(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Dunlop. That was a thoughtful contribution, and I hope the Government will reflect on it, because it is in the interests of both the Government and the future of the United Kingdom that that kind of approach is thought through.
I speak in support of the amendment, which I contend is a constructive approach to maintaining trust in the existing devolution settlements, which are strained, and establishing a consensual way forward. I believe it is consistent with the report of this House’s Constitution Committee, which, along with others, has questioned the need for the Bill at all—a point that has been mentioned by a number of speakers. Very late in the day, it appears that some in this Government show signs of a growing awareness of the dangerous game they are playing with the devolution settlements and the implications for the future of the United Kingdom. The question arises why the Government are in such a hurry to get this through with totally inadequate consultation with business or the devolved Administrations. The Minister’s claims of business support during Second Reading was, frankly, extremely thin.
The devolved Administrations are, as has been said, opposed to the Bill as it stands, and amendments have been tabled on their behalf on a cross-party basis. When challenged as to why the powers in the Bill are needed, the Government’s responses are wholly unconvincing. From everything I have seen and heard, the Bill appears to be a solution looking for a problem. When Ministers airily suggest, for example, that Scotch whisky distillers may be prevented from buying malting barley from England, without any shred of evidence, they refer to different building standards, apparently in ignorance of the fact that Scotland has different standards that well predate devolution.
Given the flimsiness of the Government’s case and knowing what we do about the high-handed, centralising, cavalier approach of the Government, we are surely entitled to be suspicious about their intentions. After all, as the noble Lord, Lord Dunlop, pointed out, three years ago it was possible to set out in a communique the principles and approach behind the common frameworks process. The language is detailed and consensual. Specifically, the communique setting out the common frameworks describes the objective as enabling the function of the UK internal market while acknowledging policy divergence. It further stated that the devolution settlement should be respected and frameworks will
“be based on the established conventions and practices, including that the competence of the devolved institutions will not normally be adjusted without their consent.”
This approach and language are entirely missing from the Bill, so the question to the Minister is not only why the Bill is needed, but, even if that case can be made, why the hurry? More pertinently, having rejected letting common frameworks take all the strain, can the Minister explain why the eminently sensible and constructive approach of the common frameworks is not incorporated into the Bill, as I hope subsequent amendments will allow it to be? We will return to that.
That said, there remains a flaw in the common frameworks approach, which must be addressed and attached to the Bill if it goes forward, and it is identified in this amendment. It is that the devolved Administrations must be fully involved throughout the process and represented in the institutions that progress the frameworks. The proposals for the office for the internal market to be incorporated into the Competition and Markets Authority has been widely criticised. First, the CMA has a dedicated and reserved function, and there is no provision for the devolved Administrations to be represented, but they surely must be represented on the OIM or a better alternative.
As has again been commented on, so far, the common frameworks are progressing with all the appearance of a high degree of consensus and the dispute mechanism has not been called into play. It might be thought that, given the constructive, consensual approach to date, the likelihood is that if dispute resolution reached the apex, it would be accepted. However, it would not be satisfactory as it stands, and certainly not fit for purpose in relation to this Bill. The weakness is that as a dispute escalates, first to Ministers of the devolved Administrations, which includes UK Ministers acting for England, the final resolution lies with UK Ministers. The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, was concerned that the devolved Administrations might be the cause of delay, but I fear she underestimates the resentment of UK English Ministers overruling the devolved territories. That, I suspect, sadly helps explain the rather smug responses from UK Ministers: devolved Administrations may huff and puff, but UK Ministers can blow their houses down.
The Government have quoted examples from abroad to justify their approach but, ironically, they are mostly drawn from countries with properly established federal constitutions, notably Australia and Canada, where state and provincial governments’ views are fully involved in decision-making. In the case of Australia, a two-thirds qualified majority is required.
According to weekend reports, Michael Gove is establishing a unit to combat the SNP and its pressure for independence. I certainly believe that the largely unchallenged fantasy and lies which are fuelling the case for independence that would be so disruptive and damaging on a disastrous scale on top of Brexit and post-Covid recovery need to be challenged, but Mr Gove should have enlightened his colleagues that in its present form, the Bill will make his task almost impossible. Amendment 4 would greatly help him by delaying implementation of Parts 1 to 4 until an agreed approach is confirmed.
As the party with the deepest commitment of any to home rule—we battled for it for over a century—Liberal Democrats are determined to protect the devolution settlement against a centralising government in London and the separatist thrust of the SNP. Scotland’s best interests lie in using the powers that have been secured, ensuring they are not eroded and gaining a positive relationship with the other devolved Administrations and the UK Government. As we rebuild after a botched Brexit and a mishandled Covid-19 crisis, businesses do not need further disruption over constitutional arguments.
With the mechanisms in place and goodwill to seek the best for Scotland, the devolved territories and the UK, confidence can be restored. Ideally, the Government should abandon this Bill, which is at best premature and probably unnecessary but, so long as they push ahead, Liberal Democrats will push to secure this responsible and constructive amendment and save us from an unwanted and unnecessary constitutional crisis. Surely we have had enough disruption for one year—or even 10.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend. Amendment 4 was ably moved by my noble friend Lord Fox, and I want to outline some further considerations based on principles and on practical considerations.
I start by reflecting on the important contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Dunlop. I first met the noble Lord when he was the adviser to Prime Minister David Cameron in Downing Street and I was chair of the cross-party Devo Plus group in Scotland, which was arguing for enhanced powers for the Scottish Parliament, which subsequently came into legislation with the Scotland Act 2016. The noble Lord considered our proposals carefully, he has been a very thoughtful contributor to our debates and I look forward to the conclusions of his review on intergovernmental relations. The fact that he has asked for a degree of pause on what could be considered a constitutional rush is important and should be taken seriously. If despite his wise counsel and the thrust of the amendment—which has been tabled sincerely—the Government insist on moving forward on their current trajectory and in their current manner, it will be the first time in a quarter of a century that a major constitutional change will have been imposed on the nations without any form of public or parliamentary consent. That will not serve the start of a new functioning internal market well. The principle of consent is therefore not a theoretical argument; it is important at the political level for those of us who believe strongly in the continued functioning of the United Kingdom and its internal market.
That is in stark contrast with the following groups that we will be considering, where, as the Minister has heard, the frameworks process has been good and we have supported it. The fact that it has been supported across all parties and, indeed, the nations is important.
I reflected on the point indicated by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, which is that we need the Bill to prevent a veto by one of the nations. That argument would have some form of justification if we had seen that approach within the common frameworks. They cover the policy areas that are being repatriated: 154 of them, of which only four remain where there is not agreement whether they are reserved or devolved. Two of them will be resolved only after we know what is the agreement with the European Union, because they concern geographical indications and state aid—we don’t know what the Government’s proposals are for those two areas because we don’t know what the agreement with the European Union is. That will leave only two. For the 18 that require legislation, it is well under way to being proposed.
So it is not the case that there will be a major gap on the statute book at the beginning of January, and nor is it the case that any of the nations that are in receipt of these powers are seeking to exercise their veto. What those nations are asking, justifiably, is whether the powers being repatriated under the Bill—not the frameworks—are being constrained in a manner that is significantly different from how they were exercised under the single market in the European Union? These are justifiable concerns. So, with the greatest respect, I do not think that the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, holds any water at all.
It is of concern that in the first group the Minister was not able to categorically reinforce what has been referred to so far, which was the agreement made among the Ministers of Wales, Scotland and the United Kingdom and the representative from Northern Ireland of the principles of moving forward on the framework agreement. I hope that, when the Minister responds to this, he will be more clear in supporting that. If the approach of this amendment had been followed from the outset, I believe that we would have been able to secure consensus, because it would have been consistent with the manner in which we have been approaching it so far.
The point that my noble friend Lady Randerson indicated, which I thought was a very powerful one and which I hope the Minister is not only aware of but very sensitive to, is that this Bill, probably more than most, brings into stark reality the fact that we do not have a federal Government, which means that there are not designated Ministers for England on devolved areas for England. So we will continue to have UK Ministers who will be operating both at a UK level and effectively as Ministers for England. When it comes to areas of the functioning of the internal market, which is about the four nations, and then separately a consideration at the supra-United Kingdom level, the direct conflict of interest that exists in a Minister making the decision in the interests of England, and thus being the arbiter of the approach of Wales or Scotland as to whether they are in breach of the market principles, is a very valid concern.
We have already heard the example of a decision made on legislation in Scotland, the deposit return scheme, where the Minister himself said in the debate on the first group that, under the Bill, it could be disapplied unless UK Ministers decided that it could be within the principles. Now UK Ministers will decide on that. The Minister is shaking his head. If he is shaking his head, it is on the basis of agreement—which is my point. Consensus would be secured on agreement for that.
What is certainly the case—and the Minister cannot shake his head at this—is that the Bill states that decisions made for England by the UK Parliament cannot be bound by any successor UK Parliament. But if decisions made in Scotland or Wales are overridden by the UK Parliament, those parliaments themselves cannot subsequently legislate within those areas. That is why paragraph 88 of the Constitution Committee report asked the Government to
“explain why clause 6 treats legislation intended for England differently from that passed by the devolved legislatures.”
This is the reality—which is why there is justifiable concern. If there is such a concern, what is a better way of approaching it? A better way, as my noble friend Lord Fox and others indicated, would be to look to other countries.
Before I move on to outlining why I think we could look at international precedents, I would like to pick up a further point regarding dispute resolution. My noble friend Lord Fox and I met the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord True, and I am very grateful to the Minister for sending a long letter answering the points that we raised in the question that we asked about when these issues would inevitably arise in disputes. The Minister’s reply of 13 October was very interesting. He said that
“dispute resolution between Administrations will be managed through the appropriate intergovernmental relations fora and are interlinked with the outcomes of the review of intergovernmental relations which is due to conclude in the autumn. The Office for the Internal Market will have a role in providing independent advice in the dispute resolution process.”
My Lords, it is a great pleasure and honour to be able to participate in this very important legislation. The search for common frameworks is something that has concerned me from the minute we went down the Brexit road. I would like to support the amendments that were put forward in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. I was also interested to hear the analysis by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, of ways of solving problems.
It is very important that we go into this area in great detail. I congratulate the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for bringing it in, in this way, this early in our discussion. What he gave us is a very fair and understanding analysis and I hope the Government will pay due attention to the issues that he outlined. We have also been privileged this evening to hear from four Members who have worked on the frameworks committee, and it is of course also very important to look at what they said. I was interested in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, supported the issue from the Scottish point of view.
I would like to offer my support to Amendment 170, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, which he moved in his intervention. It is very important that agreements that are achieved are formally notified to Parliament, and that was the point he was making.
It is not a direct parallel, but noble Lords will probably remember that, on the introduction of the Scottish devolution Bill, the parties concerned when it was brought into practice in the Scottish Parliament found that they had to achieve a memorandum of understanding. One of the things that was contained in the memorandum of understanding was the Sewel convention. Here in Westminster, we received no details of what this memorandum of understanding contained. One was left wondering how some of the agreements were arrived at. This of course was rectified when we next looked at the Scottish devolution Act and the actual practice was brought in, in a legislative form, under that Act. We need to be kept fully up to date with the agreements that Governments come to. I support that amendment.
My Lords, I also am a member of the Common Frameworks Scrutiny Committee. I would like to give my appreciation to the noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, for the way in which she is chairing the committee. It has a hugely demanding task, which we are all learning extremely fast.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is of course a member of that committee. The combination of his work and his expertise in the law has been demonstrated to be one of the strengths of the House today in the amendments that he has drafted, moved and explained in such meticulous detail. This is of huge benefit, and I hope that the Minister will recognise that he should give very serious consideration to what is being proposed.
I do not have the audacity to summarise the noble and learned Lord, other than to say that his basic questions were these: how do the frameworks fit into the Bill, and how will future arrangements be conducted if there is not a proper correlation between the frameworks and the Bill, and indeed the principles behind the frameworks? That is something that we have all been asking the Government to explain.
My Lords, I have received a request to speak after the Minister from the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie.
I shall not detain the Committee for long but the Minister came up with the example of flour. I think that as the Bill progresses we can all dream up examples of hypothetical possibilities. However, the question that arises from that example is: why should we not follow the principles and dispute resolution model of the common frameworks? Indeed, as the noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, said, where are the gaps that cannot be filled by the common frameworks? Why do the Government need to take such extreme powers for fast Executive action when, in nearly all these cases, the problem will emerge over time? Everybody agrees that if legislation is required, we should have it, but the Government seem to want to take powers in anticipation of unknown challenges. Therefore, why cannot the principles and model of the common frameworks be the basis on which these cases are taken forward and disputes resolved?
My Lords, I should have acknowledged the very thoughtful speeches of the noble Lords, Lord Bruce and Lord Stevenson. I hoped that I had made clear that the common frameworks process would continue. I was asked to give an example of how circumstances might change in the future and how matters that need to be addressed might arise. The emergence of an unregulated new technology might be another example. However, I think it is better that we address these questions in the further discussions that we might have.
So far as pace is concerned, the transition period ends at the end of the year and there is a need to provide a climate of certainty for business when the EU system falls away. Therefore, I do not resile from the fact that it was necessary and sensible for the Government to bring proposals before Parliament to address the post-31 December situation.
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I join in congratulating the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, on her maiden speech. Like others, I look forward to hearing her contributions, whether about Cumbria or the environment, which I think the House will anticipate.
I deplore that a government Bill should contain Clause 45(2)(a), which trashes the UK’s reputation for upholding its treaties and honouring its obligations and seriously undermines our ability to negotiate effective agreements. I believe it reveals that the Government are under the stranglehold of anarchists and disrupters. Indeed, I have no doubt that it suits the dark forces in the Government that this part of the Bill has diverted attention from the other deeply damaging proposals that cut across the devolution settlements, to which I now turn.
I was closely involved with the Scottish Constitutional Convention, which laid the basis of the Scotland Act and the subsequent further extension of powers. I am a passionate home ruler but deeply inimical to the break-up of the UK, which I believe will cause fundamental and lasting economic—and, indeed, emotional—division and hardship. In typically British fashion, devolution has evolved differently in each devolved Administration and is not written into a basic law, but it has become accepted and it works. One of the reasons for this has been the overarching umbrella of the European Union, now being removed.
Awareness of the implications of this was raised by the Joint Ministerial Committee on EU Negotiations in October 2017, with a joint communique setting out principles behind the common frameworks to which many noble Lords referred. As a member of the newly established Common Frameworks Scrutiny Committee of this House, I am now aware that this work has been progressing slowly but constructively. A dispute mechanism is envisaged but has not yet been required, and it is the view of the devolved Administrations that this process is both fit for purpose and practical.
As the Constitution Committee stated, it appears that this Bill is anticipating problems that may never arise but seeking powers that prejudice the effective and consensual working of devolution. By contrast, the devolved Administrations can identify how the powers in the Bill would allow the UK Government to block or disrupt the working of devolution. This could affect building regulations, where, as has been pointed out, in Scotland we want higher insulation standards or we might want lower carbon specs. It could affect single-use plastics, where Wales and Scotland want tighter restrictions than England. The mutual recognition and non-discrimination rules could nullify such divergence, which is why the devolved Administrations argue that it could be an England-led race to the bottom.
Clauses 46 and 47 give the UK Government powers to initiate spending in devolved Administration areas without requiring the engagement or consent of the respective Governments. The motivation behind this seems blatantly disruptive. No doubt the people of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland may welcome extra cash from the Treasury over and above their own sources of revenue—city deals are an example of that—but for such a measure to be pursued without the participation or consent of the parliaments or Governments is the total negation of devolution. What is more, to be pursuing this only months before crucial elections in Scotland and Wales is a monumental misjudgment by a Government who care nothing for devolution and talk unionism while trampling all over the settlements that are essential to holding it together.
The Bill is not just unnecessary; it is downright provocative. It shows utter contempt for the hard-won measures that are essential to holding the United Kingdom together. Ideally the Bill will not proceed. If it does, it must be with the removal of lawbreaking and with the requirement of consent from the devolved Administrations, which currently seems unlikely to be forthcoming or even sought. What is missing from the Government’s approach is any concern, consideration or comprehension of the delicate balance of devolution. This is well summarised in the report published by the Centre on Constitutional Change. When five archbishops are motivated to put their anxieties into print, it is time for the Government to recognise that this hastily concocted and ill thought-out Bill is not fit for purpose, whatever the purpose is meant to be.
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeThe noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, has withdrawn, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie.
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. The strength of argument he has put behind these amendments and the analysis that he always brings to bear are very forceful. I am grateful to all those who have spoken in this debate, because the Minister should be clear that they have articulated not only a very clear strength of feeling but a really strong force of argument behind all these amendments and the need to maintain the devolution settlement. Of course, all these amendments have devolution at the heart. How it is handled by the UK Government requires a huge sensitivity which, as a number of noble Lords have pointed out, has not always been displayed.
I shall speak specifically to my Amendments 27 and 76, and to Amendment 30, which I have signed. I am grateful to my noble friends Lady Humphreys and Lady Suttie, and the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, for signing Amendment 27, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, who certainly indicated some support for Amendment 76.
Far-reaching decisions under the Agriculture Bill, the Trade Bill and the forthcoming Internal Market Bill put the devolution settlements and the integrity of the United Kingdom under immense strain. This has been stressed by pretty well every speaker in this debate. It has come about because the umbrella of the European Union, which set the framework, is being removed, so powers that revert to the UK have to take account of the devolution that took place while we were in the EU. Some of the powers are fully devolved and come to the devolved Administrations. Some are reserved. All this requires that the powers that come back to the regions are not overridden. Those that are reserved, are reserved. That is clear. Those that are hybrid are clearly open to debate. But what is emerging is that some that are theoretically devolved are being clawed back by the Government’s interpretation of what is reserved.
These amendments seek to test the Government’s good faith and ensure that decisions that may radically alter the terms of trade for companies, the public sector or individuals within any or all of the devolved Administrations are taken in a fair and objective way. Amendment 27 requires the Government to secure the consent of the devolved legislatures to any regulations under the Bill, and proposed new subsection (6B) suggests that if two of the three devolved legislatures do not consent, the regulation should not proceed. Effectively, this is an exploratory amendment to see to what extent the UK Government respect the settlements and wish to achieve unanimity—or at least, as the noble Lord, Lord Hain, suggested, qualified majority support. I think most of us accept that it would be unreasonable to allow one devolved Administration to have a veto, but it is equally unreasonable to allow the one devolved Administration which is also the UK Government to have a veto over the three devolved Administrations, which is what the Government are proposing in the Bill.
Amendment 78 seeks to embed the role of the Joint Ministerial Committee, which has been underregarded to date. It has brokered the agreement on common frameworks, which will be subject to this House’s new committee, of which I am a member. However, it has not been the vehicle for negotiation and compromise that some had hoped for. It was envisaged by many that it would be the vehicle by which consensus could be secured. The amendment requires it to meet prior to concluding a free trade agreement and to secure the consent of the devolved Administrations.
What we are talking about in practice here is that trade agreements are treaties and treaties are reserved. Under the EU, our devolved Administrations could not, at least before we left, make common cause with subnational Parliaments and Governments across the other 27 member states. We are all familiar with the role of Belgium’s provincial Parliaments in ratifying EU treaties, and nobody in these amendments is seeking to give any of the devolved Administrations in the UK a comparable power—but once the power lies with Westminster and Whitehall, there is no Europe-wide constituency to pursue. There is no consensus to be built up across like-minded legislatures elsewhere, other than the three devolved Administrations, which have different priorities but common values and common concerns.
If the Government chose to conclude an agreement that lowered food standards, perhaps compromising Scotland’s prime beef sector, it would surely be essential that this was agreed by the Scottish Parliament. Indeed, I challenge the Minister to say under what circumstances the Government could justify that without securing such consent. If public procurement was amended to allow elements of the health service to be available for foreign investment, or for previously non-approved drugs to be allowed, or financial regulations to be lowered or changed in ways that were detrimental to Scotland’s important financial services sector, should the people of Scotland and their representatives not be consulted in a meaningful way?
I take on board the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, about whether it should be Ministers or legislatures—but, as he said, that is a matter of detail. The principle is that the voice of Scotland should be taken into account, and the same would apply on comparable issues in Wales and Northern Ireland. Of course, England needs devolution, and if the Government could find a democratic way of consulting the English regions, it could add a valuable balance. But the fact that that has not been done should not be used as an excuse to say that the devolved Administrations cannot expect to have their views given the weight that these amendments are trying to secure.
Ministerial insensitivity and indifference are, frankly, turbocharging nationalism and separatism. Next year’s elections will be hard fought between the extremes of what to me is a fantasy independence agenda and a UK Government cavalier about their claim to be unionist, and another crisis may engulf us all. I therefore urge the Government to wake up, think and engage, and at least to adopt the spirit of these amendments and show respect to the devolution settlement and an understanding of how to secure a positive way of working.
Dispute resolution will be required. The Government should accept that, ideally, we would like to see government amendments which take the spirit of the amendments that have been debated today and put it on the face of the Bill. That would ensure that any disputes are properly handled in an objective, fair and independent way, and that it is not just a matter of the assurance of a Government who, in the Bill, are saying that ultimately, in the event of disagreement within or across the devolved Administrations, the UK Government, representing the English devolved Administration and the UK, will override the wishes of the devolved Administrations. If the Government seek to do that, they will put a huge explosive under the continuing functioning of the United Kingdom.
It is important that the strength of feeling and the strength of argument that these amendments have demonstrated to the Government require a clear vision from government, and for it to be put on the face of the Bill before it is enacted.
My Lords, as I respond to this continuing debate today, I welcome the opportunity to discuss the important issue of the devolved Administrations’ role in international trade and to demonstrate the significant strides that the Department for International Trade has taken on this matter since the passage of the Trade Bill 2017-19. I have listened to the arguments, and the essence of this debate has been a discussion on the balance between devolved and reserved, and, as the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, said, its link to the test of good faith. There are bound to be differing views on what that balance should be.
During the passage of the previous Trade Bill, the UK Government conducted a significant programme of engagement with the devolved Administrations and your Lordships’ House to ensure that the Bill delivered for all parts of the UK, including regular meetings with devolved Ministers and attending the devolved legislative committees. As a result of this engagement, the UK Government made a number of amendments and commitments to address the devolved Administrations’ concerns. This led the Welsh Parliament to consent to the relevant clauses of that Bill. We are conducting a similar programme of engagement for this Bill and have included all the amendments and restated all our commitments that we made to the devolved Administrations. As a result, the Welsh Government have once again recommended consent to the clauses that were contained in the previous Bill.
However, we have also gone further on this Bill and have made an additional amendment to remove a restriction on the devolved Administrations’ use of the powers in the Bill which the Scottish Government previously objected to. As a consequence, I am pleased that the Scottish Government have now also recommended consent to the Bill, and—to be helpful to the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie—we are working very hard to ensure that the Northern Ireland Executive also feel able to do so. That the Welsh and Scottish Governments have already recommended consent demonstrates that the Bill is already drafted in a way that respects the devolution settlements. Indeed, in its report on the Bill, the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House welcomed the progress that we have made on this matter and made no recommendations for changes to devolution aspects of the Bill, which it might otherwise have done.
On Amendments 26, 27, 31 and 99, as many noble Lords have highlighted already, international trade is a reserved matter under the devolution settlements. However, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, rightly noted at Second Reading and today, in line with the noble Baroness, Lady Humphrey, on Tuesday, that the implementation of international obligations in devolved areas is a devolved matter. We absolutely recognise the devolved Administrations’ competence in this area, which is why the Bill confers powers on them so that they are able to implement our continuity agreements where they touch on devolved matters.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, also noted at Second Reading, these are concurrent powers that also allow the UK Government to legislate in devolved areas. We have sought to put in place concurrent powers to provide greater flexibility in how transitioned agreements are implemented, allowing each devolved Administration to implement the agreements independently in some cases, but also allowing the UK Government to legislate on a UK-wide basis where it makes practical sense to do so.
We understand that those powers should be used appropriately, which is why the Government have committed that we will not normally use the concurrent powers to legislate within devolved areas without the consent of the relevant devolved Administration, and never without consulting them first, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said. We have also put in place a five-year sunset provision on the concurrent powers in Clause 2, which can be extended for further periods only with the agreement of both Houses of Parliament. We recognise that this would also extend the devolved Administrations’ and the UK Government’s ability to use the powers in devolved areas, and have therefore committed to the devolved Administrations that we will consult them before extending the sunset.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they will take to ensure the recovery and diversification of the United Kingdom oil and gas industry supply chain.
My Lords, I recognise the impact that the coronavirus pandemic and the lower oil price have had on the oil and gas supply chain. We are working closely with the sector to agree a transformational North Sea transition deal, which we have committed to delivering in this Parliament. The focus of this deal will be on ensuring that the sector can support the energy transition and on anchoring the supply chain here in the United Kingdom.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. Does he agree with me that, as we transition to net-zero carbon, we will continue to require fossil fuels and that it is better to use our own, which meet high international standards, and to sustain a quarter of a million UK jobs? Will the Government work closely with the industry, the Scottish Government and local councils to help accelerate diversification into carbon capture and storage and renewable energy, and exploit the huge potential from hydrogen, using the capital and world-class expertise that exists in our industry, so that these high-quality jobs can be diversified into new, low-carbon-sector jobs, rather than be lost?
I agree with the points made by the noble Lord. I congratulate the sector on its response to the twin crises of the pandemic and the lower oil price. The Government launched an unprecedented Covid-19 financial package because we want to support the sector, which sustains more than 270,000 jobs in the UK. As I said earlier, we are committed to a proper North Sea transition deal.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I also congratulate the Minister and the right reverend Prelate on their maiden speeches. I am sure we all look forward to hearing their future contributions.
However, I am sorry to say that, in this Bill, I believe parliamentary democracy and our trade interests have parted company. For more than 40 years, Britain’s trade arrangements have been negotiated by the EU, with the detail subject to scrutiny by the European Parliament. Now the Government wish to negotiate trade deals in secret and ratify them without reference to any of our democratic institutions, using the powers of an absolute monarchy.
The UK is launching itself on the world with no track record of negotiating modern trade deals and, worse than that, from yesterday’s announcement it appears that the Government think they can unilaterally rewrite signed treaties and expect to be trusted as they try to negotiate new ones. However, congressional leaders have already indicated that they will block any free trade negotiations with the UK if the Good Friday agreement is undermined, as the Government’s position would certainly achieve.
Britain has a consistent balance of payments deficit on manufacturing, which even a substantial surplus on services cannot close. Yet we are giving up our privileged access to the EU market for services, knowing that free trade deals generally do not cover services. The Government seek a trade deal with the US, knowing that the EU could not achieve one, when we are in the middle of a damaging trade dispute that is seriously undermining our Scotch whisky industry.
A President who puts America first will extract a high price for access to EU markets. Jacob Rees-Mogg has boasted many times that Brexit will deliver cheap food, but we know that this will be of a lower standard than the UK currently enjoys, in spite of the Minister’s assertions. Maybe the US will play whisky against beef, poultry and even our NHS. The threat to Scotch shortbread and cashmere saw Tory MP Douglas Ross writing in our local paper of the damage it was doing to his constituents, but that was, of course, before he suddenly became leader of the Scottish Tories. The failure of the Trade Secretary to end the damaging whisky war does not bode well for our negotiating power.
Scotland has the biggest financial services sector outside London, and a significant part of that is focused on dealing with the EU. Replacing that will not be easy, and non-EU markets will not be as easily replicated. The economic balance varies across the components of the UK; concessions on trade agreements will therefore have different impacts. Big companies can adapt to changes on terms of trade by takeover, relocation or disinvestment. Small and medium-sized enterprises do not always have such luxury.
Under the Government’s trade plans, people may not know the impact of any trade deals until after the event. That is why our Parliament should be involved in agreeing the terms of trade. If the European Parliament, the US Congress and other national Parliaments can scrutinise trade deals, why not us? Is this not what “taking back control” was supposed to mean? Or was it always going to be a cabal and cosy clique of the Brexit faithful? Is there anyone left in the Tory party, apart possibly from Jonathan Djanogly in the Commons, willing to speak up for parliamentary democracy? I believe our House owes it to them to give them another chance.
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the Minister for his clear introduction and welcome these instruments. Although undoubtedly necessary, they are a little late. I note the regret Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and the details that he set it out with, but I want to explore how much scope we have to apply these instruments in the rapidly changing world we operate in. In just a few months, the UK will be leaving the shelter of the transition from the EU to full exit on, as yet, unknown terms. The pandemic and the turbulent vacillation over Huawei have brought into sharp focus the weakness of the UK’s competition rules from a strategic point of view.
The failure of the Government to ensure adequate supplies of PPE and the waste of time and money on a predictably failed tracing app exposes vulnerability in terms of both domestic supply and access to global markets. UK research into vaccines and treatments for Covid-19 appear world-class, but they are not exclusive. Trying to ensure that, when suitable developments are secured, the UK population gets early treatment is, of course, justified, but we need to acknowledge that other countries may have more and better answers, and we should not be so protective of our own that we limit our access.
We should certainly facilitate making vaccines and treatments available to poor and vulnerable people across the world. Although foreign investment has sometimes been responsible for UK inventions turning their profit elsewhere, it has also sometimes facilitated extending our global reach, development and application. So, as we start to negotiate new trade deals, caught between not trashing our EU markets while hoping to gain privileged access to non-EU markets, this could lead to arm twisting that may undermine the stated objective of these other orders. In other words, we may wish to apply them, but we may find that it compromises our ability to negotiate trade agreements with other countries.
Finally, can the Minister give a steer as to whether the legislation that the Government are planning for when we have left the EU will be in place by the end of the year, and whether they will respond to pre-legislative scrutiny, as the regret Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, requests?
(4 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberOf course, we want employers to be as flexible as possible and to consider, for instance, staggering arrival and departure times from work to enable people to avoid peak times wherever possible. As I said, we are also encouraging people to walk and cycle wherever they can; we recently announced a £250 million emergency active travel fund to help with that. Ultimately, it will require both employees and employers to work together to take into account each other’s needs and to use common sense.
Given the decision of the devolved Administrations to maintain their guidance to stay at home and to limit the return to work, will the Government carefully monitor the path of the virus across the UK? If there is significant variation in the incidence of cases or deaths between England and the rest of the UK, will the Government revise the guidance in their documents? Can the Minister give an assurance that workers, companies and, indeed, Governments in the devolved Administration areas, or indeed anywhere in the United Kingdom, will not be penalised for maintaining a cautious approach which might prevent a second spike?
Of course, we keep these matters under constant review. It is not our intention to penalise anyone. We want to continue to work together with the devolved Administrations in all parts of our United Kingdom.
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in line with the Smith and Silk commission agreements, the Scotland Act 2016 and Wales Act 2017 provide for the devolution of onshore oil and gas licensing to the respective Governments.
Today’s debate will focus on the devolution of Section 45A of the Petroleum Act 1998 to the Governments of Scotland and Wales. Section 45A provides the means of assurance to the relevant authority that the relevant person will be able to plug and abandon a well or otherwise provide the necessary funds for it to be done. As such, Section 45A is a key part of the licensing regime and needs to be devolved to enable Scottish and Welsh Ministers to ensure that licence obligations can be met and wells can be plugged and abandoned as appropriate. We intend to transfer Section 45A powers to Scottish and Welsh Ministers for their respective territories, using powers to make consequential amendments under the Scotland Act 2016 and Wales Act 2017.
As recommended by the Smith and Silk commissions, it was agreed that powers related to onshore oil and gas licensing, aside from those relating to royalties, would be devolved to Scotland and Wales. The Scotland Act 2016 and Wales Act 2017 will transfer legislative competence for onshore petroleum to the Scottish and Welsh Governments when fully commenced, with the exception of matters relating to setting and collecting licence rentals.
To aid devolution, in February this year we commenced Sections 47 and 48 of the Scotland Act 2016, which transferred the existing UK onshore licensing regime as it applies in Scotland to Scottish Ministers. This means that Scottish Ministers have the powers to administer the existing onshore oil and gas licensing regime in Scotland and to create a bespoke licensing regime if they wish. It has been agreed between Welsh Ministers and the Secretary of State for Wales that provisions that enable Welsh Ministers to administer the existing onshore oil and gas licensing regime in Wales, or to create a bespoke regime if desired, will commence on 1 October 2018. Therefore, we intend to make and lay negative regulations necessary to deliver this in early September.
I turn now to the detail of the affirmative regulations that we are debating today. The proposed consequential amendments included in this statutory instrument will make amendments to Section 45A of the Petroleum Act 1998. These amendments are consequential on the devolution of onshore petroleum licensing functions to Scottish Ministers under Section 48 of the Scotland Act 2016, and to Welsh Ministers under Section 23 of the Wales Act 2017.
The consequential amendments that these affirmative regulations make reflect the role of Scottish Ministers as the licensing authority in Scotland, and allow the licensing regime to work as intended in relation to onshore areas in Scotland. The regulations provide for the position both before and after commencement of the Wales Act 2017, which makes equivalent provision for devolution of onshore oil and gas licensing to Wales.
As I set out at the beginning, Section 45A is a power that allows the relevant authority to issue a notice requiring a person, once they have begun to drill a well, to provide information regarding their financial affairs. If the authority is not satisfied that the person will be capable of plugging and abandoning the well following the submission of financial information, Section 45A allows the relevant authority to issue a notice requiring the person to take action. This notice could include the provision of security to the relevant authority, to ensure that the costs of plugging and abandoning the well are covered. Although this provision has not to date been used onshore, we consider that the power applies onshore, and therefore Section 45A forms part of the regime which should be transferred.
A negative statutory instrument will follow these affirmative regulations to make consequential amendments to the onshore licensing regime in Wales. Transferring powers from the UK Administration to a devolved Administration does not count as a regulatory provision, so we are not required to do a regulatory impact assessment. Furthermore, there has been no specific consultation on these technical amendments as they are necessary to the effective operation of the provisions set out in the Scotland Act 2016 and Wales Act 2017, which were consulted on separately.
The regulations assist in giving the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and Scottish and Welsh Ministers greater control over their onshore oil and gas resources, complementing the provisions of the Scotland Act 2016 and Wales Act 2017. These affirmative regulations are an important step towards delivering a recommendation of the Smith and Silk commission agreements and to ensure a smooth devolution of powers for onshore oil and gas licensing in Scotland and Wales to Scottish and Welsh Ministers.
I commend the regulations to the House.
My Lords, of course I support the instrument, not least because, as the Minister said, it fulfils a pledge of the Silk and Smith commissions to transfer these powers to Scotland and Wales, but I have one question and a bit of context, because the transfer of these powers has generated a lot more heat than light in Scotland, where the Scottish Government claim that this gives them the power to ban fracking or any other form of onshore exploration, which the Court of Session says does not exist. In other words, the First Minister says that fracking is banned in Scotland, but the Court of Session says that it is not and is simply subject to normal planning considerations, so we are in a state of confusion, which is no responsibility of the Minister or the UK Government, having transferred that power.
This will become a significant issue only if there is a commercial desire to do significant onshore drilling or shale activity in Scotland, which Ineos has been preparing the ground for. It is entirely hypothetical, but it has been stated that if the future of Grangemouth, for example, depended on being able to extract shale oil that exists right underneath the plant, the issue would become politically more real, because you would be banning something that had a significant impact for Scotland, as opposed to current theological arguments about whether we should be doing that.
The only question I have for the Minister relevant to the regulations is on the section that says that everything is devolved except for the consideration—which is presumably the fee that might be involved. I completely understand that the administration and licensing of oil and gas energy is a reserved matter and therefore entirely for the UK Government, but I wonder, given the context that I have just outlined, whether adding to the pot the economic benefit of a licence—not only the commercial benefit but the revenue and royalties that might accrue to the Scottish Government—could change the tenor of the debate.
I have to make it clear that my party is not in favour of fracking and supports a ban. I personally do not agree with that; I think we should wait and look at the facts and the science rather than take a decision before it becomes a reality. Right now, it is purely theoretical; the whole thing is a power to do something that no one commercially is seeking to do and which the Scottish Government and public say that they do not want to happen. However, I can anticipate a situation in which reality will say that it is material and significant—that there are jobs and investment that matter—and the devolution of this power will become a problem, albeit one for Scottish politicians, not UK politicians. But I repeat what I said about transferring the consideration as well—not necessarily the licence, but the consideration. That would just be another factor that might realistically be put into the mix.
My Lords, my noble friend has pretty well gone through everything that I might have said, except to say that from these Benches we fully support this extra act of devolution in an important area. It is about making sure that those in the energy field—in this area it is petroleum, but it can also be nuclear, renewables or whatever—such as energy developers and owners, put the environment or land back to what it was originally. Should be public need that, the Government or the devolved authorities are able to insist on a financial consideration. So we very much support these regulations.
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the regulations will provide BEIS’s offshore petroleum regulator—that is, OPRED, as referred to earlier—with powers to impose emission limits on atmospheric pollutants from certain types of combustion plant and monitoring requirements for those pollutants.
The regulations transpose two European Union directives and will allow OPRED to impose emission, monitoring and reporting controls on specific atmospheric pollutants from certain types of combustion plant, such as gas turbines and engines, on offshore installations. Obligations from these directives are transposed by amending the existing Offshore Combustion Installations (Pollution Prevention and Control) Regulations 2013.
The 2013 regulations implement provisions of chapters I, II and VII of the industrial emissions directive. The controls are enforced through permits for combustion plant, such as gas turbines and engines, on offshore installations that, alone or when aggregated, have a thermal rated input equal to or greater than 50 megawatts. When the industrial emissions directive was being implemented, there were no offshore facilities with qualifying large combustion plant such as boilers, heaters and diesel engines and none was foreseen. Consequently, those obligations relating to large combustion plant in chapter III of the directive were not transposed. However, there are now two offshore installations with plant that fall within the scope of chapter III of that directive, and relevant provisions in that chapter will now apply. The medium combustion plant directive obligations mean that we now also need to extend our regime to medium combustion plant to include boilers, heaters and dual-fuel engines with thermal capacities in the range of 1 to 50 megawatts.
Twelve offshore installations will be subject to the new requirements. There will be new requirements to control, monitor and annually report data on specified atmospheric emissions from large and medium-sized combustion plant, in line with the directives. Relevant existing permits issued under the 2013 regulations will be revised to incorporate the new obligations. Where necessary, new permits will be issued. The regulations will also ensure that inspection reports relating to large combustion plant are made publicly available. This is not required for medium combustion plant. The Offshore Environmental Civil Sanctions Regulations 2018 will apply to the regulations and will act as a deterrent against non-compliance.
In September 2017, a four-week public consultation on these draft regulations was undertaken. Eight responses were received seeking additional clarifications and concerns were raised regarding combustion plant which would be unlikely to meet the emission limits. The Government’s response addressed the consultation comments and we agreed to publish an updated guidance note to support operators’ compliance with the regulations.
One substantive issue arose from the consultation regarding the provisions in Regulation 15, under which emission limits will be included in permits to control the level of pollutants emitted into the atmosphere. The concern is that, in some cases, those limits may not be achievable because replacement or retrofitted abatement of existing plant will not be possible due to space limitations and technical configuration on offshore installations which were designed many years ago. We took account of industry concerns by making clear that we will work with operators on a case-by-case basis to manage the situation in line with the regulations. We understand the importance of maintaining the security of energy supplies and maximising economic recovery of hydrocarbons and do not want to see offshore installations entering early cessation of production.
The regulations are needed to control and reduce emissions of pollutants harmful to the environment and human health and implement two EU directives. Without additional powers to monitor air pollutants at the individual plant level, it is difficult to accurately quantify the emissions and ensure compliance. The regulations will contribute to our aim of ensuring that offshore hydrocarbon activities are carried out in a safe, clean and environmentally sound manner.
In conclusion, the object of the regulations is to control atmospheric emissions from offshore combustion plant which are harmful to the environment and human health, in line with EU directive requirements. This will be achieved through permits for qualifying combustion plant to set emission limit values, monitoring and reporting conditions; conducting offshore inspections and investigation of breaches; and the use of enforcement notices to instruct operators to take action to address breaches within specified timescales.
The regulations will enter into force 21 days after being made. The requirements will take effect immediately for large combustion plant, but there is a phased implementation for medium combustion plant. I commend these draft regulations to the House.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that introduction. He has touched on my concerns, but I want to press him a little further. I appreciate that this is the implementation of an EU directive and we want to maintain compliance with EU regulations, but it is a fact, nevertheless, that the largest volume of offshore installations are in the UK or the Norwegian continental shelf. I am not denying that there are other installations in Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark, but the big ones in the most exposed conditions are in the UK and Norway.
Of course, in the past the EU has attempted to have more direct involvement in the regulation of the North Sea, which has been resisted, I think correctly, by the UK. What I want to explore, and the Minister did touch on this, are the concerns, particularly with some of the mature investments we have in the North Sea, that the difficulty or the disproportionate cost that might be involved in meeting these could affect future production. The Minister has indicated that the Government want to work with the industry, but how sure are they that we will not reach a situation in which significant production or investment will be compromised?
I say that with some hesitation. I know the environmentalists tend to want to shut everything down, or be resistant, and I certainly do not wish to give the impression that I am not keen to ensure that we operate the highest possible standards. But we have to operate within realities and it is true that large installations in really difficult conditions such as the northern North Sea are likely to have larger requirements for generating capacity, which could cause them problems.
My final questions are: given that it is an EU regulation, is Norway applying the same conditions? Is there any question that UK installations would be at any cost disadvantage compared with Norway, or do we have an assurance that Norway is operating at least the same standards?
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the regulations will provide BEIS’s Offshore Petroleum Regulator for Environment and Decommissioning—OPRED—with powers to impose financial civil sanctions as an enforcement option for contraventions of offshore environmental legislation. The regulations do not create new offences; they allow OPRED to impose financial civil sanctions for breaches of a suite of existing regulations.
The current enforcement options available to OPRED are not consistent with those held by onshore regulators and do not provide for sufficient deterrence against non-compliance with environmental legislation. This is because, in the majority of cases, the only enforcement options available are criminal prosecution, or to take no action at all. As prosecutions are disproportionate in the majority of cases, no action can be taken. Expanding OPRED’s powers to allow for the imposition of civil sanctions would bridge this enforcement gap.
OPRED investigates breaches of environmental legislation in respect of offshore oil and gas platforms operating on the United Kingdom continental shelf. Unlike onshore regulators, OPRED does not have the powers to impose financial civil sanctions in respect of the majority of those breaches. Current enforcement options for OPRED include: serving an enforcement or prohibition notice, revocation of a permit, and referral for consideration of prosecution. OPRED can issue civil sanctions in relation to breaches of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme but has no power to do so in relation to its remaining regulatory regime.
Since 2016, OPRED has been made aware of 4,178 potential breaches of environmental legislation by offshore operators and has undertaken 78 formal investigations. Seven resulted in the issue of enforcement notices and two were referred for criminal prosecution. Although the remaining 69 were judged to meet the required standard of proof and involved significant non-compliance with legislation, most involving spills of over 1 tonne of oil or chemicals, OPRED could take no formal enforcement action due to the lack of an appropriate and proportionate response. This has had the consequence of undermining the deterrent effect of the existing environmental regulation. The introduction of civil sanctions would allow for fines to be awarded in the more serious of these cases.
The regulations provide for a more appropriate and proportionate enforcement response, allowing OPRED to maintain a consistent approach with onshore regulators and encourage greater compliance by operators. Enforcement or prohibition notices are not appropriate in all cases and the revocation of a permit, with the result that a holder could no longer operate, would not be a proportionate response to the majority of regulatory breaches. Prosecutions are reserved for only the most serious of cases. They are costly and time-consuming, with cases frequently taking more than a year to reach resolution. In addition, the decision whether to proceed with a prosecution is taken by bodies other than OPRED. Expanding OPRED’s existing powers to enable the imposition of civil sanctions would allow for a more timely, cost-effective and proportionate response that would not unnecessarily criminalise oil and gas operators.
The civil penalties currently available to OPRED may be awarded only in respect of CO2 emissions and cannot be utilised for any other regulatory breaches such as oil or chemical spills. As such, the vast majority of contraventions of environmental legislation currently result in no enforcement action being taken. The regulations will allow OPRED to take swift action where previously it could not, thereby providing greater deterrence against non-compliance and tackling the behaviour of those who perform poorly or ignore their environmental responsibilities. Civil sanctions will be applied instead of, not in addition to, criminal prosecution in cases where the criminal standard of proof is met. The fact that breaches must be proved to the criminal standard before a sanction can be issued is required by the parent legislation. The fixed and variable civil sanctions that OPRED will have will give it the ability to impose fines ranging from £500 to £50,000. This range has been chosen to maintain a consistent approach with onshore regulators and reflects the statutory minimum and maximum fines available to the courts through criminal prosecution.
The objective of the regulations is to provide OPRED with the powers to impose financial civil sanctions on offshore oil and gas operators who contravene specified environmental legislation. To this end, the regulations will provide a more proportionate enforcement response than criminal prosecution alone while retaining this option for the most serious breaches. They will maintain a consistent approach with onshore regulators and encourage greater compliance by offshore operators by allowing for enforcement action to be taken more swiftly in more cases. The regulations will come into effect on 1 October 2018 and I commend them to the House.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that explanatory introduction, and I have just a couple of points to raise with him. I welcome the purpose behind this change in the law, which I assume is to reduce the number of incidents. Has the regulator made an assessment of the impact it will have? The figures the Minister gave are for the number of breaches, most of which were not serious. However, those that were serious cause a little concern, and obviously the point that prosecutions are not effective under the present law has to make it a consideration as to whether civil sanctions will make a significant difference.
My second point is whether the criminal burden of proof will have a difficult impact in the sense that it is quite a high standard of proof, although that is right and proper given that these are new regulations. Nevertheless, is the regulator satisfied that it will be able not only to prosecute effectively but, more importantly, that it will be able to create a climate in which there will be a significant reduction in the number of incidents? That is really what I am seeking. Has there been any assessment by the regulator of that?
My Lords, when I first read the regulations, I had a vision of a motorboat chugging up to an offshore oil rig and sticking a parking ticket on it with a fixed penalty fine, but obviously that will not be the situation.
One of the questions I was going to ask is about numbers. I thank the Minister for going through them. It is certainly very stark that we have two prosecutions for environmental offences out of 4,000. I guess that is one of the reasons that this measure is needed.
Paragraph 7.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum states:
“The need for the instrument has arisen due to a number of contraventions of environmental Regulations”—
the Minister has gone through those very well—
“going unpunished as a result of OPRED’s lack of a proportionate enforcement response”.
What resources does OPRED have? Is it an organisation with capacity? Is it underfunded at the moment? Is that part of the problem? Can it do enforcement in a quicker and cheaper way?
I want to expand on my noble friend Lord Bruce’s point. It rather surprised me that we were moving from criminal law to civil law but the burden of proof did not move to balance of probability; it stayed at the level of criminal proof—that is, beyond reasonable doubt.
Regulation 9(1) states:
“A person on whom a final notice is served may appeal to the Tribunal in relation to the decision to impose the fixed monetary penalty”.
That is fair enough. However, Regulation 9(2) states:
“In any appeal where the commission of an offence is an issue requiring determination, the relevant enforcement authority must prove that offence according to the same burden and standard of proof as in a criminal prosecution”.
If I were faced with a £48,000 fine, what would I do? I would just say, “Take me to court. Go through this criminal proof”. If that is getting in the way of prosecutions at the moment, the barrier is still there. There is a quick and easy way for justice to be avoided once again.
Going through the regulations, I looked at the fixed penalties. Although I realise that they are rather more draconian than going through a Cornish village at more than 30 mph, I wonder whether £500, £1,000—as for most of them—or the top limit of £2,500 would even be in the petty cash of the sort of organisations that we are talking about, which I assume are the potential offenders. Although I realise that the fines can go up to £50,000, I wonder whether organisations would even notice these fixed penalties, which are the cutting edge of these regulations. It seems that it will be part of the P&L line where you just pay your money to avoid environmental regulations.
I have a final question for the Minister. I assume that the answer will be no. I like the idea of immediate penalties in low-impact environmental impacts, so that the system is sped up and more enforcement takes place. Might this apply to any marine-based activities other than the hydrocarbons industry?