Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Debate between Lord Butler of Brockwell and Lord Lexden

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Monday 11th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

My Lords, the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, appears next on the list by mistake—he has already spoken—so I call the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB) [V]]

My Lords, in supporting the new clause in Amendment 33 and its consequentials, I am riding pillion to my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich. When I heard his speech at Second Reading, I immediately felt that his approach struck the most practical balance in controlling the activities of intelligence agencies embedded in groups carrying out criminal activities. Following the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, I rather suspect that the scale of this is both at a lower level and in a larger quantity than previous speeches have suggested. One has to see the practicality of that in those terms.

My experience, both when I was in government and when I was on the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, leads me to believe that control of these operations requires three things. First, it requires better precision than there has been so far in the definition of how far agents can be authorised to go in participation in criminal activities. That is fair to them, and it is fair to the authorities. Ever since the case of Brian Nelson, the Northern Irish loyalist informer, to which I referred in Committee, I have felt that it is unsatisfactory that judgments on these matters should be left open and to the discretion of prosecuting authorities after the event, although I have no doubt that the decision to prosecute Nelson—indeed, he confessed—was correct.

Secondly, there is a need for close contact and immediacy in the control exercised. These situations in which covert intelligence agents are involved are often fast-moving. Communication between agent and controller may need to be rapid, and control needs to be agile. I do not believe that that can practicably be provided by a judge or a Secretary of State.

Thirdly, independent oversight is needed in as close to real time as possible. Controllers cannot be the judge and jury in these matters—certainly not the sole judge and jury—since there is an obvious temptation to cross lines in the interests of achieving what are often laudable objectives. I am persuaded that oversight is likely to be best achieved by giving the independent Investigatory Powers Commissioner a more active and immediate role. It seems to me that the provision proposed by my noble friend in the proposed new clause achieves these objectives in a practical way, and I am glad to hear that the Minister is inclined to agree that this is a fair and effective way forward.

The Liberal Democrats’ Amendment 17 takes a similar approach and, to that extent, I am sympathetic to it, but I am sceptical about whether the requirement for “prior approval” by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, even with a get-out clause in circumstances of urgency, would meet the requirement for operational agility—so I will stick with my support for my noble friend’s amendment.