Brexit: Peace and Stability

Lord Collins of Highbury Excerpts

Tuesday 18th October 2016 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Collins of Highbury]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the potential effect on peace and stability in Europe and around the world of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union.

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

My Lords, I am pleased to open this debate. I expect I shall have an opportunity to wind it up on Thursday morning, as we are having another Europe debate on that day. There may be issues which I shall return to then.

We have been given our instructions by the British people to leave the European Union and we must act on them. The Government must also prepare for the risks that will come from Brexit. Historically, the United Kingdom has been one of the key players in driving the direction of the EU’s common foreign and security policy and its common security and defence policy. That has been due largely to our position as one of the largest and most advanced military powers within the EU and to our ability to take command of a mission. It has given us substantial bargaining power to control and influence the direction of EU thinking in the areas of foreign and defence policy.

If we are to have the international security and stability that we seek, development, defence and diplomacy have to go together. While foreign and security policy remain the competence of individual member states, the shared exercise of soft power through the Copenhagen criteria is the biggest benefit the UK derives from EU membership in the sphere of foreign and security policy. This enables us to exert influence in the areas of the world where, independently, we may not hold much sway. Collective action through the EU gives member states more bargaining power over countries with which we want to do deals and more muscle over countries we want to deter from aggression. The ability of the EU to respond to threats as they emerge through its common foreign and security policy has been vital—for example, with the sanctions against Russia following the illegal annexation of Crimea, and in securing the nuclear deal with Iran.

How does the Minister think the Government will be able to maintain the United Kingdom’s influence in the development of the EU’s common foreign and security policy after Britain leaves the EU? If she believes that the UK will have no influence on this post-Brexit, what assessment have the Government made of the impact this will have on the UK’s broader influence throughout the world and the Government’s ability to pursue their foreign policy objectives?

In the field of defence, a common security and defence policy gives the UK flexibility to work with EU partners on issues of common interest, such as the highly successful Operation Atalanta mission to tackle piracy in Somalia. That involved not just co-ordinated military action but activities such as helping coastal countries enhance their judicial and prison capacity to deal with those cases—something that NATO could never have replicated. Do the Government intend to maintain the United Kingdom’s participation in joint operations and initiatives taking place under the umbrella of the common security and defence policy after Britain leaves the EU?

Britain is also currently a member of the European Defence Agency, which helps facilitate collaboration in the defence industry and carry out research to promote the EU’s defence capabilities. Does the Minister know whether the UK is obliged to leave the EDA after it leaves the EU? If it is, what plans do the Government have to negotiate an agreement with the EDA, enabling the UK to continue participating in its research and technology projects?

The EU’s international development assistance helps us to magnify the UK’s presence around the world, allowing us to exert influence on countries which—on current rules—would not qualify for allocations from the UK’s domestic overseas aid budget. How does the Minister envisage such vital global co-operation continuing after Brexit? Will DfID have to extend its bilateral aid programmes? While I am on this subject, when will the House learn of the result of the reviews of both the multilateral and bilateral programmes conducted by DfID?

For decades, Britain has been a key link, ensuring that NATO and the EU’s Council of Ministers and External Action Service act in concert with one another, delivering EU influence, aid, diplomacy and sanctions in pursuit of common objectives. Outside the EU, Britain will no longer play this role. Some have argued that the UK will be able to exert exactly the same international influence post-Brexit, given its permanent place on the UN Security Council and its role within NATO. What this does not address is the effect it will have on British influence and leadership and the knock-on effects on NATO’s political cohesion and operational effectiveness.

Of equal concern is that if the EU starts to develop its own distinct foreign and security policies without Britain’s influence, it could put its objectives at odds with those of NATO, the UK and the USA. This could destabilise NATO and impede its ability to perform its defence role, the policy towards Russia being a particular concern. What assessment have the Government made of the risk that, without the UK’s restraining influence, measures that we have long opposed at EU level—such as the establishment of an EU army—are more likely to come to fruition? How do the Government intend to deal with such risks in future?

Most of the foreign policy risks faced by the UK will continue to require international action—for example, international terrorism, Russian aggression, climate change and the threats to economies that implies, and cross-border cybercrime. Britain is going to need the EU if we want to tackle any of these threats effectively, but we may increasingly find ourselves at odds with the EU over the policy and the mechanism for tackling such threats. It is also clear that the FCO will need to devote significant diplomatic resources during the coming years to the task of exiting the EU. Will the Minister outline what steps the Government are taking to ensure that other vital Foreign Office work, such as in Africa and the Middle East, will not be put at risk?

Before I conclude I want to raise the issue of Gibraltar, which is important in maintaining stable relationships with our neighbours in the EU. Despite 96% of its population voting to remain in the EU, Gibraltar will now leave, along with the rest of the United Kingdom. What steps will the Government take to ensure that we are best able to protect the interests of the people of Gibraltar? What assessment have they made of the risk of increased border controls and the impact they will have on the economic sustainability of Gibraltar?

I am sure there will be many more opportunities to seek explanations from the Government as to how they will ensure their negotiating plan for Brexit will protect our foreign policy and security relationships with the EU and enhance them with the rest of the world. We will certainly have that opportunity on Thursday. There are no easy answers to the questions I have posed, but that is why those who have advocated Brexit need to be confronted with them and made to prioritise them as negotiations proceed.