Horn of Africa

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Tuesday 29th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin by commending, thanking and congratulating my noble friend Lady Harman of Peckham on her maiden speech today, a speech demonstrably characterised by great experience, wisdom and insight. I will not attempt to be the feminist from the male sex in this speech— I am too much of a coward in this environment.

Occasionally, I am deluded in regarding myself as an experienced parliamentarian, with 13 years in the other place and 11 years in your Lordships’ House, taking into account that I had a three-year leave of absence. However, next to someone who served in the House of Commons for 40 years—is it 40 or 42 years? My noble friend says it is 40 years and she will know, because she has probably counted them. That makes her, as I understand it, the second-longest serving female MP in British history after my noble friend Lady Beckett, who I am delighted to see in her place today—and ended up as the Mother of the House, I am forced to regard myself as something of a neophyte in this sort of company. No less extraordinary is the fact that, on ending such a distinguished tenure, my noble friend has promptly taken up another role and entered your Lordships’ House. Indeed, perhaps only in politics could one essay this somewhat Benjamin Button-esque transformation from being the Mother of one House to an eager, thrusting new arrival in the other.

I could easily fill my allotted time by rehearsing the details of my noble friend’s distinguished career—noble Lords will be glad to hear that I will not. In my time in politics, I can scarcely think of a better fit between a job and its holder than her time as the first Minister for Women. Her role in driving the adoption of the Equality Act 2010 will be long remembered and long celebrated, and her service as deputy leader and chair of the Labour Party was undertaken with commitment and distinction.

The golden thread running through my noble friend’s career is a passionate commitment to equality and the protection of the human dignity of every individual. That consistency of purpose and sheer doggedness tell me that she is an invaluable addition to your Lordships’ House and that she will command respect and attention in all her interventions in our proceedings.

I thank my noble friend the Minister not merely for affording us the opportunity to consider this Motion today but for the characteristically wise and well-informed speech with which he opened the debate. I called for a full debate in government time on the situation in the Horn of Africa in Oral Questions on 10 October. Whether the scheduling of today’s debate is causation or coincidence, I join other noble Lords in welcoming the opportunity to turn the full glare of our attention to the conflicts that disfigure some parts of the Horn of Africa and the splintering peace in others.

It is perhaps understandable—but no less regrettable—that in general, conflicts in this part of the world are ill-served by international reporting, and consequently receive a very small percentage of global attention. I do not propose to enter into the question of why, for instance, the deaths of around 20,000 in the Sudanese civil war since April 2023 have excited such an extraordinarily small fraction of the international emotion and indignation that has focused on Ukraine and the Middle East over the last couple of years, but it is something that might repay a little thought. Finland’s Foreign Minister rightly warned about the dangers of “Ukraine fatigue” two weeks ago. Those who are victims of state-sponsored violence or repression or of militia groups in the Horn of Africa would welcome even a fraction of the apparently attenuating western attention that is focused on Ukraine.

Mindful of the debate on the 40th anniversary of the Ethiopian famine and the many forensic and moving contributions from noble Lords on that occasion, I will focus the first part of my remarks on Eritrea. Your Lordships’ House will be aware that on 10 October, the Presidents of Egypt, Somalia and Eritrea met in Asmara to sign a joint statement which pledged the three participants to work together for

“strategic co-operation in all fields”.

That designedly vague phraseology should give us pause but, if precedent is any guide, we can expect an intensification of mutual military aid and co-ordination —largely directed against Ethiopia. Indeed, even before the summit concluded, Egypt had sent two arms shipments to Somalia to reduce its reliance on Ethiopian forces in fighting al-Shabaab.

The communiqué that followed the summit underlined tripartite agreement on—I read this short—

“respect for the sovereignty … and territorial integrity of the countries”

in the region. Although cloaked in the cool objectivity of diplomatic language, this was a pretty clear disavowal of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s coastal ambitions and the MoU Ethiopia has concluded with Somaliland.

Such agreements serve only to normalise Eritrea and its regime, but Eritrea has consistently acted as a destabilising force in the region. Not only is it a one-party state but it is now a one-family state, with President Isaias having frequently signalled his intention that his son should succeed him. It ranks last out of 180 countries in the Reporters Without Borders press freedom index. It sits 161st out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s corruption perception index. The UN special rapporteur describes “severe control” exercised by the state over every aspect of civil and personal life, and daily repression clouds the lives of all Eritreans. Thousands of political prisoners within Eritrea are subject to torture and sexual violence, 300,000 individuals are subjected to forced labour, and almost half of Eritrea’s population is forced into military service, which can last for decades.

These statistics detailing internal repression within Eritrea are grim enough, but the recent diplomatic alignment with Egypt and Somalia is doubly concerning given Eritrea’s long record of intensifying regional conflicts or fanning them into flame. Eritrea’s President Isaias has a record of plotting attacks against neighbouring states. Despite having won independence from Ethiopia as recently as 1993, Eritrea has already engaged in conflicts with Yemen, Sudan and Djibouti, while recently offering intermittent support to al-Shabaab. With all that in mind, can the Minster tell us what assessment the Government have made of the potential benefits or drawbacks of sanctioning individual members of the Eritrean Government and the Eritrean Defence Forces who have involved themselves in serious human rights violations in Tigray and Eritrea itself, their own country?

I would also welcome any comments my noble friend might share on Eritrea’s diplomatic closeness with Beijing. Only last month, President Isaias attended the Beijing summit and was greeted by Li Qiang, Premier of the State Council, and a warm statement committing to further Sino-Eritrean co-operation under the auspices of the belt and road initiative. I mention that not merely because it is a further supervening diplomatic complication but because those economic ties to China and the Gulf states render our sanctions many times less effective than they otherwise would be.

I have focused my attention thus far on Eritrea and its increasing gravitation towards Somalia and Egypt, but as other noble Lords have reminded us, the start of this phase of escalation is at least partly consequent on the MoU signed by Ethiopia and Somaliland. The expansionist ambitions of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed are placing a severe strain on relations with Somalia. They are pulling other regional powers, including Egypt and Turkey, into the orbit of this diplomatic crisis, and have fashioned an ideal context in which al-Shabaab recruitment and funding have spiked.

Of course, the quid pro quo for coastal access in the MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland is the recognition of Somaliland independence. I understand those who point to the cultural distinctiveness, the resilience of civil society and the six democratic elections and peaceful transfers of power in Somaliland as factors that should impel this country to recognise Somaliland independence, but I worry about the consequences.

A senior adviser to the Somali president, speaking under the condition of anonymity, told the world that Somalia is prepared to countenance war with Ethiopia over the deal. In June, Somalia announced that it would expel thousands of Ethiopian troops deployed against al-Shabaab unless the deal was scrapped by the end of the year. Compounding that capacity problem in quelling terrorism, the Institute for the Study of War released an analysis last month that suggested that an intensification of Egyptian military support for Somalia would destabilise the region and hinder operations designed to counter al-Shabaab. In such a febrile situation, what precedent would UK recognition of Somaliland aspirations set?

Were we to indulge in unilateral recognition of Somaliland independence, it is not only possible but probable that this would be seen as implicit endorsement for the separatist aspirations of a host of other groups and regions across the Horn of Africa. In other quarters, it may well be greeted as a piece of high-minded neocolonialism, pushing states engaged in conflict with separatists in their own populations further into the arms of China, Russia and other strategic adversaries. No UN member state has recognised Somaliland’s claim of independence, and earlier this year their Government began the process of appealing to the International Court of Justice. It would surely be destabilising to pre-empt, or possibly to disavow, that judgment by proceeding unilaterally.

The Ethiopia/Somaliland MoU stipulates that Ethiopia can lease a 20-kilometer coastline in Somaliland’s Awdal region for 50 years to build its naval base. That region within Somaliland is dominated by the Issa clan, who have protested vigorously against this deal, accused the Somaliland Government of selling their land and threatened war if the agreement is not rescinded. This is another reminder, if one were needed, of the intense complexities that shape the politics of this region.

Your Lordships’ House will recall the Edwardian satirist, Saki, who in 1911 described countries in the Balkans as producing

“more history than they can consume locally”.

We all know what followed three years later. I believe that the same remark could be applied to this region, with all its complexity: ethnic, religious, cultural and political affiliations that do not conform neatly with national boundaries.

I reiterate my admiration for the vigour with which my noble friend the Minister, the Foreign Secretary and others have pursued a course of de-escalation in the Horn of Africa in the few short months they have been in post. With that in mind, can my noble friend say what consideration the Government are giving to ongoing participation in the EU’s CSDP missions, including in Somalia? Given that international unity is the best means we have of mitigating the humanitarian impact of regional divisions and conflicts, such a step, while small, may well enable us better to ease these conflicts in the medium to longer terms.