Fixed-term Parliaments Bill
Lord Butler of Brockwell Excerpts(13 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Butler of Brockwell
Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do insist on its Amendments 1, 2 and 9 and do disagree with the Commons in their Amendment 9C in lieu.”
Lord Butler of Brockwell
My Lords, I will not take up your Lordships’ time by repeating the arguments for the sunset clause which noble Lords passed on two occasions before the Summer Recess, except to say to the Minister that it was a novelty to hear him accuse me of reintroducing politicking. I have rather been against politicking in my career. He referred to what was said by your Lordships’ Constitution Committee in its report on the Bill. I should like to remind the House of that. The committee said that,
“the balance of evidence we heard”—
the committee heard evidence from a number of very distinguished academics—
“does not convince most of us that a strong enough case has yet been made for overturning an established constitutional practice and moving to fixed-term Parliaments”.
The effect of the sunset clause passed by the House on two occasions was to give future Parliaments the power to decide whether they wish to make a permanent change.
Your Lordships will know that when this House has insisted on an amendment, the other place has to come back with some sort of modification to a Bill to prevent it from being lost. My noble friends and I had hoped that we might use the time during the Summer Recess to reach a reasonable agreement with the Government on a modification to the Bill. In August, my noble friend Lord Pannick had a meeting with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, and Mr Harper, the Minister in the other place. My noble friend told the Ministers that, for our part, we would be happy to modify our amendment to meet criticisms that were made of it, including some of the criticisms made by the Minister tonight. Specifically, we said, first, that we would be content for a resolution to apply the legislation to be made only by the other place since it is the elected House. Secondly, we would be content for a time limit to be placed on the period within which such a resolution should be moved—within, say, three or six months of the meeting of a new Parliament. My noble friends and I were open to discussion on other aspects of the sunset provisions.
The Ministers made it clear that these modifications were not acceptable to them, but they put forward no proposals themselves. My noble friends and I then waited to see what modification the Government would propose. Last week, without any further consultation or notification, the Government put down in another place their modification to which the Minister has referred. That modification is now before us on the Marshalled List. It goes no way towards meeting the point made by noble Lords on two occasions. The key words of the modification are:
“The Prime Minister must make arrangements … for a committee to carry out a review of … this Act … Arrangements under subsection (4)(a) are to be made no earlier than 1 June 2020”.
As a former Cabinet Secretary, I have had experience of Governments fobbing people off by promising reviews that effectively kick issues into the long grass, but this is of a different order. Seriously, I have to say to the noble and learned Lord that if the Government’s amendment is intended to meet the point which your Lordships have legitimately made, it is an insult. It shows a contempt for your Lordships’ House and for the amendments we have passed.
There is still time to reach a reasonable agreement that will satisfy the point which this House has twice made, but I am afraid that this can happen only if noble Lords once more insist on the amendment and we can have sensible discussions. I beg to move.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell. Your Lordships will not want to hear lengthy Second Reading speeches at this stage, but it needs to be understood that because this House and the other place have disagreed twice, the Government are obliged either to accept our amendments, lose the Bill, or produce a variation—what Erskine May describes as “alternative proposals”. The procedure is designed to ensure that the Government and the Commons cannot simply ignore what we have decided. Your Lordships have heard what the Government have produced by way of alternative proposals: that there should be a committee which will not begin its consideration for another nine years. That is not so much kicking the issue into the long grass, the phrase used by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, as burying it in a time capsule. The authors of “Yes Minister” would have regarded it as lacking in credibility to suggest, even in a work of fiction, that a Minister should solve a problem by setting up a committee which would begin its work in nine years’ time.
The Minister suggested that there is some constitutional novelty in the provision approved by noble Lords, but many legislative provisions have attracted such a procedure: there is the need to consider each year whether to maintain the late and unlamented control order system; and Parliament requires that the Armed Forces Act be reconsidered every five years. The Minister suggested that the House should accept the views of the House of Commons and that we should go quietly into the night on this issue. He emphasised that we are a revising Chamber and that we cannot challenge the will of the elected House. But the relationship between this House and the other place depends on the other place and, indeed, the Government taking seriously the concerns we have expressed.
The response of the Government and the other place to our amendments is simply derisory, and it is intended to be so. The Commons and the Government are not listening to or engaging with your Lordships’ House, and I regret that. Just as the Government introduced this legislation without bothering to consult anyone or to adopt any pre-legislative scrutiny, they are now rejecting the views of this House without bothering to listen to and engage with us. We should ask the House of Commons to think again on this matter.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
That is not the case, as we know. I was making the point that this Parliament was not elected as a fixed-term Parliament. I am sure if the noble Baroness thinks about it, she will appreciate this. The arguments, I recall, when we debated the benefits of four or five years and whether it would affect the legislative plan of Governments coming into office, were that this would not happen with this Parliament, as that was not the basis on which it was elected. I am saying that you really need the experience of a full fixed-term Parliament to see whether the claims that have been made for it have been borne out. Therefore there is no way that is disrespectful—it is the only time you can have a meaningful post-legislative review, unless you are simply going to have an academic one rather than one based properly on experience.
I say again that I believe that this House has made an important contribution to this Bill and that its shape—in particular the trigger mechanisms for an early election—is vastly better because of the debates that we had. This Government are prepared to listen and have shown their willingness to do so. However, we cannot agree to something that we believe actually goes to the heart of the Bill and undermines one of its central purposes. For that reason, we cannot agree with the Motion as proposed, but we believe that it is proper and right to have a proper post-legislative review; one which, if the fixed-term Parliaments take their normal course, would have to be started within just over one month after the election or no later than six months after that. There is a set time limit under which the Prime Minister would have to make the necessary arrangements. On that basis, I commend that amendment in lieu to the House.
Lord Butler of Brockwell
I thank those who have taken part in this debate. I particularly say to the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, that of course I accept that this is a disagreement—a disagreement on a very important constitutional matter, on which, I think, everybody agrees there has not been the normal preparation for a major change on a constitutional matter. That is the argument for allowing a sunrise clause, which will allow the next Parliament to take a view, in the light of further deliberation, consideration and consultation, and, indeed, of experience. Those who read the debate in the House of Commons last week will know that there are views on both sides of that House on this matter. As has been said, both on the government and the opposition side, there is concern about, and opposition to, the Bill as it stands.
The noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, said, in his very eloquent way, that the House of Lords never has to give way to this Bill, strictly speaking, because it is not covered by the Parliament Act. I sincerely hope that it does not come to that but, in the House of Commons debate last week, it was a Conservative Member who—making the point that the Bill is not covered by the Parliament Act—said that the House of Lords can hold out indefinitely if necessary. I am not arguing for that at all but would like to have the sort of serious discussions with the Government on a serious constitutional matter that so far—I am sorry to say—the Government have not been prepared to have. In the House of Commons last week, the Labour spokesman said of the Member who pointed to the effect of the Parliament Act:
“The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right: your lordships, stand firm”.—[Official Report, Commons, 8/9/11; col. 592.]
I very much hope that the House of Lords tonight will stand firm, with a view to enabling meaningful discussions with the Government on this important constitutional matter. I beg to test the opinion of the House.
Fixed-term Parliaments Bill
Lord Butler of Brockwell Excerpts(13 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Butler of Brockwell
As an amendment to Motion A, leave out from “House” to end and insert “do insist on its Amendments 1, 2 and 9”.
Lord Butler of Brockwell
My Lords, in the absence of my noble friend Lord Pannick, but with his support, it falls to me to urge your Lordships to cause the Government to think again about these amendments which this House passed to the Bill. My noble friend asks me to express his regret that other unavoidable business prevented him being here today.
The amendment which your Lordships passed would give the next Parliament and subsequent Parliaments the opportunity to decide whether the provisions of this Bill, subjecting them to a fixed term, should apply to them. It does not nullify the Bill. It merely gives future Parliaments the right to disapply it without having to go to the lengths of repealing it.
In essence, the case for your Lordships’ amendment is that a permanent constitutional change to fixed-term Parliaments should not be made without more preparation and consultation than this Bill has had. In the substantial debate in the other place last week, thoughtful individuals in both the main political parties both spoke and voted for your Lordships’ amendment. A Conservative Member described the Bill as a “reckless” constitutional act,
“on the back of an envelope”.—[Official Report, Commons, 13/7/11; col. 375.]
A Labour Member, perhaps better versed in the vernacular, described it as tinkering with the constitution,
“on the back of a fag packet”.—[Official Report, Commons, 13/7/11; col. 373.]
As for those who argue, as the Minister did today, that it would be open to a future Government who disagreed with the provisions to repeal the Act, the Minister in the other place gave the game away. He asked, if the Bill became law and fixed-term Parliaments became the norm,
“would any Minister realistically be able to come to the Dispatch Box and suggest with a straight face that we should change the position and give the power back to the Prime Minister to hold an election at a time of his choosing to suit his political party? Would anyone take that proposition seriously? I suggest that they would not”.—[Official Report, Commons, 13/7/11; col. 361.]
So it is clear that the Government intend that this should be a permanent change to the constitution.
The main case advanced by the Government for the legislation—what the Minister called today the “fundamental justification”—is based on a fallacy. I do not doubt the sincerity of those who argue for it, but it is a fallacy none the less. It is that the power of a Prime Minister to seek a dissolution at a time of his or her choosing gives the governing party an unfair political advantage. The Minister went so far today as to describe it as a “trump card”. In the real world, the Prime Minister’s room for manoeuvre is heavily constrained. In normal times, and with a workable parliamentary majority, it is simply not practical politics for a Prime Minister to call an election in the first, second, third or even fourth year of a parliament. It is true that the fifth year becomes open season for elections and Prime Ministers often seek a dissolution before the last moment in order not to be at the mercy of events, but the practical advantage this gives is very limited—it is far short of a trump card. Even the proponents of the Bill accept that there should be some flexibility in the fifth year to allow for unforeseen events such as the BSE epidemic.
It follows that it will be only in exceptional circumstances that a Prime Minister will seek a dissolution in the first, second, third or fourth year of a parliament. As the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, pointed out in our earlier debates, history shows that these occasions are never dictated merely by political advantage. In 1966 and 1974, general elections were called in the second and first years of the parliaments respectively in the circumstances of a growing economic crisis when the Government did not have a sufficient majority to deal with it. In 1974, a general election was called in the midst of a miners’ strike when the incumbent Government had exhausted their means of resolving the strike. Can it be denied in these circumstances that it was in the national interest rather than in the Governments’ political interest that the Governments should seek a reinforced mandate to deal with these national crises?
In such circumstances, what would have been the effect of this Bill? The Government would have had to rely on the Opposition’s support to obtain a dissolution. Proponents of the Bill may say that, in practice, general elections would always be available in such circumstances because Oppositions would never deny themselves the opportunity to throw the Government out. In that case, the legislation is pointless. However, let us suppose that they have a point, that there would be circumstances in which a Government would want a reinforced mandate to deal with a national crisis and the Opposition, for whatever reason—shortage of party funds or whatever—denied them the 75 per cent majority necessary for a dissolution. Would that be in the national interest? Can it be right that in such circumstances the Government should be dependent upon their political opponents in seeking a fresh mandate from the people? The purpose of this constitutional change is misconceived.
A further argument used by the Minister in another place, over several columns of Hansard—although I noticed that the Minister made only a glancing reference to it today—was that because a decision to reapply the provisions of the Bill would require a resolution of both Houses, your Lordships could deny an elected House of Commons the right to apply the Bill and thus undermine the supremacy of the elected House. To my mind, it is appropriate that, if a law is to be reapplied, it is constitutionally right that it should be reapplied by both Houses of Parliament. I find it inconceivable that in a future Parliament, if the newly elected House of Commons voted for a fixed-term Parliament, your Lordships would overturn that decision. The fact that the Minister relied so much in this argument on another place illustrates, to my mind, the weakness of the Government’s arguments against the amendment.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, the answer is the same to both parts of my noble friend’s question. On the position in February 1974, which has been raised in the debate, if the Conservative Prime Minister of the day believed that it was necessary for an election, it is beggaring belief to suggest that the Labour Party would not also have agreed to an election and that the 75 per cent majority for a dissolution would not have been achieved. This does not mean absolute job security for five years because, if a Government lose confidence, the Bill contains within it mechanisms which can lead to an election. This can also happen if there is an agreement—as I believe would have been the case in March 1979. The then Prime Minister, Mr James Callaghan, could have said that he had lost a vote of confidence and that the following day he would table a Motion for dissolution, which I am sure would have been overwhelmingly carried by more than the majority required under the Bill. To suggest that he would have had to go scrabbling around trying to find a means of living on until October would not have been the case. There are mechanisms in the Bill to deal with that kind of situation.
I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Butler, sought to dismiss the suggestion that there could not be tensions between the two Chambers, although I do not think that he actually denied that that was a possibility. However, he did say that this House would not stand in the way of a newly elected Government who sought to establish a fixed-term Parliament. Part of the problem with the noble Lord’s answer, apart from suggesting that this House might simply rubber-stamp the Bill—heaven forbid—is that the amendment does not say that the resolution would be brought forward by a newly elected Government. It actually says that it would have to be brought forward at some time during the Parliament. Therefore it might be brought forward some years into the Parliament. At that point, who is to say that this House might not think that they were at it at the other end, bringing forward the resolution for partisan advantage? This House might take a different view about that in those circumstances. Therefore it does change the balance.
My noble friend Lord Forsyth asked whether this does not parallel the position in the Parliament Act when Parliament was extending the lifetime of a Parliament. The point is that the exception in Section 2 of the 1911 Act is to,
“a Bill containing any provision to extend the maximum duration of Parliament beyond five years”.
There is a crucial difference between a Bill that extends a Parliament beyond five years and a resolution as to whether there should be a fixed-term Parliament. In that respect, it is not proper that this House should be given a veto in these circumstances.
I have already indicated that this course can be revived in each succeeding Parliament. It is not just a case of seeing how the Parliament from 2010 to 2015 would go. It may not happen under the amendment here—there may not be a fixed-term from 2015 to whenever—but it could be revived in the following Parliament. It is another unsettling uncertainty about this Bill that it can switch on and off fundamentally important constitutional proceedings.
There has been considerable debate on this Bill. As I indicated, it was introduced a year ago this week. It had its Second Reading in another place in September last year, extra time was made available in Committee, and Report and Third Reading in the other place took place in January. In your Lordships’ House, the Bill was introduced in January, Second Reading took place in March, the Committee sat on three days in March, Report was heard on two days in May and Third Reading also took place in May. It has been very fully debated. I note that the noble Baroness, the chair of the Constitution Committee, referred to the committee’s report on the process of constitutional change, which I believe was published overnight. One of the conclusions was as follows:
“We stress the importance of proper parliamentary scrutiny of all bills”—
and this Bill has been subject to considerable parliamentary scrutiny for a Bill of only seven clauses and one schedule—
“but we do not recommend that any new parliamentary procedures such as super-majorities should apply to significant constitutional bills”.
I cannot think of any more noted significant new parliamentary procedure than the one that is promoted by this amendment. If the Constitution Committee is sceptical about using new parliamentary procedures with regard to even very sensitive and important constitutional Bills, this is one about which we certainly should be very sceptical. I do not believe the view of the noble Lord, Lord Butler, that we are doing a service to the constitution by saying that we do not have to go to the length of repealing. Repealing is what we do if we do not like legislation that was passed by previous Parliaments. If we depart from that principle on a matter of constitutional importance, I believe we should only do so with very great caution. I would urge your Lordships not to insist on the amendment because I do not believe that the case has been made for such a serious constitutional departure.
Lord Butler of Brockwell
My Lords, I agree that this has been a very good debate. I do not need to go over the arguments again except perhaps to assure the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, that, like Mark Twain’s death, reports of the advantage to a Prime Minister of being able to decide when to call an election in the last year are greatly exaggerated. Certainly such reports did not prevent the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher, from packing her bags on the morning of a general election in preparation for the election not going the way she expected.
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, who spoke about the report from your Lordships’ Select Committee on the Constitution. The Minister quoted one of its conclusions in his last remarks, but I would like to quote the two main conclusions. The Minister said that the Select Committee on the constitution in another place endorsed the proposal, but I shall quote what your Lordships’ committee said. If I may say so, your Lordships’ committee contains distinguished constitutional lawyers from all parties, who trump those who are members of the constitution committee in another place. They said:
“We take the view that the origins and contents of this Bill owe more to short-term considerations than to a mature assessment of enduring constitutional principles or sustained public demand”.
The committee continued by saying that,
“the balance of the evidence we heard does not convince most of us that a strong enough case has yet been made for overturning an established constitutional practice and moving to fixed-term Parliaments”.
There could hardly be two more damaging sentences.
Our national constitution is too important to be tinkered with as a bargaining chip in the negotiations of a temporary coalition. The British people have decisively prevented that from happening to the voting system for the House of Commons. They are not to be given a chance to express a view on this constitutional change, so it falls to your Lordships to insist that the Government and the House of Commons refrain from making a permanent change and give future Parliaments and Governments the opportunity to make these decisions for themselves. I would like to seek the opinion of the House.
Fixed-term Parliaments Bill
Lord Butler of Brockwell Excerpts(13 years, 6 months ago)
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Lord Armstrong of Ilminster
My Lords, I hope that the House will forgive me. I have to chair a committee upstairs at 4 pm so I rise perhaps a little prematurely to commend to your Lordships my Amendment 22ZB. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has already described what the amendment is intended to do; I do not need to repeat that, as he did so better than I could do myself. It loses the Speaker and the 14 days. It lays down precisely what is to happen if there is a vote of no confidence, and lays upon the Prime Minister the first duty to seek a dissolution of Parliament in the event of a vote of no confidence being passed. It defines with clarity what shall be regarded as a vote of no confidence for the purpose of triggering that Motion. That seems to be clear, simple and practicable. I strongly commend it to your Lordships as a way of resolving these problems in a simple and clear way and establishing a sensible procedure for the duration of the Bill if it becomes an Act.
Lord Butler of Brockwell
My Lords, I raise one question with my noble friend about his amendment. Under subsection (2)(a) of the proposed new clause, the Prime Minister would be bound to submit to Her Majesty a request for a proclamation leading to a general election if the Queen’s Speech had been rejected. Would not that go against what happened in 1924, when there was indeed a defeat on the Queen’s Speech, but one which had been expected, and an alternative Government was then appointed? Would it not be regrettable to make it inevitable that there should be a general election in a circumstance such as that?
Fixed-term Parliaments Bill
Lord Butler of Brockwell Excerpts(13 years, 6 months ago)
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Lord Cormack
My Lords, not for the first time today I find myself very much in sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Grocott. I cannot say that I share his aspirations regarding a future Labour Government, but apart from that, he has spoken very persuasively and sensibly, as he always does. The noble Lord is a constitutionalist and thus, in the constitutional sense, a true conservative. As I listened to him, I thought of my dear friend, the late, great Jack Weatherill. He used to say, “I am all in favour of progress so long as it does not mean change”. I think that Members from all sides of the House to some degree view this Bill in that spirit. I have never been totally opposed to the concept of fixed-term Parliaments, and indeed I made that plain in my maiden speech. But I must say that the more I have heard of the debates as they have gone along, the more I am convinced, as I said earlier today, that this is unnecessary legislation which is taking up a lot of our time and need not do so.
Some exceptionally distinguished Cross-Benchers—I pay tribute to them all, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, a former Speaker of the House who has unparalleled experience—have put down an amendment that, in a sense, saves us from ourselves. It is a wise and sensible amendment in the best traditions of this House because it accepts, however reluctantly, that it is the will of the Government to have a fixed-term Parliament Bill. I have never for a moment challenged the right of a Government to serve for five years and have said repeatedly that I applaud that desire. I do not think that this legislation is necessary for it, but I applaud the desire. I am pleased to support the coalition Government and I hope that they do survive for five years. I hope that, as the years go by, they become more and more politically mature, less and less bent on messing up the constitution, and then more and more inclined to concentrate on those issues which truly concern the people of this country, wherever they may live.
What the amendment does is recognise the right of the Government to do what they are seeking to do, but enshrines in the legislation one of the principles of our unwritten constitution, which is the right of every new Parliament to determine which way it will go. That does not in any way inhibit future Governments. If, after the next general election, there is a majority Conservative Administration, which I personally would like to see, or a majority Labour Administration, which the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, would understandably like to see, it matters not. If the Government wish to continue with the fixed five-year term, they can do so, but they have got to say to Parliament, “Let us look at this”, as one of their very first acts after the election.
I can imagine that in 1974, because I was there, it would have been difficult for Prime Minister Harold Wilson to have got through the necessary clause to create a five-year Parliament. I am exceptionally sorry, of course, that that would have prevented the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, or Paul Tyler as he was then, serving out the five years which he had hoped to serve, but to have a Government with a tiny majority or, in that case, no majority at all, enshrined for five years would have been a legislative and constitutional nonsense. Of course, Harold Wilson had the right to go to the Palace in the late summer/early autumn of that year, to ask for Dissolution and to have another general election, which had as a catastrophic by-product the loss of the services of the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, but was nevertheless the right thing constitutionally to do.
All that this amendment does is to recognise reality and it ought to command a degree of support from those of us in all parts of the House who truly treasure our constitution. I said earlier today that it is the most important part of our democratic heritage. The Government are not damaging it irrevocably by producing this Bill, but we are putting in a safety clause. We are giving an opportunity for future Parliaments not automatically to be saddled with this but to have to face up to the question: do we want it? I was delighted that my noble friend Lord Hamilton made the brief and telling speech that he did. I think that he spoke for many who share our views and our prejudices—because we all have them. This is an amendment which ought to commend itself to my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace, for whom I have a genuine regard and who has always handled matters in this House extremely sensitively and considerately. I hope that he will say that he can commend the amendment, just as he has put his name to another amendment lower down the Marshalled List.
The amendment paves the way for the important debates next week when we have to decide the circumstances in which an early election can be called, all of us having recognised that there must be a proper, comprehensible and simply expressed formula which can provide for that. For the moment, we are dealing with this amendment and it should command widespread support.
Lord Butler of Brockwell
My Lords, I and, I am sure, my noble friends are very grateful for the generous things which have been said about this amendment. They have been said so well that I need speak only briefly, but I hope that brevity will not disguise from your Lordships the constitutional importance of the principle which underlies the amendment.
I do not question or doubt for a moment the sincerity of the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, and his colleagues who believe in a fixed-term Parliament. I do not agree with them, largely for the reasons that were so well put by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, because there are circumstances in which it is in the national interest for a Prime Minister to seek an early general election and a new mandate. The circumstances which the noble Lord described bear that out. I simply do not think that it is true that all Prime Ministers who go for an early election do so for their party advantage. There are very often national circumstances, as there certainly were in my experience, which make that desirable.
Perhaps I may state some propositions on which I think we can all agree. The first is that to go from flexible-term Parliaments to an arrangement for fixed-term Parliaments is a constitutional change. As the noble Lord, Lord Owen, said, it is a major constitutional change; arguably, it is more important than the change to the alternative vote system on which the country had a referendum. Secondly, I think that it is unarguable that the Government do not have a mandate for this proposition. It was in the coalition agreement, but it was not in the Conservative Party manifesto and it is not something on which the public voted at the last general election. Thirdly, as was said, there has been no pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill. It has been introduced very quickly; I think that one could say that aspects of it were not properly thought out. That is not the way that a major constitutional change of this sort ought to be introduced.
As has been said, the Government have a perfect right to commit themselves to a fixed term for the present Parliament, provided that they continue to maintain the confidence of the House of Commons. As the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, and others have said, it is not necessary to have legislation for that purpose, but if the Government want such legislation, to bind themselves with hoops of iron, I regard that as their business; I do not challenge it. What I do challenge is their right by making a permanent constitutional change to bind future Parliaments. Certainly, they do not have the right to make a permanent change to our constitution to meet the convenience of a temporary coalition.
As has been said, this amendment seeks to deal with this situation in a reasonable way. It does not defeat the Bill. It allows it to apply to the present Parliament, which is the Government’s wish. It allows the legislation to remain on the statute book in case a future Government or coalition wish to bind themselves similarly. However, while giving a future Parliament that choice, it avoids a permanent change to our constitution. I urge noble Lords in all parts of the House, whether they agree with a fixed-term Parliament or not, to uphold the principle that we do not make permanent changes to our constitution without more consideration than has been given in this instance and that we do allow future Parliaments to apply this legislation to themselves if they choose it.
Lord Butler of Brockwell
Since it is agreed that the legislation is not necessary to bind the present Government, what purpose can it possibly have except to bind future Governments?
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, that is an important point, but the answer is that if you legislate on the principle, as this Bill when an Act will seek to do, the electorate will be entitled to know what it is voting for at any election. Will it get a fixed-term Parliament unless the legislation is amended or repealed, or will the Government and the Prime Minister retain the right to choose when to go to the country? If the Government decide to repeal the legislation or amend it, they are likely to put that in their manifesto. On the basis of these amendments, the Government will have the right after the election to determine what the electorate has given them. That, in my respectful submission, is wrong in principle.
Furthermore, the amendments are inconsistent with the Parliament Act 1911. By that Act, the House of Commons can insist on legislation that does not extend the life of a Parliament and this does not extend the life of a Parliament, with the exception of the possible two-month extension, and we do not know what will happen to that. This House can only delay legislation. By these amendments, because of the provision for a resolution of both Houses, the power of this House would be there to deny passage to a resolution that the House of Commons wished to pass. That again is contrary to the principle and militates against these amendments.
The so-called sunrise clause in Amendment 25 would cause chaos. By way of example, under Amendment 25, the schedule would come into force only to the end of the first meeting of the next Parliament, but that schedule is the one that would repeal the Septennial Act 1715 among other things. Would that suddenly come back into force after the next election?
The amendments are understated in their presentation. They hand straight back to the Prime Minister and the Government of the day, with no need for legislation, the power to choose the timing of the next election. That is the answer to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, when she intervened on my noble friend Lord Tyler.
Fixed-term Parliaments Bill
Lord Butler of Brockwell Excerpts(13 years, 8 months ago)
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Lord Howarth of Newport
My Lords, if we are to have a fixed-term Parliament, and I believe that we should not, we will do less damage if we fix it at four years rather than at five. I rather agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and with my noble friend Lord Wills that there is little advantage to be gained when we are considering how to reform our own constitution, which has grown out of our distinctive political and constitutional tradition, in looking over the way to see how such matters are organised in other countries. I do not think that when de Tocqueville engaged in such an exercise he was intellectually desperate; it was quite a fruitful exercise. It is worth noting that there is no advanced country with which we can sensibly be compared that fixes the terms of its Parliament for as long a period as five years. France has a fixed term of five years, but it has presidential government; Italy has a fixed term of five years, but Italy is a byword for governmental instability; Malta and Luxembourg have fixed five-year terms, but we cannot sensibly compare ourselves to them. I do not think that there is an advanced democracy abroad which sets the term of its Parliament at five years which should encourage us. If we look inwards at our own affairs, we should remind ourselves that the terms of the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly are set at four years. It is therefore incumbent upon the Government to explain why they have taken such an eccentric view. It is all the more so because setting the term at five years, notwithstanding what the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, said, seems to be at odds with the principles that the Liberal Democrats have professed.
If we fix the term of Parliament, for whatever duration, we insulate Members of Parliament and, significantly, Ministers from public opinion. The longer the term, the worse that effect; the shorter the term, the more accountability and democratic engagement are brought into play. In the light of all the professions that the Deputy Prime Minister has made about the whole thrust of the constitutional reforms being brought forward by the coalition Government being to improve accountability and democratic engagement, it seems very odd that they should have decided on five years rather than four. It was Mr Mark Harper, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, when he was giving evidence to your Lordships Select Committee on the Constitution, who used the phrase, “it is an issue of judgment”. It should not perhaps surprise us very much that the judgment that the Government took was that which best suited the political interest of the coalition parties. I hope that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, will be able to persuade us that the Government have some better reason.
Lord Butler of Brockwell
My Lords, I decided to intervene briefly in this debate because I felt that the arguments advanced by my noble friend Lord Armstrong at Second Reading had not been given voice and because he was not in his place. He now is in his place and I think that he could put them a lot better than I can. They have been referred to, but I should like to reinforce them.
Like other noble Lords, I do not like this Bill. It is an unnecessary Bill. As the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said, if the Government had wanted to commit themselves to a five-year Parliament, they could have done that under the old legislation. For that reason, as the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, said, this is not a Bill that binds the present Government so much as it does future Governments. There has been a lot of speculation in the debate about the Government’s motives for what they have done. I do not want to enter into that, because I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, that what this House should do is decide on principle what is better for the country. On that issue, I come down in favour of the view expressed by my noble friend Lord Armstrong at Second Reading. I do so for a reason which I am sure will be dismissed as a Sir Humphrey-esque argument, as a bureaucrat’s argument, but I am not ashamed of that. Those of us who have seen government from the inside—the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, made this point, rather unexpectedly from my point of view, but from a political perspective—have reason to put to the House that too frequent elections are not good for the government of the country. Terrible things are done in the lead-up to a general election. Decisions are put off or are made in budgets which are designed to attract voters and are not in the interests of the country. For example, it will be in your Lordships’ memory that the Personal Care at Home Bill, which was introduced by the previous Government before the general election, was a blatant piece of electioneering. I made the point then that, in the economic conditions of the country, it was irresponsible to the highest degree. So to have elections more often than we need to have is not in the best interests of government.
Some people may say that I am against democracy, but that would be unfair. Of course there have to be elections. However, if there is a choice between every four years or five years, I would argue in favour of a five-year term.
Lord Lloyd of Berwick
Can the noble Lord comment on the point that all the experts who gave evidence, both in the House of Lords committee and in the House of Commons, came down in favour of four years? These were experts on our constitution, both in law and in practice.
Lord Butler of Brockwell
I should like to comment on that because the experts were, for the most part, either politicians or distinguished academics; they were not people who had seen government from the inside. That is why I am anxious to express this alternative point of view.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
First, a number of the politicians had been Ministers. Does the noble Lord regard that as government from the inside—or were they kept from the inside by Sir Humphrey on a regular basis? Secondly, on the basis of the argument he has made, if the noble Lord was given a choice between five and six years, I assume he would choose six years because there would be even less wearisome elections then.
Lord Butler of Brockwell
A balance has to be struck and I would strike it at five years.
On the previous day in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, urged a referendum on the question of the day of the week that polling should take place. In his speech today, he did not urge a referendum on going to a four-year term, which is a greater constitutional change than a change in the day of the week for voting.
Lord Grocott
My Lords, it is precisely the same issue. This is about whether the election should be every four years or five years—I am happy to accept that there may be failings in the wording of the amendment—but the principle is exactly the same: it is to enable the electorate to choose between whether the term of a Parliament should be five years or four years.
Lord Butler of Brockwell
I take it that, if the amendment is passed, the noble Lord would also want a referendum on the question of whether a fixed-term Parliament should be for four or five years.
Lord Butler of Brockwell
Thank you. That makes my point. It has been argued that the merit of a four-year term is that it gives the electorate more ability to hold the Government to account because they can do so more frequently. People like us and experts on government argue about what is good for the people and what the people want. If this was put to a referendum, I doubt whether there would be popular support for four-year rather than five-year terms. Elections are not very popular in this country; people do not like having their television dominated by politics for five or six weeks at a time. One of the arguments in favour of a four-year term is that we are giving the public what we think they ought to want, but I doubt they want it themselves.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
He might have been, but I would not rely on anybody whose point of principle—this one was adopted for years by the Liberal Democrats—evaporates in the course of one sentence in a negotiation. Say that it is a compromise or a deal done to benefit the country, but do not say that it is a point of principle which switched in the course of negotiations. That is the weakness of the argument, in my respectful submission, that the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, was making.
The noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, made an impressive speech. I have never heard statistics more blatantly abused than by him. Perhaps I might draw attention to two particular points. First, he chose his starting point as October 1974 to ignore the February to October 1974 point, as he explained. Secondly, the difficulty with the fact that there was one election where the date was forced upon the Prime Minister by a Motion of no confidence was simply obliterated from his mind completely, so that he focused only on 1978. What he said was accurate in that, obviously, in choosing the date that they have for elections Prime Ministers are motivated by the chances of winning. That is the basic reason why one has a fixed-term Parliament but it does not really assist in determining between four and five years.
The speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, was the most admirable. I say that genuinely, having worked with him. He was the Cabinet Secretary in 1997 when we took power and, having seen the talent of the noble Lord, I can genuinely understand how he would find the elected politicians quite wearisome to start with, particularly when they come into power with no experience of any sort of government. If I were him, I would have the least often elections as possible but, as people have made the point, this debate is just as much about accountability as about stable government. The reason that the Bill is being brought forward—this is the Government’s defence—is because the public are fed up with the politicians and want more accountability and more mechanisms to have control over them. The idea that you do that by extending the length of a Parliament, which is the effect of this, seems, with the greatest respect, to be nonsense. Nothing could be better designed to reduce confidence in government than the disingenuous explanations that have been put forward for the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill in the course of this debate. I will withdraw my amendment, but it will be back. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Butler of Brockwell
Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, since he had a go at me, can he quote one piece of evidence that the public generally want four-year elections?
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
Can the noble Lord quote one bit of evidence in favour of five years? I suspect that the public have no view on whether it should be four years or five; it is for us to judge.
Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill
Lord Butler of Brockwell Excerpts(13 years, 9 months ago)
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Lord Butler of Brockwell
My Lords, perhaps I may ask the Minister to address one point which is material to the issue. He said that the 10 per cent margin—5 per cent each way—would make it unnecessary to break up any ward in an existing constituency. If that is the case, the risk that one would need greater flexibility than the 5 per cent is either non-existent or very materially reduced. Can he clarify that point? It is relevant to whether we need the extra flexibility provided by the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
Lord Desai
My Lords, the Government have asked the Boundary Commission to fit 597 out of 600 seats within a 5 per cent margin either way. I have tried to argue before that, in terms of statistical distributions, this will be an immensely difficult task because a standard deviation of 1.7 per cent is too small.
If the Boundary Commission were allowed to fix 95 per cent of the seats within the Government’s favoured margin of 5 per cent and the remaining 5 per cent of seats—30, perhaps 25, seats—were allowed to fall under the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, it would make the tasks of the Boundary Commission and the Government simpler. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has not tried to subvert anything the Government want to do; he has been very helpful in making it much easier for the Government to achieve what they want to achieve. Otherwise it will be very difficult to carry out the task.