Privileges and Conduct

Debate between Lord Butler of Brockwell and Lord Campbell-Savours

Tuesday 30th April 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Campbell-Savours (Lab)]

My Lords, I always follow very closely the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Hussein-Ece, because she has shown great courage over a few years in a number of contributions, particularly the speech that she gave about the Lester case. However, I profoundly disagree with her.

I also listened to the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, who drew a distinction between the investigatory and the examinational approach to these matters. That is exactly the argument at the heart of what is going on in ICSA. People believe that ICSA will come to the wrong conclusions because of the process that it has adopted in its inquiries. However, that is another matter and it is relevant only in the sense that it deals with sexual offences.

Paragraph 122B on page 44 of the report says:

“When a member is being investigated in relation to allegations of bullying, harassment or sexual misconduct the identity of that member will not usually be made public until the publication of any report at the conclusion of proceedings (see paragraph 122)”,


which deals with it in some detail. I want to know what,

“not usually be made public until the publication”,

actually means. What criteria will govern whether the name of the Member concerned is made public? We are talking here about a person’s reputation, and in the case of Lord Lester the international reputation of a prominent lawyer. My view is simple. We need clear guidance about the circumstances in which the name of a Member will be made public when it may well be that at the end of the inquiry that Member is found to be totally innocent, yet his reputation will have been completely destroyed.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)]

My Lords, I want to say a few words because, very unusually, I want to express a different view from that of my noble friend Lord Pannick, the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and my noble friend Lady Deech.

Having taken part in the debates about Lord Lester, I of course recognise that when the House has the responsibility of reaching a verdict on the conduct of one of its own staff or Members and on any sanctions attaching thereto, it is vulnerable to the appearance of conflicts of interest. Quite understandably, this debate has concentrated on the subjects of bullying, harassment and sexual misconduct, which come into the code of conduct for the first time. But we have to remember that the code of conduct is hugely about other matters, not just those three; in fact, paragraphs 10 to 106 are about other matters that reflect the rules of the House.

Breaches of the code of conduct, including those in the future relating to bullying, harassment or sexual misconduct, will often be breaches of the criminal law. In those cases, it is obviously right that the inquiry should be entirely independent. It should be carried out by the police, have lawyers on each side and be subject to the courts of law.

In this case, even with our distaste for bullying, harassment and sexual misconduct, we are talking about something short of breaches of the criminal law. We are talking about the rules of the House. It seems anomalous that, in a self-regulating House, the ultimate decision on those breaches and the sanctions that attach to them should not be a matter for the House itself. I therefore agree with the report, which introduces a procedure in which there is an independent investigation and a committee with a significant element of independent members, but the discipline committee is chaired by a Member of the House and has a small majority of Members of the House on it. When we are talking about the rules of this body, like any other institution, it should ultimately be for this body to decide whether those rules have been broken and what sanctions should attach to it.

I welcome the respects in which the report makes changes. I welcome that it brings in bullying and sexual harassment, and I support the other changes, including the widening of the code of conduct to parliamentary activities, not just parliamentary duties. As I have said, I believe it is right that the discipline committee should have a small majority from the House because that seems consistent with a self-governing House. I also welcome the encouragement to the commissioner to call upon the support of teams of independent investigators to help establish the facts; in the case of Lord Lester, I felt that aspects of the way in which the commissioner carried out her investigation were defective.

One aspect of the report gives me pause—here, I follow the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford—and that is the proposed change to Standing Orders so that a report of the discipline committee is put to a vote of the House without debate. I see the dilemma here. On the one hand, like others, I am anxious to avoid the House getting involved in distasteful debates and votes, as in the case of Lord Lester. On the other hand, it seems that to vote on a question without any opportunity for debate is to go through the formality of obtaining the House’s assent without any reality in the substance; it is, to coin a phrase, “a meaningless vote”. Therefore, like the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, I would prefer that the report of the disciplinary committee be subject to a take-note decision and not to a vote without debate.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Butler of Brockwell and Lord Campbell-Savours

Monday 19th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

In moving Amendment 2, I wish to speak also to Amendment 4, with which it is grouped. I hope that I can deal with this group of amendments shortly because the Minister, rather unusually, dealt with them in his response to the previous group of amendments and asked me to withdraw them, which I will do.

However, if I have a complaint against the Government, it is that I moved these two amendments in Committee, seeking that the Intelligence and Security Committee should be described as the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament to emphasise its role as a servant of Parliament rather than as a servant of the Executive. I also moved Amendment 4 in Committee, which seeks to confer privilege on the committee. On that occasion the Minister—the noble Lord, Lord Henley—spoke sympathetically in response to both amendments, as, indeed, has the Minister today. The noble Lord, Lord Henley, said on 9 July, some four months ago:

“Noble Lords will understand from what I have said that there is a degree of sympathy for both amendments, and particularly the first, but more work needs to be done”.—[Official Report, 9/7/12; col. 918.]

Four months have passed and it seems that the Government have not done that work and reached a conclusion in amendments that they could put before the House today. That is a pity.

These are probing amendments. The Minister has said again that he is sympathetic to the addition of the words “of Parliament”. A more substantial issue is Amendment 4, which seeks to confer privilege on the Intelligence and Security Committee. As has come out in the earlier debate, there are genuine difficulties about that. I acknowledge that in response to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. I understand that the clerks of the two Houses of Parliament see difficulty in extending parliamentary privilege in this way.

On behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee, I want to make it clear that the safeguards that are provided by parliamentary privilege are essential—not parliamentary privilege itself. Provided those safeguards can be in the Bill—in other words, the protection of witnesses and the protection of the proceedings of the committee from judicial intrusion or the Freedom of Information Act—that is equally satisfactory. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours expressed some doubts about that and the Minister, in reply, said that there were aspects to be considered. It seems to me that it cannot be impossible for those protections to be provided statutorily in the Bill. Provided that is done, I would not seek, nor would the Intelligence and Security Committee seek, to press Amendment 4. I hope to hear from the Minister, if he does not mind repeating himself a little, that the Government will seek to provide those protections that the Intelligence and Security Committee needs in an alternative way from that of privilege. I beg to move.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

I wish to intervene only very briefly, perhaps to rephrase the question about the ministerial certificate that I put during the course of my previous intervention. Is it true that the ministerial certificate could be overturned by a tribunal? Perhaps those in the Box can advise the Minister. If that is the case, it means that the responsibility has been transferred from the Executive to the tribunal, as against being transferred from the Executive to the Speaker. We should know whether that is the case.

If I am correct, the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, is suggesting that somehow that to which I am referring could be dealt with in the legislation whereby there would not be a right to challenge a ministerial certificate, as is the case with a Speaker’s certificate. When he talked about judicial intervention, perhaps he was referring specifically to that. As I understand the freedom of information legislation, it is not possible for a challenge to be mounted against a certificate granted by the Speaker. That is why I always felt that it was far better that the Speaker had that role, because the Speaker of the House of Commons would always uphold national security. It is inconceivable that a Speaker could not be trusted in these circumstances. It seemed to be being suggested that because this power was being transferred from the Executive to Parliament, it was placing something in jeopardy. On the contrary, I should have thought that the Speaker of the House of Commons—whoever that might be at any stage, now or in the future—could be thoroughly relied on to be as secure as the intelligence services themselves in protecting national security.

In one of his amendments, the noble Lord seeks to add the words “of Parliament”. Where we have a committee set up outside of Parliament—at arm’s length—are we saying that, in order to make it look as if it represents Parliament in some way, we simply tag “of Parliament” onto the end to give it the imprimatur of Parliament? As a concept, it is ridiculous and it abuses the institution. What other organisations or statutory bodies of such notable importance are going to be set up with these words simply added onto the end in order to give them some extra credibility? I am opposed to an amendment of that nature.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

My Lords, again I can speak quite briefly to the amendment, which provides that the chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee should be remunerated on a basis similar to that of chairs of Select Committees of the House of Commons.

I emphasise that the present chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee has not asked for this amendment to be brought forward. However, the members of the committee feel strongly that the chair has to do a large amount of work—as I am sure the noble Lord, Lord King, and the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, also did—and that it is an anomaly that, whereas other Members of the House of Commons who are chairs of Select Committees receive remuneration, the chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee does not.

As I understand it, the Government’s position is that this is, in these days, a matter for IPSA. However, I hope that they will be willing to put this issue to IPSA with their recommendation that it should consider it sympathetically. If the Minister is prepared to go as far as that, my colleagues and I on the Intelligence and Security Committee will be happy not to press the amendment.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, I vigorously support this amendment because it has always been my view that the chairman should be remunerated. I served under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, and he should have been remunerated, as indeed should my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton. However, what worries me a little is that the matter is to be left to IPSA. That is a very controversial proposition to put, not because IPSA is as unpopular in the Commons as we know it to be, but why should an organisation established to deal with parliamentary allowances and expenditure be required to deal with the expenditure of an outside body? This is the first body, but are we to presume that in the future IPSA will extend its tentacles to managing the financial arrangements of more bodies that are established under statute? Is this the beginning of the growth of IPSA into something even larger than the current organisation which is causing so much grief to Members of Parliament? I simply put the question. If a mechanism is to be found, perhaps I may suggest that IPSA is not the ideal organisation to proceed with this responsibility.

Railways: Franchises

Debate between Lord Butler of Brockwell and Lord Campbell-Savours

Tuesday 9th October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords—

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

My Lords, the chairman of the Public Accounts Committee has pointed out that since 2006 there have been eight separate Secretaries of State—more than one a year—and since 2001 there have been six different Permanent Secretaries at the department. In view of that, are the Government surprised when things go wrong in a department?

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Butler of Brockwell and Lord Campbell-Savours

Monday 9th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

My Lords, I will speak also to Amendment 2. These two amendments are in my name and that of my noble colleague on the Intelligence and Security Committee, the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, as well as those of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. I can introduce the amendments quite briefly, and I hope that we are pushing at an open door. It is, I think, common ground with the Government that the Intelligence and Security Committee will serve Parliament and the public better if it is made clear that it is indeed a committee of Parliament and not a creature of the Government. Since its creation in 1994 the committee has played an independent part, but because the committee is appointed by the Government, it has often been difficult to convince outside observers of its independence. I again pay tribute to the committee, as I did in my Second Reading speech to earlier members of the committee. It is now common ground that it has behaved in such a way that it has come of age and its independence and duty to Parliament can be made clear by adding the words that it is indeed a committee of Parliament. I hope that that is agreed with the Government.

Amendment 2 would have the effect that the Intelligence and Security Committee would enjoy the same rights and privileges as a departmental Select Committee in respect of having parliamentary privilege. Perhaps I may just explain that. Because the Intelligence and Security Committee is created by statute and is not a Select Committee of Parliament, it does not automatically receive the same rights and privileges as, for example, a departmental Select Committee. That is the purpose of writing in the Bill that it should have parliamentary privilege. This issue is important, because the committee’s work has to be conducted in confidence and those who give evidence to it, including not only the intelligence agencies but also others, must have confidence that the security of their evidence will be protected. This is necessary not only for future evidence but for past evidence, because in this litigious age there needs to be assurance that evidence previously given cannot be sought to be disclosed as evidence in any proceedings. To make that clear, this amendment proposes that privilege should apply to the proceedings of the Intelligence and Security Committee as it does to Select Committees of Parliament.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

Is there a precedent for this form of committee anywhere within the constitution?

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

There are indeed committees that are set up by statute. I can give the noble Lord three examples: the Ecclesiastical Committee of Parliament, the Public Accounts Commission and the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission. Those are all similar committees which have been set up by statute but are not Select Committees.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

My Lords, I wish to make a brief point. In doing so, I know that I risk being regarded by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, as the siren voice of cautious officialdom—or, in my case, cautious former officialdom. However, I want to raise a question on what the noble Lords, Lord Campbell-Savours and Lord Deben, said.

The argument of the noble Lord, Lord Deben, was that the badging of the security committee would be improved if it were called a Select Committee. I can see the case for that. I think we all agree that the ultimate purpose is that the public should have confidence in the committee’s scrutiny of the intelligence services. However, it was clear from the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, that if this were to be a Select Committee, it would have to be hedged around by a very large number of parliamentary resolutions, and that would have the same effect as the constraints that are written into the Bill. The question is: would that make it more convincing if it were a Select Committee when it was a Select Committee unlike any other because it would be so inhibited by those restraints?

They say that something which looks like a duck and quacks like a duck can be regarded as being a duck, but this would not look like or quack like a Select Committee; it would be something completely separate. I suspect that this might reduce, rather than increase, public confidence in it because people would see that it was a Select Committee that did not operate like any other Select Committee and could not really be regarded as a Select Committee in the true sense in which the public understand it.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

Could I draw attention again to the noble Lord’s own argument over privilege? The issue of privilege will not arise in the event that it is a full Select Committee because by definition it has everything that the noble Lord proposes in his amendments.

Procedure of the House (Proposal 3)

Debate between Lord Butler of Brockwell and Lord Campbell-Savours

Tuesday 8th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, the problem with that as a proposition is that it does not work. We have been arguing for that for the past 10 years. I can think of innumerable occasions where Members have sought to try to stop people asking long supplementary questions, but I can guarantee the House that tomorrow it will happen again, and that it will happen on Statements. It is because we simply do not enforce the rules of the House. It is a problem that this House will ultimately have to address.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

My Lords, I want simply to ask whether it is in the House’s power to arrange that the Question is printed on the television screen. That was exactly 25 words.