EU and Sudan: EUC Report

Lord Chidgey Excerpts

Wednesday 7th December 2011 Grand Committee

[Lord Chidgey]

My Lords, I express my congratulations to the committee for the work it has done in preparing this report. I also acknowledge the comments that the noble Lord, Lord Sewel, has just made, particularly on the African Union—something that was not particularly well covered in the earlier statements, but which is very important for the future.

I speak in this debate as the vice-chair of the Associate All-Party Parliamentary Group for Sudan—and South Sudan, of course, now. In that guise, I had the opportunity to visit Juba and Khartoum with the group shortly after the referendum and before the independence of South Sudan earlier this year. We quickly discovered a stark, even macabre, contrast between the two. Khartoum is all towering office blocks and shiny five-star hotels, with modern motorways snaking between them, while Juba had some 30 kilometres of surfaced road around a collection of crumbling buildings that served as the city centre. The best hotel in town was easily recognisable as a former army barracks—nevertheless, charging room rates well into the oil state category, with payment required in US dollars in cash.

Juba had no banks. Carrying around plastic bags stuffed with dollars was not for the faint-hearted, given the frequent warnings not to stray into town day or night for fear of being robbed or shot or kidnapped—or all three.

Juba had few paved roads; little in the way of basic services; failing schools, where teachers had not been paid for months; and hospitals that hardly functioned. Added to this mix was the mass inward migration of indigenous southern Sudanese returning from the north by bus and Nile barge at the rate, we believe, of several thousand a day. By the time this exodus from the north is complete, some 2 million southern Sudanese are expected to have come home to the south.

Some six months after our visit, the Government's response to the recommendations in the sub-committee report allows us to compare and contrast the circumstances in Sudan, particularly South Sudan, then and now. In this context, I ask the Minister to respond to further questions arising from some of these key passages—if not during this debate, then perhaps later in writing.

In paragraph 230 in the recommendations, and also referred to in paragraph 257, the Government stress the importance of creating a prosperous economy to the future of Sudan and that there are no trade sanctions on Sudan from the UK or the EU and no legal obstacles to trade. Do the Government agree that the major obstacles to trade are in fact the lack of a credible banking and financial system, and to investment, the endemic corruption throughout the state and business sectors? What interventions is the UK making to address these crucial obstacles, to protect British interests and to create conditions for greater investment confidence?

In response to paragraph 233, the Government rightly acknowledge that proper accounting for oil revenue is a high priority for the Government of South Sudan. Can the Minister provide an updated assessment of progress since independence in July of this year—some while ago now—in improving financial management of public sector finances in South Sudan and reducing loss of funds through corruption?

While the report calls for South Sudan to enhance its accounting ability by building up structures for budgeting expenditure and auditing, this should be seen against the severe capacity shortfall that is a legacy of the historic inadequate education system in the south, a result of which is that some 60 per cent of civil servants have not progressed beyond primary school education and most, if not all, Ministers in the Government have been drawn from the officer corps of the SPLA, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army.

In response to paragraphs 250 and 251, the Government have noted that the UK continues to play a leading role in diplomatic presence and interests, with the EU, to maintain a high level of engagement. In February, when we visited, we noted that in Juba most of the western donor countries, together with the EU mission, shared a diplomatic compound which provided secure, effective and efficient accommodation. Could the Minister tell the House what the current and planned arrangements are now?

In response to paragraph 259, the Government recognise the need for humanitarian aid to reach the most vulnerable according to need. Do the Government agree that one of the most vulnerable groups is that of the orphaned or displaced children shipped down from the north by bus or Nile barge, often unaccompanied?

In February, we discovered during our visit dozens of small children, some no more than four years old, who were found wandering in the Juba markets by volunteers who fed and clothed them, and placed them in a one-room playschool funded mainly by ad hoc contributions from expatriates. At night, however, they had to return to the markets. We were told that by the time the girls reached nine or 10, they left to work in the market brothels. There they stayed until their premature death, usually in their early teens. No one seemed to know what happened to the boys.

With the numbers of children being shipped south thought to run into thousands, what intervention are the Government making with the Governments of the south and the north to curb this appalling abuse? While the Government agree with the recommendations in paragraph 263 on the need for capacity-building, can they confirm that in the absence of state capacity the Sudanese community has become more and more dependent on international NGOs to deliver essential services, creating a dependency culture, particularly in the urban areas? What plans do the Government have, with other donor agencies, for tackling this development?

The Government also agree with the recommendations in paragraph 264, calling for support for agricultural investment. The urgency of this can be measured by the huge reduction in land under cultivation in Sudan as a result of some 20 years of civil war. Some donor-supported agriculture projects we visited frankly proved clearly inept or inadequate. In addition, relocating urban dwellers returning from northern Sudan's towns and cities to rural areas in the south, while equipping them with farming tools and settling them on smallholdings with ill-defined land titles, hardly seemed to be a recipe for agricultural progress.

In response to paragraph 266, concerning the high levels of corruption in South Sudan, the Government state that this area is one of DfID's high priorities. What evidence is there that the Government of South Sudan are responding to this programme of support and engagement? After some six months, does the evidence show that corruption is declining or increasing? Finally, on the Government's response to paragraph 273, they note that the EU is currently drafting a joint strategy paper on the effective co-ordination of aid and the priorities of South Sudan. How does this strategy fit with the responsibilities assumed by the troika of nations that witnessed the comprehensive peace agreement: the United States, Norway and the United Kingdom?