Lord Campbell of Pittenweem
Main Page: Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Campbell of Pittenweem's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberI have the advantage of agreeing with a great deal of what has been said, with one exception: the intervention made by the hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson), who I regret to see is no longer in his place, which was, I think, particularly inept. He and his colleagues complain when those of us who are opposed to independence argue that it might lead to introspection, but I rather fancy that he has made my point more directly than I could have.
As has already been acknowledged, the issue is not just about the fate of Ukraine and Crimea. It has long-term consequences for European security and the transatlantic alliance. I admit to some miscalculations about Russia. I did not calculate how the collective mood of Russia was so ready to respond to a dominant and ruthless leadership, albeit out of weakness. Nor did I expect that the perestroika and glasnost that we welcomed so enthusiastically in this country and elsewhere would become so despised at home in Russia. Nor did I expect that that disillusionment would spawn a determination to try to recreate a sphere of influence.
It is worth reminding ourselves on this occasion that it was Mr Putin who said that the break-up of the Soviet Union had been the single greatest foreign policy mistake of the 20th century, conveniently ignoring the fact that the break-up was inevitable for a variety of reasons that we need not discuss today. Anyone who heard his speech today will have found a great deal of difficulty in accepting the proposition that he did not want to restore the cold war when he somehow felt it was necessary to use the language of the cold war to support that proposition.
I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way and I agree with what he is saying. Although we cannot ignore or get away from how the mood has changed in many parts of Russia, we should nevertheless not forget that many people in Russia still do not support what the Government are doing. Indeed, tens of thousands marched for peace in Moscow just a few days ago. We should remember that and pay tribute to those who, with great courage, are still speaking up for human rights and democracy in Russia itself.
I admire the courage of those who seek to protest against a leadership so potentially brutal and determined as that explained by Mr Putin.
The other calculation that I made, and perhaps others would admit to this too, was that we should have seen the signs in relation to Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It is easy to point to the history, but it is much more difficult to determine how to respond to the contemporary issues.
My right hon. and learned Friend mentions Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As chairman of the all-party group on Georgia I have been struck by how our Georgian friends see Russian interests not so much in Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Crimea but in intimidating Governments, whether in Tbilisi or Kiev.
My hon. Friend makes a powerful point.
I was turning to the question of how to respond. Since the very beginning, it has been accepted that a military engagement in response simply is not possible. If we consider carefully what the prospect would have been for a nuclear alliance facing a nuclear power across Europe, albeit initially in conventional terms, the risks of something much more serious would be profound. As a parallel, let us remember the atmosphere when, in Pakistan and India, across the line of control there were a million men under arms, and the possibility that some provocation or something of the kind could have brought grievous consequences.
Today, the Russians have offered a contact group. That is disingenuous in the extreme, because the basis upon which that offer is made is that Ukraine and the rest of the world should accept and endorse the illegality of the conduct that has given rise to the crisis of the moment.
How do we proceed? We proceed, I hope, diplomatically, by persevering and promoting the isolation that Russia found itself in at the Security Council—an isolation so considerable that China, which would normally be predicted to take the side of Russia, decided to abstain. On sanctions, I agree with much that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) said a moment or two ago. We have to ask ourselves what the cost would be, but we also have to ask ourselves what the cost of not imposing sanctions would be, and take a long-term rather than a short-term view.
Russia is now emboldened by energy resources and fuelled by imagined slights, with a new confidence, but as has already been pointed out, that confidence is built on very shaky economic grounds. If there is an area of fallibility, that is in the Russian economy. That is why anything that can be agreed in order to impose pressure on that economy seems to me entirely worth while. I understand that Crimea has decided to adopt the rouble as its currency—a case of joining the sinking ship, rather than leaving it.
I accept the point that has been powerfully made by a number of contributors that the European Union and the United States of America must stand together. To quote a former Prime Minister whom I do not commonly quote, “This is no time to wobble.”
The right hon. and learned Gentleman is making a very eloquent speech and has dwelt considerably on the pressures that we need to bring to bear on Russia. Will he explain what he believes a successful, realistic resolution will look like?
I do not think anyone can answer that question. My hon. Friend is right to ask the question, but I do not believe anyone can answer it at this stage, because in the end there will have to be a diplomatic solution. The one thing that is essential is that when these negotiations and discussions break out, as we hope they will, those on behalf of the Ukraine, the European Union and the United States are firmly in a position to say that if a diplomatic solution does not work, more can be done.
One of the issues that has been before us in Europe recently is the question of short-range nuclear weapons. There was a possibility of disarmament, both from the United States’ holdings and from Russia. That is no longer possible. In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, people will be relieved that that possibility is off the table.