Nuclear Submarines

Lord Coaker Excerpts

Thursday 6th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Vernon Coaker (Gedling) (Lab)]

I join the Defence Secretary in paying tribute to the soldier from the 32 Engineer Regiment. His death is a reminder of the service and sacrifice given to our country by the armed forces, and our thoughts are with his family and loved ones at this time. I thank the Secretary of State for briefing me on this statement last night, and for sight of it. These are complicated and sensitive matters, and it is in all our interests that they are debated in a calm and reasonable manner that befits the seriousness of the issue.

I will come to the specific issues raised about the reactor in Dounreay and the nuclear submarines, but I start by asking the Secretary of State why he is making this statement now, and why the House is being told about this matter only today. He says that this issue was discovered in January 2012, which is more than two years ago. Does he not think it would have been right to brief the official Opposition spokesperson on defence then? Why did that not happen, and why has it not happened at any time since then until now? Should Parliament have known earlier?

There must be public confidence in the Government to be open and transparent about such matters. A fault, however small, that develops in a nuclear reactor is something that the British people, and this Parliament, should have been told about. This is an issue of national security and national importance, and it will cause particular concern in Scotland. When did the Scottish Secretary know? Did the Defence Secretary or his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland discuss the issue with the First Minister of Scotland and the Scottish Government? It seems to me that it was incumbent on the UK Government to inform and work with the Scottish Government on this matter. I accept that the Secretary of State briefed me and other colleagues last night and this morning, and I appreciate his candour, but does he agree that it has come rather late?

Let me turn to the specific issues with the PWR2 nuclear reactor at Dounreay and the implications for the Royal Navy’s fleet submarines and ballistic missile submarines. There will inevitably be concern when the words “nuclear”, “reactor” and “fault” are used in the same sentence. Can the Secretary of State provide further assurance that there has been, and there is now, absolutely no risk to workers on site, personnel in service, or the wider public? Having discovered that there was a problem at the Vulcan naval reactor test establishment, on what basis was the decision made to continue running the reactor? We know it is now in maintenance. Will he tell the House when a decision will be made about whether to continue running the reactor? I understand that if a decision is made to stop running it, it takes three years from the point at which it shuts down to the point at which it has cooled enough to be examined. That is a long time. Has he examined the potential to look at the PWR2 currently being constructed for the later Astute-class boats, and does that provide an opportunity effectively to X-ray every aspect of the cladding to see if we can detect any faults? There will be concerns about the impact that might have on the Astute-class submarines. Will the Secretary of State outline what those are?

The decision to maintain a test reactor so that faults could be identified has proven a good one. A fault has been found, however small, in PWR2—the test reactor in Dounreay. What plans are there to ensure that we have the same security with PWR3, which will be used on the Successor-class submarines? Have there been discussions with our US counterparts to see what lessons or expertise can be borrowed? In the current international defence and security climate, many people will be asking an important question: will this affect the UK’s ability to maintain continuous at-sea deterrence? Will it be necessary to adjust the operations timetable of the continuous at-sea deterrent? Finally, can the Defence Secretary confirm the total cost envisaged and that it will have no impact on the rest of the defence programme? If the cost is met by the submarine contingency fund, will that have any impact on the existing submarine programme?

Given that there will be concern about the length of time it has taken to inform the House and the public about this issue, will the Secretary of State tell the House what plans he has to keep Parliament and the country involved and updated throughout this process? Does he agree that public confidence and trust on these issues is crucial, and that people should have been told earlier? There will rightly be anxiety about these matters. The British public must be assured that everything is being done to resolve them, and they must be confident that Britain’s defence and security is paramount and will be maintained. That is best done through openness and transparency.

[Mr Hammond]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, and by and large we agree on the importance of these matters, but I am afraid I must start by saying that I am not particularly minded to take lectures on transparency from someone who was a member of the previous Government. The decisions we have made throughout this process from January 2012 have been carefully balanced. I have, of course, considered throughout whether it would be appropriate, sensible or helpful to make a public statement, and I remind him that the advice we have received throughout from the regulators and experts is that no safety issues are arising, and that this incident scores as a level zero event on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s scale—an event that requires no action and presents no risk.

We have kept the independent military nuclear safety regulator and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency informed of matters, as is proper, and I have no doubt that there will be people who say that the Scottish Government should have been informed. We will see when we hear from the representative of the Scottish National party in a moment whether it will approach this matter from a responsible and sensible point of view. Key Ministers within the Government were, of course, aware of these issues throughout.

The hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) asked why we decided to restart the reactor. Once it was clear that there was no safety risk and that a safety case for restarting it had been built and approved by the regulators, we continued with the operation of the test reactor to fulfil its intended purpose: to have delivered the same amount of core burn, and some more, as the most aged operational reactor will have achieved by the end of its service life.

The hon. Gentleman asked about the reactors being built for the Astute submarines, which are also core H reactors. I confirm that after this issue arose, all reactors in-build were re-examined with the best equipment available, to look for signs of anything that might give any further clue as to what has happened with the core H reactor at Dounreay.

The hon. Gentleman also asked about the decision not to have a test reactor for the successor series—the PWR3 reactor. There are several technical reasons for this. The reactor is being built to an entirely different design specification. Because of the way in which technology has evolved, the engineering tolerances will be much less challenging in the PWR3 reactor and we have access to far more advanced computer modelling techniques, which can provide an adequate substitute for prototyping. However, in view of the concerns that have been expressed about this decision, I have asked the chief scientific adviser to review again the evidence on which the decision not to operate a test reactor was based, and to report back to me on the appropriateness of that decision. I will inform the House in due course of the result of that review.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether CASD is affected. It will not be, and that is the point of taking this decision today. Refuelling Vanguard during an existing planned deep-maintenance period means that the operational rotation of the Vanguard-class submarines will not be affected. That is the reason we have taken that decision. It is not a safety-related decision; it is a submarine availability-related decision.

On the question of cost and as I have said already, we expect the total cost of the measures I have announced today to be about £270 million, all of which will come from contingency provision within the submarine programme that is currently unused. We do not expect it to have any impact on the wider defence programme. The contingency within the submarine programme is more than adequate—this amount is substantially less than 10% of the total contingency in the programme.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether I intended to make further statements. Clearly, I will of course notify the House if anything of significance happens; if we make a decision to decommission the reactor at Dounreay early; or if there are any further significant developments in respect of the reactor while it is running. I stress that we have reacted properly throughout, in consultation with the regulatory authorities, and we have dealt with this matter in the same way that any minor incident in a reactor, whether military or civil, would routinely be dealt with.