Governor of the Bank of England

Debate between Lord Davidson of Glen Clova and Lord Sassoon

Tuesday 10th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davidson of Glen Clova]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government, in the light of current concerns over the supervision of financial markets, what qualities are required in the successor to the current Governor of the Bank of England.

[The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Sassoon)]

My Lords, the Financial Services Bill makes provision to strengthen the UK’s financial regulatory structure. The proposals will establish a new system of focused financial services regulation with the Bank of England at its heart. The current governor still has almost a year of his term to serve. My right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer has confirmed that the process of appointing a successor will not begin before the autumn. The new governor’s qualities will of course reflect the Bank’s new mandate.

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[Lord Davidson of Glen Clova]

I thank the Minister for his Answer. It is essential that the next governor is a man of unimpeachable integrity, or a woman of unimpeachable integrity—certainly a person who in all jurisdictions will command respect through their understanding of financial markets. Surely they will be required to be a person who has an intimate understanding of markets. The UK’s future problems are likely to have a substantial international context. Does the Minister agree that the next governor must have a character and position that enable him to have a strong, effective relationship with central bank governors in other jurisdictions, particularly the Middle East, China and the United States? If Her Majesty’s Treasury agrees with this, will it ensure that the next governor has these qualities?

[Lord Sassoon]

First, my Lords, for the clarity of the noble and learned Lord, the Chancellor has said:

“When the time comes, the best person for the job will be appointed, whoever she or he may be”,

so he is very clear on that point. The noble and learned Lord goes on to make an interesting suggestion about one of the possible dimensions of the job, and I listen carefully to what he has to say on that point.

Scotland Bill

Debate between Lord Davidson of Glen Clova and Lord Sassoon

Thursday 15th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davidson of Glen Clova]

If such an event came about, any retractions that might be required from any quarter could also be added into the consultation. We support the amendment.

[The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Sassoon)]

My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Forsyth of Drumlean has explained, Amendment 53A would require the Scottish Parliament to consult interested parties prior to passing a resolution that would see a Scottish taxpayer paying a higher rate of tax on non-savings income than the equivalent UK taxpayer. Of course, my noble friend has also explained in passing that there is no such requirement on the UK Government to consult interested parties when they make similar decisions.

There are two reasons why the Government do not see merit in my noble friend’s amendment. First, the underlying purpose of the Bill is after all to provide for greater financial accountability of the Scottish Parliament to its electorate and give the Scottish Parliament a real stake in Scottish economic performance. I hear, and heard in our previous sitting, my noble friend’s doubts about that, but that is the purpose of the Bill. Devolving the right to set a Scottish rate of income tax to the Scottish Parliament is absolutely key and central to that, which clearly my noble friend accepts. In devolving that key power, I do not believe that it is right for the Government to impose conditions on how the power is used. Ultimately, as the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, pointed out in the previous discussion, the Scottish Parliament is and will continue to be subject to regular elections. My noble friend seems to be blithely suggesting that somehow the income tax rate will go up and up in Scotland without reference to the fact that it might not be an election-winning strategy. The Scottish Parliament should not be fettered in the consultation processes through the legislation.

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[Lord Davidson of Glen Clova]

I am guided by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, as to how one should approach the Minister. I note what he has said and I hope that I have at least given the noble Lord some useful advice that will allow him to look at certain issues. However, I will await the answers from the Minister.

There is one further point that I should raise with the Minister, which to an extent echoes what the noble Lord, Lord Kilclooney, said. We are in a position where devolution seems to be taking us to where we may have a separate tax system in Scotland, in Northern Ireland, possibly in Wales and in England. Under the coalition Government there is a new Office of Tax Simplification. It would be helpful to know whether some guidance might be sought as to how simplification might be assisted. I do not mean that entirely frivolously because it is plain that this is an area of great complexity. It would be useful at least to recognise that there may be a step away from a unitary tax system to something that is more complicated, so guidance on simplification from every quarter might be useful. In relation to the various amendments, it will be detected that we are broadly in support of seeking clarity.

[Lord Sassoon]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson of Glen Clova, for his measured and reasonable approach. I think that I have had 57 varieties of questions and counting. Some of the questions are very technical and possibly do not go to the heart of the clause, but I will make sure that a letter sweeping up as many of the points as possible is written ahead of the Report stage so that all noble Lords have their queries addressed in good time.

There are one or two questions that I had anticipated which we did not get to, such as the tax position of Scottish astronauts. I am sure that we could have found one or two other cases. The serious starting point of all this is that, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson of Glen Clova, points out, there is huge complexity already in the UK system on residence matters. We do not want to add unnecessary complexity in this Bill. Quite a number of the issues that have been identified in this interesting discussion already arise under UK tests, and are not particular to Scotland. Others are very much issues particular to Scotland. I believe that they have all been given consideration, but I certainly do not pretend that any of this will be simple.

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[Lord Davidson of Glen Clova]

My Lords, might I also perhaps encourage the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, to consider the position of judges. One of the great strengths of the United Kingdom is that Scotland has access to the whole Supreme Court, and therefore some of the finest minds and judiciary in the world. All those members of the Supreme Court have responsibilities for Scotland and it would perhaps be unfortunate if all 12 members of the court were to suddenly find themselves subject to the Scottish rate of income tax. I know he is looking for suggestions for his list, but possibly that one should be removed.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I see a clear distinction between the previous category of people and parliamentarians, who are different in a number of respects, not least because they are specifically tied, in a very clear way that we well understand, to the electorate and a constituency in Scotland. However, the extent to which a judge, a Peer or a civil servant could be said to have responsibilities for Scotland will vary enormously from case to case. My noble friend has said that this is a probing amendment and that he is not serious about it, so it would be wrong to criticise the amendment for the flaws in its drafting, but goodness knows how one would go about defining what “responsibilities” means in this context and how the test would apply in practice. It would be very difficult.

I certainly agree with the sentiment that we do not want to go down the slippery slope that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, identifies of putting lots of people into some special category. Obviously, many judges, civil servants and, dare I say it, Peers will have a close connection with Scotland and will therefore be caught or encompassed by the definition of “Scottish taxpayer” as defined in the draft Bill. I am with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, in that I do not think we should go further down this route other than in the specific case of the parliamentarians, where the considerations are different in a number of respects, not least because they are very specifically tied to Scotland in a way that this other, looser, category would not be. It is right that the individuals identified in Amendment 54D should have the conditions A and B applied in the same way as all other taxpayers. On that basis, I would yet again ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Davidson of Glen Clova]

My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, in seeking further areas of consultation. How true it is that the Scottish Parliament, under improved devolution, will have greater powers. None the less, it remains part of the United Kingdom and therefore it would be very important that consultation on areas which could have a significant effect throughout the United Kingdom should be put in place by the Treasury.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, Amendment 54G would indeed require the Treasury to consult interested parties, specifically including the Scottish Government and Parliament, on its plans. It may be helpful to explain the Treasury’s new approach to tax policy-making, which was published with the 2010 Budget, because that sets out the Government’s commitment to consult on tax changes in legislation. Secondary legislation made under the power in proposed new Section 80G would be treated no differently, so we already have a commitment to consultation through the Government’s general approach to consultation on tax changes. Indeed, in the context of the Bill and through its technical groups, the Government are already consulting on further changes needed as a result of the Scottish rate. The Scottish Government have been involved in these discussions, so I have absolutely no difficulty with the underlying concern that my noble friend seeks to address here. I simply point him to the fact that since 2010, under the new framework which the coalition Government have put in place, we are doing all these things already on a UK-wide basis under the policy that we announced.

It is important to recognise, nevertheless, that any changes which are made as a consequence of the introduction of the Scottish rate will still need to fit within the wider UK income tax system. I believe it is correct that while the Government are committed to consulting with the Scottish Government, Ministers and Parliament, and with others as part of our general approach, the Government should nevertheless have the final say on how these matters are handled, just as they do on how matters are handled across the UK tax system. On that basis, I again ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Davidson of Glen Clova]

I am obliged to my noble friend. There is considerable difficulty in identifying where that line should be drawn. However, where there is a significant tax, the view from this side is certainly that there would be virtue in its being found in primary legislation. If one were using a power under new Section 80B, it would be primary legislation in the context of the Scottish Parliament. I hope that helps.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I think I should allow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson of Glen Clova, to continue; he seems to have made the points in a way that I could not hope to match. I suppose I should do more than say that I agree with everything that he said and sit down.

I do not want to reopen all the discussions that we had in the previous Committee session but it is important to recognise that, as the noble and learned Lord said, there is an appropriate series of checks on both sides before any power could be devolved under Clause 28. I remind my noble friend that a similar power exists under Section 30 of the Scotland Act. I see the noble Lord, Lord Sewel, nodding. A power already exists for the Scottish Government to request new powers, including on taxation, under Section 30 of the Scotland Act. Perhaps I should not have gone into this territory, but it provides important background to this matter.

My other point is that Scottish Ministers referred to the Section 30 power when seeking legislative responsibility for a whole range of things, from firearms to consumer protection. As noble Lords will know, in each case the Government rejected the requests made by the Scottish Government. As background to this discussion about air passenger duty, it is important to remind ourselves that there are proportionate powers under Clause 28.

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[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, the short answer to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson of Glen Clova, is that the additional safeguard proposed in his amendment does not need to be written into the Bill in this way because the limit and sources of borrowing are already controlled in the legislation and the Command Paper. I could leave it at that, but I feel that I should say a little more, because I understand what the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord, Lord Browne, are driving at in their amendment. I agree that control over the borrowing powers needs to be careful and considered. They have given us an important opportunity to look at this matter and to confirm what I believe to be the case; namely, that sufficient controls exist.

The extended current borrowing facility proposed will provide Scottish Ministers with a lever to deal with the deviation between forecast and actual outturn receipts from devolved taxes. It will also enable them to deal with the volatility in revenue flows from taxes as they enter the Consolidated Fund at different times over the tax year and beyond. The current borrowing power will come into operation when the taxes are devolved, up to a limit of £500 million. I do not think that the noble and learned Lord is suggesting that there is anything inappropriate about that—he is confirming that he does not challenge the logic of that. In addition to the current borrowing facility, Scottish Ministers will have the power also to borrow to fund capital expenditure to a limit of up to 10 per cent of the Scottish capital budget in any year, with the overall stock of debt for capital purposes not exceeding £2.2 billion.

Such borrowing will need to be self-financed through increased revenue from taxation in Scotland or a reduction in public spending. So there are controls in place on the levels of borrowing, as there must be. On that basis, the Bill allows Scottish Ministers to access the most competitive source of lending, which is the National Loans Fund.

All other things being equal, Scottish borrowing will increase UK borrowing and debt. The limits in the Bill and the controls set out in the Command Paper will ensure that the Scottish debt is affordable from within the UK fiscal position.

While I support the intention behind the noble and learned Lord’s amendment, which is that borrowing by Scottish Ministers must not risk the UK’s fiscal position, I believe that the borrowing limits reflect a judgment of what is affordable and do not put that position at risk. The limits on borrowing for capital expenditure were judged by my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer to represent an acceptable level of risk that he was willing to place on the UK’s public finances. The limits on borrowing for revenue expenditure were based on an assessment of the size of forecast errors in income tax in normal times. Unlike capital expenditure, where a stock may build up, borrowing for revenue expenditure is related to a technical assessment of forecast errors and the timing implication.

The protections already in place in the Bill are sufficient to ensure that the UK’s fiscal position is fully protected. I again thank the noble and learned Lord for stimulating this short discussion, but ask him to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Davidson of Glen Clova]

I am obliged to the Minister for his careful clarification of the position. There is much content in what he has said and I shall reflect on it. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Al-Qaida (Asset-Freezing) Regulations 2011

Debate between Lord Davidson of Glen Clova and Lord Sassoon

Wednesday 9th November 2011 Grand Committee

[Lord Sassoon]

I am afraid that I did not quite catch the noble and learned Lord’s question and I want to try to give him the service of an answer. His noble friend asked me lots of questions but since the noble and learned Lord asked only one, I want to make sure that I got it right. Perhaps he would not mind clarifying the question.

[Lord Davidson of Glen Clova]

It will be my pleasure. I was seeking clarification or explication of the processes which the UN employs for putting individuals on the target list and the way in which discussions by the UK Government at the UN level have improved the potential for challenge by individuals finding themselves on the UN target list. One fully appreciates that the UN target list is not simply replicated by the EU target list. It applies its own judgment in relation to these. But, given that the EU takes considerable account of what the UN does by way of placing individuals on the target list, it would be helpful to understand how a challenge might be made by an individual at the UN level. I appreciate that this is entirely tangential but it would be interesting to know as this matter has caused concern in the past.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords very much for this focused short debate and for a number of questions which are absolutely to the point. Even though the noble and learned Lord says that his question is tangential, I do not think that it is at all. It goes to the heart of the UK’s concerns to make sure that when the UN did its review of the regime leading up to June 2011 we made sure that there were additional proper protections. I might come back to that in a minute.

I am grateful that all noble Lords recognise the importance of these regulations but it is equally clear that we should get the details right.

In answer to my noble friend Lady Kramer’s questions, I can certainly reassure her that absolutely nothing will slip through the gaps; there is nothing separating the old and the new regimes. We are putting in place something that ensures that there is a seamless continuation from the old combined resolution regime into the two separate regimes.

On whether there will be any additional burdens on ordinary people, I shall expand that to ordinary people and small businesses because it is important that small businesses do not have any additional burdens placed on them. Consistent with my previous answer, there should be no substantially changed burdens from the previous regimes. In fact, there has been some rationalisation of the drafting of the regulations in the process of coming forward with this new regulation. We continue to have a dialogue with representatives of small firms. I can reassure my noble friend on that. She also asked about the burden on people. It mainly will ensure that private individuals, who are in any way conceivably connected to this regime, have legitimate payments flowing to them. I believe that the regime will continue to ensure that that is the case.

I wondered why the noble Lord, Lord Myners, was writing away so furiously and I now understand that he was setting an exam paper for me.

Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 4) Rules 2010

Debate between Lord Davidson of Glen Clova and Lord Sassoon

Monday 7th February 2011 Grand Committee

[The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Sassoon)]

I beg to move that the Grand Committee do now consider the Civil Procedure (Amendment No.4) Rules 2010, but I will also speak to the Rules of the Court of Judicature (Northern Ireland) (Amendment No.3) 2010.

Noble Lords may find it helpful if I start by briefly explaining the wider legislative context of the rules that we are debating today. The ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Ahmed and others v HM Treasury in January 2010 placed the legality of the Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2009 in doubt. Consequently, the Terrorist Asset-Freezing (Temporary Provisions) Act was passed in February 2010 to protect the 2009 order from being quashed on vires grounds. Subsequently, the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010 received Royal Assent in December and put terrorist asset-freezing designation powers in primary legislation. I think that all parties recognise that the 2010 Act was absolutely necessary to the United Kingdom’s continued national security and to fulfil our international obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373.

Both Houses of Parliament gave the Act careful scrutiny during its passage, in particular looking closely at the civil liberties issues raised and how best to address them without compromising national security. The Government made a number of amendments to the asset-freezing regime provided by the 2009 order, including the introduction of a higher threshold for designations lasting longer than 30 days—reasonable belief rather than reasonable suspicion—and a merits-based right of appeal against designation decisions rather than judicial review. I am confident that we struck the right balance in the 2010 Act between protecting national security and protecting civil liberties.

As part of the government amendments which introduced a merits-based right of appeal to asset-freezing designation decisions, a provision was included to allow the Lord Chancellor to make rules of court for such appeals. That was necessary to allow rules to be made quickly after the Bill received Royal Assent. Rules were needed quickly because transitional provisions in the Act deem designations in force under the 2009 order to have been made under the 2010 Act for a short time to ensure continuity of asset-freezes. Rules needed to be made to ensure that there was a framework in place if designated persons wanted to challenge their freezes under the Act.

The Lords Chief Justice of England and Wales and of Northern Ireland were consulted on the draft rules. The Civil Procedure Rule Committee was informed that the Lord Chancellor would be making rules to provide for asset-freezing appeals and was shown an early draft. The Civil Procedure (Amendment No.4) Rules 2010 and the Rules of the Court of Judicature (Northern Ireland) (Amendment No.3) 2010 were laid before Parliament on 23 December 2010 and came into force the next day.

The rules of court made by the Lord Chancellor for designation appeals amend Part 79 of the Civil Procedure Rules and Order 116B of the Rules of the Court of Judicature (Northern Ireland) 1980 respectively. Part 79 was created following the passage of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 to provide rules of court for financial restriction proceedings, including asset-freezing proceedings.

Rules in Part 79 cover the use of closed information and special advocates and are intended to ensure that information is not disclosed contrary to the public interest while ensuring that proceedings are properly determined. The existing provisions of Part 79 apply judicial review principles to such challenges. These remain in force for decisions—such as challenges in relation to asset-freezing licensing decisions—that remain subject to judicial review principles.

There are three strands of amendments to the Part 79 rules to allow for appeals. First, Rule 79.1 is amended so that the general provisions concerning the appointment of special advocates, the requirements for disclosure and procedures for determination of proceedings apply also to designation appeals. Secondly, a new Section 3 is inserted. This deals with the mechanics of starting an appeal by setting out the details to be included in the notice filed to start an appeal and the material to be filed with that. It also applies existing rules to any application to the Court of Appeal following a High Court determination. Thirdly, there is one substantive amendment made to the general provisions in Section 4 of Part 79 as they apply to appeals. This concerns disclosure, which in itself is a complicated matter and requires a little explanation.

Rule 79.23 requires the “disclosing party” to search for material that is relevant and, under Rule 79.23(1)(b), to file and serve material: on which the disclosing party relies; which adversely affects the disclosing party; which adversely affects the other party; or which supports the other party.

There is an exception for the disclosure of “closed material” which is dealt with separately. A difficulty arises because the definition of closed material in Part 79 does not cover material which a party holds and which adversely affects not him but the other party, but which he does not wish to use. Therefore, if the Treasury holds sensitive material which supports the case for designation but which, for reasons of national security, it does not want to rely on in an appeal, it could be argued that it should be disclosed under the current wording of Rule 79.23. We think that this interpretation is wrong, given the obligations in the rules to ensure that disclosures of information are not made where they would be contrary to the public interest.

We are therefore using this amendment to make clear the parties’ disclosure requirements so far as the rules apply to appeals. We will ask the Civil Procedure Rule Committee to exercise its power to remove this provision from Part 79 as it applies to other financial restriction proceedings. Let me stress that this change in no way adversely affects the appellant or the proper determination of the appeal. Nor will it affect the Treasury’s obligation to disclose all information which adversely affects the Treasury’s case or supports the other party’s case.

On 4 February, the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments published its 14th report, in which it drew two issues to the special attention of both Houses. We are grateful to the committee for publishing the report on Friday, rather than tomorrow as would have been its usual practice. Early publication has enabled this debate to go ahead when otherwise it would inevitably have had to be postponed.

The first point to which the JCSI draws special attention is a failure to set out the fact that Section 28(4) of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010—one of the instrument’s enabling powers—incorporates by reference Sections 66 to 68 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. Sections 66 to 68 authorise provisions in the court rules which apply to designation appeals. The JCSI concludes, and the Ministry of Justice accepts, that the instrument does not in this respect comply with proper drafting practice. However, there is no effect on the validity of the instruments.

The JCSI has also drawn attention to a reference in each set of rules to “the application” rather than “the appeal”. The Ministry of Justice has made it clear in correspondence with the JCSI that although the meaning should be clear from the context, use of “the appeal” would have been preferable. The Ministry of Justice will draw that to the attention of the Civil Procedure Rule Committee, which can, if it considers it appropriate, make that change next time the Civil Procedure Rules are amended.

I turn now briefly to the Rules of the Court of Judicature (Northern Ireland) (Amendment No.3) 2010. Order 116B was, like Part 79, created following the passage of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 and creates rules of court for the determination of challenges to financial restriction decisions. Order 116B has a similar scope and content to Part 79 in that it provides for the use of closed material and the appointment of special advocates. Order 116B is similarly amended by the Amendment No.3 instrument to apply it to designation appeals under the 2010 Act, and is amended in the three ways outlined above for Part 79. If the amendments to Part 79 and Order 116B are approved, any future amendments to Part 79 will be made by the Civil Procedure Rule Committee and any future amendments to Order 116B will be made by the Northern Ireland Court of Judicature Rules Committee.

The court rules we are debating set out the process we expect the court to follow when considering merits-based challenges to designation decisions. They implement one of the key new safeguards agreed for the UK’s terrorist asset-freezing regime. They are necessary to ensure that a proper framework is in place for challenges to asset-freezing designations, and will ensure that appropriately in-depth scrutiny is given to the relevant decision while protecting sensitive material from damaging public disclosure.

[Lord Davidson of Glen Clova]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for introducing these rules. The previous Government promoted terrorist asset-freezing orders, for very good reasons, to increase the protection of the UK and of its citizens. I am pleased to see that the approach has been continued by this Government. I particularly welcome the refinement in relation to disclosure, which I agree will remove the potential for difficulty.

One appreciates that, prior to the election, many members of the then Opposition made criticisms about anti-terrorist legislation and that this Government contains a number of those who made those arguments—although not, of course, the Minister. Yet those others are, perhaps, now coming to an understanding that the tension between civil liberties and the protection of the UK is rather more complicated and less clear-cut than they first argued. One notes that they are also discovering this in relation to control orders, another area which was of great controversy.

These instruments seek to implement the innovations that the Government thought proper to bring to terrorist asset-freezing orders. The use of judicial review with the addition of a separate merits-based appeals structure adds another level of potential court intervention. Another innovation is the introduction of the distinction between “reasonable suspicion” and “reasonable belief”, which is not pellucid. It now means that where the individual is reasonably suspected of being involved in terrorism, he will not be under a terrorist asset-freezing order after 30 days, unless that reasonable suspicion is shown to move towards reasonable belief standards. I am not sure whether that is particularly reassuring to UK citizens.

There are views that reasonable belief and reasonable suspicion are, if at all different, extremely close in meaning given the application of the objective standard imposed by the use of “reasonable”. This will no doubt be an area for complex argument before the courts, but it is perhaps not easy to see how much of a gain for the civil liberties argument this represents, if the difference is negligible. If, on the other hand, there is a palpable and real difference between the two standards—one notes that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, has identified such an interest in the case of Saik—then the notion that those reasonably suspected of being involved in terrorist activity will be at liberty, after 30 days, to use their assets as they choose becomes a real concern.

It would hardly be satisfactory, where an interim order is made expressly because the individual is reasonably suspected of being involved in terrorist activity and to protect members of the public, that if one falls short of reasonable belief that individual is at liberty to do with his assets as he will. Is the Minister in a position to offer guidance on an interpretation of the difference between reasonable suspicion and reasonable belief? I ask him that because doubtless it will become an issue in the courts. It is doubtless that the provisions in respect of judicial review and appeal will be deployed on these types of arguments as well as on other issues. The expansion of the courts’ role with the addition of a separate merits-based appeals structure regarding terrorist asset-freezing orders against individuals suspected or believed to be involved in terrorist activity will presumably be welcomed by those individuals, at least. In this context, it would be interesting to hear whether the Government consider that the courts’ increased role pursuant to these instruments provides an increase or a reduction in the level of protection to the population at large—for of course it is they who will be among the victims in the event of any future terrorist attacks.

Will the Minister explain whether this expansion of the court’s role creates a tougher or more relaxed environment for potentially highly dangerous terrorists? I ask that question in the light of the expression made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, in his recent report on the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. There is a concern that European Court of Human Rights’ decisions are making the UK,

“a safe haven for some individuals whose determination is to damage the UK and its citizens”.

The question should be asked whether the Government consider the expansion of the court’s role by these orders discourages or encourages those individuals identified by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile.

The Minister has made reference to the report of the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments regarding the failure to comply with proper drafting practice and defective drafting. I note his explanation and proposed action in relation to these observations and I shall say nothing further on the point. However, we welcome the general continuation of the previous Government’s approach to disrupting potential terrorist activity.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I am scripted to say that this has been an interesting debate, but it has been a short, focused and to-the-point exchange. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson of Glen Clova, for being short, sharp and to the point in asking me some key questions about these new court rules.

The noble and learned Lord asked about the distinction between suspicion and belief, and what, if anything, that says about our underlying concern for national security as balanced with proper safeguards on grounds of civil liberties. As the noble and learned Lord will know, various court judgments define the difference between reasonable suspicion and belief. In summary, for suspicion, one believes that something may be so and, for belief, one believes that it is so. I am certainly not in a position to second-guess the courts, which have judged that there are significant differences. The Government certainly believe that national security requirements can be met by this combination of interim freezes for up to 30 days on the basis of reasonable suspicion, during which time further investigations can be made to determine whether the belief can be met. We believe that this balance between the national security and the civil liberties imperatives, which was extensively debated in your Lordships’ House, achieves what is intended. The court rules merely flow from that. I certainly do not think that the court rules in any way cut across or work against that construct.

On the role of the courts and judicial review versus appeal, the question was asked whether these instruments will result in a strengthening or a lessening of the protection of the public or, indeed, of the appellant. As a non-lawyer, I understand that what has been striking in the way that the courts have interpreted judicial review recently is that—in a national security context and, specifically, in relation to control orders—courts have increasingly approached judicial review in a way that is substantively similar to that of an appeal process. When considering the control order in the MB case, the Court of Appeal made it clear that it could substitute its own view for that of the Minister when deciding whether reasonable suspicion existed. We had expected the court to take a similar approach in relation to asset freezes, which would bring judicial review and appeal, in substance, close together in this area. In part, the approach we took in the 2010 Act was to formalise, in effect, what the courts were moving towards. It is better if, in reality, the substance of what the courts were moving towards was an appeal, but we actually put in the legislation, as Parliament has seen fit to do, a full appeals process and then the court rules follow from that. The noble and learned Lord’s question, in a sense, falls away because the courts have been bringing the two processes increasingly closer together.

On the role of the European Court of Human Rights, we do not think that the rules we are looking at here and the thresholds for suspicion and belief will mean any material change as to whether, why and how the ECHR can intervene in any particular case. Without commenting on the discussion on these issues over the weekend, I do not think that anything we are doing in the Act or the rules which we are considering today touches materially on those concerns.

I hope I addressed the less than perfect drafting in my opening remarks. The first of the two issues is a stylistic point that is an omission, but it does not have substantive effect. In the second case, it is clear from the context that the words, “the application” refer to the application to the Court of Appeal and so I think there is no question of possible misinterpretation of the statutory instruments and no substantive risk of being challenged in court. In any event, it will be up to the Civil Procedure Rule Committee to be able to amend the rules should that committee deem it necessary.

I hope I have been able to deal adequately with the noble and learned Lord’s points as I believe it is important that these rules are approved today. They provide the framework for those designated under the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010 to challenge their asset freeze designation under the new appeals procedure. The court rules will ensure that rigorous scrutiny is given to the relevant decision, while at the same time protecting sensitive material from damaging public disclosure. Therefore, I commend these rules to the Committee.

Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Davidson of Glen Clova and Lord Sassoon

Wednesday 6th October 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davidson of Glen Clova]

My Lords, the last Government passed the provisional Bill earlier this year to validate existing asset-freezing orders and to avoid gaps in the terrorist asset-freezing regime. At the same time, we sent a draft Bill for public consultation to ensure that we had a viable long-term framework for terrorist asset freezing. Those were the right decisions to take at the time and I thank the Treasury for its advice on these matters. What it means for us today is that we now have the benefit of public submissions on the draft Bill and the report from our Constitution Committee. Submissions on the draft Bill voiced a concern that the balance was not right between public security and individual civil liberties. Added to that is the report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which noted the necessity to keep assessing the appropriateness of terrorist legislation to ensure that the measures imposed remain fair and proportionate. We have taken these views on board.

The interim designation proposal from the Government is inevitably a compromise position to accommodate some of the concerns raised by the Supreme Court in the Ahmed case, in public submissions made on the draft Bill and by the Constitution Committee in the House of Lords. We have been considering the viability of a similar regime ourselves. In considering this solution further, we have a few questions about the Government’s proposed regime.

One issue that might benefit from clarification—this echoes the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner—is how the Government came to the 30-day timeframe. I assume that there was nothing very principled about it. Do the relevant agencies consider that they will be able to meet the higher test within such a period? Do they consider that that will put a particular imposition on the limited resources available to them in this particularly difficult area?

As I understand the Minister’s position, the consequence of the new approach is that the order will drop, although it is reasonably suspected that an individual is involved in terrorist activity. I appreciate that there is more than a semantic difference between “reasonable suspicion” and “reasonable belief” but, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, said, the difference between the two tests can be quite thin. Because this may be an area that will become contentious in court, it would be helpful if some indication might be given as to how the Minister perceives the difference between the two tests. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, also said, it is paramount to suspend terrorists’ funding when one may.

There is a concern about the extent to which a string of interim designations might lead to pressure on sparse resources. Have the Government considered the possibility of a longer timeframe with a definitive cut-off point as a way in which to provide certainty and capacity for the long-term credibility of the asset-freezing regime? There is in New Zealand a possibility of a one-year interim designation based on the lower burden of proof. That cannot be renewed. After that period, the relevant authority, in that case the Prime Minister, must decide whether to grant a final designation or to allow the designation to lapse. That acknowledges the important balance required between civil rights and security. It would be interesting to know whether the Government have any information on how that regime has operated in New Zealand and it would be useful if such information as the Government possess might be made available.

There is interest in the Government’s assessment of costs in introducing this regime into the asset-freezing framework. I appreciate that this might be asking for too much, but are there any indications as to what additional costs might be associated with having an interim and final designation scheme?

Finally, I share the view expressed from all quarters of the Committee, including by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Falkner, and the noble Lords, Lord Myners and Lord Lester, that further debate on some of these amendments might be useful. I echo the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in expressing disappointment about the absence of a review. Again, it would be helpful to have a timeframe that the Minister is confident in telling the Committee about when that review might come.

I draw attention to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, identified, with his usual acuity, on the recent decision of the European Court of Justice. Plainly this must raise questions about how that Court views the potential for abuse in the system as it is currently proposed. It would be useful to hear what consideration the Government have given to the decision of the Court. I appreciate that the decision is very recent and would not expect any developed appreciation of the judgment.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I am grateful for the important contributions that we have had to this discussion and for the focused points. I appreciate the remarks from around the Committee in response to the amendments that we have brought forward. On one or two of the procedural points, I apologise if noble Lords believe that our amendments came forward a bit late in the day but, as your Lordships will appreciate, they are fundamental amendments to the Bill and, with the Recess and the summer holidays, it took some time, both within the Treasury and with my colleagues in Government, to ensure that we got them absolutely right. We took the time necessary to do that, but I apologise if it has been a bit of a scramble in the past couple of days.

On the question that a number of noble Lords have raised about the process of amendments to amendments, my understanding, although I am the newest of new boys here, is that amendments to amendments are possible but the reversal of amendments on Report is not. Whatever the construction is, though, I am sure that we will be bound by whatever the conventions of the House are. However, I take the point that there are potentially a number of bits of tidying up. We will come to the individual items, but there are certainly one or two things that I shall take away and reflect on. I take that procedural point.

On the question of the publication of the Home Office review, I can only repeat what I said in my opening remarks—I have no specific date. However, I note the remarks that have been made today, and I will take them away and relay them to my right honourable friend the Home Secretary.

I turn to some of the specific points that have been raised. A number of noble Lords, starting with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, have made the suggestion that it should be for a judge to make the order rather than a Treasury Minister, with the courts then reviewing the order if it is appealed. I cannot do more than refer to the powerful case succinctly put by my noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew, who said what I would probably have said at greater length: we believe, given the nature of this regime and the nature of the process that requires Ministers to take account of operational information, that it is appropriate for Ministers to make the initial order, but making that order has to be done on the considerably strengthened tests that we are now proposing and there has to be a concern that the public would be put at risk if the order were not made.