain circumstances, even when justified. Conversely, where these powers are abused, resentment naturally follows. However, used appropriately and in a manner which is proportionate to the circumstances, there should be no fear on the part of any person where officers have reasonable grounds to use the powers and follow the correct and proper processes. It is true that mistakes are made, but that is more an issue of management and training, which should be identified and addressed.

Sadly, during the last year we have seen an unprecedented increase in knife crime on the streets of London. Murders in the capital reached their highest level for 11 years, with 148 deaths recorded in 2019, and no sooner had we seen the new year in when the first tragic death by stabbing occurred. I am therefore encouraged to see that the proposed serious violence Bill will create responsibilities for a range of agencies, including that local government, youth offending services, health services and probation services should work collaboratively to tackle the root causes of violent crime. I am particularly encouraged by the proposed creation of new court orders to target known knife carriers, making it easier for police to stop and search those convicted of knife crime offences. I look forward very much to seeing this Bill make a swift and successful journey on to the statute book.

On devolution, I have but one wish, and that is to see Wales prosper economically. Many of the levers for such prosperity rest with the Welsh Government. However, financial support from central government is essential for city and growth deals and major infrastructure projects. I could wax lyrical for hours on the lack of infrastructure projects in Wales, particularly on the lack of local political foresight and the need for investment in transport infrastructure, which, after all is said and done, is the essential ingredient for social and economic mobility in rural areas. I very much look forward to the day when the A55 will be upgraded in north Wales. It is a major arterial road but is now a frequently gridlocked dual carriageway, unable to meet the capacity needs of that essential northern Wales, east-west connector route.

I am especially pleased to note that government is to fund the West Wales Parkway station, just outside of Swansea. This will transform journeys between west Wales and Cardiff and beyond. It is a sad fact that young people in places such as Pembrokeshire and Ceredigion are unable to travel daily to our capital city of Cardiff to engage in their chosen vocation. Consequently, we see a drain of young people out of our rural areas, never to return. This is all due to the unbelievable Victorian principles that we still apply to the journey westwards towards Cardiff and a lack of rail infrastructure. A Swansea parkway will enable journeys to be completed without the current mandatory change of train at Swansea and further connection, while exposed to the elements. More importantly, it will considerably reduce the volume of traffic heading eastwards in the morning and back in the evening, which consequently creates a daily logjam on a now not-fit-for-purpose M4. Above all, it will, I hope, also reduce vehicular emissions by encouraging more people on to our trains.

I conclude by saying that I look forward very much to playing an active part in the work of your Lordships’ House but especially in promoting those issues not just near and dear to me but, above all, that influence the quality of life of our citizens.