European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Howarth of Newport

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting
Monday 20th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

The noble Lords and noble and learned Lord who have already spoken have advised us, rightly, that there are extremely important constitutional issues raised in Clause 26. They have dwelt upon the manner in which Ministers would trespass upon the proper responsibility of the judiciary. I simply add the thought that by taking powers to deal with these matters under regulations, Ministers are also trespassing upon the proper responsibility of Parliament, because Parliament would not be able to give adequate consideration to what could be very important policy decisions by Ministers. They might be seeking to require the courts to consider different tests where environmental policy, or workers’ rights policy and law, are concerned. These must be matters for Parliament to be able to consider fully and deal with in primary legislation.

The adoption of these powers by the Government would be doubly offensive in constitutional terms. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, has proposed a partial remedy at least that is, as always, both wise and practical. I simply say to the House that if we approve the amendment that he has tabled, and I hope we will, it is no more than damage limitation and does not undo all the mischief that this clause provides.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, there are a few countries in the European Union, all in central Europe, where the independence of the judiciary has been under attack for the past two to three years, as is evidentially measurable. We in the United Kingdom, of all political persuasions and none, have repeatedly condemned what has happened in those countries. My understanding was that one of the reasons put forward for leaving the European Union was that we could revert to our own best traditions of the law, with judicial independence, with the rule of law guaranteed by it and with the separation of powers intact.

I am not one who subscribes to the view held by some that the present Government wish to undermine the independence of the judiciary. It would be inconsistent with the basic views they expressed in relation to leaving the European Union. However, if one reads Clause 26 carefully, one sees that, textually, it raises the possibility of the independence of the judiciary being interfered with politically. That is not acceptable, and I do not believe that in their heart of hearts—if they have a heart or a heart of hearts—the Government wished to achieve that end.

My legal practice, lasting the best part of 50 years, has, I confess, been less esoteric and possibly more worldly than those of some other noble Lords and noble and learned Lords in this House, especially those sitting on these Cross Benches. However, my years as a practitioner, both as an advocate and as a part-time judge, have led me to magistrates’ courts all over the place, to county courts in parts of Wales whose names some of your Lordships would struggle to pronounce and to Crown Courts all over the country, including London. I have sat in some of those courts. Frankly, it fills me with concern that the Government would be able to determine by statutory instrument or ministerial fiat which of that huge number of courts would be able to make the determinations under discussion.

The proposal in Clause 26 undermines the consistency of decision-making and the importance of precedent—the principle of stare decisis—which have enabled barristers in ordinary courts around the country to know what the law is on sometimes very complicated issues and therefore to be able to make submissions to judges, who also know what the law is. What is proposed will remove that consistency and undermine the importance of precedent unless the decision-making on these issues is limited to a number of courts which are genuinely regarded as binding by the other courts; that is, as courts of record. If we are given the opportunity, my preference is that we should vote for the amendment proposed so brilliantly by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, and that the Government should then have the opportunity to amend that amendment before it comes back to your Lordships’ House to include, as the noble and learned Lord suggested, the Court of Appeal and its equivalent in Scotland. I suggest to your Lordships that this is realistic, it is practical, it is certain, and it is probably what the Conservative Party really meant anyway before it was maybe trapped into a little bit of rhetoric which has gone wrong.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Howarth of Newport

Wednesday 7th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, I want to give my noble and learned friend the Advocate-General a brief moment of ministerial bliss during this debate—there have not been many so far. I speak to government Amendment 68. My noble friend Lord Faulks and I and others have argued that clinical negligence should be available for severely disabled infants—at least for those who suffered neurological damage, which may of course result in physical damage, and often does, either before birth, at birth or shortly after. It is a great pleasure to see Amendment 68. It has been the result of some negotiation, but I should say that the Government have been very willing negotiators at all times on this issue.

I recognise that there will be understandable disappointment if legal aid is not extended in the same way to all clinical negligence relating to infants, even that which does not involve neurological damage, and disappointment that legal aid is not being automatically scoped into all clinical negligence. Like the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, I am old enough to have been involved in clinical negligence cases and seen the advantage of legal aid, particularly for those of poor means.

I raise one issue with my noble and learned friend on which I would be very grateful for a specific response. It is about other clinical negligence and exceptionality. Many of us have pored over Clause 9, entitled “Exceptional cases”, although if one reads the text of Clause 9, it is ambiguous whether it applies only to exceptional cases or, potentially, to a largish cohort of cases that fall within Clause 9(3)(b)—that it is appropriate to grant legal aid,

“in the particular circumstances of the case, having regard to any risk that failure to do so would be”,

a breach of convention or enforceable EU rights. I have in mind where there may be a number of claims of a similar nature—for example, a group of 100 claims arising from the negligent use of a particular drug. One has only to say the word thalidomide to understand how that can arise. I believe that a similar situation could arise in our age, just as it did then.

I would be grateful if the Minister would confirm that, were such a cohort of cases to exist, it would not be excluded from exceptionality by reason of being a cohort or group. If one looks at the decided cases in which the word exceptional or exceptionality has been interpreted by the senior courts, it is generally understood to refer to singular cases. We can envisage a plurality of cases of the kind I described, which may give rise to a risk of a breach of convention or other EU rights.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, I, too, welcome the concession that the Government propose in Amendment 68, in so far as it goes, to allow legal aid to be available in cases where infants have suffered perinatal injury. As the parent of a child who suffered perinatal injury, I can only welcome it. I simply ask the Minister on what argument of principle he extends legal aid to that group of people but not to others whose lives may be ruined through the experience of clinical negligence.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Howarth of Newport

Tuesday 20th December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Bach and the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, have identified, imaginatively and sensitively, extensive groups of people for whom a mandatory telephone gateway would be entirely inappropriate. I hope that the Minister will reflect carefully on the apprehensions expressed this evening. The noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, and the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, both suggested that it would be a false economy to skimp on the cost of the initial advice and assistance. We could end up, perversely, having to spend a lot more because people did not receive the advice and assistance that they needed, it was not comprehensible to them, it failed to match what was appropriate for them or because they lacked the encouragement to explain themselves fully, so their cases were not taken further through the appropriate channels and their personal predicament deteriorated. We must take all those worries seriously.

The noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, touched on the question of training, and the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, talked about the need for the people who are to provide the service to be of high calibre. Those things are important. It would be helpful if the Minister would say more about what the Government envisage by way of training programmes and the level and standard of personnel who will be recruited to provide the service. We are in a familiar dilemma as we examine the legislation. It is perfunctorily articulated in extremely important aspects. We were asked to take the Government on trust. We are willing to take the Government on trust to the extent that they will explain themselves to us and we know what we are being asked to trust. I hope that the Minister will be able to be helpful to the Committee on those points.

I have two quick questions to put to the Minister. Will this be a freephone service? Secondly, does he envisage that there will be a network of telephones that people will be able to use when they make these calls? It could be a very sensitive matter for people explaining themselves to someone at the other side of the telephone gateway about issues concerning family breakdown, debt and so forth. It is not just that they are painful topics but that it could be positively hazardous for people not to be able to make those telephone calls in circumstances of privacy where they can be confident that they will not be overheard or interrupted. We need to know a lot more detail about how the Minister anticipates that the system will be made to work in practice.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, I raise just one or two points about the notion of a compulsory telephone gateway. The first relates to legal professional privilege. Can my noble friend confirm that all communication in the telephone gateways are and will continue to be covered by legal professional privilege, so that we can avoid the risk of cases eventually arriving in court and initial conversations with telephone gateways being used for the purposes of cross-examination when the person accessing the telephone gateway may well have been lacking in confidence and have stated their case in an inaccurate way?

The second matter I wanted to raise is about the group of people—and there are many of them—who contact what I will call informed lay services. That would include people going to citizens advice bureaux, well informed councillors, Members of the Welsh Assembly in their constituency surgeries and, of course, Members of Parliament in their constituency surgeries. It would not make much sense if people who had gone through those routes were then required thereafter to access a mandatory telephone gateway. Otherwise, we will run into the ludicrous situation where people sit in those establishments with their MPs and a call is made to the telephone gateway during the constituency surgery. That would of course be an absurdity. Perhaps the Minister would explain to the Committee what is proposed in such circumstances, the ones that I have described being but examples.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Howarth of Newport

Tuesday 20th December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

I will come to that in a second. The noble and learned Baroness will be pleased to know that I am about to wind up. We should all be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for tabling an amendment that challenges us to debate the principles against which the detailed amendments should be judged.

I conclude by saying that I believe that the Government have no mandate for what they seek to do. They have no political or moral authority and no permission from the people to take away their right of access to justice and to dismantle that part of the justice system. It would be a dereliction of our constitution if the Government and Parliament were not to resolve to spend the money that is genuinely necessary to secure access to justice for all. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will press his amendment to a vote. If he does I will certainly support it. If he does not, I hope that when we come back to the issue on Report, he or others will table an amendment that fairly and squarely insists on the fundamental principle. If they were to table the amendment proposed by the Constitution Committee in all its principled directness and simplicity, that would be preferable.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, speaking as a liberal from the Liberal Democrat Benches, it is with regret that I say that I support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I support it with regret because I had hoped that we would not be in this position by the time we started Committee. Noble Lords will recall the Second Reading debate at which unfortunately I was not able to be present because I was out of the country. Since that debate there has been private and public negotiation, lobbying, a great deal of journalism and an expectation that we would move from the position that was expressed from the government Front Bench at Second Reading. However, I detect absolutely no hint that any concessions will be made. Indeed, I detect an air of irritated intransigence coming from the Ministry of Justice in relation to the Bill.

I would not feel driven to vote for the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and to take the same position as my noble friend Lord Faulks from the Conservative Benches on the coalition side, if I felt that there was some movement in the direction of the general principle set out in the amendment. Furthermore, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, explained, this is not an expression of a new principle, nor is it an expression of a principle that is to be applied outside the context of this very Bill. It seeks merely to set out a principle that I believe every person in this House should embrace within the Bill’s in effect financial constraints, which are expressed in the amendment.

I, as a liberal and a Member of the Liberal Democrats, have understandably—like, I am sure, my noble friend Lord Faulks—been encouraged not to cause difficulties, not to intervene too much and not to obstruct the Government in getting their Bill through; in other words, I have been encouraged to support this coalition Government, which I would very much like to do. However, I have detected an assumption that Liberal Democrat Peers are to support the Government’s approach to this Bill, and I say to my noble friend Lord McNally that it is not sufficient to make us wait to find out later what concessions are to be made on the many representations that have been made.

I agree wholeheartedly with the Government that a great deal of legal aid money is being wasted at present. I believe that fervently, and I could identify, and indeed have identified when asked, areas in the legal aid system where savings could be made. However, arguments have been made for concessions in areas where access to legal services is required as the only way, in effect, to meet the needs of people whose rights have been adversely affected. If my noble friend wishes us not to support this amendment, I invite him to tell us when he replies to this debate the areas in which concessions are to be made and the general nature of those concessions, not the particulars. In other words, I am asking my noble friend not merely to assume our support from these Benches but to earn our support from these Benches. Without that, I am afraid that I shall remain dissatisfied and will feel free to intervene during these debates on the merits of these amendments.