(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has just said and ever so slightly disagree with my noble friend Lord Hailsham. Whatever the nature of the offence, it is wrong that it should be created in this way. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that custodial sentences are highly unlikely, but that is not the point. To create any sort of offence in this way is fundamentally wrong and we should not have anything to do with it.
My Lords, I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, has just said. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and my noble friend Lord McNally explained, the Bill as drafted would permit Ministers, when they consider it “appropriate”—a point made by the noble Viscount and a word discussed at length last Wednesday—to create by regulations new criminal offences carrying up to two years’ imprisonment for wide and diffuse purposes. As discussed last week, regulations could also be used to make any provision that could be made by Act of Parliament. The Henry VIII powers are as all-embracing as could be imagined. This is all the more shocking in the context of the creation of new criminal offences. These may concern individual liberty, certainly; reputation, always; and the conduct of business, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has pointed out.
The report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee—on which I sat for a number of years—described the powers as “wider than we have ever seen”. It described Clause 7 as notable for its width, novelty and uncertainty, and the same can be said of all three of the clauses in question. The principle is simple: it is in general not acceptable for the Government to have the power to create new criminal offences by regulation without an Act of Parliament. That principle was treated as cardinal when I was on the Delegated Powers Committee.
In 2014 the committee produced a document headed Guidance for Departments, directed principally at memorandums for the departments. However, on the question of criminal offences it was considered so out of order that new criminal offences would be created by regulation that the guidance did not even address that possibility. The committee said:
“Where a Bill creates a criminal offence with provision for the penalty to be set by delegated legislation”—
that is, the Bill creates the offence—
“the committee would expect, save in exceptional circumstances, a maximum penalty on conviction to be included on the face of the bill. Therefore, where this is not the case, the memorandum should explain why not, and at the very least the Committee would expect the instrument to be subject to affirmative procedure. Similarly, where the ingredients of a criminal offence are to be set by delegated legislation, the Committee would expect a compelling justification”.
However, this Bill potentially permits the creation of a new range of criminal offences. Both the Bill and the Explanatory Notes are silent about everything to do with such offences as might be created except for the broad statement of their purpose in the three clauses, in the most general terms, and with no indication of what offences are envisaged, except that the maximum penalty must not exceed two years imprisonment—which, as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, pointed out, is a not insubstantial period.
The basic principle was enshrined in Article 39 of Magna Carta: that no one should be imprisoned or stripped of his rights or possessions or deprived of his standing in any way except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land. These are constitutional principles as old as this Parliament, and we should be very careful in dealing with the issue of allowing the right of Parliament to insist on a say over criminal offences being created by the diktat of Ministers.
(13 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the draft Bill soon to be considered by the Joint Committee starts from the proposition that, in a parliamentary democracy, the Parliament is elected by the people. Whatever the status of this House relative to the other place, your Lordships’ House is an integral and fully functional part of our Parliament. We may be the subordinate Chamber in a bicameral legislature and our role may primarily comprise scrutiny and revision, but no one can argue that we are not a fully functioning Chamber of Parliament. To use Bagehot’s classification, we are, now at least, fundamentally an efficient rather than a dignified component of our constitution.
That being the case, fundamental democratic principle demands that this should be an elected House, whose composition is determined by the people. Yet while we argue and even fight for the principles of democracy internationally, our own out-of-date and largely haphazard composition derives from a historical mixture of political patronage, merit-based appointment, birth and office in the established church. If “democratic deficit” is the phrase for a failure to live up to the principles of democracy, our composition is paradigmatic of democratic deficit.
The weightiest argument that is said to outweigh democratic principle in this field—a matter alluded to by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, who personally supports an elected House—is that an elected House would undermine the primacy of the House of Commons. That is the principal argument that I will seek to address, but before I do so it is worth reminding ourselves that this argument is about the primacy of the House of Commons, not about its supremacy.
The whole point of this House is to act as a legitimate check on the powers of the other place. The argument about primacy starts from the proposition that an elected House of Lords would have greater democratic legitimacy than the present House and it is said to follow that a reformed House would feel unrestrained by the conventions that limit the exercise of its powers. It goes without saying that this argument starts from the important concession that the composition of the present House indeed lacks democratic legitimacy. However, the argument about primacy does not take sufficiently into account the law governing the powers of the House of Lords, which is to remain unchanged, nor does it take into account the substantial difference in composition—
I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. Does he agree with the president of the Liberal Democrats that a second Chamber elected by proportional representation would in fact be more legitimate than the present House of Commons?
(13 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I very much agree with what has been said so far. We will have an opportunity later to debate this clause in its entirety, and I believe that it should be replaced by something that is much more carefully and thoughtfully drawn up. To bring the Speaker into this position would be a cardinal political sin, in my view. We have heard from two former Speakers, who were clear in their advice to this House. In doing so, they were able to speak from the experience of working with the Clerk of the House that none of us can rival, and nor can any Minister in the Government.
While the Minister in charge of this Bill in another place is an extremely able and industrious young Minister, who I am sure has a glittering future ahead of him, he is not the world’s greatest constitutional expert. This Bill is deficient in many respects. It has many aspects, some of which I will touch on later, that should give any constitutional expert real cause for alarm. However, if there is one thing above anything else that is devastating in its implications, it is the politicisation of the role of Speaker. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, has done the House a signal service in drawing specific attention to this. The House has been singularly fortunate too to be able to hear from the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, and the noble Lord, Lord Martin, who were able to speak from very real experience. I beg the House—although of course we will not vote on this tonight—to stand firm. I very much hope that the Minister’s response will indicate that we will not need to proceed into the Content and Not Content Lobbies on this one, but if we do we should send a real signal to the other place that this is something up with which we will not put.
My Lords, I rise with some diffidence in view of the speeches from the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, the noble Lord, Lord Martin, and others that we have heard. First, I think we all believe that the notion that the courts should be able to interfere with the Speaker’s certificate when this Bill is enacted, if it is enacted in its present form or in something similar to it, is one that we would abhor. No one is suggesting that that is a desirable or acceptable outcome in any way.
In moving his amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, discussed the evidence before the Constitution Committee in some detail. I do not propose to rehearse that evidence. However, I would point out that Professor Bradley, an old friend with whom I would be hesitant to disagree, expressed the conclusion that the judiciary would surely accept that this was an area for political judgment which the courts were not qualified to make. That was the conclusion of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee.
This is not simply a matter of the evidence of Mr Harper, which has been dismissed in quite strong terms by others who have spoken. In the light of the careful note of the Clerk of the House of Commons, the Constitution Committee spent a great deal of time analysing all the evidence on this point. The conclusion to which it came was that the risk of judicial interference was very small. It went further in concluding that it was so small that it was not sufficient to warrant the rejection of Clause 2. The assessment of what risk might or might not be acceptable is a difficult area. I align myself with the view expressed by the majority of the legal evidence to the effect that the chances of interference by the courts would be so small as to be insignificant.
That is not to say that we can ever stop anyone bringing a misguided application. However, as Professor Bradley also pointed out, misguided applications can be dealt with quickly and given short shrift. That is what I believe and would expect to happen. The result is that in theory an initial challenge could be brought to the Speaker’s certificate. However, it is the judgment of the Constitution Committee, which I invite your Lordships’ House to accept as well founded, that that challenge would not lead anywhere—a judgment that was made in the face of, and on consideration of, the evidence of the Clerk of the House of Commons, to which a great deal of respect was given.
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberThat is a perfectly fair question, because it is well known that it was Liberal Democrat policy to go for four-year fixed terms. However, it is quite clear that the formation of the coalition caused people to consider their policy and the arguments one way or the other. The coalition has put forward a programme for government. It is a considered view—which, I suggest, is no less right because it is a view come to after negotiation, the negotiations to which Mr Laws refers in the book that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, is now reading—that that period gives more stable government. The question for this House is, in the light of what has happened, to consider whether five years is better than four. The history of the Liberal Democrat policy on the point does not assist us. We have to bring a new and balanced judgment to the question now before Parliament.
Surely if five years is what the leaders of the coalition want—I fully understand that, as I have made quite plain—we do not need the legislation for that. How does the noble Lord answer that point? They can have that under current legislation.
The noble Lord is quite right to point that out, but it has long been Liberal Democrat policy, with which I firmly agree and consider extremely important, that we should have fixed-term Parliaments in the long term, because they make a level playing field. The question that we are considering in the context of the Bill is whether those Parliaments should be for four years or five. It is of no assistance to say that we can fix a Parliament for five years now and decide later. We are determining the right period under the Bill. This Parliament cannot bind its successors, as the noble Lord plainly knows. If a future Parliament should take a different view, it is for that Parliament to legislate, as my noble friend pointed out. However, on consideration of this Parliament and what we should do now, we say that, as a matter of principle, it is right to go for five years.
Understandable concern has been expressed on all sides of the House and by the Constitution Committee about the need for pre-legislative scrutiny. If we accept that there is a need for pre-legislative scrutiny of important legislation, then the first year of a Parliament will generally be given over in respect of important legislation to that scrutiny.
I accept that; it gives rise to the concern that has been expressed and that I am, for these purposes, accepting. If it be the case that enactment of legislation starts in year two of a Parliament, and given the point made by the noble Lords, Lord Martin and Lord Grocott, which I think we all accept, that the last year of a Parliament is given over to preparing for a general election, a five-year Parliament leaves a period of three years for positive legislation and a four-year Parliament leaves only two years, because we all accept that inevitably the imminence of Dissolution makes legislation more difficult, as the time is limited in the last year. I suggest to the House that the stability that is required for the convenient and sensible passage of legislation is better achieved with three whole years between the first and last years.
In terms of government rather than simply legislation, I also suggest that four years runs a danger of leading to short-term planning, which inhibits a strategic approach to all forms of activity in government. That point was well made by the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, at Second Reading.
On the other side, of course it is the case that regular recourse to the electorate is at the heart of our democratic system of government. However, there is no doubt that Governments that are too driven by early electoral considerations may not be the best or most effective Governments. The four-year term in the United States is frequently and rightly criticised for its shortened electoral cycle and for the fact that from far too early in the term the Administration are looking for the prospects of re-election—all political eyes are firmly fixed on the next election.
The last point is this: a shorter term has the effect of depriving the electorate of the time to judge on mature reflection the effectiveness of government policy and legislation. That is particularly true of a reforming Government who reform the way in which the public services are delivered and taxes and benefits are administered, as this Government will and as may be the case with many future Governments. That is the case because the preparations for the Dissolution and an election come at a time when much of what the Government have done during the term, particularly after the first year of the term—this brings me back to the point about pre-legislative scrutiny—has not had time to take effect, so the electorate have not had the opportunity to judge what the Parliament and the Government have done during the term.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, laughed when I talked about a matter of principle with reference to what I had previously described, and continue to describe, as a matter of judgment. Of course that is right, but I suggest that the better balance between four years and five years is the one that the Government have struck and incorporated in this Bill as unamended.
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am extremely grateful to the noble Lord, but when he read out the list of issues which could be subject to a referendum he mentioned the abolition of the monarchy and the abolition of either House. Does he not accept that, if your Lordships’ House is replaced by a different second Chamber, wholly elected, it has to be abolished first? Therefore, surely there is no logic at all in saying there should not be a referendum on that issue.
My Lords, I do not accept that. It is not the abolition of a House to change its composition, however attractively the point might be put.
I remind your Lordships’ House that we had a very significant constitutional reform with the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, whereby the highest court in the land, having been constituted by a committee of this House, was replaced when the Supreme Court was established. Nobody then argued that there should be a referendum on that very significant and wide-ranging change in the constitution.
Both the noble Lords, Lord Grocott and Lord Howarth of Newport, addressed the question of four or five years. That is an important point which we are addressing in this Bill and on which there will be a separate debate during this Committee stage, and I would not be at all surprised if either or both of them contributed. However, the point here is not the length of a fixed-term Parliament, which is a matter of judgment and on which many speeches were made at Second Reading, including my own, but whether this is a matter for a referendum.
There are a number of further points. In a lengthy consideration of the Bill by the Constitution Committee —which I might say was not an enthusiastic report endorsing the Bill and the way it had been handled—it was not suggested that this was a matter for a referendum. Had it genuinely been believed at that stage that there were respectable arguments that this was a fundamental issue of a nature that required a referendum, I suggest that it would have been put before the committee and either adopted or rejected.
I qualified that by saying, “on important matters of constitutional reform”, and I then went on to explain what the Constitution Committee said when they used the term “fundamental”. I stand by that. What I am saying is that, if you extend the number of referendums that you have well outside the ambit of what is fundamental, you move away from representative democracy and towards government by plebiscite. It is a matter for Parliament properly to decide—both the principle and the question of four years or five.
I make one final point about Amendment 57, which the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, applauded —in spite of the fact that it is his own—and said that he liked its design. He said that the amendment was advisory only. That is entirely wrong since, as drafted, the amendment is a wrecking amendment, as it seeks to impose a mandatory 50 per cent threshold, which means not 50 per cent of those who vote but 50 per cent of the electorate, without which the Bill cannot become law. That is a very high threshold indeed. It means that a turnout of anything less than 50 per cent cannot give effect to the Bill, even if not a single no vote is cast.
It is nowhere near as high a threshold as has been put in this Bill for a dissolution of Parliament.
My Lords, 66 per cent of the House of Commons voting on an occasion when we may expect a turnout of well over 99 per cent is not, in my respectful submission, a very high threshold. The thresholds are different in kind, and my noble friend Lord Cormack knows that perfectly well.
In the recent Welsh referendum we had a turnout of 35 per cent, which was seen as somewhere between respectable and high. Not only do thresholds detract from the view that referendums are valuable, because they involve telling the electorate that we propose to ask for its view and then reserve the right to turn around and reject it after the event, but thresholds of this magnitude, which are mandatory in this way, do nothing for the cause of democracy.
I apologise to your Lordships for intervening at this stage when I was not here for Second Reading, not least because I missed the maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, which I have had the pleasure of reading since then.
The reason why I was not here on St David’s Day when the Second Reading happened was that, thanks to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, I was at the New Zealand Parliament, which I had the great pleasure of visiting with the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, although he made it home rather faster than I did. When I was there, I discussed the three-year terms that they have in New Zealand, and how business and elections could best be organised around that period. It is true that many people in New Zealand, politicians and civil servants, consider that four years would be a better period. I have to say that they do not even go to five years; it was not on their agenda at all. The interesting thing from the point of view of this debate is that, despite the fact that many would like to move to a four-year period, they have never dared to test that in a referendum with the electors, because from their sample polls and from listening they know that the move from three to four years would be rejected. That is a lesson for us to learn about extending a Parliament’s life. The Government should perhaps heed that.
There is a broader lesson with this amendment, and that is to note the incredible significance that the legislators in New Zealand attach to their electorate. They would not dare even to ask them to extend their term of office without a referendum. They will not do that until they think they can win it. So we should ask the people their view before we entrench anything new in our law. I would even like to put the option of three years as well as four years and five years in that referendum, but I would certainly favour at least going out to ask people for their opinion to find out what suits them rather than suits the politicians who will be elected in those elections.