Commonwealth

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Thursday 17th October 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, in this debate. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Luce, and congratulate him on securing this timely debate. I agree with him that for the Heads of Government convening in Colombo in November there is a significant history to be celebrated and a narrative that is redolent with optimistic potential, but, as the noble Lord, Lord Black of Brentwood, reminded us, as did my noble friend Lord Wills, there is also a narrative of challenge.

The latter is a familiar narrative for this part of the 21st century for organisations such as the Commonwealth. It is a narrative of challenge of reform and renewal, particularly a narrative of re-establishing trust among current Commonwealth countries and Governments in the credibility of the organisation, as well as rebuilding confidence in the delivery mechanisms of the secretariat, which involves dealing with institutional reform, developing leadership and showing a degree of resolve. The nature and scale of this challenge should not be underestimated despite the obvious achievement. For example, 70% of the Commonwealth secretariat’s budget is contributed by only three, possibly now only two, countries, and 30 out of 54 countries—or 53 as it is now—in the Commonwealth are in arrears in their contributions to it. There is a manifest north/south divide in the narratives of the Commonwealth. It was exemplified most recently by the differential narratives of the Canadian Government’s decision and the Gambian Government’s decision. This narrative is blocking relationships between countries. It is being exploited by others outside the Commonwealth, as the Library note makes clear in relation to China, and involves a significant deterioration in relationships. Polling shows that there is a lack of knowledge about the Commonwealth among the public of its member countries, and why would there not be when a majority of Governments do nothing to explain, promote or support the Commonwealth? None of this is new, and these challenges are not even comprehensive.

What is new is that part of the process of reform and renewal was to be the relaunch of the Commonwealth as a partnership of nations committed to upholding the Commonwealth values as set out in the new charter signed by Her Majesty in March. These values of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good governance are all to be seen in a shared vision of bringing together better opportunities for people around the world. This is a challenging ambition in itself. Just how challenging has been exemplified by some of the references that have already been made to the varying views about the rights of citizens in the Commonwealth and by the evidence in pages 8 to 12 of the Library note, which make shocking reading, about the behaviour of some Governments in Commonwealth countries. The issues that frame this challenge for the Commonwealth are identified in the EPG’s report and recommendations. If we were to look for an agenda for the future of the Commonwealth, we could do worse than just to take that report and its recommendations as the agenda for the CHOGM.

How is that consistent with the question that has already been asked by convening this important relaunching of CHOGM in Sri Lanka at this time? How can we not be appalled by the idea of doing that, as the Canadian Government were? There is only one justification in being present there, and that is encapsulated in the Answer that the Prime Minister gave to a Question at Prime Minister’s Questions on 9 October. In response to a Question about attendance, he said:

“I think it is right for the British Prime Minister to go to the Commonwealth conference because we are big believers in the Commonwealth … but … we should not hold back from being very clear about those aspects of the human rights record in Sri Lanka that we are not happy with”.—[Official Report, Commons, 9/10/13; col. 160.]

The Prime Minister has set a challenging ambition for our attendance at that conference, and I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, for whom I have enormous respect, to spell out in more detail exactly what our Government will do during the time that our senior representative, our Prime Minister, is there to live up to the challenge that he has set for himself.

UN Arms Trade Treaty

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Tuesday 21st May 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Warsi]

As the noble Lord is aware, the UK already has one of the most robust and effective export control systems in the world. I regularly see documentation on the countries for which I have responsibility. We have extensive criteria against which we assess any sales. We feel that this arms trade treaty sets an international benchmark, but we do not think that primary legislation will be required to enable us to implement it.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

My Lords, of the 150 countries that adopted this treaty, a significant proportion do not have the capacity to implement it. What plans do our Government have to build that capacity in countries that are key to the implementation of the treaty as it is in our interests that they are able to do so?

[Baroness Warsi]

I can inform the noble Lord that resource has been set aside to make sure that we work with those countries which do not have the developed, sophisticated arms control systems that we have. The treaty will be effective only when 50 countries join; thereafter, it comes into force. We will, of course, use the network—as the noble Lord is aware, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has one of the most extensive networks—to make sure that we work with our partners to ensure that countries which need the support get the support.

Nuclear Disarmament

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Thursday 24th January 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

My Lords, I remind the House of my entry in the register of Lords’ interests. I am honoured to follow the cogent and well argued speech of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley. Much what he said I agree with, but in a qualified way. I pay tribute to the noble Lords, Lord Ramsbotham and Lord Hannay of Chiswick, for securing the debate and congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, on introducing it with such an interesting and comprehensive speech. I associate myself fully with the tributes to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall. As I was listening to him, it reminded me of my time as the Secretary of State for Defence, when I was not nearly as happy sometimes to hear him speak in your Lordships’ House as I have been today.

As we await the State of the Union address it is relevant to remind ourselves that some progress has been made since President Obama’s speech in Prague in 2009. Arguably the new START treaty and the nuclear security summits are the high points of this progress. However, it is undoubtedly the case that the steam has gone out of this agenda, which we all espoused and cheered to the echo at the time of Prague, and we watch US/Russia relationships sour, for a number of reasons, with some worry.

Although global stockpiles of nuclear weapons are down dramatically since the end of the Cold War, today there are more nuclear-armed states and some of the weapons are in the hands of the most unstable regimes and regions in the world. Today Iran appears to be on track for a nuclear weapon, and it was announced yesterday that North Korea is planning a nuclear test. Pakistan is increasing the size of its nuclear arsenal and its plutonium production and appears to be pursuing smaller warheads for missiles aimed at India. Despite Fukushima, plans for expanded civil use of nuclear power remain. Widespread dispersal of enrichment technologies will make it more, not less, difficult to secure and control nuclear materials in the future.

Some say the dangers of the current environment and their uncertainties strengthen the case for our continued reliance on nuclear weapons. In the short term, I agree with them. I was partly responsible for the decision to renew the UK nuclear deterrent in 2006 and I still do not support the unilateral abandonment of an independent UK deterrent. However, this is not 2006 and relevant factors have changed even since then, as has their significance. It is becoming clear that deterrence as a cornerstone of our defence strategy is decreasingly effective and increasingly risky. As nuclear technologies spread, it will be more difficult, not easier, to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism. In 2006 I believed that our deterrent could play a role in deterring nuclear terrorism by threatening any state known to support it, but as the sources of material used for terrorism multiply, it will be more difficult to pinpoint the state responsible. If one cannot do that, one has no target for a credible threat of retaliation.

Cyber attacks are more commonplace today and they will grow both in number and in intensity. Attribution of the source is difficult, if not impossible. Where one cannot attribute an attack to a source, again one cannot deter with a threat of massive retaliation. That is not to say that nuclear weapons are irrelevant to all 21st century challenges, but it is to say that they offer less of an insurance policy against the challenges we will face in the future.

Further, I invite noble Lords to reflect on recent research into the climate change impacts of even a small nuclear exchange, let alone the effects of one between superpowers. Since 2006, new scientific research has revisited the nuclear winter theme. The research, employing more sophisticated climate models, stresses the devastating climate effects that would follow the use of nuclear weapons. A major use would be suicidal. It would so alter the climate and, as a consequence, our agriculture that the attacker’s population would starve to death, even without any nuclear retaliation. Even a smaller nuclear exchange, for example, between India and Pakistan, would produce global temperatures colder than any experienced in the last millennium, with massive impacts on agriculture affecting up to 1 billion people, particularly in China and the United States, causing economic damage and huge political instability around the world.

If we want to be secure against nuclear and other threats, we have to think more creatively than our current reliance on deterrence implies. We have to shift the emphasis away from the threat of massive retaliation to prevention of nuclear catastrophe and resilience in the face of any attacks. On the nuclear side, we must plan for the unthinkable, but prevention is our main route to safety. Fewer nuclear weapons and materials in the world must be better than more of both. Those who argue the opposite are dangerously overconfident about our ability to keep control of nuclear weapons and materials, particularly in the face of terrorists’ ambitions. Prevention means a number of things. First, we have to get and keep better control of the world’s nuclear weapons and materials. It is essential that the nuclear security summit in the Netherlands is ambitious. This is an issue for continued leadership attention. It is important that world leaders reaffirm their commitment to continue this process, and talk of the meeting in the Netherlands being the last of the series is foolish.

Secondly, we have to cap the problem by making progress towards a fissile material cut-off treaty. The issue of such a treaty cannot be allowed to languish in the conference on disarmament any longer; it has been there for far too long. Thirdly, it is essential that President Obama and President Putin meet and pursue a follow-on deal to the new START treaty as soon as possible. The US needs to show flexibility on missile defence, agreeing to share more details because that is the key to unlocking the door to further nuclear reductions and a deal in which the US could agree to reduce the warheads it holds in reserve and Russia could agree to cuts and more transparency about its non-strategic nuclear weapons. Fourthly, we must never miss an opportunity to tell both the US and China that they have a solemn international responsibility to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.

Fifthly, we have to work harder to strengthen the grand bargain at the heart of the non-proliferation treaty or risk losing it. We are becoming dangerously complacent about it. All states have a responsibility here, but the nuclear weapons states bear a special responsibility. Successive Governments have reduced the number of warheads in the UK arsenal, but we need to do more. Formally, we are committed to the like-for-like renewal of Trident and the operational posture of continuous at-sea deterrence. The Government and all Members of this House need to reflect further on this position. Are we telling the countries of the rest of the world that we cannot feel secure without nuclear weapons on continuous at-sea deployment while at the same time telling the vast majority of them that they must forgo indefinitely any nuclear option for their own security? Is that really our policy? If so, do we expect the double standard that it implies and indeed contains, to stick in a world of rising powers?

The non-nuclear weapon states signatories to the NPT committed themselves to non-nuclear status only in the face of a commitment by the nuclear weapon states to pursue disarmament. Some of that disarmament must come through multilateral negotiation and agreement, but some of it can come through independent action, as in the case of several rounds of announced reductions in the size of the UK nuclear warhead stockpile, none of which we negotiated with anyone else. The time is now right, in my view, to change our posture and to step down from continuous at-sea deterrence. This would demonstrate that nuclear weapons are playing less and less of a role in our national security strategy, and along with the reductions in stockpile numbers we have made, it would strengthen our ability to argue internationally for the kinds of measures I have outlined in this speech.

There are those, I know, who will argue that we have already done enough, that it is time for others to act and that, in any case, such measures will have no impact on the actions of the Irans and North Koreas of this world. They may well be right. Certainly, some states must be confronted with firm international action and other states must also step up and take their responsibilities more seriously if we are to avoid the worst. If a disastrous nuclear incident does occur, it will not be all or even partially the fault of this country, but what consolation will there be in the blame game the morning after London has been devastated by a terrorist nuclear attack? What consolation will there be when we cannot secure incontrovertible evidence of the source of the attack and therefore cannot use the nuclear weapons we have on continuous deployment, even should we wish to? What will the value of our insurance policy be then? Where will the consolation be if even a small nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan has the kind of climatic effect I described earlier? The choice is not between one risky and one risk-free future. There are no risk-free futures on offer.

The primary purpose of our policy must be to ensure that we never suffer the consequences of a nuclear attack. At this stage in our history, nuclear deterrence still has a residual role to play in achieving this objective, but the character of 21st-century threats means that its shelf life is eroding. To achieve our objective, we now need to shift the emphasis to the kinds of measures I have talked about—on to reducing the chances of any nuclear weapon ever being used anywhere. That means the relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons reductions, a relentless strengthening of nuclear security and non-proliferation regimes, and a decreased reliance on nuclear weapons for national security by all, including ourselves.

Arms Trade Treaty Negotiations

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Tuesday 24th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

I do not want to be involved in this polarised binary approach, as my noble friend rightly calls it. We are negotiating very hard. She is quite right that there are very high prizes to be achieved if we can get the robust treaty we want. I think I shall leave it there, except to observe that even with the treaty and, indeed, much more so without a treaty, illicit arms continue to swirl around the world and feed Syria, the killing and the murder, and they will continue to do so unless, step by step, we can move from the treaty to tighter and tighter controls.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

My Lords, those of us who follow these matters closely are hearing very strongly from New York that the sceptics are dominating the floor of this conference. We are constantly being impressed by the request that Britain speaks up more in this conference as a leader of those who wish to see a robust treaty. I shall repeat to the Minister the question posed to him by my noble friend Lord Triesman, about it not being too late for the UK Government to sign up to the statement signed by 74 countries setting out the humanitarian bottom line for a robust treaty. Are the Government prepared to consider doing that? It would send a very strong message to these negotiations.

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

Strong messages are going all the time. As I think the noble Lord knows, we have always said that we want to have a humanitarian dimension fully in this treaty. We have said that, but how we manage to secure our aims in this last vital stage is a matter of delicate negotiation, and I think I must leave it there, although I fully recognise the strong feelings on both sides of the House about this matter.

NATO

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Tuesday 29th May 2012 Lords Chamber

Asked By

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the outcome of the NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review and the implications of clarifying NATO’s deterrence posture for European security and the relationship with Russia.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

My Lords, I am pleased to have been granted the privilege of initiating this debate today. At the outset, I draw the attention of your Lordships' House to my entry in the Register of Lords’ Interests, particularly my association with a number of organisations involved in arms control and disarmament.

Our Prime Minister, David Cameron, has now attended two NATO summits: in Lisbon in November 2010 and in Chicago two weeks ago. After Lisbon, in his Statement to Parliament, he said:

“the test for NATO now is whether it can meet the challenges of the present and future. That means real change—not just signing communiqués about change but showing real political will to bring those changes about”.

Then he promised that the alliance would,

“shift its focus and resources still further from the old, Cold Wars of the past to the new unconventional threats of the future”.—[Official Report, 22/11/10; col. 979-80.]

With respect, I must say that that is the correct analysis and the proper test to be applied to NATO's transformation in the 21st century.

As part of the necessary “real change”, NATO spent the year before Lisbon rewriting the alliance’s main doctrine—the strategic concept—but it did not finish the job in time for Lisbon. The alliance managed to agree that,

“as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance”.

The apparent clarity of that statement masked an inability of member states to agree on key issues about NATO’s nuclear deterrence. At the same time, NATO agreed to,

“develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence”.

However, that, too, hid significant differences about the role of ballistic missile defence in the alliance's future mix of capabilities.

The Lisbon summit solved this continuing disagreement by a procedural device and tasked the NATO council to continue to review,

“NATO’s overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance”.

This process, the Defence and Deterrence Posture Review—DDPR—set out to consider the appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence forces for NATO, and reported to the NATO summit in Chicago. Last week the Prime Minister reported the outcome of Chicago in a Statement to Parliament. Unfortunately, however, the Statement did not mention the DDPR.

For completeness, I asked the Library to research any parliamentary material or references relating to the DDPR. Yesterday it reported that, apart from an obscure reference in the Prime Minister's Statement following Lisbon, all it could find were Questions that I had put down and which were answered last week.

Today's debate, therefore, represents a unique opportunity to discuss whether the DDPR achieved the best possible outcome and whether the mixed capabilities mentioned in the outcome are indeed appropriate for the international security environment in the years ahead.

What were the realistic expectations of the DDPR? I and more than 40 other senior European political figures outlined in a statement issued prior to Chicago what we hoped the review and the Chicago summit might achieve. Together, we requested our leaders in Chicago to pave the way for a world without nuclear weapons and to live up to President Obama’s vision in Prague, which they all say they support. We stressed the opportunity to outline a clear NATO nuclear declaratory policy: that our nuclear weapons will be used for deterrence purposes only, aligning NATO’s policy with the declaratory policies of the UK and the US.

We would have welcomed the announcement of an immediate reduction of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe with the prospect of an eventual consolidation of all those weapons within the next five years. All tactical weapons in Europe not only pose a risk to this continent’s safety and security, they lack any credibility to deter 21st century threats. They have no practical military value for the alliance any longer, and one cannot find anyone in uniform who says that they do. In addition, the review created the opportunity to provide greater transparency on the importance of NATO’s missile defence project and on the costs involved for European allies. One would have thought that in times of austerity, European leaders would grasp the opportunity with both hands.

On the issue of missile defence, the review was always going to have an impact on relations with Russia, whether NATO intended it or not. As missile defence is a dividing issue, more transparency would certainly have enhanced deteriorating relations between the United States, the alliance and Russia.

Finally, the review should have spelt out further co-operation with Russia, especially on increasing warning and decision times for political and military leaders so that no nation fears a short-warning nuclear or conventional attack. Unfortunately, the outcome has not lived up to my or my European colleagues’ expectation. In fact, it is a rather indecisive document. In the words of my United States colleague, Sam Nunn, a US senator for 24 years and former chairman of the powerful US Senate Armed Services Committee:

“The Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR) has made little progress in defining a clear strategy for changing the nuclear status quo and deserves, at best, a grade of ‘incomplete’”.

The DDPR avoided the challenge of resolving differences among the allies on the future role of nuclear weapons in NATO and instead opted for the maintenance of the status quo. Apart from acknowledging the,

“importance of the independent and unilateral negative security assurances offered by the United States, the United Kingdom and”,

to some extent, France, the DDPR broke little new ground on NATO’s nuclear posture. As the allies could not agree on a unified policy on the basic purpose of nuclear weapons, NATO will continue to be governed by different nuclear doctrines, depending upon the state that owns the arsenals and without any input from non-nuclear NATO members.

More disappointingly, no tangible progress was made on the US non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. On the contrary, NATO will maintain and upgrade these weapons in Europe, and in doing so is likely to worsen the relationship with Russia. In contradiction, the DDPR states:

“The review has shown that the Alliance’s nuclear force posture currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defence posture”.

At the same time, the US is planning to modernise its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The B61 Life Extension Program, which reportedly is a national decision by the United States, was inexplicably conducted independently of the question of implementation of nuclear sharing within NATO. It comes at a significant financial cost to many European allies in a time of financial austerity and in the absence of a demonstrated commitment by those allies to carry their share of the financial burden of existing commitments. It does not explain how this apparent contradiction is to be resolved. More worryingly, this move will prove to be a welcome excuse for Russia to continue investing in the upkeep of its own tactical nuclear arsenal, playing directly into the hands of hardliners in the Russian Federation who refuse to discuss reductions in Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons unless the US withdraws its own arsenal from Europe.

The DDPR has not delivered for disarmament. It is worth remembering that in Lisbon in 2010, NATO leaders committed themselves to the goal of creating the conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons. No longer can our leaders simply make this sort of statement and then ignore it when making their own nuclear policy. The alliance has a responsibility to be the change it wants to see in the world, not just to advocate for that change on the part of others. The only hope those who share our Prime Minister’s vision for NATO are left with is the promise of the DDPR to,

“consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia”.

Set against the test set by the Prime Minister for NATO, are the Government content with the outcome of the DDPR?

The DDPR was a major opportunity to make a comprehensive, coherent and balanced assessment of the mix of capabilities required in the years ahead and, importantly, it was an opportunity to spell out the potential contribution that arms control and disarmament can make to reducing nuclear risks in Europe. The issues covered by the DDPR and the decisions made will shape the alliance’s defence and deterrence posture for a decade or more. These decisions have major implications for Euro-Atlantic security and create the environment that will determine our relationship with Russia. If we do not get them right, we are at risk of sleepwalking back into the Cold War. I believe that NATO has missed this crucial opportunity for change, for overcoming Cold War thinking, for a new beginning as a security organisation of the 21st century, and for enhancing overall European security. Perhaps it is no surprise that, in his post-Chicago summit parliamentary Statement, the Prime Minister neglected to mention the DDPR again. For the sustainable security of the Euro-Atlantic area, let us hope that the opportunity we have grasped today is the first but not the only debate that this Parliament will have on NATO’s defence and security posture.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference 2015

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Thursday 26th April 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

Yes, it certainly does. As we move towards the next review conference, we would of course like to see clarified Israel’s position on nuclear, which is ambiguous, as the noble Lord knows, and for Israel to sign up to the NPT.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

My Lords, I remind the House of my entry in the register of interests, in particular my engagement in a number of multilateral nuclear disarmament organisations. The Minister will be aware that the worst aspect of the nuclear order in the modern world, now 20 years after the end of the cold war, is that there are thousands of nuclear weapons on high alert status. Indeed, in arsenals not only in the United States and Russia there are weapons ready for use within minutes, in some circumstances on warning of a possible attack and not just minutes after an attack is known. It seems highly improbable, given that President Obama took months to decide to send troops to Afghanistan, that he is comfortable with that position. What steps are our Government taking with our allies to reduce this dangerous situation in the world, because it is totally unnecessary?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

The noble Lord is absolutely right about the concerns. Obviously, we welcome the signs that Russia and the United States, which after all hold 95 per cent of these weapons—although other countries certainly have dangerous weapons as well—are moving towards some further resumption of the START negotiations. That would be very good. Over and above that, we continue to take the lead in the P5 process. Disarmament is one of the key three pillars of the NPT regime, along of course with non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy, and our full emphasis and efforts are applied to it. But obviously the big reductions in numbers must come through Russian and American action, which we greatly welcome and support.

Turkey

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Thursday 13th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

My Lords, I am pleased to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Scott of Needham Market, who brought significant personal experience of the island of Cyprus to enrich this debate. I have experience of the island of Cyprus only as the Secretary of State for Defence, but I know from my observations of the tragedy of that island the need for us to address the impasse there if for no other reason than that it ties down very valuable international military resources on the peace line that the international community could otherwise use.

I, too, commend the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, for an assured and informed maiden speech. If he had not told us that he had spent a lifetime in communications, we might have worked that out for ourselves from the way in which he communicated with us. I look forward to his contributions in this House in other areas where I know he has genuine expertise and depth of knowledge.

I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Hussein-Ece, on securing this debate. I thought that her introduction was comprehensive—in fact, it was so comprehensive, as the noble Lord, Lord Chidgey, said, that the rest of us are bit-part players merely reinforcing what she said. As I rise as the tail-end gunner on the Back Benches, I am in the happy position of knowing that everything has been said, although not yet everybody has said it, so I can cut to the chase.

I intend to make three points. One is a point of observation and information and two are points of inquiry, which I shall come to in a moment. Before turning to that, I should draw the attention of the House to my entry in the Register of Lords’ Interests, particularly an entry relating to a visit to Ankara in October 2010 when I took part in a roundtable discussion on NATO’s defence posture and Turkish security. That roundtable seminar and discussion was supported by the Arms Control Association, the British American Security Information Council, the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy in Hamburg and, very importantly, an organisation known as USAK, the International Strategic Research Organization in Ankara. At this point, I should say that before I went there I was assisted greatly in preparing for that meeting by the embassy and the ambassador from Turkey to the United Kingdom, who facilitated my engagement with some genuine experts on these issues, for which I am very grateful. I promised to report back to the ambassador and if he is able to hear me here today—I know that he is here—I promise him that I will report back to him in detail. I intend to follow up that seminar with a further seminar on this issue in the not-too-distant future. I shall come back to that in a moment.

The first point that I wish to make arises from the potential in our relations, strategic or otherwise, with Turkey, with its changed and improved position in the world. It is a country of considerably greater assurance and of considerably greater importance in the geopolitical environment that it occupies. I know from my time as Secretary of State for Defence how important that has been to us as a country, not just in relation to Iraq and to our engagement in the Middle East, but specifically in relation to this issue: we have to thank the Turkish Government and their assured position in that part of the world for helping to release the 15 sailors who were taken by the Iranians in the northern Arabian Gulf when they were doing their job there protecting shipping. The Turkish Government quietly and assuredly made a significant contribution to securing their release and, as Secretary of State for Defence at that time—a very difficult time for me—I am very grateful to them. I know that our military are grateful to them, as the country should be. The point that I wish to make is that the potential of Turkey as a strategic partner for the United Kingdom has already been to our benefit and we should continue to exploit that relationship. I am glad to see that our Prime Minister approaches his relations with Turkey in a strategic way.

My second point arises directly from the reason why I was in Turkey in October last year. My visit was to discuss security issues and nuclear issues in particular. I found a country that has security concerns on a number of issues, including the behaviour of the PKK. It also feels, I think rightly, that it sometimes receives less than full support from fellow NATO allies in a difficult region. None the less, it is a country that is looking to take progressive positions on a number of issues that matter not only to it, but to our country, too.

Turkey does not want Iran to go nuclear and is seeking to play a constructive role in the international effort to prevent this. We should engage with Turkey on that. I am not necessarily supporting everything that it does, but we should engage with it and recognise the important contribution that it could make. Much more important, Turkey does not want to stand in the way of less NATO reliance on nuclear weapons. That is an ambition that Governments of all types in the United Kingdom share, as does the United States of America. Specifically, Turkey wants to play a role in the removal of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe. The point that I wish to make to the Minister—and I ask him to engage with this—is that we will not succeed in achieving that ambition, which I know that the Government have, unless we translate the strategic relationship with Turkey into a strategic discussion about both the EU and NATO and address the issues that it has, so that we can move from a collective reliance on these weapons as the only manifestation of the cohesion of the NATO alliance. That is a consistent experience that I have had across Europe in talking to other countries with an interest in this area.

My final point—I am running out of time and have spoken longer than I intended to—relates to EU-NATO relations. These are key to our security, as Afghanistan has proved. Our ambitions in nation building rely on EU resources; we cannot deploy them into semi-secure environments unless we can improve EU-NATO relations. For two organisations that have such consistent membership with each other, the relationships between them are appalling and will be improved, as the alliance itself recognises, only if we address the issues that lie at the heart of that. That will happen only if we engage in proper strategic discussions with Turkey about the issues that cause the barrier in those relationships. I ask the Minister to address these issues in his response if he can, at least in general terms.

Human Rights

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Thursday 2nd December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for securing this debate. He promised us an interesting and engaging debate and it has been both of those thus far. On the subject of interesting, engaging and educative, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, on her maiden speech and I look forward to her contributions in future. It is perfectly clear that a substantial part of our community now has a very eloquent advocate in the House. I am sure that she will talk knowledgably and interestingly on many other subjects.

I commend the noble Lord, Lord Trimble, on using his comparatively short time in a characteristically valuable way. I have had recent experience of the organisation that he speaks of and I share a lot of his observations in practice, particularly in relation to Sri Lanka. While I am addressing contributions, because I found them all valuable, I shall express a prejudice to the argument that the noble Lord, Lord Hastings, put before your Lordships’ House. From my experience in both Iraq and Afghanistan, I might find some opportunity in future to show where the international community has failed in doing just what the noble Lord described in conflict resolution.

I do not envy the Minister in responding to this debate, given its diversity and the interesting nature of the speeches that have been made so far. There are more to come and while I have no intention of adding to his challenges, I intend to draw him on the coalition Government’s policy and proposed actions on the continuing human rights challenges faced by the people of Sri Lanka in particular.

I do not think that this is a declaration of interest but I remind the House that I was the special envoy of the previous Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, to Sri Lanka. I was privileged to hold that job from early 2009, when more than 100,000 people were trapped at the height of the end of the conflict, until the general election. I suppose that I do not need also to remind the House that, as has been recorded, my appointment, although initially agreed to by the Government of Sri Lanka, shortly became an issue of division within their coalition Government, resulting in a lamentable lack of public co-operation with me in that role. Privately, however, I had numerous meetings with representatives of the Government and their emissaries. I do not consider the public posture that they adopted to me to be in any sense personal, because they have adopted that posture to a significant number of emissaries, including most recently the three-person panel of experts appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General.

Despite the vanquishing of the LTTE and the apparent end to 30 years of the most atrocious violence and abuses by all sides to the conflict in that beautiful island of Sri Lanka, despite the renewed and increased electoral mandate that the Government of President Rajapaksa enjoys, which was gained on a manifesto of reconciliation and respect for minority rights, among many other arguments that he put forward, despite a personal commitment that he gave to the United Nations Secretary-General in May 2009 that he would take measures to address possible violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, and, despite the repeated but often rebuffed efforts of the international community to support an agenda of reconciliation and respect, there are in Sri Lanka, as Alistair Burt, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, told the other place on 16 June:

“widespread and persistent allegations of”,

continuing,

“human rights abuses by both state and non-state actors”.—[Official Report, Commons, 16/6/10; col. 166WH.]

My observation on the pervasive propaganda of the media in Sri Lanka is that there are, as the noble Lord, Lord Sacks, identified, the beginnings if not the developing evidence of a culture of hate there against the Tamil minority, which will lead inevitably to just the sort of consequences that we have seen all too often around the world.

Reports of the Government of Sri Lanka and their agents committing arbitrary and unlawful killings, including credible reports of the police and other security forces killing detained suspects, are all-pervasive. I remind the House that successive commissions of inquiry under the warrant of the President have all run into the sand and lack credibility. There have been disappearances, many of which can be brought to the door of paramilitary groups operating on behalf of government military forces. Civil society groups and former prisoners report several torture cases, involving beatings with bars or bats, electric shocks, suspending victims in contorted positions, asphyxiation and many other horrible acts. Yet because of restricted access for humanitarian organisations, the evidence of that sort of behaviour is very difficult to find.

I could go on but I am conscious of the time. The point I wish to make is that there has been no lack of engagement by the international community or by successive Governments, including this Government, in trying to deal with the issues on that island which is, I remind your Lordships, a holiday island for many of our fellow citizens. There have been many assurances and substantial rhetoric from the Government of Sri Lanka but very little evidence of any improvement. In the debate that I referred to in the other place the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, a Minister for whom I have the enormous respect, assured that House that this Government were convinced that the present Government of Sri Lanka intend to deal with those issues. That assertion, in my view, is denied by the facts that are known more broadly.

On a note which is slightly inconsistent with the rest of this debate, I say to the Minister that I regret the fact that during the visit of the President of that country over the past few days, the Secretary of State for Defence chose to meet him in a private capacity. I anticipated that the meeting would be used for propaganda purposes and, this morning, I see on the front page of the Government of Sri Lanka’s website them doing just that. I encourage Ministers to meet members of the Government of Sri Lanka but I would much prefer that it was done openly and reported in a very transparent fashion. I thank noble Lords for listening with respect to my observations.