Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 22nd November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

What I am saying in putting forward this provision is that you want to send a clear signal that a certain sort of evidence is not admissible. In order to make it easier for people to come forward, you need to have much clearer lines than we have had previously. There has been a whole variety of evidence that English law has said is not admissible, even though many people would think it was probative, because it is the safest way overall to deal with trials—it is the safest way to ensure that an appropriate balance is struck between complainant and defendant.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

Surely the noble Lord and the noble and learned Lord must be at cross purposes. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, put it on the basis that the witness is saying, “I wouldn’t do this, not only with this man but I wouldn’t do it with anybody, ever”, and the evidence is that she has. Is that perjury simply to go unresponded to in any shape or form?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I am afraid I did understand what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said. It is exactly as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, has put it. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is right in the way that he analysed this amendment: it would exclude that evidence. I understand that that is the consequence, and I am saying it is a good thing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, I have added my name to these two amendments and I hope the Minister will agree to take them away. I did so, first, to support my noble friend Lord Bach, and, secondly, not so much to agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, on her actual amendment but to try to develop a debate on the role of police and crime commissioners. As my noble friend has said, unfortunately we have had little opportunity to do so since the Bill in 2011 and the Act that was subsequently passed came in.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, said, I led for the Opposition at that time. We were very glad to work with her and opposed the concept. It was defeated in the Lords and the Bill went back to the Commons without a reference to police commissioners, which was subsequently put back in. The fear at the time was always that it would risk undermining tolerant policing in this country by bringing political partisanship too close to police operational matters. I suggest that there is still that fear around the way in which PCCs have operated. There have of course been notable successes—I mention my noble friend Lord Bach, Dame Vera Baird and David Jamieson in the West Midlands as examples—but there have been failures too. A number of police and crime commissioners have had to resign prematurely under what one might call somewhat unfortunate circumstances.

During the passage of this Bill we have debated policing quite extensively, particularly in relation to lamentable performances on domestic violence. My noble friend Lord Bach, whom I rarely disagree with, thinks that nine years is too short a period on which to make a judgment. However, I think I am entitled to point out that on the cultural issues which are very much at the heart of police failures in relation to domestic violence, I cannot see much evidence that this new leadership has been able to tackle those effectively.

A two-part review of PCCs is going on at the moment. The first part reported in October last year and there is a second review. It is interesting that this review is not getting anywhere near the heart of the issues around PCCs. It is also interesting that, in the first review, a lot of reference was made to the dismissal process for chief constables, which reflects the fact that there has been a fallout in many areas between the PCC seeking to exert his or her power and the chief constable. There has been instability. Because of this, there is a shortage of candidates for chief constable roles—not surprisingly.

Of course, the tension between chief constables and police and crime commissioners was built into the legislation. PCCs were there to provide political leadership for policing in their area, but they were not responsible for leading their force. Police chiefs retained operational independence, making independent decisions supposedly free from political interference on operational matters. Of course, there is no definitive list of operational matters, nor an expectation that operational decisions should be free from political scrutiny altogether. Inevitably, a grey area was built in between policing matters that PCCs can influence and those that are at the operational discretion of chief constables.

Going back to our debate on the Bill, where policing culture and failures in domestic abuse have been so evident, it is interesting that Ministers and noble Lords who have debated this extensively have laid responsibility clearly at the hands of chief constables. PCCs have hardly had a mention. Why not? If PCCs cannot get a handle on crucial issues such as this, what on earth is the point of them in the first place?

Obviously, the model that the Government started with was a US model. The logic, when they first brought in the Bill, was for PCCs to be given much more power than they have been given because of their democratic accountability. However, the Government backed off, partly through fears of politicisation, but also because of the usual Whitehall paranoia about letting go. One of the stated aims of PCCs was for police forces to stop looking up to Whitehall and be more accountable locally. If anything, in the last 10 years, we have seen more and more interventions by Home Secretaries into the work of chief constables and pronouncements on strategic policing requirements. Home Secretary interventions have become the order of the day. The end result is utter confusion as to where accountability lies, ambiguities and tensions between the role of the PCC and the chief constable and a sense that policing lacks effective direction.

I look forward with interest to part two of the review that the Government are undertaking but, when one looks at the areas that they are inquiring into, it seems that none of them goes to the heart of the issue of what PCCs are really for and whether they are going to be given the powers to carry that out. That is a matter of regret.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I briefly but strongly support Amendment 292D, but not the other two—I say that without needing much elaboration. I have two main reasons for supporting Amendment 292D. First, it is promoted by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, for whom I always have the greatest regard. He now has the expertise and experience of this job, so his judgment on it, as he knows what he is talking about, is surely worth listening to. We should take advantage of the expertise that he now has in this field and his appreciation of the crunch issues that are involved.

The second main reason is this: I am generally against these absolutist or purist positions such as those adopted uniquely—it appears—in this legislation. Once you have sinned, you are out for life. It is ridiculous. Some small measure of discretion or flexibility is generally an advantage. Of course, it is unlikely to happen that often, but we have surely heard two wholly compelling instances where it is a flagrant injustice to say to these people, now in maturity, having served the public, that because of one slight error in their youth and having strayed once they are never eligible again. This is a point of genuine principle: we ought not to pass this opportunity of putting it right.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Bach, in his amendment. He could have added police officers to his list of occupations that would not have been barred. He chose not to, but it seems rather odd that only police and crime commissioners can be excluded entirely by a previous conviction.

I do not agree with the amendments proposed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Harris, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. I do not know whether I have unique experience, but certainly I have experienced both police authorities and PCCs as a chief constable and then as a commissioner. Having been the person held to account, I am probably the person to whom you would least listen—I may have the most prejudice. I find both roles to be about equally effective and, frankly, equally ineffective.

Police authorities had the great benefit that they were a broadly based group of people, rather than one person. They were not directly elected, but they tended to create an awful lot of committees. The consequence of creating committees is that things take an awfully long time: that may not be understood here, but people take a lot of time to make decisions. That was my experience. Police and crime commissioners, where you could get a good relationship, tended to make quicker decisions, but, frankly, in somewhere like London, they struggled to be representative of the nearly 9 million people or to hold all the views—particularly of minorities —through one person. That was a challenge, but it could be overcome at times. Certainly in London, which was my latest experience, there has been a plethora of accountability regimes, whether it be a police and crime commissioner selected by the mayor, the Home Secretary, 32 local authorities, the police and crime scrutiny committee and a number of committees of Parliament. I am not sure that that made it better accountability; it just made more of it.

We ought to think carefully about how we govern the police. I am not sure that this is the best way to address that problem. It could be improved, but I am not sure that this is the best way. There are three reasons for this. On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is the fact that you are only getting one applicant for the role of chief constable good evidence that this is because of PCCs? It may be, but I think that it is more to do with the fact that the officers who are applying believe that the solutions have already been determined. They believe that the police and crime commissioners, usually with the sitting deputy, are going to select that person, whereas in the past, with police authorities, at least there was a broad spectrum of people and it was far harder to arrange a conspiracy. I think that it is good evidence, but perhaps for the wrong reason. It is a problem that needs to be addressed and it is not helping the police leadership to develop in the future.

My objections to the amendment are around logistics. If we end up having a referendum at every PCC election, the danger is that we will end up around the country with a mixed tapestry of governance. In some places it would be PCCs and in some places it would be police authorities. We might even flip them at the succeeding election, although I guess that you would not get one if you had a police authority—there would not be another opportunity to have a referendum and then reselect a PCC.

In our current police tapestry, we have 46 forces, 43 of which have local accountability. This has to happen nationally, whether it be the police authorities or PCCs; we need to make national arrangements to govern these things. We already have a complicated arrangement: with 46 governance sets—with different governance sets as well—that is a tapestry too far.

If these things are to be changed, we should look at it properly, and in the round. We should see what has worked and what has not to make improvements. What we should not do is decide it locally. This is a role for government; the governance of the police should be set centrally. There may be local affiliations, but the Government have responsibility to set the governance of the police. As I have said before, I would have far fewer police forces, which might make this a little easier. Whether one agrees with that or not, I would not have a referendum every time a PCC is elected.