National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord West of Spithead

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 4th July 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I now have the opportunity to speak to Amendment 22D. I thank the Minister and the others involved in the discussions we have had. I give particular thanks for the involvement of the Security Minister, whom he mentioned, in the creation of what the Minister offered today.

In my reamendment, I offered an independent review, which is quite a physical way—to use a metaphor—of examining the law in this area. We have been offered a much more neurological review, to use another metaphor, because it involves going to every place where knowledge is held within government of the possibilities by which foreign powers may contribute to political parties.

I am particularly grateful to the Minister because the Government are offering something that not only places a clear moral obligation on political parties by which their honesty will be judged, but which goes further. It means that there will be standards by which their honesty will be judged, which has potential implications for political parties that they had better pay regard to. Compared with the no-action approach when we last discussed this matter, what was decided today is a generous response by the Government.

I will close with another metaphor. The right reverend Prelate, who read Psalm 24 in Prayers this afternoon, spoke of a “pure heart” and “clean hands”. I doubt very much whether these measures will purify the hearts of political parties, but it will certainly make their hands much cleaner. I therefore announce my intention not to move Motion A1.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to Motion B1, an amendment to government Motion B. I am very pleased that the Government have finally proposed an alternative amendment, recognising that only the ISC can undertake effective scrutiny of intelligence and security work undertaken by the Government.

The ISC supports the government Motion on the basis that my Motion is also accepted. It removes the requirement for consideration of whether the ISC’s MoU needs to be updated to commence within six months. We are concerned that such a time restriction may have unintended consequences; it might inadvertently affect the ability of the ISC to oversee security or intelligence activity related to the Bill. For example, if the Government commence new security or intelligence activity as part of the Bill outside the ISC’s remit—beyond the six-month period—the Government could attempt to argue that they will not consider any commensurate update to the ISC’s MoU as considerations are required to start within six months of the Bill coming into force.

Because of the Government’s long-standing refusal to update the ISC’s MoU, and their continued arguments to justify their refusal to accept independent oversight of the committee, the committee is of the view that it will be much safer for us to remove this time limitation to avoid any possible confusion in the future. Although that sounds like a lawyer’s argument, this is a lawyer’s issue; it is something we have to be quite careful about.

While the government Motion will not remedy the significant gap in ISC oversight that already exists in relation to intelligence and security matters, it at least seeks to stop the oversight gap becoming even bigger. I hope that this reflects a turning point and the beginning of a shift in the Government’s position, including their acceptance of the need for robust, independent and democratic oversight of secret intelligence matters.

However, the House should not forget the wider problem, and we should continue to insist on a remedy. With my ISC colleagues in the other place, I have already explained repeatedly why the ISC’s MoU needs to be updated more broadly. I will not repeat those arguments now, other than to say that currently there is insufficient parliamentary oversight of the Government’s intelligence and security activities.

Intelligence and security matters are too important for there not to be comprehensive parliamentary oversight. There can be no activity by the Executive which escapes democratic oversight. The Motion is the first indication from the Government that they have begun to grasp this fundamental principle and the importance attached to it by those in this House. Despite the Motion’s significant limitations, I support it being added to the Bill, with my own Motion, to ensure that there are no unintended consequences which may negatively affect the ability of the ISC to oversee the entirety of this regime. I encourage the Government to use this as a foundation for constructive engagement on the rest of the ISC’s MoU, which, as I have explained, urgently needs updating.