Public Order Bill

Lord Brougham and Vaux Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 30th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I agree with my friend the noble Baroness about the importance of the issues. I think everyone in the Chamber is taking this seriously. There is a legitimate debate going on as to what “serious disruption” means. My friend is right to point out that we are discussing very serious issues, and we will talk about that when we come to “reasonable excuse” in particular. Before I am accused of being a hypocrite, I should say that I did drive here today—I thought I had better own up to that.

I turn to Amendments 48 and 49 and the Government’s response, we think, to slow walking, introduced at a very late stage—not in the Commons, and not even in Committee in this Chamber, but here on Report. It has been our contention that existing legislation, enforced robustly, would deal with many of the problems we have seen. As the chief constable of Greater Manchester said—and no doubt we will quote chief officers at each other, so let me start—in an article in the Telegraph on 12 December 2022, entitled “Just Stop Oil protesters should be arrested ‘within seconds’”:

“I think fundamentally, if people obstruct the highway they should be moved … very quickly”.


In other words, he argued for greater use of obstruction rather than a whole range of new powers, as contained in Amendments 48 and 49. We should remember that existing law, whatever the rights and wrongs of this, have led to Extinction Rebellion calling off its action.

In new subsection (3) as inserted by Amendment 48 and new subsection (4) as inserted by Amendment 49, there is the same argument about hindering that is more than minor, which I have just been through with respect to the meaning of “serious disruption”. In other words, the threshold for what constitutes “serious disruption” is being lowered.

I think all of us believe in the right to protest. Yes, sometimes we may get irritated when protests disrupt our lives, and clearly there have to be limits, but many of these amendments simply go too far; they will have a chilling effect on protests and protesters. It will undermine one of the fundamental freedoms we all enjoy: standing up to injustice as we see it. It is a price we pay for our democracy. Any interference with these freedoms poses an unacceptable threat to the right to protest, which is a fundamental cornerstone of our rights and our democracy. I beg to move.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Brougham and Vaux) (Con)]

My Lords, I remind the House that if this amendment is agreed to I cannot call Amendments 5, 14 or 24 due to pre-emption. As we are on Report, I remind noble Lords that they are allowed to speak only once.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 1, and no less strongly I oppose Amendment 5 proposed by the Government, my noble and learned friend Lord Hope and others. I never feel comfortable at the opposite end of the spectrum from my noble and learned friend Lord Hope, but I trust that he feels at least as uncomfortable on the other end of the spectrum from me.

Before commenting briefly on the actual language of these rival amendments, let me make what seems to me to be a critical preliminary point, and it is this: the meaning of “serious disruption”—assuming it is to be defined by one of these proposed amendments—is closely related to the concept and discussion and issue of “reasonable excuse” and the rival proposed amendments to that. I recognise that “reasonable excuse” comes under the next group but it is important that it should not be ignored at this stage. As your Lordships will readily understand, the lower the threshold is set for what constitutes “serious disruption”, the less justification there is for narrowing down, let alone excluding, the defence of “reasonable excuse” or for putting the burden of that defence on the accused. It becomes highly relevant as to what is decided in group 1 when we get to group 2. I acknowledge that the converse is true too: the higher the threshold for what constitutes “serious disruption” then the readier the House may be to look at shifting the burden, as the Bill already does, on matters of that sort.

Let me now turn briefly to the proposed definitions. Is “serious disruption” really to mean no more than substantial—in other words, something that is merely more than to a minor degree—interference with someone’s daily activities, as proposed by the Government, such as somebody driving to the shops? “Hindrance”, which is the concept used in the proposed government amendment, is effectively just that: it is really no more than interference and inconvenience. What weight, one asks, is given in the Government’s proposed definition to the word “serious”? Is it to be suggested that this is sufficiently catered to merely by the “hindrance” in the definition having to be

“more than a minor degree”?

I would submit it is surely not.

I do not wish to damage the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and I would risk doing so if I were to go on at any great length. Surely the preferable definition is that which is proposed in Amendment 1, “significant harm”, as illustrated in the amendment. It is that significant harm, not merely interference or inconvenience, against which this legislation is directed, and it is certainly only that which could possibly justify most of the regressive, repressive features of this Bill. I therefore support Amendment 1.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Brougham and Vaux Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 7th September 2020 Lords Chamber

I am sorry I have gone on for quite a long time, but I hope that noble Lords will not press their amendments.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Brougham and Vaux) (Con)]

My Lords, I have received requests to speak after the Minister from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her extended explanation. She talked about electronic travel authorisations and referred to The UK’s Points-based Immigration System: Further Details document. As far as ETAs are concerned, that document talks about the “border of the future” and that it is part of a phased programme to 2025. How will EU and EEA citizens using the e-passport gates be stopped from coming in if they have not provided details in advance? If it is not necessary for them to provide details in advance, why are the Government introducing ETAs for EU and EEA citizens up to 2025?

--- Later in debate ---

Clause 1 agreed.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Brougham and Vaux) (Con)]

My Lords, we now come to the group beginning with Amendment 2. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division should make that clear in the debate.

Amendment 2

Moved by

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Lord Brougham and Vaux Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 15th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

My Lords, we turn to Schedule 5, which deals with an issue covered in the Data Protection Act 1998 and comes forward again in this Bill. It relates to how the accreditation of certification providers is carried out in practice and, for a primary piece of legislation, goes into rather a lot of detail about the way reviews are carried out and appeals are heard. These are probing amendments to try to put on the record some of the issues.

Amendments 108C and 110A would ensure that documentation submitted by the applicant must be relevant to the matter to be considered by the commissioner. This is quite a widely drafted power and it would be otiose if the applicant raises issues that are not narrowly to the point.

Amendment 108D is a probing amendment into the grounds on which an applicant can bring an appeal. At the moment, all the applicant appears to have to show is that they are “dissatisfied”, which seems a rather broad way of opening up a discussion on an important issue. The word “dissatisfied” does not sound as though it will restrict the ability of people to put in submissions on this point.

Amendment 108E deals with the timing. There is a two-stage review process, each stage lasting 28 days, so it is odd that we have different timings. I would be grateful for a comment on that. I do not think there is a particular issue; perhaps the problem is the way it is expressed.

Amendment 108F deals with the very wide powers specified for the grounds to appeal against those appointed members of an appeal panel. Again, I do not see anything wrong with that, but it would be helpful to know the Government’s thinking on why the grounds are so wide: someone can simply put in an appeal and it must be heard. That would probably be rather open-ended, but it may be that there is a history of this and issues that we are not aware of.

Finally, on Amendment 110A, the arrangements for the appeal panel hearings also seem heavily specified. I wonder whether there may be a case for a slightly lighter touch and leaving it more open to the ACAS body, if that is the one concerned, to carry them through.

There are no particular issues here and we are not looking for major changes, but I would be grateful for a response. I beg to move.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Brougham and Vaux) (Con)]

If Amendment 108F is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 109 due to pre-emption.

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for turning the attention of the Committee to the accreditation process. I recognise the intention behind his detailed amendments; namely, to reduce the administrative burden associated with requests for accreditation decisions to be reviewed and, subsequently, for the review process to be appealed. Under the new regime, both the Information Commissioner and the United Kingdom Accreditation Service will be able to accredit organisations that wish to offer a certification service for compliance with data protection legislation. Many organisations may wish to make use of certification services to support their compliance with the new law, and the accreditation process is intended to support them in choosing a provider of certification.

Schedule 5 establishes a mechanism for organisations that have applied for accreditation to seek redress against a decision made by UKAS or the Information Commissioner. The mechanism process has two elements. In the first instance, organisations can seek a review of the accreditation decision. Then, if they are unhappy with that review process, they can lodge an appeal. I share the noble Lord’s desire to minimise the administrative burden created by that review and appeal mechanism. Amendments 108C and 110A limit the documents that may be submitted when appealing. Amendment 108E reduces the time to lodge an appeal. Amendment 108F removes the ability of the appellant to object to members of the appeal panel.

I assure noble Lords that we want a fair and straightforward review and appeals mechanism. Our choice of process, time limits and other restrictions mirrors the appeals process that UKAS currently operates. That process is as provided for by the Accreditation Regulations 2009. Maintaining a consistent appeals process creates administrative simplicity and efficiency. The Government consider that the process in Schedule 5 strikes the right balance between limiting the administrative burden on the accrediting bodies, while also providing applicants with sufficient means of redress.

To add them up, there are four reasons why we feel that what is in there now works well: our choice of process, time limits and other restrictions limits the appeals process that UKAS currently operates; it maintains a consistent appeals process, which creates administrative simplicity and efficiency; it strikes the right balance between limiting the administrative burden but provides applicants with sufficient means of redress; and the accreditation process will give organisations confidence that they are choosing the right provider of certification. I hope I have addressed the noble Lord’s concerns and urge him to withdraw the amendment.

Modern Slavery Bill

Lord Brougham and Vaux Excerpts

Monday 23rd February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kennedy of Cradley (Lab)]

My Lords, this amendment seeks to remove the inclusion of the reasonable person test before the non-prosecution defence applies to children.

I thank the Government, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Bates, and the noble Baroness, Lady Garden of Frognal, for the constructive way in which the debate on a statutory defence for children has been carried out; for listening to and engaging with noble Lords, NGOs and others on the issue; and for the welcome improvements in the statutory defence clause that the Government have made along the way, particularly in relation to children. But, and there is always a “but”, I am moving this amendment because I still believe that the addition of the reasonable person test for children, first, is another test of compulsion and therefore not in line with international law, and, secondly, adds a further test that goes further than our current case law and CPS guidance.

I welcome the Government’s amendment to the statutory defence, Amendment 49, tabled on Report, which removes the need to prove that there was not a realistic alternative and shifts the burden on to the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that a reasonable person would not have committed the crime. However, the child still has an obligation, in raising the statutory defence, to set out the facts of their case. In persuading the jury to put themselves in their shoes, the child will have to show that they were forced to commit the offence for the jury properly to understand what the child was going through. The reasonable person test is therefore another test of compulsion, and is not in line with the rest of the Modern Slavery Bill or with the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, which in July 2014 urged the Government to establish,

“a clear obligation of non-prosecution in the criminal justice system”,

and ensure that children,

“are treated as victims rather than criminals by law enforcement and judicial authorities”.

That highlighted the need for the statutory defence to be suitable for children—for a child to be treated as a child. A child should never have to prove that illegal means have been used to coerce them into trafficking or slavery to achieve legal protection in the way that an adult may have to, which is why our colleagues in Northern Ireland, in the Northern Ireland Human Trafficking and Exploitation Act, which received Royal Assent in January this year, retained the reasonable person test for adults but removed it for children. They acknowledged in the memorandum to the Act that this was done so that their Act was compliant with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the child would not have to prove compulsion. They believed, as I believe, the reasonable person test to be a test of compulsion, and therefore removed it for children. If they do not need this extra test, why do we?

The reasonable person test is also not in line with current UK case law. As we have discussed in this Chamber, in the landmark case of R v L and others, the Lord Chief Justice and his colleagues pronounced that two questions must be addressed for the non-prosecution principle to apply to child victims: age and whether the criminal offence is,

“consequent on and integral to the exploitation”.

This is mirrored in the current CPS legal guidance on human trafficking and smuggling with regard to children where only two tests—age and direct consequence of—are necessary for a non-prosecution defence to apply. Adding a third test, a reasonable person test, therefore goes further than existing law. When the CPS guidance is rewritten following the passage of the Bill, it will be tougher than it is now. Why do we need to go further?

Can the Minister assure the House about non-legislative measures in the application of the statutory defence? Can he ensure that the CPS consults stakeholders and NGOs, including UNICEF, on any new guidance to prosecutors and reviews other relevant guidance to ensure coherence and consistency across the board? Will he ensure that the CPS trains prosecutors on the implications of the new Act and seeks technical assistance from specialists in the trafficking field if required to develop and deliver training that will cover both adults and children? Will he liaise with all law-enforcement agencies, make them aware of the new legislation and ensure there are plans to adapt existing policy and guidance to comply? Having sought these assurances, I beg to move.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Brougham and Vaux) (Con)]

My Lords, if this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 49 because of pre-emption.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, when I read the Hansard of our first debate on this issue, I realised how much I agreed with the noble Baroness, and I agree with her tonight. I am also concerned about applying the reasonable person test to a child for the reasons she gave and because children develop at different stages. To ask a jury, as I suppose would have to be the case, not only to see what a reasonable adult person would do but to take account of the variables of a child’s development makes the test so complicated that it would be inappropriate. That is the sort of word one uses to be polite, is it not? I do not think we should be requiring this of a child. It adds to the complications and is not the direction in which we should be going.

I have been at meetings where I have heard the noble Baroness say to the Minister that we should not be constructing legislation that allows people to say, “I was trafficked, therefore I should be let off doing anything wrong”. She has been very upfront and quite blunt about that, and she is not trying to resile from that attitude here. I support her amendment.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Brougham and Vaux Excerpts

Monday 25th March 2013 Lords Chamber

Clearly, getting the balance of incentives is also very important. It is important that we draw the right line between the publishers intended to be caught and those who are left outside. I am confident that the Government have drawn the line in the right place and I have set out my reason for that today. Through the cross-party talks, we have agreed a set of proposals that will create a tough new system of press self-regulation. We are, I believe, striking the right balance through these amendments, which enable the implementation of this system but which, equally, do not compromise freedom of expression. They form a crucial part of the new regime for press regulation as Lord Justice Leveson set out and which, as politicians, we have a collective duty to implement. I will wait to hear what noble Lords have to say about their amendments, particularly in the light of manuscript Amendment 131BA, and respond to them when I wind up this debate. For now, I commend these Commons amendments to the House.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Brougham and Vaux)]

My Lords, I now call Amendment 11A. I have to advise the House that if Amendment 11A is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 11B by reason of pre-emption.

Amendment 11A (as an amendment to Commons Amendment 11)

Moved by

Public Bodies Bill [HL]

Lord Brougham and Vaux Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, the Minister was not replying to the debate. The amendment was moved by my noble friend Lord Kennedy. I put my name to it, as did the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, so I think I am in order.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Brougham and Vaux)]

I remind the noble Lord that the Companion says:

“Only the mover of an amendment … speaks after the minister … except for short questions … or where the minister speaks early to assist the House”.

The noble Lord should have spoken before the Minister. He is out of order, I am afraid.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response to my amendment. As I have said on several occasions, whatever happens we need to ensure that criminality does not return to the industry and that the public are able to remain confident that the people employed in the industry are fit and proper. The overwhelming majority of the industry acts responsibly and supports retention of the SIA. If the Government bring forward a Bill for consideration, it will be important to give it detailed line-by-line scrutiny. In particular, I concur with the comments of my noble friends Lady Royall and Lord Whitty.