Iran

Debate between Lord Campbell of Pittenweem and Douglas Alexander

Monday 20th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Alexander]

There is surely consensus on both sides of the House on the desire for a peaceful resolution to this crisis. That is why I argue that the strengthening of the sanctions regime to an unprecedented level is a necessary response to the growing tensions. All of us have an interest in a peaceful resolution.

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

I do not want to embark on a theological discussion about deterrence, but does the right hon. Gentleman accept that the effectiveness of deterrence depends on the party against which nuclear weapons might be used being unwilling to accept the consequences of using them? To base the whole issue of non-proliferation in the middle east on something so uncertain—the regime is renowned for its uncertainty—would be very dangerous.

[Mr Alexander]

I have some sympathy with that view. I will argue that there have been instances where the regime in Tehran has come to judge where its own self-interest lies, and the continued pursuit of sanctions reflects that reality. That said, I sympathise with the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s broader point about what is implicit within a relationship of deterrence. That is why, despite my appearance on the “Murnaghan” show on Sky television yesterday morning, I was rather restrained in my mild rebuke to the Foreign Secretary over his cold war analogy. He was more accurate in describing the potential risk of an arms race, but I would not say that the cold war is the perfect historical parallel. First, it involved a global struggle for supremacy, and it mischaracterises the threat that we are confronting in the middle east to suggest that there is a perfect parallel with a global struggle for supremacy. Secondly, it is fair to say that mechanisms were developed during the cold war that allowed for a peaceful resolution. In that sense, it was in some ways a prospect more favourable than that which we are facing now, unless we find a resolution as I have described.

I have been generous in taking a number of interventions. I would now like to make a little progress. What would I, on behalf of the Opposition, argue is the way forward? In my view, there has been too much discussion in recent days of possible military action and too little discussion of how diplomacy can still succeed. As one of my colleagues suggested, we must avoid talk of the possibility of military action becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Our efforts must focus on how we can use all the diplomatic tools available to force the Iranian Government to change course. In the past, Iranian leaders have adjusted their behaviour in the face of international pressures—ending the war with Iraq in 1988 and stopping assassinations of Iranian dissidents in the 1990s are just some of the most significant examples.

Evidence is now accumulating that the sanctions are beginning to put unparalleled pressure on the Iranian regime. Sanctions in place for many years now on exporting materials relevant to the development of nuclear weapons have slowed Iran’s nuclear programme and directly hindered its ability to develop next-generation centrifuges. The combined effect of international sanctions on the Iranian financial sector, including steps taken by the Government last year, has triggered an enormous currency devaluation, which the regime is struggling to contain. The Iranian Government can no longer access reputable sources of international credit, insurance for its merchant fleets or investors for its state-led infrastructure programs. Crucially, Iran is struggling to find investors to revitalise its dilapidated energy infrastructure, which requires billions in new investment if production levels are to be maintained. Alongside that, the oil embargo, of which we have already heard a little, is increasing the strain on the Iranian regime even before the EU embargo comes into full force on 1 July.

Despite rejecting offers of talks in past years, Iran has now signalled that it is willing to resume talks with the E3 plus 3, and reports suggest that Iran’s supreme national security council replied last week to a letter from Cathy Ashton, on behalf of the European Union, inviting Iran to resume those talks without preconditions. Those are encouraging signs, but let me be clear that we must remain vigilant against the prospect of Iran seeking to draw out talks while continuing its nuclear programme unabated. The Opposition welcome the diplomatic steps that the international community has so far taken: the United Nations Security Council has passed seven resolutions on Iran in less than six years, and the EU, the US, and the UK Government and others have all taken important steps in recent months to increase further the pressure on Iran. However, despite those efforts, we have seen too little progress. What is needed now is a more concerted and co-ordinated international response. At this crucial time, it is vital that we remain focused on pursuing the twin-track approach, which remains our best route to resolving the crisis.

As we have heard, sanctions are not designed to punish the Iranian people. They are intended to increase pressure on the regime, and those pressures now seem to be mounting. This month, the Iranian Parliament voted to hold a special session to force President Ahmadinejad to account for some of the dire economic and social indicators in Iran today. Unemployment is high, growth is low and anger is mounting. The Iranian regime is beginning to show signs of doubt as to whether international isolation is simply too great a price to pay. Alongside that, parliamentary elections to elect new members of Islamic consultative assembly are due to be held in Iran on 2 March. They may offer yet another opportunity for the regime to change course and for a new leadership to steer Iran away from the brink of international isolation. The Iranian political calendar, the internal political dynamics, and the domestic economic and social pressures all imply that the next few months could be crucial.

The motion focuses on the use of military action, which has rightly been the subject of much debate in the House today. The risks facing the region are real, but I believe we must make it clear to our friends in Israel that now is not the time for a pre-emptive strike. However, notwithstanding our view that pre-emptive action should not be taken now, we are firm in our view that all options must remain on the table. That is because the prospects for a diplomatic resolution are enhanced, not undermined, by all options remaining on the table at the present time. Leaving all options on the table actually strengthens the international community’s hand in negotiations and therefore increases the likelihood of achieving a peaceful resolution, to which I believe the whole House is committed.

North Africa and the Middle East

Debate between Lord Campbell of Pittenweem and Douglas Alexander

Thursday 17th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Alexander]

A trend seems to be developing whereby those on the Government Benches ask three questions under the guise of a single intervention. On the issue of arms exports, it is a matter of record and the records were rightly published transparently by the previous Government. I have also made it clear that if changes need to be made in relation to the consolidated agreement between the European Union and ourselves on arms sales, I will support the efforts of the Governments in that endeavour.

On the second issue, may I make a general point and then a specific one? The general point is that in trying to understand the stimulus to the changes that we are seeing across north Africa and the middle east, it is indisputable that engagement with the outside world has contributed, in part, to the extraordinary courage, passion and bravery that we saw from demonstrators in, for example, Tunisia and Egypt. In that sense, it is important that the default setting of the international community should be engagement with countries, even where there are profound and long-standing disagreements.

On the specific issue as to whether it was appropriate in the early years after 2001 to engage directly with Gaddafi, I find myself in agreement not with the hon. Gentleman, who is a Back Bencher, but with his Front-Bench team, who generously but wisely have recognised that foreign affairs at times involves dealing with those with whom one has profound disagreement in the service of a greater good, which in this case is the security of the United Kingdom and the broader international community. We were trying to address a situation in which Gaddafi had, by any reckoning, armed the IRA—he was responsible for the largest arms shipment to the IRA—and so had actively sponsored terrorism against United Kingdom citizens. He was also in the course of developing a capability for ballistic missiles, for nuclear missiles and for other weaponry. There is and will be the opportunity to look more broadly at what other lessons can be drawn from our engagement with Libya, but I do not resile from the difficult judgment that was exercised at the time to engage with Gaddafi, notwithstanding his record, in the service of what I think was the right judgment to make British citizens more secure.

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

May I take the shadow Foreign Secretary back to his expression of disappointment at the tentative nature of the international community’s response? Does he understand that those of us who were in the House during the Bosnian crisis feel some familiar echoes from that period, when the response of the international community was equally uncertain? Should we not have learned lessons from that unhappy period?

[Mr Alexander]

As so often, not only in recent days, but over many years in this House, the right hon. and learned Gentleman speaks with great authority and wisdom. I was coming on to a passage in my speech where I was keen to suggest to the House that it is illuminating at times to take, momentarily, that longer view and to appreciate the full extent of the failure that we have seen over recent weeks.

In different times and, admittedly, in different circumstances, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen said of the Kosovo conflict:

“We ran a military campaign and in parallel we ran an information campaign. Both were professional and focused but it was, to my mind, the information campaign which won it.”

He went on to say:

“Publics across the world got the message that we meant business and that we were absolutely committed to achieving our objectives summed up succinctly as ‘NATO in, Serbs out, refugees home’. The Kosovars watched and were reassured by our resolution and in Belgrade the generals and the Serbs generally began to understand that once NATO had taken on a mission, it was simply not going to fail. And as they got that message their resolution crumbled and even though their immediate military advantage remained, they gave up.”

Sadly, the clarity, coherence and effectiveness of that communication have not been matched in recent weeks by the international messaging to the Gaddafi regime.