Reserve Forces

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, in answer to the first part of the noble Lord’s question, medical reservists develop additional valuable specialist skills when they are deployed, which they then bring back to the National Health Service. The Defence Medical Services is uniquely placed to share the development of operationally specific medical science and clinical excellence with the NHS. The National Institute for Health Research centre has brought together military and civilian trauma surgeons and scientists to share innovation in medical research, to advance clinical practice on the battlefield and to benefit all trauma patients in the National Health Service at an early stage of injury.

On the benefits to an employer who recruits an employee who is a reservist, I would say that reserve service will benefit different employers in different ways. For some, the improved skills, experience and training of the individual reservist will be beneficial. For others, where the reservist’s military role is close to their civilian one, there will be more benefit from transferable skills. For some companies and sectors, reserve service suits and supports their business models. For many, reserve service may support corporate social responsibility objectives and may be part of their social action plans, alongside wider volunteering policies. We encourage employers to publicise their support for the Reserve Forces to customers, suppliers and their local communities. The second part of my answer was in response to my noble friend’s third question.

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, the Government say in the White Paper that they will introduce new legislation to enable mobilisation for the full range of tasks that our Armed Forces may be asked to undertake. Current mobilisation arrangements are something of a historical anachronism. Invariably they require ministerial authority. They date from a time when protection for employers was nothing like as good as it will be in future. Will there be arrangements to allow mobilisation of individuals for very small units to be carried out without having to seek ministerial authority?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I cannot from the Dispatch Box answer the noble and gallant Lord’s question. That point is not in my briefing, but I will write to him.

Armed Forces: Human Rights

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Tuesday 25th June 2013 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Craig of Radley]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what advice and directions are being given to Armed Forces personnel following the Supreme Court judgment on 19 June that human rights legislation, and in particular the right to life, may apply to Armed Forces personnel engaged in operations abroad.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Astor of Hever)]

My Lords, urgent cross-government discussions are taking place to consider our options. We will provide advice to members of the Armed Forces as soon as possible. The Government are concerned that the ruling creates uncertainty and will continue to defend their position against ill-founded legal claims, while continuing to provide our forces with the equipment they need, and ensuring that, where casualties occur, generous provision is made for troops and their families through the Armed Forces compensation scheme.

[Lord Craig of Radley]

I thank the noble Lord for that not very reassuring Answer. Can he advise on this situation? A commanding officer orders a soldier to take part in operations overseas against an armed enemy, so clearly there is a risk of injury or loss of life. Is that officer’s order lawful? If the soldier disobeys the order, is he liable to a charge and court martial under Section 12, possibly, of the Armed Forces Act because he did not go into the operation? Is the officer liable to be charged or found disciplined under the human rights legislation because the soldier followed his instructions but was killed in battle?

Armed Forces: Redundancies

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Thursday 20th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, no Government likes making these kinds of redundancies. While reduced recruiting and fewer extensions of service will account for some reductions, a redundancy programme is needed to ensure that the right balance of skills is maintained.

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, is it not the case that more than 80% of those who are on the redundancy programme this time are volunteers? If so, what does that say about morale in the Armed Forces, particularly in the Army?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, the number of applications for redundancy is not a good indicator of the state of morale because the Army has deliberately set out to maximise applications. Additionally, it should be noted that only 30% of those who were eligible applied for redundancy.

Royal Navy: Escort Vessels

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Monday 17th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I cannot comment on what the noble Lord says about BAE. However, I compliment him on his resolute lobbying for the Royal Navy to attend the Royal Australian Navy’s 100th anniversary. The noble Lord has had a word with me two or three times about it. I can now assure him that the Royal Navy has responded to his request and will attend the 100th anniversary. HMS “Daring”, a Type 45 destroyer, will also be out there.

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, bearing in mind the reduction in the number of surface vessels over the past few years, what commitments have Her Majesty’s Government had to give up as a result?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, the Naval Service, which includes the Royal Navy, the Royal Marines and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary which supports them, is able to fulfil commitments around the globe and maintain a maritime presence in priority regions, such as the South Atlantic, the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The Naval Service also safeguards the security of home waters, meets our defence commitments in the North Atlantic and the Caribbean, patrols the Antarctic waters and undertakes periodic deployments to other areas, such as the Far East and the Pacific.

Armed Forces: Pay

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Wednesday 20th March 2013 Lords Chamber

Asked By

[Lord Craig of Radley]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government why they did not approve the 0.5 per cent increase in the X-factor supplement recommended by the Armed Forces Pay Review Body in its 2013 report (Cm 8571).

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Astor of Hever)]

My Lords, earlier today my right honourable friend the Chancellor announced in the other place that we would fund an increase in X-factor, so this recommendation will now also be accepted. This will be welcome news for service personnel and their families who should receive the increase with their May pay. This positive response to the Armed Forces Pay Review Body recommendation also emphasises the importance and the respect that the Government accord to the views of the review body.

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, that is of course very welcome news, although I think it would be a shade fanciful to think that a topical Question could so rapidly change the Government’s mind. Nevertheless, because there has been a delay, can the Minister assure the House that the pay uplift will be made available on time in April, or will it be delayed and have to be backdated? I hope that the Government will do everything they can to ensure that it does not have to be backdated. Will this additional pay be available to full-time mobilised reservists as well as to service personnel?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, service personnel will receive the increase from 1 May onwards. I understand that it is the general policy of all Governments not to backdate, to avoid adding complexity and risk to normal administrative operations. The noble and gallant Lord asked if the uplift in X-factor will be paid to mobilised reservists. X-factor is paid at the full level—currently 14%—to all ranks up to and including lieutenant-colonel or equivalent in the Regular Forces, full-time reserve service personnel on full commitment and mobilised reservists.

Armed Forces

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Monday 5th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Astor of Hever, for arranging this debate. He has been most assiduous in keeping your Lordships’ House aware of defence issues and this is yet another example of that. I also welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Garden of Frognal, to her new responsibilities. She has proved to be an excellent Front-Bench spokesman on other subjects and I am sure that that she will be equally good, or better even, on this subject, of which she has much background knowledge.

In this Remembrance Week, many families and friends of the fallen will be thinking of their loved ones—loved ones who served in the two world wars and in a variety of combat operations since 1945. Along with many others, I shall be honouring their memory next Sunday as I march past the Cenotaph with the Not Forgotten Association contingent, of which I am the senior president. While the majority who served in the two world wars or on national service were called up, causalities in more recent conflicts were volunteers. They joined the Armed Forces as a career choice, accepting that in the course of their service they could be exposed to real danger. Public support for Remembrance Sunday, as in your Lordships’ House, is thankfully large.

The recovery of the Falklands following Argentina’s invasion was ultimately a matter for combat operations and, importantly, enjoyed overwhelming national support. However, I fear that our more recent efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have not enjoyed the same national understanding or backing. Many reasons are suggested for this. The rationale for committing so much treasure, for sacrificing so much in lost lives and limbs, and for continuing over so many years—double the years that it took us to win through in World War I and World War II—is complex, difficult to explain simply and difficult for the public to grasp. But unlike with the world wars or even the Falklands, it is not easy to engender a sense of real tactical successes or even ultimate victory. Media coverage is largely confined to reporting casualties in Afghanistan, and much more needs to be done about that. Minds are now focusing on getting out of Afghanistan, and hopefully enough will have been done by the coalition to enable Afghanistan to look after itself.

However, the so-called war against terror has yet to succeed. There are limits to the contribution that military forces can make in the fight against terrorism. The enemy is not like a state, which is a geographic entity. It can and does threaten from many widely dispersed areas and in numerous different forms. This presents Governments with far more difficult choices for the involvement of their forces in support of other diplomatic and political initiatives.

The current approach is based on two incompatible assumptions. On the one hand there is the size of the financial commitment to defence, not just for day-to-day functioning but also for the future size and shape involving programmes that take many years to realise. For shorthand, let me characterise this as a commitment of 2% of GDP. The other assumption, now shown to be incompatible with the first one, is that the Armed Forces are to be structured to meet a certain level of immediate and ongoing enduring commitments without an honest costing of what that might mean for defence funds.

Most telling now is the number of criticisms of the MoD and Government by coroners dealing with inquests about the lack of life-saving equipment or inappropriate kit for the tasks expected of the casualty. This serves to highlight the mismatch in the public’s mind—their perception of a mismatch between the 2% GDP and what capabilities can be procured and operated on an enduring basis with such funds. Ministers would do well, if the 2% of GDP is not to be increased, to realise the risks of relying on urgent operational requirements and backing from the contingency fund in future engagements. They must never lose sight of the fact that those who will fight for them are volunteers who are prepared to pay the ultimate sacrifice. So service men and women have a right to reasonable expectations that they will get not only political and moral support but the right equipment in the right place at the right time when they are ordered into conflict in a war of choice.

There are two other particular constraints that do not seem to figure as strongly as they should, and attract little or too little attention in the ability of our Armed Forces to take on new operational commitments. The first is that no matter how much current equipment—ships, aircraft or armour—has advanced in hitting power and accuracy, these improvements provide no recompense for meeting geographically widespread commitments.

Noble Lords will recall the endless arguments about frigate/destroyer numbers over the years. My first exposure to this was half a century ago when a force of at least 55 of these ships was deemed to be the absolute minimum. Without going through each of the soon-to-be-breached irreducible minimums in defence reviews in the intervening years, we now expect to stand up a mere 19 of such vessels. Of course, each of the 19 will be more powerful than any of their predecessors, but you cannot cut any of the 19 in two to spread the coverage on worldwide commitments. The Falklands guard ship, the Caribbean drug-busting task force, combating piracy in the Indian Ocean and safeguarding the deterrent are just a few examples of worldwide enduring commitments, as of course are training and ship repair schedules. These could leave too little available for mounting any wars of choice with a maritime contribution. Air power has the flexibility and reach to move rapidly afar, but it, too, can become overcommitted on enduring operations, as we have experienced in the combat air support of Afghanistan—and that was before the most recent cull of front-line fast-jet numbers.

Another factor that has a bearing on numbers is the risk of losses in combat. Since the Falklands, our forces have been fortunate to operate in benign or near-benign air environments. Consequently, losses to opponents have been non-existent or very small. It would be all too facile to assume that future operations would take place in a benign air environment, with no serious loss of ships or aircraft or other major equipment. Experience in the Falklands against an enemy of only limited air power capability cost us dearly, particularly in ships sunk or badly damaged.

Losses in a fight with a better equipped enemy than we have had to face in the past two decades could be infinitely more serious today. Indeed, the very limited cover we might be able to mount for a carrier task force, particularly as we now lack the protection of any maritime patrol capability, could restrict its use to operations facing benign threats and an opposition without any serious strike capability. The Exocet type of threat has not gone away.

A defence budget of only 2% of GDP, which will include the replacement boats for the nuclear deterrent—requiring 25% or more of the equipment budget during the peak stages of that programme—has to be the driver for calculating the variety and mix of short or enduring capabilities that the Armed Forces could mount. This must be constantly reviewed so that Ministers are able to reach judgments on the use of the Armed Forces in the expected threat environment. What this produces must be the yardstick used by Ministers before embarking on any future war of choice.

Surely it should be part of the military covenant that our young men and women are sent on combat operations only when adequately armed and equipped for the task. It should not be acceptable that they have only additional support from the contingency fund but do not have the strength and depth of equipment and back-up for losses in conflict. Such losses cannot be made good overnight, no matter how much money is thrown at them. Unless Ministers are guided in this way, there will be more avoidable casualties in the nation’s thoughts on future Remembrance Sundays.

Armed Forces: Reserve Forces

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Thursday 1st November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, it is my great privilege and pleasure to congratulate the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, on his maiden speech. He has entertained us well and, I think, rather modestly left out some other judicial appointments in his magnificent career. He was of course Master of the Rolls and Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales in between the times he served here, first as a Law Lord and then as the Senior Law Lord, before moving on to the Supreme Court. He obviously learnt from his time in the Royal Navy. Whether it was all good or all bad, I think we can judge that he enjoyed it, and I am certain that we are going to enjoy his contributions to this House. We welcome him and thank him for speaking today.

I congratulate, too, the noble Lord, Lord Freeman, on his choice of topic. He is right to focus our thoughts on the future of the reserves. Much thought has been given and effort put into this as part of the major restructuring of the Armed Forces following the strategic defence and security review. I am myself a firm supporter of the value of Armed Forces reserves that have real operational worth and are not seen by those outside or within the reserves as weekend chancers playing at being soldiers or, indeed, sailors and airmen. Happily, thanks to the important changes that were introduced for the reserves over the past decade, and the large number of reservists who have been on active operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is far greater public understanding of the key value of reservists, some of whom have made the ultimate sacrifice.

To concentrate on the future, I hope that the Minister will give the House a better understanding of the Government’s expectations of reaching the numbers and mix of reserves that they are now pursuing, and the risks if they are not achieved. As it is well understood, a variety of factors will influence this outcome. First, of course, there are the individuals who have to be attracted, motivated and committed to volunteering and remaining within the reserves structure so as to become worthy and effective members of their units. If trained from scratch, it is essential that the individual is prepared to serve for a number of years in order to “amortise”, as it were, his or her training costs.

Then, as has already been mentioned, there are the employers. While the country is involved in operations overseas, the profile of the Armed Forces is much enhanced in the public mind. Employers react to this by wishing to be as accommodating as possible in releasing employees for reserve activity and retaining them on the payroll after service. But as we move, we hope, beyond the past decade or two of wars of choice—that is, choice by the Government of the day to commit forces into sustained expeditionary operations—will the reduced prominence of the Armed Forces still be a good recruiting sergeant for the reserves, and will they be as readily accepted by employers as they are today? I am not clear what proposals or suggestions the Government will pursue to encourage and, indeed, to reward employers who agree to have and release reservists when they are required for training or for operations. More will need to be done in this regard.

I am also concerned that the Government’s expectations in terms of achieving their recruitment and retention targets are overambitious. Even for the Royal Air Force, which has a good blend of reserve units and is standing up further elements in other geographic areas, such as Liverpool and Northern Ireland, to expand areas for recruitment and provide or sustain an RAF regional footprint, forecasts have not lived up to expectations. I recall mentioning in 2008 in a debate on the reserves the serious dip in recruitment that had been experienced by the RAF Auxiliaries earlier that decade and that it was estimated that full strength could not be reached before 2013-14. A quick look at the figures shows that the trained strength is now forecast not to be reached before 2016. In other words, expectations have not been fulfilled.

Why are the Government so confident that this time around, with far greater ambitions for reserve numbers, the targets can be reached? What evidence do they adduce from past figures? What will have changed so dramatically in the next five to six years that trained strength targets will be reached and sustained? I hope that the Minister can reassure the House on this critical point. Or will he be frank and say that while their aspirations are to get to 100%, 75%, say, may be more realistic?

Defence Equipment and Support

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Tuesday 17th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I agree with my noble friend that this is a really big issue. I had only a short time in which to prepare for this Statement and that made me realise what a big subject this is. It may be an area on which we could have a debate in the House, and I would encourage my noble friend to go through the usual channels to see whether a debate could be set up. He asked why no legislation was necessary for this. I asked officials about that and their advice was that it is very unlikely—but just in case it is needed, all the building blocks are being put in place. No decisions on the future operating model of DE and S have yet been taken. The GOCO may require legislation, but the issue will be addressed in due course.

I cannot answer my noble friend’s question about whether it was just MoD officials involved in the decision-making process, but I understand that there will be no additional redundancies as a result of these changes. I am pretty certain that that is the correct answer.

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, one of the criteria that Mr Bernard Gray identified in his major study of DE and S was that a budget provision for a 10-year period should be made for the equipment programme. Many instances of overloading the programme in the past have probably been attributable to changes in the budget provision, which the Ministry of Defence had expected. Has an agreement been reached on the lines of what Mr Bernard Gray was looking for, with a 10-year guaranteed budget for the equipment programme? Without that it will be difficult to be sure that we will not overload the programme if there are cuts.

[Lord Astor of Hever]

I can assure the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, that Bernard Gray, who wrote the report, is now working for the MoD—poacher turned gamekeeper. I am confident that he has extracted a lot of the assurances that he was after.

Armed Forces Act (Continuation) Order 2012

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Monday 25th June 2012 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Astor of Hever)]

My Lords, I am pleased to speak to the Armed Forces Act (Continuation) Order 2012. The purpose of the order is to continue in force the legislation governing the Armed Forces for a further period of one year, until November 2013.

I should like to say a few words about the legislation that the continuation order is set to continue—that is, the Armed Forces Act 2006 as amended by the Armed Forces Act 2011. The 2006 Act made significant changes to the legislation governing the Armed Forces and established a single system of service law for the first time. The single system applies to all members of the Armed Forces, wherever in the world they are serving.

The 2006 Act was fully implemented and came into force on 31 October 2009. I am pleased to say that the services say that the 2006 Act is doing a good job—the modest scale of changes made to it by the 2011 Act is testament to that—so I am confident that the 2006 Act will continue to serve the Armed Forces well for many years to come.

Your Lordships’ House has enjoyed full and interesting debates on matters of great importance to the Armed Forces, none more so than during last year’s passage of the Armed Forces Act 2011, which received Royal Assent on 3 November last year. That Act continued the Armed Forces Act 2006 for a further year, allowed it to be continued by annual Order in Council until 2016 and made various provisions to amend the Armed Forces Act 2006.

I should also like to say a few words about the 2011 Act. Although it is modest in size, its provisions are wide-ranging, partly as a result of the Ministry of Defence normally bringing forward primary legislation only every five years. I am pleased to report that over half the provisions in the new Act have been commenced, and an implementation programme for the remainder is well under way. Our aim is to complete the largest part of that work by spring 2013. Notably, for the first time, and as a result of this Act, the Armed Forces covenant is now recognised in legislation. The 2011 Act places an obligation on the Defence Secretary to report annually on progress made by the Government in honouring the covenant. The first report will be published at the end of this year. The Armed Forces covenant makes a clear commitment by the Government on how service people should be treated. Now, this and future Governments will be held to account on what they deliver on the covenant.

I should make a further observation about the order that we are considering today. Previous Governments have given an undertaking that Ministers moving instruments subject to the affirmative procedure will tell the House whether they are satisfied that the legislation is compatible with the rights provided in the European Convention on Human Rights. We believe that the order that we are considering today is compatible with the convention rights. I welcome this opportunity for another interesting debate. I beg to move.

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his introduction. The Armed Forces Act 2011 introduced into law the concept of the Armed Forces covenant, as he has mentioned, and the particular requirement for the Secretary of State to prepare an Armed Forces report. I was pleased to note when that report is due to appear.

As the Minister knows, I have also tabled a Question for Written Answer about compulsory redundancies. I asked whether, in selecting personnel for compulsory redundancy, consideration was given to their immediate pension point. For the record, is the Minister able to answer this question now? There has been considerable anxiety and press coverage. There is a feeling that the Government are solely focused on achieving financial savings rather than showing understanding for the effect on the individuals involved of a sudden abrupt end to their aspirations of a lifetime career in the Armed Forces. Equally, it is a difficult time to find alternative employment in civilian life.

The effect is of course not confined to the individual but spreads to their immediate family and friends, who are as shocked, taken aback and worried about the future as the individual being made redundant. What steps is the Ministry taking to help those who are being sacked? There seems to be little in the public domain to give confidence that these individuals are being looked after with sympathy and real understanding for their plight. It would underline the value of the military covenant, and show that personnel should be considered, if a more proactive approach to the impact of redundancies on the individual were to be taken by the Ministry of Defence.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, lest any of the points I wish to make should be construed as meaning otherwise, I make it clear at the outset that we of course support this order, which enables our Armed Forces to remain in existence, by law, for at least a further year by providing that the Armed Forces Act 2006 will not expire on 3 November 2012, as currently scheduled, but instead will continue in force until 3 November 2013. As the Minister has said, the 2006 Act also brought together various orders of discipline in the Armed Forces while the 2011 Act enshrined the Armed Forces covenant in legislation.

Depending on one’s point of view, this order is either a piece of archaic ritual bearing no relevance to the way that we should be conducting the affairs of our nation, or indeed the affairs of our Armed Forces, in the 21st century or an essential constitutional prop, ensuring that anyone who might be tempted to think otherwise knows that our Armed Forces remain in existence to perform their role not because they think—or anyone else thinks—they should, but only because the representatives of the people in Parliament have decided that that should be so, with that decision having to be renewed and restated each year. As I understand it, the order that we are discussing stems from the Bill of Rights Act 1689, or 1688 by old-style dating, which restated in statutory form the declaration of right presented by the Convention Parliament to William and Mary in March 1689, inviting them to become joint sovereigns of England while further restricting the powers of the sovereign by laying down certain constitutional basic rights, in respect of which the Crown was required to seek the consent of the people as represented in Parliament. Among those basic rights was that no standing army could be maintained during a time of peace without the consent of Parliament.

I am not sure that the people of this country are quite as suspicious, in the 21st century, of a reigning monarch deploying a standing army as they were in the 17th. While other countries have suffered and do suffer from military dictatorship, I am not convinced that it is the existence or knowledge of the requirement for this Armed Forces Act continuation order to be agreed each year by Parliament that is preventing or deterring a takeover of this country by the military. There may just be other, rather more powerful and influential factors and considerations at play. Having said that, is it literally the case, as I understand it, that if this continuation order was not approved our Armed Forces would cease to exist from early November, or is there in reality other legislation or a decision of Parliament that would enable them to continue in being?

I make these points seriously to understand what failing to renew the Armed Forces Act 2006 for a further year—I stress that this is not a road I am suggesting we go down—would mean in practice, as opposed to theory. We have an Armed Forces Act every five years. If there is a continuing widespread feeling, as is presumably the case, that Parliament should have to make a regular decision in order for our Armed Forces to continue in existence, one wonders whether there is still a need for this to be done every year as opposed to, say, every five years in the Armed Forces Act. The debate on this annual order does not seem to be regarded as an opportunity for having a wide-ranging discussion or debate, no doubt because there are other, better ways of having more frequent and lengthier discussions and debates on our Armed Forces in your Lordships’ House. It is presumably also the case that if the other place had reservations or concerns at any time, it could bring things to a head—not least by declining to agree to the necessary expenditure needed to maintain our Armed Forces for the following financial year. Nor does it seem likely that your Lordships’ House, as an appointed House, would decide to vote down an order on such a major issue as retention of the Armed Forces, and surely not when the other place, the elected House, had voted for the order.

Armed Forces: Personnel

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Monday 23rd April 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, the House should be most grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, for bringing this topic to attention. Her experience of the Armed Forces’ Pay Review Body was extensive, both as a member in 1993-94 and as the chair from 1999 to 2005. The Minister and Government should pay most careful attention to her remarks and criticisms, and those of other noble Lords who spoke. I will add my slant to the thrust of their remarks.

Noble Lords will recall that the early 1970s were a time of acute national economic difficulty. A series of government steps such as the pay and prices code and the Counter-Inflation Act 1973 were applied nationwide. Looking at the Government’s strictures on public sector pay, have we not all been here before? However, for the Armed Forces of today, things are not as they were then. Experiences of dealing with the Cold War and the threat from the Soviet Union are far removed from the expensive and extended expeditionary warfare of today, in which large numbers of an ever dwindling cohort of service men and women are now involved, at greater risk of being killed or severely wounded or of being long separated from their families.

This significant change was recognised by the previous Government in their Command Paper, The Nation’s Commitment: Cross-Government Support to our Armed Forces, their Families and Veterans, and by this Government with the passage into law of the Armed Forces Covenant last autumn. That special recognition of the distinctive nature and value to the nation of the Armed Forces receives scant attention in this year’s AFPRB report. The Government’s across-the-board imposition of pay freezes in the public sector treats service personnel once more—as was the practice in the 1970s and 1980s—on a par with the rest of the public sector. However, it was the prime thrust of the Armed Forces Covenant and the previous Government’s White Paper that the services and their families were distinct from the rest of society and merited preferential treatment.

As this year’s AFPRB report makes clear, far from being independent and able to make its recommendations to the Prime Minister, the board has been directed by Ministers to observe the public sector pay restraints. This seems somewhat at odds with the response that I got to a recent Written Question about the Government’s attitude to the AFPRB. I asked the Government whether it was part of their commitment to the military covenant to implement the recommendations of the Armed Forces’ Pay Review Body in full. Their reply stated:

“The Government believe that the recommendations of an independent body such as the Armed Forces Pay Review Body (AFPRB) should constitute an integral part of the process used to determine the pay of the Armed Forces.”—[Official Report, 10/2/12; col. WA 113.]

That hardly describes the process followed this year and is some way, at least, from the assurances given by successive Governments in the past that the independent review body’s recommendations would be accepted unless there were clear and compelling reasons for not doing so. It would have been a more independent review if the body, after taking account of how comparators were faring, had been freer to reflect the increasing pressures of service life. The board stated:

“The Chancellor’s announcement in November 2011 of two further years of public sector pay restraint, with average increases (excluding increments) capped at one per cent, disappointed Service personnel who had made clear their expectation that we”—

the board—

“would return to making recommendations in the normal way following the pay freeze. We emphasised to the Secretary of State during oral evidence that this would be of great concern to our remit group and pressed him on whether there should be special consideration for the Armed Forces”.

I hope that the Minister will say something about that. The Board has perforce danced to the Government’s economic tune.

What gets overlooked in these immediate restrictions on pay and increases in charges is the longer-term impact on an individual’s financial circumstances. The baseline for calculating remuneration increases in future years has been debased and lowered while that for charges has been raised. As we heard from a number of noble Lords, at this sensitive time for morale and motivation in the services, the importance of treating service men and women—as both this Government and the previous one set out in statue and White Paper—is critical. Positive action, not vapid assurances that “we are all in this together”, is required to sustain the calibre of the forces that the nation must have to defend its interests.