Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Bill [HL] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Sassoon
Main Page: Lord Sassoon (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Sassoon's debates with the Wales Office
(13 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, before moving the government amendment, I will make some brief introductory remarks to the Committee. At Second Reading, I explained to the House that the Government took seriously the civil liberties concerns that had been raised about the terrorist asset-freezing regime, and that they were committed to striking the appropriate balance between protecting national security and civil liberties. I explained that the Treasury would do further work over the summer, informed by the wider Home Office-led review of counterterrorism and security powers in considering civil liberties safeguards on asset freezing, and that if any government amendments were tabled to strengthen civil liberties safeguards, this would be done in Committee.
I am pleased to say that the Treasury has concluded its consideration of civil liberties safeguards on asset freezing, and has now brought forward amendments to strengthen safeguards in two key areas. First, we have tabled an amendment to raise the legal threshold for freezing assets from “reasonable suspicion” to “reasonable belief”, with “reasonable suspicion” only able to be used for interim designations of 30 days. Secondly, we have tabled an amendment stating that challenges to Treasury decisions to impose, vary or renew asset freezes should be heard by the courts under an appeal rather than a judicial review procedure. This ensures that there will be a robust, in-depth review by the courts of the Treasury decisions.
I hope that noble Lords will agree that these amendments address the concerns raised at Second Reading, and that they significantly improve the Bill. I know that noble Lords also are keenly awaiting the outcome of the Home Office-led wider review of counterterrorism and security powers, but I cannot provide the Committee today with a date for publication of that review. However, the Treasury's conclusions on asset freezing and safeguards are not intended to pre-empt the Home Office review, which has a separate piece of work. I assure noble Lords that the Treasury's work on civil liberties safeguards has not been carried out in a vacuum. The Home Office and other government departments have been consulted on, and have agreed to, the conclusions reached by the Treasury.
While the Government have an overall coherent approach to counterterrorism powers, this does not mean that each power should be subject to the same civil liberties safeguards, as the appropriate level of safeguards will vary depending on the nature of the power and how it is used. In particular, the Treasury and the Home Office agree that there are significant differences between asset-freezing and control orders, and that in consequence the approach that we take on asset freezing reflects the circumstances of this tool and does not need to be aligned with the Government’s approach to control orders, which is still under consideration.
I turn in more detail to the government amendments to Clause 2. The clause specifies the circumstances in which the Treasury has the power to designate persons. The Bill contains a provision for the Treasury to make an asset freeze on the basis of reasonable suspicion that that person is or has been involved in terrorism. The Government have tabled amendments to Clause 2, with a series of consequential amendments. These allow the Treasury to make an interim designation using the reasonable suspicion threshold for a period of 30 days. The Treasury can only make a final designation—that is, beyond 30 days—if it has reasonable belief that a person is or has been involved in terrorism. For ease of reference, Amendment 2 is the substantive amendment that raises the legal threshold from reasonable suspicion to reasonable belief. Amendments 29, 30, 31 and 32 permit the Treasury to make an interim designation. The other government amendments in the group are consequential and ensure that other parts of the Bill that referred to designations now refer to initial and final designations.
I will explain why we have tabled these amendments. I note that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has tabled an amendment on a similar theme, and I look forward to his remarks as the debate continues. We have retained reasonable suspicion for a 30-day interim period because we recognise that there may be occasions when asset freezes need to be imposed where there is a terrorist threat, but when, for example, investigations are continuing and it may not be possible to meet a higher threshold at the time. This was the case, for example, with the asset freezes against the attempted transatlantic airline bombers in August 2006. In these cases, asset freezes were made soon after arrests, to prevent assets being dispersed to associates of the plotters. The police assessed the freezes to be of significant operational impact.
My Lords, the last Government passed the provisional Bill earlier this year to validate existing asset-freezing orders and to avoid gaps in the terrorist asset-freezing regime. At the same time, we sent a draft Bill for public consultation to ensure that we had a viable long-term framework for terrorist asset freezing. Those were the right decisions to take at the time and I thank the Treasury for its advice on these matters. What it means for us today is that we now have the benefit of public submissions on the draft Bill and the report from our Constitution Committee. Submissions on the draft Bill voiced a concern that the balance was not right between public security and individual civil liberties. Added to that is the report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which noted the necessity to keep assessing the appropriateness of terrorist legislation to ensure that the measures imposed remain fair and proportionate. We have taken these views on board.
The interim designation proposal from the Government is inevitably a compromise position to accommodate some of the concerns raised by the Supreme Court in the Ahmed case, in public submissions made on the draft Bill and by the Constitution Committee in the House of Lords. We have been considering the viability of a similar regime ourselves. In considering this solution further, we have a few questions about the Government’s proposed regime.
One issue that might benefit from clarification—this echoes the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner—is how the Government came to the 30-day timeframe. I assume that there was nothing very principled about it. Do the relevant agencies consider that they will be able to meet the higher test within such a period? Do they consider that that will put a particular imposition on the limited resources available to them in this particularly difficult area?
As I understand the Minister’s position, the consequence of the new approach is that the order will drop, although it is reasonably suspected that an individual is involved in terrorist activity. I appreciate that there is more than a semantic difference between “reasonable suspicion” and “reasonable belief” but, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, said, the difference between the two tests can be quite thin. Because this may be an area that will become contentious in court, it would be helpful if some indication might be given as to how the Minister perceives the difference between the two tests. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, also said, it is paramount to suspend terrorists’ funding when one may.
There is a concern about the extent to which a string of interim designations might lead to pressure on sparse resources. Have the Government considered the possibility of a longer timeframe with a definitive cut-off point as a way in which to provide certainty and capacity for the long-term credibility of the asset-freezing regime? There is in New Zealand a possibility of a one-year interim designation based on the lower burden of proof. That cannot be renewed. After that period, the relevant authority, in that case the Prime Minister, must decide whether to grant a final designation or to allow the designation to lapse. That acknowledges the important balance required between civil rights and security. It would be interesting to know whether the Government have any information on how that regime has operated in New Zealand and it would be useful if such information as the Government possess might be made available.
There is interest in the Government’s assessment of costs in introducing this regime into the asset-freezing framework. I appreciate that this might be asking for too much, but are there any indications as to what additional costs might be associated with having an interim and final designation scheme?
Finally, I share the view expressed from all quarters of the Committee, including by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Falkner, and the noble Lords, Lord Myners and Lord Lester, that further debate on some of these amendments might be useful. I echo the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in expressing disappointment about the absence of a review. Again, it would be helpful to have a timeframe that the Minister is confident in telling the Committee about when that review might come.
I draw attention to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, identified, with his usual acuity, on the recent decision of the European Court of Justice. Plainly this must raise questions about how that Court views the potential for abuse in the system as it is currently proposed. It would be useful to hear what consideration the Government have given to the decision of the Court. I appreciate that the decision is very recent and would not expect any developed appreciation of the judgment.
My Lords, I am grateful for the important contributions that we have had to this discussion and for the focused points. I appreciate the remarks from around the Committee in response to the amendments that we have brought forward. On one or two of the procedural points, I apologise if noble Lords believe that our amendments came forward a bit late in the day but, as your Lordships will appreciate, they are fundamental amendments to the Bill and, with the Recess and the summer holidays, it took some time, both within the Treasury and with my colleagues in Government, to ensure that we got them absolutely right. We took the time necessary to do that, but I apologise if it has been a bit of a scramble in the past couple of days.
On the question that a number of noble Lords have raised about the process of amendments to amendments, my understanding, although I am the newest of new boys here, is that amendments to amendments are possible but the reversal of amendments on Report is not. Whatever the construction is, though, I am sure that we will be bound by whatever the conventions of the House are. However, I take the point that there are potentially a number of bits of tidying up. We will come to the individual items, but there are certainly one or two things that I shall take away and reflect on. I take that procedural point.
On the question of the publication of the Home Office review, I can only repeat what I said in my opening remarks—I have no specific date. However, I note the remarks that have been made today, and I will take them away and relay them to my right honourable friend the Home Secretary.
I turn to some of the specific points that have been raised. A number of noble Lords, starting with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, have made the suggestion that it should be for a judge to make the order rather than a Treasury Minister, with the courts then reviewing the order if it is appealed. I cannot do more than refer to the powerful case succinctly put by my noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew, who said what I would probably have said at greater length: we believe, given the nature of this regime and the nature of the process that requires Ministers to take account of operational information, that it is appropriate for Ministers to make the initial order, but making that order has to be done on the considerably strengthened tests that we are now proposing and there has to be a concern that the public would be put at risk if the order were not made.
Will it be open to the Treasury to make an order in a case where it cannot be revealed to the defendant what the case against him is? In other words, is it accepted that the Treasury will be applying the decision in AF?
I do not believe that the rules about what evidence can be brought before the court are in any way changed by what we are proposing from the conventions that apply. It relates in some way to the point that the noble and learned Lord made about the nature of the evidence that should be there before an order is made. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, quoted one Supreme Court justice; I could quote others but perhaps I should not detain the Committee. I might have referred to that at Second Reading. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Rodger, has in some of his remarks expressed a different view about the nature of the supporting evidence in order to support very much a preventive approach to this regime.
Following the point just made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, if the Bill were to place the responsibility on the Treasury not to designate but to seek an ex parte decision by a judge to designate, would that hearing not be held in camera? In those circumstances, would it not be possible to provide, for example, evidence from the security services, such as SIS and GCHQ, without any danger to national security?
The issue here, as the Government see it, is to get a workable regime that is able to respond flexibly and appropriately and can be a preventive regime. The balance we have struck between a limited period when the evidence can be used to support a ministerial decision on the basis of reasonable suspicion, followed by the reasonable belief with the appeal to the court, is the right one. There are different ways of doing it which would entail various ways of the court looking at it. I come back to the fundamental point—my noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew has absolutely gone to the heart of this. While we could debate alternative ways of doing it, in striking the balance it is appropriate to have a ministerial decision, with the person designated able to challenge it through an appeal process in the court.
The Minister is answering me by saying that the balance is in favour of the Treasury route because it is a more appropriate route, which is slightly circular. Can I establish what exactly it is that the Government feel is in the route’s favour? What are the decisive criteria in favour of taking the route that they suggest? Is it a matter of time? Is the noble Lord suggesting that it is a matter of time because Ministers could take decisions more quickly than a judge could grant an ex parte injunction or designation? If not time, what other specific considerations does the noble Lord have in mind?
Ultimately it is the responsibility of the Executive to make these orders. They have the operational information at their disposal. Yes, the orders can be made very quickly. Fundamentally this is an appropriate action power of the Executive, with checks through the courts. That is the way it has operated to date, with the important exception that we are strengthening both the test that Ministers have to apply and the ability to challenge decisions through the courts. I take to heart the words of the noble Lord, Lord Myners, as a Minister who was involved in implementing the regime. He graciously said that the new construct provides a better approach than the one in the previous legislation. I take that very much to heart from a former Minister who is used to making these difficult judgments, which have to be made.
My Lords, does the Minister accept that this is a highly controversial matter, that I for one have the misfortune to disagree with my noble friend Lord Carlile, and that the Kadi case, for example, about which we hope to hear more, is very much in favour of full judicial protection and full due process of law? I for one wholly agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and with the noble Lord, Lord Davies. I see no reason whatever why we cannot trust the High Court, with its very sensitive procedures concerned with protecting national security but also personal liberty, with the primary decision to make an order with draconian consequences. I understand the arguments of administrative convenience which are always deployed by the Executive but I for one am not satisfied. I cannot tell whether the Joint Committee on Human Rights will come to a similar view.
My Lords, I shall come to the Kadi case although I should note that it does not directly relate to this particular regime. There is a judgment to be made as to what actions are ones for the Executive and what are not. We believe that this measure—it is the way this regime has worked over the years—should be operated by Ministers with the appropriate protections. The word “draconian” has to be used and understood in a particular way. The measure is intended to be draconian in the sense of making a material impact on the ability of terrorists to finance their activities but is not intended to be draconian in the sense that we also have very significant safeguards in the regime through the licensing which allows proper expenditures to be made. Therefore, I do not recognise the word “draconian” in that sense as we ensure, under individual or general licences, that money can be released for the appropriate uses, whether that is to pay legal bills or family expenses and so on.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made some very helpful remarks. As we are also discussing his amendment, I reiterate his endorsement of the broad shape of the regime that we propose in the government amendments. He made three specific points in relation to what we are proposing in Clause 29 and asked detailed questions about whether it should be the same evidence or substantially the same evidence. As I think he recognises, these are fine points which I will take away and consider. On the noble Lord’s point about appropriate notification, I should have thought that if certain people had been notified at the outset, at stage two it would be appropriate to notify the same people, so I am not sure that that needs to be stiffened up. Indeed, I am not immediately persuaded as to what difference the use of the same evidence or substantially the same would make in practice, but I will have a look at that.
My noble friend Lady Noakes talked about the procedural points that I have addressed in the Home Office review. My noble friend asked whether the review will detail the number of interim and final freezes and how many interim freezes had become final freezes. I have little doubt that that will be covered in the review. I am not sure that the implication should necessarily be drawn that if a number of interim orders are made, but they actually fall away, that in any sense suggests that they were improperly made or that the evidence was not properly based. I can quite see circumstances in which interim orders have to be made but, for a number of reasons, could fall away. I take my noble friend’s point about—
I probably did not express myself particularly well when I put the point to my noble friend. I was not talking about the work of the independent reviewer, but of the requirement in Clause 24 on the Treasury to make a report. I hear the Minister trying to say that nothing can necessarily be inferred from the relationship between interim and final designations. I am really seeking to make sure that that information will be made available in the public domain, and the report by the Treasury under Clause 24 seems to be the obvious route, not the work of the independent reviewer.
I thank my noble friend and entirely take her point that it would be a matter for the Treasury report. I am grateful to her for clarifying that she agrees with me that one could not take a simple implication from a read-across of the number of interim reports that might—we will see whether they do—fall away.
My noble friend Lady Falkner of Margravine asked why there should be a period of 30 days as opposed to any other number of days. There is, as she put it, no particular magic in designating a period of 30 days. One could mount an argument for 14 days or 45 days. Thirty sits in the middle, and it seems a reasonable period. Quite a number of cases have come across my desk and that period seems to strike a reasonable balance. However, there is no magic about it.
As for the experience of other countries, I shall look to see what other experience there is. However, I can say that New Zealand, specifically, has an interim designation which can be made for 30 days on the basis of suspicion and a final designation which requires reasonable belief. New Zealand was mentioned in a question from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson of Glen Clova. Regrettably, I met New Zealand’s Deputy Prime Minister yesterday—if the meeting was tomorrow, I could ask him the question. However, the review here operates in a different way, and we also have the regular review which Treasury Ministers have to make. Our regime is different from New Zealand’s, and we have a separate safeguard, the regular review, which is also subject to appeal to the court.
The noble and learned Lord made a couple of points about resource pressures and additional costs. I have no reason to believe that there will be significant additional costs or resource pressures. Perhaps linked to that, the noble Lord, Lord Myners, asked about fishing trips. He said that it was a churlish point, but I would not say so. It is important to question whether there will be fishing trips. I have absolutely no reason to believe that the new regime as proposed will lead to fishing trips. A series of serious tests have to be applied and that includes protection of the public. This is linked to the resources point. Resources will not be significantly increased, because nothing in the proposals will allow Ministers to go off on fishing trips.
Perhaps the last point left hanging concerns the Kadi case. The first thing to say is that the case does not impinge directly on the legislation that we are looking at. The latest judgment annuls the EU regulation and the listing under it dating back to 2001 as it applies to Kadi, but there is a suspension of the judgment for two months and 10 days to allow time for an appeal to be made to the Court of Justice. If an appeal is lodged, it is likely to take 18 to 24 months. I expect that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will press the Commission to appeal the decision; so the case has a long time to run. Of course, if the judgment were upheld, it would set our EU obligations squarely against our UN obligations, which would present a difficulty: but it is not a difficulty that impinges directly on the Bill.
I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend the Minister, but he is putting his own gloss on the judgment. He says that it puts us at odds with the United Nations regime, but am I not right in saying that the European Court was at pains not to put itself at odds with the regime, but to insist upon safeguards in administering the regime?
My Lords, I am reluctant to get too far into the details of the Kadi case. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson of Glen Clova, said, this is a recent and complex judgment that may be appealed and does not have a direct bearing on the Bill. I hope that we can now pass on, but appreciate that we may need to come back to this in the House in future.
I think that I have picked up most of the material points. The last one is the question of what happened to the printed copy of the Treasury’s human rights memorandum. I will go back and make sure that the memorandum is available. I do not know where it has got to in the paper trail, but I will find out, and I look forward to seeing the conclusion of the Joint Committee on Human Rights on the Bill and discussing this further on Report. That is a further important step as we scrutinise the Bill.
I will ask the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, not to press his amendment but to support the government’s amendment.
My Lords, it is the term “the real world” used by my noble friend Lord Carlile that provokes me to speak. He may well agree—academic pursuits and all that set aside—that because of my background, if for no other reason, I have some understanding of this particular real world and the people involved in it. The concern, particularly for me, is that an interim designation that is based on reasonable suspicion followed by such a broad inference of what kind of suspicion might lead to what kind of involvement is very wide indeed. We will catch an awful lot of people for no reason at all. I am talking about communities where large numbers of family members live together. Such communities are tight-knit and a lot of support is given to each other, often simply on the basis of familial, religious or community loyalty. The people in these communities, particularly the women, will, often in good faith, do something that is asked of them without seeing what it might lead to. The idea that they will be cognisant of and understand reasonable suspicion enough as a test and the level of involvement as another test and try not to commit those offences is asking rather a lot on frail grounds. Will the Minister reconsider this and the exhortations of my noble—and extremely knowledgeable—friend Lord Carlile that we need to be extremely careful in this regard?
My Lords, let me attempt to deal with this. I certainly feel that I live in the real world in that I have to make such decisions regularly. One limb of the test that has not been stressed in this discussion but which is absolutely critical to it is that the legal test for freezing assets has the second limb that the Treasury must also conclude that a designation is necessary for public protection. That is the critical safeguard on how the power to freeze assets is used. There can be very fast-moving situations, as described by my noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew, when the exact nature of each person’s role in a plot is not immediately clear. It would be a significant restriction on the regime’s ability to operate in the preventive way that is necessary for public protection if we were to exclude those who might be involved in the broader commissioning, facilitation and support of terrorist activity.
My noble friend instanced the case of people who may be sitting on money. It is essential that the definition is not restricted in the way that Amendments 4 and 8 propose if it is to be effective. As the plot is disrupted, the exact nature of people’s role will become increasingly clear. It will become clear who is a “bystander”, to use the word of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I think that the two-stage framework that we will now have in place, combined with the requirement for Treasury Ministers to conclude that the designation is necessary for public protection, deals with the point.
I am most grateful to the Minister for giving way. I accept of course that there has to be very wide discretion, which is allowed to the authorities in these two provisions, subsections (1) and (2). However, at the end of the day, one has to ask: what is the target area? Reasonable suspicion is perfectly understandable. It is something with which the authorities have to deal day in and day out. The question is: what is the target area? Is it a person who has been criminally involved to some degree or another as a principal in the first or second degree or as an aider, abetter, counsellor or procurer, or is it wider than that and, if so, how much wider? In other words, what is the end product that one is being reasonably suspicious of?
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, but I must reiterate that we are trying here to achieve the protection of the public against active, live terrorist attacks. In order to do that, Ministers need to be able to exercise immediate discretion to stop the flow of money—as we know, very small sums of money can create enormous disruption. Ministers must have appropriate powers to disrupt the terrorist threat. That means that it is important that the freezing net is drawn so that those who are involved in supporting or facilitating the activity are caught in it, but, as the evidence becomes clearer, the Treasury must be concerned at all times that the designation is necessary for public protection. Where an individual may have been part of a wider group that is involved in terrorist activity but where it has subsequently become clear that the individual’s involvement was purely incidental and that they themselves were not supporting or facilitating terrorism, it would be difficult to demonstrate that a freeze was necessary for public protection. Freezes cannot be imposed or maintained unless the second limb of the test is met.
I return to the analysis by my noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew. I believe that protections are in place and that we must not forget that second limb. For those reasons, I hope that, on reflection, my noble friend will be prepared to withdraw her amendment.
Before the Minister finishes, is he prepared to give the assurance that the concept of being involved must connote some culpability, some knowledge—some recklessness, at least—and that a perfectly innocent person caught up in events would not be covered?
One has to go back to the definition of terrorist activity in Clause 2(2). I cannot do more than draw the Committee's attention back to the definition there, which mentions,
“the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism … conduct that facilitates the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or that is intended to do so … conduct that gives support or assistance to persons who are known or believed by the person concerned to be involved in conduct falling within”,
the previous two paragraphs of the subsection.
It is necessarily drawn wide, but the linkages that are made are clear from the definition. All cases also have to be linked to what is necessary for public protection. I ask my noble friend to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I will not leave the Minister in suspense. In view of the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I am minded to bring the term “involvement” back on Report in the hope that the Minister will have had an opportunity to consider the culpability issue and will perhaps be able to give us some more assurances on it.
When I moved this amendment, I acknowledged paragraph (b), and I hope I said, because it was what I wrote down, that I was reassured by it. I take that point very seriously and was by no means ignoring it. The boundaries of culpability, as the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, described them, are very important. I will come back to this, but not in as extensive a fashion, and I know there are some problems with some of these amendments. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I have one question in connection with Amendment 51 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham, which seeks to insert “grant” into Clause 13. He suggested that the Bill did not contain any power for the Treasury to grant a licence. Could he say whether there is any other way of reading Clause 13, other than as saying that the Treasury may be able to grant a licence?
Let us deal with that point. I am advised that Clause 13 gives all the power that is necessary to grant a licence. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham, for trying to help the Government by making sure that the power is in the Bill. However, I am assured, and my noble friend Lady Noakes confirms this, that Clause 13 grants that power.
I will address Amendments 7 and 10 more generally. There are some important issues here. Although the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, did not spend long speaking to her amendment, she made an important point. These two amendments would clearly require the Treasury, when deciding whether to designate a person, to consider the UK’s international obligations to prevent terrorism. The Treasury would also be required to consider the humanitarian needs of persons affected by designations, including which licences should be granted immediately after the designated person is notified. The key international obligation is United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, which requires all UN member states to freeze the assets of terrorists and prevent their nationals and persons within their jurisdictions making funds, resources or financial services available to them. However, it is left to individual member states to decide to whom the measures should be applied. The Government recognise that a decision to designate someone has a significant impact on their human rights. It is for this reason that designations can be imposed only where they are necessary to protect the public from a risk of terrorism.
It may be helpful if I explain the process that the Treasury goes through when designating someone. Decisions as to persons who should be subjected to terrorist asset freezes are informed by law enforcement and intelligence agencies, which prepare statements of case setting out the material that gives rise to a reasonable suspicion or belief that the person is or has been involved in terrorist activity, and why the freeze is necessary for public protection. When submitting their recommendations, law enforcement and intelligence agencies also provide a risk assessment framework to inform immediate licensing decisions by the Treasury, and ensure that designated persons are not deprived of access to funds immediately after designation and before the longer-term licensing needs of the person can be addressed. That is also informed by the risk assessment framework. Treasury officials and lawyers then scrutinise the statements of case and make recommendations to the Minister on how to proceed. Where a designation is envisaged, this will include recommendations on immediate licensing needs, in accordance with basic principles of good governance, to ensure that a designated person’s basic needs can be met.
It is important that the asset freeze is applied in a proportionate manner—managing the risk of funds being used for terrorism while ensuring that the human rights of the designated person are protected and that third parties are not adversely affected by the freeze. For this reason, several general licences have been issued—for example, to authorise legal aid to be made available for designated persons and to enable them to take out insurance. We have also made clear in Clause 12(3) that the payment of social security benefits to spouses is not caught by the prohibitions, even when they are made in respect of the designated person. Designated persons can also contact the asset-freezing unit to seek additional licences and to make additional representations in relation to their designation or licensing arrangements at any time.
My Lords, I do not want to detain the House. I am one of those who has been anxious about designation without involving the judiciary. I am very grateful for Amendment 7 in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, because, as a probing amendment, it has produced from the Minister a statement on the context in which these decisions are taken. I know that it will be in Hansard, but can a copy of what he has said to us about the Treasury taking these decisions and the responsibilities it takes be put in the Library? People could then look at that and refer to it. I am one of those who now thinks it is right that the Executive should take the decisions and the judges should then look at them. Therefore, I welcome Amendment 57, because the matter has been made clearer by the wonderful probing amendment. Without it, I was still living in a fog.
Perhaps I may end on why this clause should be part of the Bill. On page 10 of his wonderful book, The Rule of Law, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bingham, quotes Magna Carta. I love his translation, because the old language is pretty difficult. He refers to the terms of chapters 39 and 40, which state:
“No free man shall be seized or imprisoned or stripped of his rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with force against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land”.
If the law of the land does it, that part of Magna Carta is right. It continues:
“To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice”.
I thought that I heard the Minister tell us what the Treasury does. I am comforted and I should like that description to be placed in the Library.
First, I should say that I am grateful to the most reverend Primate. If we have managed to raise a bit of fog through the combination of a probing amendment and a bit of detail from me, and be reminded that we are meeting part of the test in Magna Carta, we will have spent a worthwhile hour or so. He also answered rather eloquently part of the further challenge from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, on whether it should be the responsibility of the Executive or the courts to issue the order. I do not know whether the noble Lord is still looking for an answer. He partly answered the question himself, because I was going to start by reminding him that indeed it was the previous Government who operated the regime in this way. It was the Bill passed by this House which became an Act in February—
I quite understand that the noble Lord is trying to tease me in this way and he is welcome to do so, but I am not asking for an ad hominem response to this point; I should like a substantive response, please.
I will try briefly to help the Committee. There is a judgment to be taken in many areas where the Executive exercise authority that could be handed over to other people; the courts might be one place to which it could be handed over. However, I fundamentally believe that actions and decisions to prevent the commission of acts of terrorism, as the noble Lord points out, often must be taken under very considerable pressure of time and require fine judgments of operational matters which, as I have attempted to describe, involve the intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The combination of the flow of information, the time required and the complexity of decisions is suited to decision-making by the Executive, subject to the important safeguards of the courts. I do not know what more I can do, other than say to the noble Lord that I absolutely agree that some of the speed and operational considerations that he raises are ones that make these decisions a proper function of the Executive.
I will also say that I do not accept the word “catastrophe” if it relates to somebody who is reasonably suspected or believed to be involved in a way that leads to the freezing of their assets, subject to the safeguards. We have put in place licensing provisions, and I explained at some length how those are operated right from the start of the designation. Of course it is a serious matter to freeze somebody's assets, but when we talk about the balance against protecting the public against terrorist acts, we should be careful about using “catastrophe”, given the nature of the threat on the one hand and the protections that I have described on the other.
I will move on swiftly to the question of piracy, kidnapping and hijackers. Of course the Government take all these matters extremely seriously. In so far as they are linked to terrorism, as defined in the way that the noble Lord has set out, they will come within the provision of the Bill; but often piracy, kidnapping and hijacking will be independent of terrorism and so not the proper province of the Bill. However, this absolutely does not mean that the Government do not take this seriously, particularly the question of ransom payments. We do not encourage the payment of ransoms. There is a range of other ways, for example through the money-laundering rules, in which aspects of the transmission of illegal money are dealt with, and the Government continue to keep under review all these matters. I suggest that, although it is important that they are raised, they go beyond not only Clause 2 but the Bill itself. I ask the Committee to agree that Clause 2 should stand part of the Bill—
I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way at the last minute. I take note of the fact that obviously we are all reassured that the Government do not actively encourage the payment of ransoms and that they take the matter very seriously. However, if the problem is so serious—and the noble Lord agrees that it is serious—we should do something about it. The Government, after the election, now have a responsibility to do something. I would be grateful if the noble Lord will give an undertaking to the Committee that he will discuss with his colleagues what might be done, either legislatively or by use of executive power, to inhibit the payment of ransoms, or at least look again to see what could be done more effectively to make these activities less cost-free and risk-free to the terrorists.
Of course I am happy to take back to my colleagues the noble Lord's concerns, but I reiterate that they are not ones that have a direct or even indirect bearing on the Bill. However, I will relay them to my colleagues.
I shall speak also to Amendment 13 and hope that discussion of the two amendments will take two or three minutes rather than 23. Noble Lords are accustomed to hearing debates about changing the term “may” to “must” in legislation. My amendments would change the term “must” to “may”. They are about notifying designation and about publicity. Clearly, the Treasury must tell the banks, which it does by way of the consolidated list, but I am concerned here, as I am in other parts of the Bill, with the stigma that is allied to designation, and the effect on the family.
The conditions in Clause 3(3) that allow the Treasury not to publicise the designation are very specific. I should like to give the Treasury some discretion, although I accept that it may not use it, to pause and take account of the wider concerns that I have expressed. The clause is important: the offence is dealt with later, but there is a serious point here and I shall be interested to hear what the Minister says about the Treasury's approach.
It was very helpful to hear him explain what lies under the tip of the iceberg, as he described it, when it comes across his desk; but I am sure that he will accept that legislation needs to give assurances both about the tip and about what is concealed under the surface of the sea, and that what the Treasury does as a matter of practice, when it is good, needs to be enshrined in legislation so that it cannot be varied without Parliament being aware. He will not have had the experience that other noble Lords have had of saying: “Yes, Minister, you’re fine, but what about your successors?”. I beg to move.
My Lords, I fully appreciate that the intention of Amendments 12 and 13 is to give the Treasury flexibility when determining whether to publicise a designation. However, the Treasury believes that the automatic publication of designations on its website where the conditions of Clause 3(3) are not met is the most efficient and effective way of achieving the appropriate level of awareness and compliance with the asset freeze. It is the most effective method of informing the financial sector and other parties of their asset-freezing obligations, and thus of limiting the risk of the prohibitions—
I apologise to my noble friend for interrupting him in mid-flow, but I wanted to capture his previous sentence. As I understand it, there is nothing to prevent the Treasury from advertising on its website if we substitute the word “must” for “may”. The Treasury may still do so—and, I am sure my noble friend agrees, must do so—but we do not need the word “must” here.
If my noble friend will permit me to go on, I will get to the answer to that challenge and explain why, in the round, the current construct works. We need the most effective method of informing the financial sector and other parties of their asset-freezing obligations to limit the risk of the prohibitions in the Bill being unwittingly breached in relation to funds being diverted for terrorist purposes. I accept that such an aim is not inconsistent with Amendments 12 and 13, but, if I may go on, let me complete what I was saying about our reasoning for believing that the Bill as it stands works well.
We recognise that, yes, publication would interfere with the listed person’s right to respect for their private life, but we believe that greater weight must be given to the public interest in ensuring that a designation is effective and that a designation will be most effective when generally publicised. Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the public interest in publicising designations generally. In January, the court ruled that the identity of four designated persons could be made public and that anonymity orders were justified only in an extreme case where there was significant risk to the designated persons or their families. There are no reports of any individual being harmed as a result of their asset freeze being publicised. Indeed, general publication is consistent with international best practice and the FATF guidance. The EU publishes on its website details of those persons who have been designated under the respective regimes. If the UK were to cease publicising designations generally in all cases other than when a restricted publication was justified under Clause 3(3), that would give rise to an approach that was inconsistent with those of international partners and international guidance and best practice.
For the reasons that I have set out, I hope that your Lordships will support maintaining the current drafting of the Bill and that my noble friend will withdraw Amendment 12.
My Lords, I had not thought of the point about danger to the designated person and his family. Actually, I can see that that could be a serious concern.
I am still not persuaded that Amendments 12 and 13 would inhibit the Treasury acting as the Minister described. I am sure that this is not his intention, but his response seems almost to amount to a fear that the Treasury cannot be trusted to make a sensible decision. However, although I am not persuaded, I will not pursue the matter further so I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 12.
In speaking briefly to Amendments 24 and 28, I perhaps come from a different stance from that for the previous group of amendments.
In both Clause 4, “Duration of designation”, and Clause 5, “Variation or revocation of designation”, as currently drafted, the Treasury must,
“take such steps as they consider appropriate”,
to bring such matters to the attention of the persons who have already been informed of the designation. Amendments 24 and 28 would change “they consider appropriate” to “are necessary”. First, I simply want to understand why it is necessary for the Treasury to have the slight subjectivity—the discretion, if you like—that is allowed in the clauses as drafted. Secondly, I want to ask whether “appropriate” implies a degree of reasonableness. Could the Treasury take a completely off-the-wall view, or must it act reasonably in Clauses 4 and 5?
Let me try to address my noble friend’s concerns about Clauses 4 and 5. As she said, Amendments 24 and 28 would remove the Treasury’s discretion to determine subjectively the steps that it considers appropriate and replace it with an obligation to take steps that are objectively necessary. Let me try to explain why the Government believe that the amendments are unnecessary.
In practice, the Treasury will consider what steps are objectively necessary. In determining the appropriate steps to be taken, the Treasury will be conscious that the determination should be objectively justifiable, as a decision not to take a step that would be objectively construed as being necessary would be subject to legal challenge on the basis of being unreasonable. The Treasury will in practice decide on a case-by-case basis the best way to notify persons that a designation has expired, been varied or been revoked, with full consideration being given to the particular circumstances of the case of the designated person and of any other relevant factors. In practice, designated persons will always—unless they cannot be traced because, for example, they have gone overseas—be notified in writing that their designation has expired or been revoked or varied. Details of the change will be notified to other persons in the same way as the original designation.
The Treasury’s duty to notify is underpinned by the requirement in Clause 37(3), which states:
“Where the Treasury do not have an address for the person, they must make arrangements for the notice to be given to the person at the first available opportunity”.
I absolutely agree that it is important that persons informed of a designation are also informed of its expiry, revocation or variation and that such information should be provided in the most appropriate way. However because of the way that, as I have described, that will happen in practice, I do not believe that Amendments 24 and 28 are required. I hope that noble Lords will agree that it is not necessary to amend the Bill in this respect.
On that basis, I hope that my noble friend will consider withdrawing Amendment 24.
My Lords, I will do more than consider it. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 24.
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 36, 37, 39, 40 and 43. Clause 6 creates an offence, so we must be very confident that that offence is on a proper basis. My amendments would change the words,
“or has reasonable cause to suspect”,
in the context of a person knowing or suspecting that certain information is to be treated as confidential, to “reasonably suspects”. The same point comes up in a number of places in the Bill. The two terms are obviously extremely close but “reasonable cause to suspect” is about the reason for the suspicion, whereas “reasonably suspects”—my alternative phrase—is about the suspicion itself. One needs to ask whether the suspicion is reasonable in the round, as distinct from merely whether it is reasonable to believe in whatever caused the suspicion. Indeed, with regard to the term in the Bill, “reasonable cause to suspect”, I might add the question: does the person have to have the suspicion or can he be guilty of an offence—I stress that this is why this issue is important—if he believes something that would lead a reasonable person to suspect although the person himself does not form the suspicion? If someone says “angels and pinpoints” I shall understand, but I think that there is an issue there.
Amendment 36, quite differently, would take out the reference to “any other enactment” in Clause 6(4)(c), where disclosure is permitted if it is necessary to give effect to a requirement under this part or under any other enactment. I have tabled this amendment in order to ask the Government to justify those words and to explain why it cannot be left to the “other enactment” to deal with the situation. I beg to move.
I shall take Amendments 34 and 36 in turn. Amendment 34 would limit the effectiveness of the provisions concerned with protecting the confidentiality of information provided by the Treasury to certain persons in connection with a designation. It would mean that only those who know, as opposed to those who have reasonable cause to suspect, that information they possess is to be treated as confidential may commit an offence by disclosing it. This would weaken the protections afforded to confidential information and thus potentially adversely affect the designated person’s rights.
It is right that those who have reasonable cause to suspect that information they possess is to be treated as confidential should be subject to criminal sanctions if they disclose such information. If a person had reasonable cause so to suspect but claimed not to have any suspicion and went on to disclose the information, it could be said that the person ought to have held a suspicion, in which case such disclosure should be prohibited. The current drafting of the clause provides the greatest degree of protection to the confidentiality of the information that the Treasury has provided. This is a complex series of interlinkages but I hope that on the basis of that construction my noble friend will withdraw her amendment.
Amendment 36 would limit lawful disclosure to circumstances where disclosure was necessary to give effect to a requirement imposed under or by virtue of Part 1 of the Bill only and not any other enactment. The amendment would have the effect of prohibiting disclosures which are required to give effect to any requirements imposed by any other Acts of Parliament. This would, for example, prevent disclosures concerning money-laundering or terrorist financing being made to the Serious Organised Crime Agency under either the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 or the Terrorism Act 2000 with the consequence that the person concerned would be in breach of the statutory requirements contained in another Act. Preventing such disclosures would of course have a serious impact on the UK’s operational effectiveness in fighting crime, and delaying such disclosures while authority to disclose was sought from the Treasury would have an adverse operational impact. Therefore, as with the other amendment, I hope that my noble friend will not press Amendment 36.
My Lords, I am grateful for that. I had to think very carefully about how to express the bulk of my amendments, and indeed I had to take care to read my notes accurately. Similarly, I think that I need to read the Minister’s reply carefully to ensure that I understand it. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.