Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Debate between Lord Craig of Radley and Lord Houghton of Richmond

Report stage
Monday 5th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, happy new year to everyone. I will speak to Amendments 1 and 38. In an earlier debate on the Bill, I raised the concern that the UK is required, under Article 11 of the treaty, to continue to pay Mauritius even were the military base on Diego Garcia to become unusable. There seems to be no break or conditional clause agreeing any reasons why the UK may cease these payments before the 99-year date is reached.

Article 15 sets out how Mauritius may react should the UK cease payment, but this is a reason why Mauritius may terminate the treaty, not the UK. If the UK were to persist in not honouring its obligation to pay, the treaty would perforce be terminated by Mauritius. For the avoidance of doubt, would that mean that Article 1 of the treaty is still applicable and sovereignty would remain with Mauritius? Can the Minister confirm the Government’s view on this? I have forewarned her of this question.

In Committee on 18 November, the Minister said in response to my question about the base no longer being usable:

“I will reflect on this and try to come back to him with a more thorough response, because I can see that he … wants to know that the Government have given this the proper consideration that he would expect. I undertake to do that”.—[Official Report, 18/11/25; col. 772.]

If she has written with this further information, I have not yet received it. Fundamentally, does she feel that the environmental risks and the risks of other possible events, such as a major destructive attack on the base or even a decision by the United States that it has no further use for it, are sufficiently remote and unlikely for the UK to be able to accept—or have a possibly messy and even dishonourable termination, where considerable sums of taxpayers’ money may be involved?

As this is Report, I do not intend to do more than point this out without detail, but experience tells us that much can and does change over time. In well under the past 100 years, foes have become friends and friends, potential and real, have become foes. Weapon technology may well change and has frequently done so, as has how operations are mounted and security maintained. America could decide that it has no need for the base for operational reasons or even cease to act as a world police force and revert to isolationism. Is there any legally binding agreement between the UK and the United States that it will continue its use of the base or have need of its use for the 99-year duration of the treaty?

I do not wish to suggest any lack of importance of the base to national and international security at the present time. There is also the putative threat of the sea rising this century due to global warming, flooding the base. My Amendment 1 suggests one feasible way to correct this apparent lack of foresight. I shall listen with close interest to the Minister’s response, but unless the Government can reassure the House that the issue of non-usability of the base has been fully considered and a reasonable solution adopted, I may seek the views of the House. I beg to move.

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to speak in support of Amendment 1, to which I attach my name, and to reinforce the arguments made by my noble and gallant friend Lord Craig of Radley. This amendment is not moved by any wider purpose than common sense, and we trust that the Government will respond accordingly.

Currently, the Bill makes no provision for the circumstances under which the requirement to pay an annual fee for the use of the Diego Garcia base is revisited in the event of the base becoming unusable for military purposes. My noble and gallant friend has already mentioned the potential risks to the utility of the base arising from an extreme environmental event, the future potential for a policy change by the United States and the potential for the technical obsolescence of the base to come about. I argue that concerns regarding potential legal initiatives to constrain the use of the base, particularly partial constraints deriving from nuclear exclusion agreements or the question of Mauritius as the sovereign power having to honour obligations for the authorisation of offensive operations from the base, should be added to that list of concerns.

I fear that the greatest future concern should perhaps be the full or partial destruction of the base through military action by a hostile state. This might seem a surprising concern given the extremely remote nature of this base, but I have been to it. I argue quite strongly that the strategic importance of the base, its entirely militaristic purpose and its extreme remoteness from civilian life all combine to make it a highly vulnerable and attractive target.

The principal tenets for the use of force in warfare are distinction, military necessity, humanity and proportionality. Pause for a moment to imagine the early stages of a global conflict, when a desire for escalation dominance prompts a hostile nation to destroy a western strategic asset as a proportionate response, with no risk of collateral damage to a civilian population, attracting relatively minor moral opprobrium but resulting in huge military benefit. I cannot think of an obviously better or more considered target than Diego Garcia.

Many in the Chamber may think my concerns are drawn from the world of fantasy or nightmare, but do the last 72 hours not give serious cause for concern regarding our ability to predict with certainty the next two years of geopolitics, let alone the next 100? This treaty needs to cater far better for what the future might hold.

Armed Forces Bill

Debate between Lord Craig of Radley and Lord Houghton of Richmond

Committee stage
Monday 8th November 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak in support of this amendment. It is one of the few elements of the Bill that seeks to get ahead of the game rather than just play catch-up. My particular perspective is that there is one element of the new security challenge that I feel has escaped proper consideration, one for which there seems no comprehensive or coherent plan of action, which is the issue most commonly referred to as “lawfare”.

To my view, the law is potentially one the most powerful weapons that we have in the security context of the age. It is both a weapon of defence that we should use to protect ourselves from the malign activity of others, and a weapon of attack that we should use to liberate our own freedom of action. As had been said, a fundamental deduction from the recent integrated review was that, within what is a significantly changed strategic context, we now live in a persistent state of adversarial competition, but one in which the resort to formalised warfare at scale is, perhaps by choice, avoided. The preferred vectors of attack in this competitive world are not, therefore, active, large-scale military operations, but more subtle, more deniable and less attributable activities.

The domains of active warfare are no longer necessarily primarily land, sea and air, but space, cyber and what is called the “cognitive domain”. Whereas traditional warfare has rules and laws and accepted norms of ethics and morality, the new character of grey-zone warfare is one in which our enemies exploit, for advantage, the absence of a legal framework within which to operate. So the new vectors of attack are activities such as disinformation, multiplied by internet bots; deniable cyber offensive activity; proxy terrorism; and political assassination, potentially using international private military companies.

More specifically in relation to this amendment, technological advancement in the areas of artificial intelligence, machine learning and autonomous weapons systems also offers scope for our adversaries to deny us their potential benefit while they exploit their unattributed use simply because no accepted legal framework for their authorised use yet exists. This context means that our principal geopolitical adversaries can employ methods that are both malign and aggressive but which we find difficult to respond to because we are unclear about what is morally, ethically and legally permissible. We risk, in effect, allowing our enemies to win without fighting.

In this House, during the passage of the overseas operations Bill, I bore witness to—forgive me—some remarkably contorted debates that appeared to present the law as either something inviolate to change or else an irremovable object that needed elegant methods of circumnavigation. I fear that our enemies will exploit our legal complexities to undermine our morale and devalue our credibility as an ally, among other things.

My view is that the only practical way to respond to the situation I have described and the one described in the integrated review is to start to use the law to our advantage: to go on the legal offensive, to reimagine our use of the law not as a time-honoured constraint on activity but as a weapon to be employed to liberate and confirm the legal boundaries of our own freedom of action while bringing much-needed constraint to the malign activities of our enemies. The Government need to give serious thought as to what aspects of this legal offensive need prioritisation. This House, consisting as it does of far more legal minds the military ones, has a significant role to play, but unless global Britain can make a meaningful contribution to the re-establishment of internationally accepted norms of morality, truth and justice, some might seriously undermine the willingness of our people to fight for them.

My strong view is that this country has all the necessary skills to embark on lawfare. I hope that, within their stated intent to help shape the future international order, the Government have the political will to do so as well. I believe the amendment is a small step in the right direction and it has my unreserved support.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, I support this amendment and agree that there is an increasing need for clarity not just today but in the immediate future about the legality of, for example, remote aerial vehicle kinetic operations that involve loss of life, whether military, paramilitary or civilian. Many recent operations have been conducted on an asymmetric footing and not all perhaps with formal, clear-cut international approval. Of course, the right to self-defence is well understood, but how confident are we that emerging technologies in defence weapons systems and their oversight will remain invariably with a human in ultimate control? How it that to be maintained in order to comply with the present laws of conflict as new weapons systems with new technologies are deployed? Are the laws of conflict being overtaken by the possibilities of new types of lethal weapons systems?

Presumably the legality of a remote aerial vehicle operation applies to long-distance control from ships as well as to that from a land base that is remote geographically from the target. Does that base have to be on national territory? What if it is not? What if the operation of the remote vehicle is shared with an ally? How has the operation been approved? What justifications are required for an armed response or for initiating one?

What if the child of a non-combatant civilian accidentally killed by a remote kinetic strike subsequently grows up and seeks to sue the individual or individuals responsible for the control or authorisation of the attack that killed their parent? Will the loss or destruction of any official records of the attack be any sort of viable defence?

As technology moves defence capabilities forward, we will soon enter the era of loyal wingman UAVs and how they interact with their human control. Swarming mini drones are also emerging. There will soon be more, as novel digital technologies are exploited; for example, in the Tempest programme, although I do not have knowledge of secret projects.

The Armed Forces personnel—and this is the key point—involved in kinetic operations exploiting these novel technologies must have absolute clarity about the legal position in which they are required to operate. It is time to know more about how the Government are examining this issue, as I am sure they must be. It is time to be kept informed about the considerations of this complex legal issue as it evolves. Reports from the Secretary of State to Parliament are a must. A review, which should be already in hand, should be reported to Parliament.