Scotland Bill
Lord Boyd of Duncansby Excerpts(12 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
My Lords, I wonder if this would be a good opportunity for the Minister in his reply to inform the House what will now happen in relation to the legislative consent Motion. It would be helpful if he could briefly give us a timetable about when it will be considered by the Scottish Parliament and the procedures thereafter. If there are any problems, how will this House be informed? Does he envisage that the legislative consent Motion will be passed through the Scottish Parliament without any difficulty; and are there any further procedures that may be necessary within this Parliament following the passage of the legislative consent Motion?
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
My Lords, before I address the amendments that the noble and learned Lord has spoken to, I should place on record the fact that the handling of this Bill has been nothing short of scandalous. To start three hours late, almost on the dinner hour, is quite unforgiveable. Yet again, those of us who are participating in this Bill are under pressure to sit longer and at unusual times to accommodate the Government’s business. At a time when we are trying in this House to demonstrate the evident utility of remaining part of the United Kingdom, of Scotland playing a meaningful role in Parliament, and of this Parliament playing a meaningful role in the affairs of Scotland, it smacks of contempt for the position of Scotland. I do not for one moment suggest that the noble and learned Lord has any part in this. I know that he is frustrated by the progress that has been made, but frankly those who are responsible for this should be ashamed of themselves.
As for the amendments that the noble and learned Lord has spoken to, we are pleased that agreement has been reached between the Government and Scottish Ministers. This allows for the passing of the legislative consent Motion. We recognise, of course, that compromises have been made on both sides, though those made by the Scottish Ministers from the demands that they set have clearly been much more substantial. It will be interesting to read how Scottish Ministers deal with the Scotland Bill Committee and Report when they come to deal with the legislative consent Motion. This group of amendments implements much, though not all, of the agreement. Inevitably, there are issues that we support, such as the removal of the clause on the partial suspension of Bills of the Scottish Parliament or the reference to the Supreme Court, and those that we find much more difficult, such as the regulation of health professionals. However, in the spirit of compromise, we support these amendments.
Scotland Bill
Lord Boyd of Duncansby Excerpts(12 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, on the second point, a noble Lord asked me earlier—it may have been my noble friend the Duke of Montrose—whether it would be possible to have a Section 30 order that applied to just one referendum. The answer is that that is precisely what we plan in our draft.
The issue that the amendment seeks to address is that for some powers it may be thought expedient or wise to give the Scottish Parliament a temporary extension of power. I think I am right in saying that such a power was granted under a Section 30 order following the case of Somerville. We seek to make it very clear that if the Scottish Parliament passes legislation—as indeed it did under that power—under a temporary transfer from reserved to devolved power, it does not automatically repeal any legislation that has been properly and competently enacted when the temporary transfer of power ends.
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
My Lords, my noble friend has suggested that as I have sat here all night, I should at least say something. It seems to me that the amendment puts the issue of competence beyond doubt. However, I am not wholly convinced that this is necessary because it seems to me that once you confer competence, the legislative provision that flows from it will always flow from it even if you subsequently take back the competence, as it is the point at which the competence is exercised which is important, not what happens subsequently. Nevertheless, I note what the Minister says. For our part, we are content that he has put the matter beyond doubt.
Scotland Bill
Lord Boyd of Duncansby Excerpts(12 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Boyd of Duncansby
My Lords, three amendments in this group—Amendment 47A, 47B and 50A—are in my name and those of my noble friends. I do not intend to speak to, or in due course move, Amendment 47B. Before I get to the meat of the amendments, perhaps I could make a general point about the Bill and the proposals from the Calman commission. The noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, said—I hope that I do not misquote him—that this was dreamed up by a group of politicians who got together to try to prevent an SNP victory. Perhaps I was slightly naive at the time, but I did not think that that was my task as a member of the Calman commission. I am looking at two of my fellow commissioners across the Chamber and I do not think that it was in their remit, either.
In relation to road traffic, we received and assessed evidence. I have just had a quick look at it. Much of it was received from the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland. It is true that we commented that it was unfortunate that we did not receive evidence from major motoring organisations representing a Great Britain-wide viewpoint. We took that into account when we reached the view that we did in relation to both drink-driving and speed limits.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
I cannot think of an example—perhaps my noble friend Lord Steel could help me—but there are roads in the Borders which go in and out of Scotland and England as you drive along them. If there were differences in the drink-driving limits or the speed limits, would we have signs every 100 yards saying “Now it is 30” or “Now it is 20”, or would we have policemen sitting in a lay-by in England or Scotland, depending on which had the higher limit, and would we have great arguments in the courts as to which part of the road you were on?
My noble friend Lord Caithness, who has now left, talked about driving across Europe. We are not talking about driving across Europe; we are talking about country roads in the Borders. What is the utility that is being achieved here? The arguments that the noble Lord is making, with which I have some sympathy, are arguments about what the limits and rules should be; they are not actually arguments for it being different in different parts of the United Kingdom.
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
I am not familiar enough with the borders to say to what extent roads come in and out of Scotland and England. The picture the noble Lord seems to be painting is that every 100 yards it meanders over the border. Of course, I am aware that a river forms at least part of the border. I actually thought that there were more significant difficulties with Northern Ireland and the Republic. I remember reading stories about people having part of their house in the Republic and the other part in Northern Ireland. Of course, you would not drive through a house. Nevertheless, roads probably do meander more over there than they do between Scotland and England. I take the noble Lord’s point; clearly there may be times when there are issues with that. I should think that there will be a common-sense approach between police forces on both sides of the border, as there already is in relation to jurisdictional difficulties, wherever they might arise.
Lord Sanderson of Bowden
I may be able to help the noble and learned Lord. The road that I use to go to Berwick—and no doubt the noble Lord, Lord Steel, does the same—goes through a small village in Scotland, in which the speed limit is 40 mph. When you go into England, it is 30 mph. I happened to get caught going at 35 mph in the village of Wark, so there are differences at the moment on these roads.
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
I am obliged to the noble Lord for that information.
A number of issues are raised by these amendments as a whole. The first is one of road safety. That has already been raised in the amendment in the name of the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger. It was also raised in the amendments that we have put down. There are two particular issues here. One relates to the Highway Code, the other to the driving test.
Paragraph 95 of the Highway Code says:
“You MUST NOT drive with a breath alcohol level higher than 35 microgrammes/100 millilitres of breath or a blood alcohol level of more than 80 milligrammes/100 millilitres of blood”.
It then tells you why you should not do that; alcohol will give,
“a false sense of confidence … reduce co-ordination and slow down reactions … affect judgement of speed, distance and risk”.
Paragraph 124 and the accompanying table in the Highway Code reflect the speed limits, and say:
“You MUST NOT exceed the maximum speed limits for the road and for your vehicle”.
It is of course clear that if Scottish Ministers exercise their powers under the Bill, and vary the limits in either case, that will have a knock-on consequence for the Highway Code and for the driving test. It is important to ensure that people are sufficiently aware of the differences where they exist. It is important that we do not have some kind of Scottish edition of the Highway Code that reflects only the Scottish position but have instead a code that is still a United Kingdom code but that reflects differences in these limits where they exist. On the speed limit, for example, the accompanying table could be quite simply amended to show these differences where they exist.
The Calman commission obviously missed a trick when we decided not to give the power to the Scottish Parliament to change the side on which the traffic moves. Driving on the left seemed to us to remain important.
The other issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, was HGVs. The Calman commission did not distinguish between different types of motor vehicles. I am unclear why that distinction is there and why it remains, and I certainly look forward to a good explanation, shall we say, from the noble Lord, of why that should be. It really does not make sense to have that kind of distinction. He may say that long-distance truck drivers are used to driving over the border, but that raises the question as to why we are devolving it at all. In fact, these very people are more likely to be aware of the differences where they exist. Therefore, if he were to advance that argument, it would not be an argument that I would accept.
The noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, also raised an important issue about penalties. The Calman commission simply looked at the offences and the limits on the blood alcohol and breath alcohol levels and the speed limit. I do not think that we mentioned penalties. However, there is an important point here. A reduction in the limit is more important when one talks about the alcohol limit. For example, there has been talk of a reduction to zero. If that happens, the penalty would be an automatic 12-month ban. Even someone with a minute level of alcohol would be subject to that automatic 12-month ban unless the Scottish Parliament had the power to vary not just the alcohol level but the penalty.
While this Bill devolves responsibility to the Scottish Ministers to set the blood alcohol level, that devolution might be constrained. Ministers might take the view that, while they are in favour of a reduction in the blood alcohol level, the penalties that would necessarily be imposed because they did not have the power to vary the penalty would mean that the penalty would be disproportionate.
Perhaps there is an issue about the ability to amend primary legislation, but this is a very real issue that the Minister has to take away and look at seriously. Otherwise, we would not properly devolve this matter at all and would be giving only one part of a solution to the Scottish Ministers. I hope that the Minister will reflect on that issue as well as on HGVs, and I look forward to hearing from him.
Lord Maclennan of Rogart
My Lords, perhaps the noble and learned Lord would explain to me what considerations he has in mind that justify the ability to set different blood alcohol levels north and south of the border. It seems to me that the people who live north and south of the border do not have greater sensitivities to these things. The purpose of the law is not to deal with the problem after the event but to prevent people driving with too much alcohol. The commonality of the law north and south of the border makes it clear to drivers what is acceptable. I cannot think that before they set off to cross the border, people are going to check precisely what milligram limits are acceptable on one side or the other. If there is any doubt about the limits of susceptibility, that ought to be discussed by doctors across the United Kingdom before the law is changed.
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
Perhaps I could first respond to the noble Lord’s intervention. I have to say with the greatest respect that I do not accept the proposition he is putting. In the first place, the number of cross-border journeys that are taken in relation to the entire number of journeys made in the UK is minuscule. Typically, people are caught drink driving over very short distances because they are driving home either from the pub or after having gone out for a meal. The noble Lord, Lord Steel, is not in his place, but let us say he goes from Ettrick over the border to catch his train, having enjoyed a good meal. Before he catches his train, he gets caught because over the border there is a different limit.
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
I will in a moment. The answer is that you should know what the limit is before you set out on your journey, and that should be the case for everyone.
Lord Maxton
There is another problem, if we take the example of the noble Lord, Lord Steel. If the noble Lord has a decent meal in the evening with a few drinks, and gets up the following morning and drives his car, he may then be stopped because increasingly, particularly in holiday periods, the police are stopping drivers early in the morning and breathalysing them. Of course, people are not aware of the dispersal rate of alcohol in their bodies.
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
The Highway Code is quite explicit: you should be aware of the amount you have drunk the night before. I had people around for a meal recently. They were not driving, but when I offered them another drink, they said that they could not take it because they would be driving the following morning. That is sufficient for me. With respect, I get the impression that people are more and more aware of both the drink-driving limits nationally and the necessity of ensuring that they do not drink in the evening if they are going to be driving the next day.
Lord Lyell
The noble and learned Lord is making one point. We have heard a great deal about the limits and the penalties. My noble friend Lord Caithness was driving in Europe and went through three countries. In many countries across the Channel, the limit may be 50 milligrams or thereabouts, but often the penalty is either what I would call a light rap over the knuckles or three months. But if the level is 80 or 100 milligrams, which is what we have, quite often it will be one year or even more. Ever since, I think, 1967, the level has been 80 milligrams and 12 months. If we are going to have lower limits as there are in some Scandinavian countries—in Finland, but not Sweden or Norway so far as I am aware, it is zero; I do not know what the penalties are, whether they fluctuate or vary—would my noble and learned friend the Minister put that into the frame when he comes to respond to this?
Lord Cameron of Lochbroom
The noble Lord raises an interesting point. I would not wish to give any definitive opinion as it is a long time since I have had to deal with these matters. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd, is probably better able to do so, as he has a more modern understanding of road traffic law as a recent Lord Advocate in Scotland. However, these questions arise over a whole series of issues apart from road traffic. We are getting into an area where I wonder whether the kind of devolving of powers that is being sought here is in fact creating more problems that it would do if the whole issue of road traffic legislation—instead of being under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 or the Road Traffic Act 1988—were left as a separate Act that applies within the jurisdiction of the Scottish Parliament. That would be much clearer for members of the United Kingdom.
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
The noble and learned Lord threw me that one and I will just take it up. It is true that there are a whole range of United Kingdom statutes that nevertheless require different evidential standards on both sides of the border. There is the Misuse of Drugs Act, for example, where corroboration would be required in relation to those offences that were prosecuted in Scotland but not—I think I am right in saying—in England and Wales. The same, of course, is true of the Road Traffic Act. If I may say so, that possibly just reinforces the point that different jurisdictions will have different rules of evidence and in theory, or at least in principle, there is nothing to stop them having different penalties and limits for particular offences.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, which has given rise to a number of important issues. I share with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd of Duncansby, his analysis of how the Calman commission went about its work. My noble friend the Duke of Montrose suggested that we were trying to deliver what the Scottish Executive wanted us to. If only the Scottish Executive had made any connection with the Calman commission—they studiously did not give us any evidence or indication of what they wished—their engagement might have been productive.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd, indicated, this was done on the basis of evidence. It was recognised by the commission that there are already different speed limits; there are already powers to set speed limits on local authority roads devolved to local highway authorities through road traffic regulation orders. They are free to use their knowledge and assessment of local roads and may set different speed limits of 20, 30, 40, 50 or 60 miles per hour where they think it appropriate.
There was a view on drink-driving that it was part of criminal law, which is already devolved—but perhaps more importantly there are serious alcohol abuse issues in Scotland. I do not think that anyone is running away from them. The view was that this might be one other measure that could be part of how alcohol abuse could be tackled in Scotland.
Before we get on to some of the more specific issues on speeding and drink-driving, I shall take up the important points that have been raised by my noble friends the Duke of Montrose and Lord Younger as well as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd, on the highway code and the driving test. The amendments to which they spoke seek to ensure that provisions of the highway code reflect the content of regulations made by the Scottish Ministers on speed limits and the drink-drive limit under the powers devolved to them in the Bill, assuming that those powers are actually used and changes made.
I fully agree that the highway code should reflect any changes made as a result of the powers being devolved, but it is important to note that there is no other legislation on the content of the code, either in the Road Traffic Act 1930 or in the supplementary provisions in Section 38 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. It would be disproportionate if the only specific statutory requirement on the content of the code were the few provisions in the Scotland Bill when there is no other such requirement to include any specific items of English, Scottish or Great Britain legislation. The code provides guidance, but it is not a comprehensive description of all road traffic legislation. However, I assure my noble friends that the mechanism exists to ensure that the highway code is accurately and adequately updated. It was referred to by my noble friend the Duke of Montrose that Section 38(2) of the 1988 Act gives the Secretary of State the power from time to time to revise the code by revoking, varying, amending or adding to the provisions in the code in such manner as he or she thinks fit.
Section 38(3) places the Secretary of State under a duty to lay proposed alterations to the code, other than those that are merely consequential on the passing of an amendment or repeal of provisions, before both Houses of Parliament at least 40 days before she proposes to make the changes.
Under Section 38(4), if the House resolves that the proposed alteration should not be made, the Secretary of State must not make the proposed revision to the code. Perhaps significantly, Section 38(5) of the 1988 Act states:
“Before revising the Highway Code … the Secretary of State must consult with such representative organisations as he thinks fit”.
That would include the Scottish Government as was the case during the last major revision in 2005 to 2007.
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
I can quite understand the noble and learned Lord’s wish to progress matters.
I am not entirely clear where to start. The amendment before this House is that:
“Before commencing discussions with representatives of foreign governments or inter-governmental organisations, Scottish Ministers are required to obtain consent to the discussions from a Minister of the Crown”.
It seems that we have ranged a little beyond that.
Perhaps I should start by declaring that I have had discussions with my noble friend Lord Foulkes of Cumnock. He is at liberty to tell the House what these were. I did not actually warn him about cybernats. I should perhaps advise him that he should not read what they say because they will just make him upset—and at his age he really ought to be careful.
I will try to pick up some of the points that have been made, and make one or two of my own. First, it seems desirable to ensure that there is good co-operation between the UK Government and Scottish Ministers when they are engaged overseas. That has not always happened, and even when the Scottish Ministers were of the same political persuasion as the UK Government it did not always happen. I am not saying that there were any undue difficulties, but sometimes the co-operation broke down. I must however say that, personally, I was always grateful for advice from the Foreign Office. My noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith, when he was Attorney-General, and I represented the United Kingdom at a conference in China between the European Union and the ASEAN countries on the issue of serious crime. I was due to chair a session of the conference which included the Attorney-General of Burma. I was unclear as to what role I should take in relation to the introduction of the Attorney-General of Burma, and I remember being very grateful for the advice that I got from the Foreign Office on that.
Secondly, it is right that both Governments respect the jurisdiction of the other, and that we recognise the frustration where it is felt that Scottish Ministers go beyond their responsibilities, particularly where it appears that they are pursuing a broader political strategy. However, Scottish Ministers have legitimate areas of activity which involve interaction with foreign Governments and intergovernmental organisations. They have responsibility for implementing directives of the European Union in the devolved area. They need to address vital European Union interests, not just in terms of directives but in terms of policy, and in doing so they interact not just with foreign Governments but with other devolved Administrations. The noble Lord, Lord Morgan, referred to the experience of the German Länder, and the way in which they go about their business.
Ministers also have responsibility for promoting trade, tourism and investment, and that of course necessarily brings them into contact with foreign Ministers and Governments. They also take an active part in intergovernmental organisations and conferences. I recently participated in a conference at the London School of Economics on what was called sub-state diplomacy. I found that quite instructive in finding out the way in which devolved Administrations work, not just in Europe but in other places; learning how Quebec, under both nationalist and liberal Governments, had promoted Quebec, and looking at the experience of Catalonia and the Belgian states in Europe.
It seems unrealistic, if I may say so, to suggest that each time Scottish Ministers were to speak to Ministers of other Administrations they should first get the consent of the Government. First of all, if you are at a conference and you are approached by a Minister of another Government it is not always possible to get that consent. Do you say “I’m very sorry, I can’t speak to you because I need to get consent from the relevant Minister”? As we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, sometimes not even the Foreign Office is able to co-ordinate.
With respect I also ask: what exactly are we attempting to do in this amendment? What sanction do we impose on Scottish Ministers if they do not get consent? We risk giving the Scottish Ministers a tool with which they can claim, yet again, that they do not have the respect of the UK Government, and that they are being gagged while they go about what they consider their legitimate business. That is not just a question of consent. If my noble friend is thinking of coming back with an amendment that they should advise or consult before they do that, the same question arises. What sanction does my noble friend suggest should be visited on a Scottish Minister who does not consult, get consent or obtain whatever other permission is required by this amendment?
We should think long and hard. I endorse a lot of what the noble Lord, Lord Martin of Springburn, said, because he made much the same point in his interesting comment, which of course comes from his long experience, mainly in the other place but also here. We should listen very carefully to these voices before we go down this road.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, it has been useful to have this discussion on foreign relations and the devolved Administration and devolved Parliament in Scotland. I share a lot of the analysis of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd of Duncansby, that in fact what this amendment proposes is largely unrealistic. He questions the sanction; we can readily anticipate how it would be spun if indeed it was accepted. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, accepted himself that the amendment was flawed. That said, the noble Baroness, Lady Liddell of Coatdyke, indicated that certain sentiments were associated with this that we should not lose sight of and quite properly referred to the initiative pursued by the noble Lord, Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale, when he was First Minister, in promoting Scotland’s links with Malawi. That was done in full consultation and co-operation with the United Kingdom Government and has been widely applauded and respected. It shows that it is possible to have that kind of relationship. Indeed, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd, indicated, there are legitimate areas of responsibility that fall on the devolved Government in Scotland involving interaction with foreign Governments.
It is important, therefore, that the Committee should be aware that there is a memorandum of understanding or concordat on international relations, which deals with devolved Administration engagement with other Governments and which is therefore relevant to the Scottish Government’s interaction with foreign Governments. Two areas are identified that are of relevance here. Bilaterally, the Scottish Government may, in co-operation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, make arrangements or agreements with foreign Governments or international organisations on devolved matters,
“provided that such arrangements or agreements do not purport to bind the UK in international law, affect the conduct of international relations or prejudice UK interests”.
Indeed, I can think of educational agreements that have been reached. It also says:
“The Scottish Government is, however, obliged to consult the FCO in advance about any contact, correspondence, or proposal that is novel or contentious, might create a contingent international liability or may have implications for international relations”.
On international organisations it is sometimes appropriate—and this is recognised in the concordat or memorandum of understanding—for,
“Ministers or officials from the devolved administrations to form part of a UK negotiating team”.
In these circumstances,
“The UK lead Minister will retain responsibility for the negotiations and will determine how each member of the team can best contribute”.
This brings us to the issue that was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, and that was spoken to by a number of other noble Lords following his intervention. He asked what the position is. The Scottish Government—his memory served him well—have put forward a proposal to have a statutory right to attend and speak at all Council meetings that relate to devolved matters. It was one of the six proposals that the Scottish Government put forward in the summer of last year. My colleagues in the UK Government are considering this request along with the other requests from the Scottish Government and will respond, but it should be clear that a statutory right to attend would inevitably have an impact on Welsh and Northern Irish representation.
Perhaps we may therefore look at what happens in practice. At present, Scottish Ministers can and do attend Council meetings when devolved matters are under discussion and do so as part of a United Kingdom delegation. My noble friend Lord Stephen indicated that there have been occasions, although perhaps not many, when a Minister from the Scottish Executive, as it then was—and still is—has led. Indeed, on more than one occasion he represented the United Kingdom, albeit as a Liberal Democrat Minister in a coalition Government representing the United Kingdom. When I was the Justice Minister in Scotland, I sat alongside Mr Blunkett when he was Home Secretary. At an appropriate point when Mr Blunkett thought that the matter under discussion was more relevant to Scotland than it was to England, I spoke on behalf of the United Kingdom.
The crucial point is that we spoke to an agreed United Kingdom line. The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, is right that on issues such as fisheries there often can be great tensions, but every effort is made ahead of the Fisheries Council to ensure that there is a United Kingdom line to which whoever speaks is expected to, and does, follow.
Scotland Bill
Lord Boyd of Duncansby Excerpts(12 years, 3 months ago)
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Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, this amendment is minor and technical in nature and has been laid following work undertaken with the Scottish Government to clarify the scope of Clause 13. The United Kingdom’s intended policy remains unchanged; we have always said that while we intend to re-reserve the regulation of health professions to Westminster, the regulation of social care professions should remain a devolved matter within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament. Likewise, the Scottish Government’s position on Clause 13 remains unchanged. They remain opposed in principle to the re-reservation of the regulation of health professions.
To give some background, health profession regulation is currently reserved by reference to specific Acts of Parliament, all of which were obviously in place when the 1998 legislation went through. Other health professions have been subject to regulation under subsequent statutes. Under the architecture of the 1998 Act they would not have been caught up in this. A considerable number of bodies made representations to the Calman commission that this was an unsatisfactory position, which is what we sought to address.
Despite the differing policy positions of the United Kingdom and Scottish Governments on the clause generally, this amendment clarifies the intent behind the clause and is an example of where we have listened to the technical concerns, which the Scottish Government have raised, and have sought to act on them. The Scottish Government’s concern was that, as originally drafted, Clause 13 might have an unintended consequence for the social care professions that might in the future become regulated by the Scottish Parliament under the Regulation of Care (Scotland) Act 2001 or a successor Act. The concern was that the regulation of these new social care professions would fall within the scope of the new re-reservation, which is not the United Kingdom Government’s intention.
This minor and technical amendment makes it explicit that regulation of the social care professions is, and will remain, a matter that is devolved to Scotland. I hope that that clarifies this amendment. I beg to move.
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
My Lords, we welcome the clarification that this amendment gives to this clause. It was never the Calman commission’s intention that the regulation of residential care workers should be reserved as opposed to health professionals. Perhaps I may add to the background. The Calman commission received evidence from the royal colleges, which are concerned at the possible fragmentation of standards as a result of the Scottish Parliament on the one hand and the UK Parliament on the other having responsibility for the regulation of health professionals. Common standards for health professionals are of evident benefit to the UK as a whole, and the Government’s implementation of this recommendation is to be welcomed.
On a final point, the re-reservation of powers to the UK Parliament in this case is a signal that devolution is about finding the right balance between the powers that sit with the UK Parliament and those that sit properly with the Scottish Parliament. It is important that we get a system that works well not only for the people of Scotland but for the people of the UK as a whole.
The Earl of Mar and Kellie
My Lords, does the clause in any way inhibit Scottish universities’ polar research? My noble friend has been to the Antarctic. In 1902, William Speirs Bruce led the Scottish national Antarctic expedition in the steam yacht, “Scotia”, its research ship. The “Discovery” was built in Dundee. Speirs Bruce also explored the Arctic, and one can still find the remains of Brucehaven in Spitsbergen. Perhaps I may ask a question that is vaguely similar to one asked by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth. Are we trying to prevent Scots universities exploring or researching in Antarctica but not in the Arctic?
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
My Lords, we support the inclusion of the clause, which seems sensible. Antarctica is obviously an important international resource. It is regulated by a treaty which, as we have heard, is now up for renewal, and it is clearly important that environmental protections are put in place to preserve Antarctica as a pristine part of the planet. Perhaps I should declare an interest as having acted for Donald Trump in a certain planning inquiry, but I assure noble Lords that there is no connection between my supporting this clause and Mr Trump.
As a Scottish Minister, I was not aware that we had any responsibility for Antarctica. I see my noble friend Lord McConnell nodding, so I do not think that he was aware of his responsibility. Clearly, that was a dereliction of duty.
Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale
My Lords, I can confirm that I was aware of my responsibilities as First Minister of Scotland, but I can also confirm in response to the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, that at no time in the five-and-a-half years that I served as First Minister of Scotland was I ever asked a parliamentary question on this subject, was a parliamentary debate on it ever suggested or, for that matter, did we ever receive any correspondence on it.
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
The question that I was going to pose was why we did not extend the ban on smoking in public places to Antarctica. Clearly, that was an oversight on our part. We could also have extended the scheme for insulation of older persons’ homes, which was one of the then Scottish Executive’s schemes. Of course, we are now spared the question as to whether the referendum on independence should also extend to Antarctica. The noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, has pointed out that if independence was ever to come, the First Minister would not have to consider whether to expand his navy by adding an ice-breaker to it. We fully support the clause.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend the Duke of Montrose for giving us the opportunity to discuss this matter and to all those who have welcomed this clause. I join my noble friends the Duke of Montrose and Lord Forsyth in saluting Captain Scott and his four fellow adventurers who on 17 January 1912 reached the South Pole. We are all conscious that theirs was a long struggle that ended very sadly, but, nevertheless, 100 years on, we remember the extraordinary feat of those explorers. I also join those who have paid tribute to and saluted my noble friend Lord Forsyth for climbing Mount Vinson last year. We all remember getting the reports and his managing to raise substantial funds both for Marie Curie Cancer Care and Children in Need India.
If the former First Minister knew that he had responsibilities for Antarctica, it is clear that he was not advised on it by his senior law officer, and he certainly did not share the fact with his Deputy First Minister.
My noble friend the Duke of Montrose asked about the draft Antarctic Bill. It was in the context of preparing for that draft Bill that it became apparent that, while outer space had been reserved, Antarctica had not. No doubt the noble Lord, Lord Sewel, will tell us why that was the case.
Scotland Bill
Lord Boyd of Duncansby Excerpts(12 years, 3 months ago)
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The Earl of Mar and Kellie
My Lords, one of the curiosities of the current rail franchising process is that while the British Government and, presumably, the Scottish Government cannot offer to run the railways directly, there is no opposition to foreign national Governments—through, for example, Deutsche Bahn or SNCF—running franchises in the United Kingdom.
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for tabling the amendment, which was debated in the other place. It seeks to rectify what appears to be an omission from the Scotland Act 1998 and subsequently the Railways Act 2005, which devolved significant powers over the ScotRail franchise, including its funding and licensing as well as responsibility for new rail lines for the network, yet neglected to devolve the power to determine the model of that franchise. Of course, it would not be appropriate to devolve responsibility for cross-border services, but that is not what the amendment seeks to address. It is clear that the amendment relates to services that begin and end in Scotland.
When this matter was debated in another place, as my noble friend indicated, we seemed to get side-tracked—if that is not an inappropriate way of putting it—down a spectre of renationalisation, which was not the purpose of the amendment. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary failed to address the central issue that the amendment poses regarding whether it is consistent with the spirit of the devolution settlement that the power to determine the nature of a discrete Scottish franchise, in relation to which the Scottish Government already have considerable responsibility, should be reserved.
I ask the noble and learned Lord the Minister to say what the position is in Wales and, more fundamentally, why the Government believe it is necessary and proper to retain powers to determine the franchise model of a self-contained Scottish rail service where the franchise is granted by the Scottish Government.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, gave a fair analysis or description of what his amendment is intended to do. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd, said that this might just be an oversight in the original arrangements. The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, said that it was too small a matter for the Calman commission. I think that quite a significant change is proposed; it is not a small matter at all. The fact that I do not recall any representation on or consideration of it as part of the Calman commission may say something about whether there is widespread support for it.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd, asked why legislative competence has not gone hand-in-hand with executive competence. I think I am right to say that executive devolution was not present in the 1998 Act, but was subsequently negotiated between the then Scottish Executive—I think that Mr Henry McLeish took a role in that—and the Labour Government. The agreement reached was one of executive devolution. The Labour Government did not think it right at that stage to extend legislative devolution, and that continues to be the position of this Government. The Government are committed to maintaining a GB-wide national rail network which is publicly specified and funded in the public interest but which is provided by the private sector.
It is important to recognise the substantial executive devolved powers which Scottish Ministers have in relation to railways. They include giving general guidance to the Office of Rail Regulation, giving notice of their requirements for the outputs of the rail network in Scotland and the level of public funding available to the Office of Rail Regulation and publishing a Scottish railway strategy. They also have power to designate, let, fund, manage and enforce Scottish franchises and publish a statement of policy on franchising; to set fares; to publish a code of practice protecting the interests of disabled passengers; to appoint a member of the Passengers’ Council; to give financial assistance to any person for the purpose of developing Scottish railways; and to publish freight grants schemes for Scotland. Indeed, they have considerably more powers than that. Of course, the Scottish Executive have also taken considerable initiatives in building and constructing new railways—my noble friend Lord Mar and Kellie is probably a personal beneficiary of the railway from Stirling to Alloa—so substantial powers are already available.
However, as I said, we believe that devolved powers are best exercised within a coherent GB structure, as provided for under the Railways Acts 1993 and 2005. It is essential that the overall regime for the provision of rail passenger services and their regulation remains a reserved matter. It would not be sensible to run the railway in such a way that the Scottish Parliament through legislative devolution could overturn the framework that governs the operation of passenger services in Great Britain as a whole.
The noble and learned Lord raised the question of Wales. I will certainly confirm the position, but the fact that we wish to keep a GB structure means that there is no legislative devolution to the Welsh Assembly.
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
My Lords, may I ask a question? They are on the Marshalled List in this group; that is the point. We are all here ready to debate these issues. It would be very unfortunate if we now moved on to other business and came back to this issue; these all form part of a group.
Lord Cameron of Lochbroom
I am in some difficulty because in listening to what the noble and learned Lord has already said about Clause 17 stand part, he justified his arguments by reference to later amendments in his name—namely, Amendments 71 and 72. It seems to me perfectly plain that these are before the Committee for discussion even though we may for the moment have swept Clause 17 out of the way—firmly batted it out of court. I ask your Lordships to reconsider the matter which has already been introduced because it would cause intense confusion if we passed over what the noble and learned Lord has already said in support of the amendments which will come in place of the displaced section at a later date.
Lord McCluskey
My Lords, I am perfectly happy to do that. Amendment 71A, which stands in my name, refers to line 11 of government Amendment 71 and proposes to insert the words,
“in the course of criminal proceedings”.
I want to emphasise that we are generally happy with the approach of Amendment 71: at least I am because I am happy that it deals with the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 rather than the 1998 Act—a point which I made earlier. However, the heading of the new clause, which is in bold on the Marshalled List, states:
“Convention rights and EU law: role of Advocate General in relation to criminal proceedings”.
First, I accept that we should deal with EU law as well as ECHR law, although our report did not find it necessary to go into that matter at all. This relates to criminal proceedings. The whole point is that Amendment 71 relates to the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, and we are making provisions in subsection (3) on:
“Right of Advocate General to take part in proceedings”.
I believe that that should read, “take part in criminal proceedings”, for a reason that I shall come to shortly. The provision states, in terms, that:
“The Advocate General … may take part as a party in criminal proceedings so far as they relate to a compatibility issue”.
The compatibility issue is defined here for the purposes of all the proposed new sections, including those that I am proposing.
Subsection (2) of proposed new Section 288ZA states:
“In this section ‘compatibility issue’ means a question whether a public authority has acted (or proposes to act)”
in the way specified in proposed new paragraphs (a) and (b). Again, we ought, for clarity to insert the words, “in the course of criminal proceedings”. They merely add something that is perfectly obvious, but they have a bearing on the important issue as to whether or not questions arising in criminal proceedings might be treated as vires issues in the way mentioned by the noble and learned Lord when he was speaking a moment ago.
Therefore, my next amendment proposes to insert after “whether”:
“an Act of the Scottish Parliament or any provision of an Act of the Scottish Parliament is outside the legislative competence of the Parliament as being incompatible”.
This is an important issue because the Advocate-General has very properly decided that there should be an amendment to paragraph 1 of Schedule 6 to the 1998 Act. That change appears in the new clause proposed in Amendment 72. Subsection (3) states:
“In paragraph 1 of Schedule 6 …after sub-paragraph (f) insert—‘But a question arising in criminal proceedings in Scotland is not a devolution issue if it is a compatibility issue within the meaning of section 288ZA of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act”.
When one looks at that provision in subsection (2) of the new section proposed in Amendment 71, we find that a compatibility issue includes,
“whether a public authority has acted (or proposes to act) … in a way which is made unlawful by section 6(1)”.
I may be wrong about this, and I hope to hear the noble and learned Lord’s reply, but if a Member of the Scottish Parliament—particularly a Member of the Government—proposes a Bill in the Scottish Parliament that will breach a convention right, as specified in Section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, that is unlawful. Therefore, under the proposed new clause in Amendment 72, from which I quoted a moment ago, a question arising in criminal proceedings is not a devolution issue, if it is a compatibility issue within that meaning. The result is, I think—although I may be wrong, because this is difficult to follow—that if, in the course of a criminal trial, assuming that the noble and learned Lord’s amendments on these matters are accepted, a person states, “The Act under which I have prosecuted or which has a bearing upon the prosecution is beyond the competence of the Parliament”, it will instantly become a compatibility issue that is not a devolution issue. Therefore, the alternative route of using the vires provisions under Schedule 6, to which the Advocate-General refers, will not be available to anyone. In other words, there is only one route to take, which is what I want to happen.
On 17 January, the Advocate-General said to me in a letter, and repeated today:
“I am not minded to accept the Lord Advocate’s suggestion”—
a suggestion made by the Lord Advocate before the committee at which I spoke—
“that the new appeal should extend to questions as to whether an Act of the Scottish Parliament is compatible with ECHR or EU law. The suggestion would mean that if someone wishes to argue that an ASP is incompatible with the ECHR and that it also relates to reserved matters they would need to use the new appeal route in relation to the ECHR issue as well as the existing devolution issues appeal route”.
I think that his amendments knocked out the devolution issue and have given us what we want, but I would be interested to hear his view on that and whether there has been some confusion on the matter.
The other amendment which I should mention in this context bears on proposed new Section 288ZA in Amendment 71, where I propose to add in subsection (2),
“references to the course of criminal proceedings are to the period beginning with the detention or arrest of a person for an offence and ending with the pronouncing of the final interlocutor”.
The reason for that highly technical amendment is that it is possible that, before a person is detained or arrested, there might be by a public authority—whether the police or the BBC, for example—an invasion of his human right to a fair trial by saying things about the accused even before he is detained. We may need to look at that separately, but the amendment draws attention to the fact that there ought to be a definition as to when criminal proceedings begin in the Act, so as to leave it in no doubt. There have been difficult questions in past cases about when a person is charged, when he is detained, et cetera. Those words themselves are not crystal clear, but I want to make it crystal clear when criminal proceedings begin and when, for the purposes of compatibility issues, they end. That matter is covered by my Amendments 71A to 71C, which draw attention to what I think are problems arising from the framing of Amendment 71, which proposes the new clause.
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
I must say that I am somewhat confused as to where we are on all this and whether, for example, I have now to address the issue of certification. I am not entirely clear whether the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, has yet to address that issue.
However, first, as the noble and learned Lord observed, I was a member of the Advocate-General’s expert group looking at the issue of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. We welcome the progress that has been made by the noble and learned Lord and reflected in the government amendments. The expert group recommended that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court should continue and should be focused on the role of the prosecutor, but that convention compliance in criminal should be outwith the jurisdiction or ambit of Section 57(2).
Lord McCluskey
I did not speak to that amendment. I agree that it may not be entirely necessary. However, as the noble and learned Lord knows, many a time have we put something in statute to make a clear point. Because there has been debate, including among lawyers, about whether the High Court of Justiciary is the final court except in relation to compatibility issues, there is something to be said for putting this in the Bill. I felt that that would be a way to do it. That was why I tabled the amendment. The intention was to underline a point that is implicit elsewhere in the Act and, as the noble and learned Lord said, is stated expressly in other Acts.
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for that. On the broad issue of references to the High Court and Supreme Court by the Lord Advocate and Advocate-General for Scotland, I will reserve my position and consider the matter in more detail. When I was Lord Advocate, I always thought that the opportunity for doing was important. I believe that I did it once. I also take the point made by the noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General that there may be issues around whether it would be better if any of the parties could ask the court to do this. I will consider that before Report. I think that I have dealt with most of the issues. Given the wide-ranging nature of the amendments in this group, I may have missed something. However, I hope I picked up on all the necessary points.
Baroness Rawlings
My Lords, perhaps I may tell all noble Lords that they should feel free to comment on any amendments on the Marshalled List that relate to Clause 17.
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
My Lords, I have very little else to add to what has been a useful debate. However, I hope that next time we come to this we are able to group the amendments in such a way that we can have a more structured debate, because it has not been particularly easy to follow. The noble and learned Lord has been up and down on his feet—I do not blame him for that in any way, but the way that this has progressed has been unfortunate. Perhaps next time we can look more clearly at grouping the amendments in a more coherent manner.
Lord Maclennan of Rogart
It may be regarded as something of an impertinence for one who is not a Scots lawyer to intervene in such a debate and I therefore propose to confine my remarks. I hope that when we do come back to this, there will be a jury as well as judges sitting, and that we may hear the voice of the man in the street on this matter. Speaking with the view of the man in the street, I am bound to say that I find the Government’s position on this, and the views expressed by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Cullen and Lord Cameron, persuasive. It seems to me that the prime consideration is not whether or not the trial can be completed quickly, but whether or not justice is done. Those who are charged with an offence should have the right of appeal considered, unrelated to whether or not the issue is of public importance. It is of direct importance to the individuals involved in the trial. I may be completely off beam, and I recognise the risk of intervening in such a debate, but having listened to most of the arguments, I found them compelling, particularly on the side of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Cullen.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
Indeed, I can confirm that the Lord Advocate has referred cases directly to the Supreme Court; the so-called “sons of Cadder” cases were on references by the Lord Advocate to the Supreme Court within the last 12 months. So it clearly has been done. Those were cases clearly where there was a wish to get clarity in some of the implications of the original Cadder judgment. So there are certainly good arguments as to why that should be there, and ones that I am certainly prepared to listen to further.
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
I referred a case about the independence of justices of the peace, for the very reason to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, referred—because of the importance in getting clarity at an early stage so that the system as a whole did not seize up.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd, for that because there are arguments there and I will give further reflection to them.
A good number of issues have been aired on certification. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lords, Lord Cullen, Lord Cameron of Lochbroom and Lord Boyd of Duncansby, who indicated on certification that although there have been issues against it, in fact the case that the Government have sought to make against certification can be justified on a number of grounds. It is right, as a number of your Lordships have indicated, that we are not comparing like with like. As I indicated in my opening remarks, in England and Wales the whole criminal justice system of substantive criminal law and criminal procedure is the potential subject matter of appeals to the Supreme Court, whereas here we are dealing with what are essentially constitutional issues that arise in the context of a criminal case—namely, convention compliance or European Union laws.
Also, as I indicated before, the original justification for certification was very much administrative. It was an Administration of Justice Act in which it was introduced, to ensure that there was not a great flood of cases. I believe that it was brought in not for any reason of jurisprudence—as the quotes from the then Lord Chancellor, Viscount Kilmuir, suggest—but as an administrative break. Again, not least because of the representations which we have received from the Lord Justice General, we will treat these matters very sensitively and seriously, giving proper weight to the arguments that have been advanced again. It would be fair to say that the arguments advanced in the course of your Lordships’ debate this evening have not really prompted me to change my mind on this, but no doubt these matters will be returned to.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, for giving us a focus for some of the debates which we have had, and I very much hope that on Report—
Lord Sewel
My Lords, my mind goes back to consideration of the Scotland Bill in 1998. Some things are the same and some things change. What is the same is that now we are reduced to a relatively small House; what is different is that in 1998 our deliberations were at 2 am—when we used to carry on till that time—and now it is 6.45 pm. Nevertheless, as they say, I am sure that we will be able to make some progress.
The amendment deals with the appointment of what is called the BBC Trust member for Scotland. In olden days it used to be referred to as the “Scottish governor” of the BBC. At the moment the Bill says:
“A Minister of the Crown must not exercise without the agreement of the Scottish Ministers functions relating to selection for a particular appointment”,
and then goes on to explain. My amendment would take out “agreement” and put in “consultation”.
That is partly because of something that happened way back in 1974, when local government in Scotland was reorganised. I remember going to a conference of the good and the great, where the whole discussion was about the relationship between the two tiers of local government in Scotland, the regions and the districts. I remember a very distinguished civil servant at the time saying, “Given good will, the relationship between the two tiers of local government would work very well indeed”, and a grizzled chief town clerk—those were the days when we had town clerks rather than chief executives—saying that in his experience the last thing that you could count on in the relationships between local authorities was the existence of good will.
I am not daring to say that that typifies the relationship between the Scottish Parliament and the Parliament of the United Kingdom, or between Scottish Ministers and UK Ministers, but having an appointment that depends upon the agreement of two Ministers from different Parliaments and maybe of different political hues, as sometimes happens in this House, creates at least the opportunity—I put it no stronger than that—for mischief-making. In other words, it is possible to generate a major row or a clash over something relatively minor, so that what perhaps starts off as an irritant becomes a major issue of principle. Basically, let us avoid that; let us avoid creating a structure that offers that possibility.
By all means let us have consultation. My amendment would mean that the Secretary of State had consultation with Scottish Ministers. To be honest, I would prefer the Scottish Minister to have the decision rather than the Secretary of State, if we got away from the business of agreement. My first position is the Secretary of State and my second position is Scottish Ministers. I just want to avoid the opportunity—the invitation, almost—to create a fuss over something where it should not exist.
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
My Lords, there is an important point in what my noble friend says. The Calman commission recommendation was that:
“The responsibility for the appointment of the Scottish member of the BBC Trust should be exercised by Scottish Ministers, subject to the normal public appointments process”.
There is no suggestion there that it would be by anyone other than the Scottish Ministers. Perhaps in addressing my noble friend’s point, the Minister could also address the issue of why there has been a difference of approach in the Bill from that of the Calman commission’s report.
Baroness Rawlings
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sewel, for putting down his amendment as it gives me the opportunity to clarify Her Majesty’s Government’s view on this delicate point.
Clause 20 will make certain that the Secretary of State has to seek the agreement of Scottish Government Ministers in the process of appointing the BBC Trust member for Scotland. Currently, the Scottish Government are involved in the appointment process on an informal basis. The clause will formalise the involvement of Scottish Ministers in the appointment process and gives them the legislative basis to undertake their responsibilities in relation to the appointment process.
Under the terms of the BBC charter, the Trust member for Scotland must be qualified by virtue of his knowledge of the culture, characteristics and affairs of the people in Scotland and his close touch with the opinion of that nation. Therefore, we feel it is preferable that Scottish Ministers should have a significant role in agreeing the appointment. In answer to the noble Lord, it is highly unlikely that the situation would arise in which they would fundamentally disagree over the appointment of a candidate. If Scottish Ministers do not give their agreement to the proposed DCMS appointment of the BBC Trust member for Scotland, they would need to provide justification for that. Both sets of Ministers have the same interest in not wanting to leave the seat empty. The opportunity is primary for a member of a UK body—that is, the BBC Trust. Furthermore, broadcasting remains a reserved matter, something that the Calman report was very clear should remain the case, and we are following that principle. On this basis, the UK Government believe it is important to retain the ultimate responsibility for the appointment.
This amendment would place a duty on the Secretary of State only to consult Scottish Ministers in appointing the BBC Trust member for Scotland, rather than seeking their agreement to the appointment. It is our view that this does not give the Scottish Government sufficient involvement in the appointment process. Securing the agreement of the Scottish Government is the appropriate way of involving them in the appointment process for the BBC Trust member for Scotland. The existing provision gives the Scottish Government an important and appropriate power and the UK Government do not wish to weaken this. I hope that this satisfies the noble Lord, Lord Sewel, and I urge him to withdraw his amendment.
Scotland Bill
Lord Boyd of Duncansby Excerpts(12 years, 3 months ago)
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Lord Selkirk of Douglas
If I may, I would like to ask a very brief question to the Minister in this connection. During the Calman commission, we recommended that more time should be given for the final stages of Bills in the Scottish Parliament. It seemed to us that with many Bills, voluntary organisations, charities or other worthy bodies would have recommendations to make but would get virtually no changes in the final stages of the Bill because procedures were so rapid and everything went so quickly. My understanding was that that was under consideration by the Scottish Parliament, and I wonder whether the Minister could give us the up-to-date situation on that subject, if he has the facts readily at hand.
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
This is the first time that I have spoken at this stage of the debate, so I renew my declaration of interest in the Calman commission. I am somewhat surprised to find that I am standing here at the Dispatch Box, and I hope that the Committee does not find it strange that two lawyers who were both on the Calman commission now find ourselves on opposing sides of the bar but pulling in the same direction. I hope that it reflects the cross-party approach to the Bill.
To my noble friend Lord Foulkes of Cumnock I can say that I was very pleased, particularly given what has been said already, that I was one of those invited to his party, and that I very much enjoyed it. So if I disagree with him on any point, he can be assured that it is not because I am biting the hand that fed me.
On the issue of timetabling, I think I am right in saying that there are states within the United States that have within their constitution maximum times during which legislators can sit. They take the view that the longer they sit the more mischief they can make. That might be one approach. In Britain, we tend to take the opposite view—that we pay legislators to legislate, and if they are not sitting in plenary session, they are clearly not worth the taxpayers’ money.
The court of public opinion is the important element here. I suspect that it modified the sittings of this Parliament, given the criticisms that were made about the long summer recess, but clearly it may also very well have worked in relation to the Scottish Parliament, given the proposals. In particular, the amendment that my noble friend has put down may very well have spurred some action on it. With these words, I look forward to hearing from the Minister.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
My Lords, just to show that the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, and I have not formed some kind of alliance for the purposes of the Bill, I do not agree with the amendment. I agree with the sentiment, which is that the Scottish Parliament should, in so far as is practical, confine its activities to its responsibilities, but to try to write that down is capable of being interpreted as trying to gag the Parliament. I can imagine circumstances in which it might wish to discuss things that are not within its immediate bailiwick and which might not be for representations to the United Kingdom Government. For example, were I a Member of the Scottish Parliament at the moment, I would want a debate on how the Bank of England, rather than the Bank of China, could become the lender of last resort to an independent Scotland. Under the amendment, it would be impossible for one to have that debate. As the First Minister has raised that startling question in the past few days, it would be entirely appropriate for people to raise such issues.
On a more serious matter, at the end of the day, this House and the other place work on the basis of convention. A convention is that we do not discuss devolved matters, and that is respected. That relates to the leadership of the organisation. One of the tragic things in the Scottish Parliament, as the noble Lord, Lord McConnell, pointed out earlier, is that the leadership seems determined to upset the neighbours and to use that to achieve a political objective. It is fair enough to use the Scottish Parliament as a platform to make the case for policy and ideas and to try to persuade the voters, but to use it as a platform in order deliberately to create dissent and division is not the purpose of it. I suspect there is nothing that we can do by way of passing amendments to the law that will change that. To change the way in which the Parliament operates it is necessary to change the calibre and nature of the leadership in the Parliament itself.
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
My Lords, we recognise the frustrations that have been expressed here, especially that this House and the other place have a self-denying ordinance and convention that we do not discuss devolved areas, but that is not respected in the Scottish Parliament. Nevertheless, there are three particular problems with the amendment.
Lord Selkirk of Douglas
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 8 and 11. In seeking to speak earlier, I was confusing Clause 7 with Amendment 7; I was not trying to hurry up the noble Lord—which would have been impossible in any case.
The purpose of Amendments 8 and 11 is to include the law officers—it could be the Attorney-General, the Advocate-General for Scotland or the Lord Advocate—among those who would be responsible for publishing a reference of a part of a Bill to the Supreme Court. The Bill lays down that it should be the Presiding Officer who should publish a notice of the reference to the court in the Edinburgh Gazette, and in such other ways as the Presiding Officer considers appropriate. As the reference should probably be made in most cases by one of the law officers, surely it is appropriate that it should be his or her responsibility to publish the fact that a reference has been made; for example, by putting it on the departmental website. The amendment ensures that the Executive take responsibility for publishing references made by them, thus showing a respect for the doctrine of the separation of powers.
I notice that the Minister has put down Amendments 9 and 10, which may achieve very much the same objective. If I am correct in that assumption, and they fulfil the same purpose but rather better—or at least are better expressed—I will not insist on these amendments and will withdraw them. In any case, I very much look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say.
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
My Lords, this group includes a notice in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Browne about Clause 7 standing part of the Bill. I will start with that and deal with the other amendments in due course.
Clause 7 introduces a new mechanism of a limited reference of a Bill to the Supreme Court to determine whether certain provisions of the Bill are within the competence of the Scottish Parliament. At present, once a Bill has passed through all its stages in the Scottish Parliament, it is for the Presiding Officer to present the Bill to Her Majesty for Royal Assent. However, before the submission for Royal Assent, there is a 28-day period during which the law officers—the Advocate-General, the Lord Advocate and the Attorney-General—can consider the Bill and if so advised refer it under Section 33 of the Scotland Act to the Supreme Court on a question as to whether any of its provisions is within the competence of the Scottish Parliament. Under Section 33, the whole Bill is referred and there is no mechanism to refer only certain parts of the Bill. Even if only one part is thought to be outwith the competence, none of it can be commenced until that issue is disposed of.
That explanation of the effect of a reference under Section 33 perhaps sets out the argument for the Government’s proposals in Clause 7. However, there are serious concerns as to how this will work in practice. I hope that this debate will draw out some of the rationale behind their proposals. To date, there has been no reference under Section 33 to the Supreme Court of a Scottish parliamentary Bill.
It might help if I briefly set out the internal procedures put in place during my time as Lord Advocate to ensure that Scottish Bills were within the competence of the Parliament. A Bill introduced into the Scottish Parliament by a Scottish Minister must be accompanied by a statement under Section 31 of the Scotland Act that in his or her opinion the Bill is within the legislative competence of the Parliament. Members of this House will be familiar with that kind of statement because all Bills presented here are accompanied by a statement made under Section 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act. The Scotland Bill is no exception to that. Therefore, there is a certificate, as it were, on all Scottish Bills which are put into the Scottish Parliament.
Certainly, in my time as Lord Advocate, no statement would be given by a Minister without their having sought the advice of the law officers that it could be made. I cannot speak for present procedures and it is possible that they have changed, although I have no reason to think that they have. Nevertheless, there are in place substantial internal procedures to ensure that Bills are within competence. In reaching a view on the competence of a Bill, there were a number of procedures. Those who were Ministers at the time will recall the passporting arrangements whereby there was a process with the Minister for parliamentary business and the Lord Advocate to have what in the UK Government would be a legislation committee—certainly, when I was Solicitor-General there was a legislation committee—which considered all the issues that were thrown up by the Bill, including legislative competence.
In addition, officials from the law officers’ departments were in constant touch with each other. We would talk to officials within the Advocate-General’s office and, for that matter, the Attorney’s office. Officials in the Scottish Government Legal Directorate would also engage with relevant departmental officials—for example, in the Home Office—to ensure that issues were identified at an early stage.
The role of the Presiding Officer is very important. The noble Lord, Lord Steel of Aikwood, will have had first-hand knowledge of that. The Presiding Officer must decide whether a Bill presented to the Scottish Parliament is within the competence of the Parliament, although I think I am right in saying that the standing orders allow for that decision to be overridden by the Parliament, but nevertheless it is an important element. Again, contacts were made between the office of the Presiding Officer and the law officers to ensure, as far as possible, that any Bill presented was within competence.
On amendments to Bills as they proceed through Parliament, it is true that not all amendments were referred to the law officers, but those that might cause an issue again were referred. I can say that on more than one occasion I did make it known both within the Executive, as well as on occasion to the individual Member who had proposed the amendment, that if it found its way into the Bill, the question of legislative competence would arise and that I or another law officer might have to refer the issue of competence to what was then the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and is now the Supreme Court. So my experience is that a number of mechanisms are available for the detailed consideration of a Scottish Bill at all stages of its passage through the Scottish Parliament, and that issues of competence should be dealt with in that process. Even so, the Bill would be given another look once it had gone through all its processes. We usually took 28 days to do that, although there were occasions when there was an emergency and the law officers dispensed with the period of 28 days.
What this clause now proposes is that there will be a mechanism for referring part of a Bill to the Supreme Court for scrutiny. As I understand it, what will happen is that the Bill could still be given Royal Assent despite the limited reference while the issue is being considered by the Supreme Court. There is a mechanism for the remaining unaffected parts of the Bill to be brought into effect. However—I am looking for some guidance from the noble and learned Lord on this—as I also understand it, the Supreme Court would have a significant role in determining or making provision for how it would come into effect. I shall come back to that in a moment.
The Scottish Government have said that they are not in favour of this. An interesting point is the question of whether it is desirable to ask Her Majesty for Royal Assent to a Bill with disputed provisions in it. There may well be a point to be made about that, although perhaps not to be pressed too far. Nevertheless, there is also the question of what signal that would give the general public. Legislation on the statute book may not be in force but usually there is no question mark as to its validity. Moreover, the provision that:
“The Queen’s Printer for Scotland may publish notice of the reference and of the effect”,
may not be sufficient.
Clause 7 was not one of the recommendations of the Calman commission. I think it arose as a result of the commission’s general recommendation that:
“There should be a review of all other provisions in the Act that constrain the Parliament in terms of its procedures or working arrangements to ensure they are proportionate, appropriate and effective”.
I do not criticise the Scotland Office for having embarked on that, but the Government have identified through the review a number of areas, including this one, where they could make further provision.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
Perhaps I can clarify for my noble friend that Section 31 of the Scotland Act 1998 is relevant in this regard. It states:
“A member of the Scottish Executive in charge of a Bill shall, on or before introduction of the Bill in the Parliament, state that in his view the provisions of the Bill would be within the legislative competence of the Parliament”.
Subsection (2) says:
“The Presiding Officer shall, on or before the introduction of a Bill in the Parliament, decide whether or not in his view”—
or in the case now, in her view—
“the provisions of the Bill would be within the legislative competence of the Parliament and state his decision”,
so the Presiding Officer has to state their decision as to whether it is within competence.
Let us take this away from the question of the referendum Bill, because our ambition here is not to get into that position; it is to reach an agreement, preferably on a Section 30 order. However, in general, the Presiding Officer has to decide whether the provisions of the Bill would, in their view, be within the legislative competence of the Parliament, and has to make that decision public. It is still the case that the Parliament could proceed to debate and process the Bill notwithstanding that, but there are obviously political ramifications. I could imagine some pretty lively debates if that was to be the case.
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
Could I clarify something which I think I asked? I am not entirely sure that I have got it over. On the provisions on the statement in Section 31, I said that in my time as Lord Advocate the law officer had to give their approval to that. That is a matter of public record and has been said many times before. I do not know whether that has changed in any way and I cannot recall whether it was part of the Ministerial Code that the Minister could not make that statement without the law officer's approval. If it was part of the Ministerial Code, I cannot think that it would be departed from. If it was simply an internal arrangement, it could of course have been departed from and one could speculate as to what procedures would now be in place.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
The noble and learned Lord is right. We cannot speculate on what happens in an Administration of whom we are not members, but I can confirm what my noble friend and the noble and learned Lord said about the Administration of whom the three of us were members. The procedures and proceedings in these matters were as they have described.
To return to Clause 7, the limited reference procedure that we are seeking would therefore allow the law officers to refer to the Supreme Court only the provisions with which they have competency concerns, while, as I said, allowing the rest to go forward to Royal Assent. We believe that this is an appropriate and sensible method of helping to ensure that the work of the Scottish Parliament runs as smoothly as possible.
On the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Selkirk to Clause 7, through our engagement with the Law Society of Scotland the Government have, as my noble friend indicated, tabled amendments that reflect the intention behind his amendments. I wish to thank my noble friend for looking at this clause closely and for tabling his amendments. The government amendments have the same effect; I am advised that parliamentary counsel think that they have a more appropriate form of wording, but the effect is exactly the same. We therefore very much support the amendments that he has tabled, and I hope he will withdraw his amendment in respect of the other amendments that have been tabled.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
Indeed, what we have here is a better outcome than what was there before. We reflected on what had been said, the representations that we had received and the amendments that had been tabled, and came to the conclusion that this was the best way forward on this point.
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
I was not quite sure if the Minister was now coming to an end. I wanted to press him on one point. Whatever view he may take of the utility of the measure that he is putting forward, what weight does he put on the view of the Scottish Parliament—whose legislation this is, after all—that it does not want this? Does he think that it is right to press it in the face of that opposition? Or does he think that, because he as Advocate-General and his successors in that office will have to operate this, this is something that the UK Government want, despite what the devolved Administration think?
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
I also need to address some of the points regarding the amendments in my own name. I indicated that this was intended to help give effect to Scottish Parliament measures where perhaps only one small part of a Bill was in contention, rather than hold them up and frustrate them. If that were to happen and a whole Bill was referred because there was one clause in it over which there was some doubt and some cause for a Supreme Court determination, I rather think the Scottish Parliament might have a view to express at the point. The Bill being held up might contain other measures that it was agreed on all sides were very valuable; indeed, the measure under reference might be one where there was agreement about the policy intent but some doubt about whether it was within competency.
The six amendments that the Government have put forward are intended to achieve a number of important changes as well as technical improvements. As I have set out, and my noble friend has made this point, we think that the law officer who is making the limited reference should be responsible for publishing notice of it, rather than the Presiding Officer.
Amendment 12 implements recommendations made by the Subordinate Legislation Committee of the Scottish Parliament. We are taking on board what it said in its report on the delegated powers in the Bill in its 10th report of 2011, Session 3, where it stated that it,
“could envisage situations where the delay in commencement of the specified provisions would possibly require further provision to be made to enable the Act to function as the Parliament intended”.
The new power in subsection (9) is added in response to those comments to give the Scottish Ministers the power to make appropriate consequential provision in that scenario.
Amendment 12 deals with a point that the noble and learned Lord picked up: it modifies Section 28 of the Interpretation and Legislative Reform (Scotland) Act 2010 in its application to commencement orders made by the Scottish Ministers under new Section 33A(6). The effect is that those orders, which are to be subject to negative procedure in the Scottish Parliament, must be laid for a minimum period of 40 days rather than the standard 28-day period before they can come into force.
It may be helpful if I also write to noble Lords about this; I spent many sessions trying to get my head around a lot of its implications. The measure is designed to eliminate the risk that the Scottish Parliament passes a negative resolution after provisions in a commencement order made under Section 33A(6) have come into force. In this scenario the resolution would have no effect, as the provisions commenced would by that time already have the force of law. By increasing the laying period to 40 days, if the Parliament passes a negative resolution within that period then, in terms of Section 28 of the 2010 Act as modified, the instrument is not to come into force after that resolution.
Amendment 12 also allows the Supreme Court to provide that an order under new Section 33A(6) may be laid before the Scottish Parliament less than 40 days before it comes into force, in acknowledgement that there may be circumstances where it is desirable to bring provisions of an ASP that were subject to a limited reference into force more urgently.
Amendment 13 amends Section 113 of the 1998 Act so that the useful supplementary order-making powers contained at subsections (2) to (6) and (11) of that section also apply to the powers of Scottish Ministers to make orders under Section 33A(6), (9) and (10). For example, that would allow a consequential order under new section 33A(10) also to make supplementary or incidental provision under the power at Section 113(4)(a).
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
I thank the noble and learned Lord for his explanation and his offer of a letter, which will help. We have had a long debate on this but some important issues and points of principle have been raised.
Lord Steel of Aikwood
I do not know whether I am interrupting at the wrong point but, after listening to the past hour of debate, I want to add that even those of us who are enthusiastic about devolution have to admit that it has created a field day for lawyers. We have lawyers galore all over the place. I was most grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd, for describing very accurately at the beginning of his speech the triple-lock mechanisms that exist, first, with the Executive’s legal advice, then with the Presiding Officer’s legal advice, and finally with the Advocate-General’s legal advice, to ensure that we do not get into difficulties with one Parliament attempting to legislate where it has no authority to do so.
I seem to recall that in the very early days of the new Parliament—my noble and learned friend and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd, will correct me if I have this wrong—when my noble and learned friend was Minister of Justice and the noble and learned Lord was the Solicitor-General, we had real difficulty in my department because the law department was not fully staffed. Both noble and learned Lords will remember that we had a backlog of legislation from the days when my noble friend Lord Forsyth rightly said that he was effectively in opposition rather than in government, and we had all the reports of the Scottish Law Commission waiting to be put into effect. We had a flood of very early legislation, none of which was particularly controversial but all of which had to be gone through. I remember that the staff in my office were almost in a state of breakdown because they did not have the capacity to give the necessary legal advice, although it was eventually given.
My noble friend Lord Stephen asked whether the legal advice would be made public. The answer is no, not normally anyway. After all, legal advice is advice; the decision rests with Ministers and with the Presiding Officer. What would happen if there were an FOI request, I have no idea. It never happened in my time so I do not know the answer to that. However, it is important that everybody knows that these locks exist even though, as I say, they provide endless employment for lawyers on a grand scale.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd, mentioned emergency legislation. I hope noble Lords will forgive me if I mention a final anecdote, but I recall the occasion when we had to rush through a piece of emergency legislation following a decision of the court over the release of somebody from Carstairs Hospital. That occurred one summer. I remember it clearly. Her Majesty was at Balmoral. I was told that the Advocate-General could not possibly take the 28 days that he was normally allowed and that the measure would be rushed through. I was asked where I was going to be located in order to receive the Advocate-General’s advice, sign it off and send a letter to Her Majesty asking her to give Royal Assent. I was at home. I think that it must have been a Saturday as I was having lunch, untypically, with two hereditary Conservative Members of this House. That was not my normal custom but just happened to be the case on that occasion. A courier arrived on a motor bike from Edinburgh. He saw me through the kitchen window and so knocked on that window rather than going to the door. I opened the window, received the document, undid all the pink ribbon and the vellum, looked at the Advocate-General’s response and signed the letter to Her Majesty asking her whether she would be kind enough to give Royal Assent to this very important emergency legislation. I gave the letter back to the man on the motor bike and asked him, “Are you taking this to Balmoral now?”. He replied, “Yes”. I said, “Let me give you a piece of advice. When you get there, don’t knock on her kitchen window”.
EU Committee: Court of Justice of the European Union
Lord Boyd of Duncansby Excerpts(12 years, 7 months ago)
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Lord Boyd of Duncansby
My Lords, I begin by declaring an interest as a solicitor-advocate in practice in Scotland, and from time to time my practice involves cases which may end up in the European courts. I am very pleased to have been a member of the sub-committee which undertook this investigation and I want first of all to pay tribute to our chairman in guiding us through what I believe was a very good report with a deftness of touch, and also to the staff, the clerks and the legal advisers who gave excellent advice.
I want to address the issue of judges and resources in the courts. In a time of austerity, for a lawyer to make a plea for more resources and more judges in a court may sound like special pleading if not perverse. To ask for such resources for European institutions is always asking for trouble. In the popular mind, a European court is one that interferes with British interests, perhaps to the detriment of parliamentary sovereignty. The failure in the popular mind to distinguish clearly between the European Court of Human Rights on the one hand and the Court of Justice of the European Union on the other makes the task even more difficult. Yet it is apparent from our report that the delays in the Court process as a result of the situation that now faces the Court are a significant impediment to economic activity and the achievement of the goals of the European Union.
The committee was particularly concerned about the workload of the General Court, which deals with cases that turn crucially on the assessment of often large amounts of factual material, including competition cases where challenges to the decisions of the Commission, which themselves run into 600 pages, may generate files that contain 20,000 pages or more. Competition cases now represent 10 per cent of the workload of the General Court, and the average turnaround for all cases, including competition cases, is 33 months. As the CBI has said, an average turnaround of 33 months in competition cases is simply unacceptable. It cites the particular example of the ICI case which, exceptionally, took over nine years to be resolved.
The move to have decisions under the EU regulation on the registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals—the so-called REACH regime—from the European Chemicals Agency subject to appeal in the General Court will undoubtedly increase pressure on that court. One estimate suggests that there may be over 2 million applications to the European Chemicals Agency, and there is real concern that the General Court may be overwhelmed as a result.
One way of helping to ease this is by the creation of specialist tribunals taking some of the work—trade marks have been suggested—away from the General Court. As we have already heard, the committee considered that specialist chambers were a more efficient way of proceeding because they would allow judges to be redeployed within the Court structure to cope with peaks and troughs. A specialist tribunal would simply increase the rigidity of the system without gaining any flexibility.
In my submission, we cannot get away from the need to increase the number of judges in the General Court. To that extent, I was pleased to see the response from the Government in the letter of 4 July to the chairman of the European Union Committee. The Minister, Mr Lidington, said that the Government were working actively with other members discussing the size of the judiciary in the General Court. Will the Minister tell us what progress has been made on that issue?
Turning to the Court of Justice, we believe that there are problems ahead. It is true that the present workload is being coped with, but we saw a crisis looming because of the number of new cases that are likely to come forward from the new states following enlargement and the new jurisdiction in freedom, security and justice. It is clear that these pressures are going to be there, and I was disappointed to see in the same response that the Minister is not convinced that the Court of Justice is facing an imminent crisis without any real specification of that. What evidence does the Minister have to counter that of the committee that the Court of Justice is indeed facing a crisis? How imminent it is may be a matter of conjecture, but does he agree with the committee that something needs to be done, and done soon, otherwise we will face further problems?
I believe that this is a good report that will set a benchmark for the future of the Court if the Government act in conjunction with other member states. I will be pleased to hear in general what the Government’s response is to this report.
Scotland Bill
Lord Boyd of Duncansby Excerpts(12 years, 8 months ago)
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Lord Boyd of Duncansby
My Lords, it was a privilege to serve along with other Members of this House as a member of the Calman commission, and it is pleasing to see its recommendations in legislation before this House, so it will come as no surprise to learn that I support the Bill. In fact, there were two reports from the Calman commission. The first, in December 2008, looked at the broad principles and, as no one else has referred to it, if noble Lords will bear with me I shall consider some of the issues from that report. We attempted to put together principles that would guide the work of the commission and to set out the issues and context for the final conclusions. We asked: what do we understand the union to be? First and foremost it is a political union, a constitutional monarchy that has over 300 years evolved, as the commission stated,
“common political and constitutional values and institutions, which form the bedrock of our liberties”.
We share on these islands a profound commitment to democracy and the rule of law. We have a common citizenship that includes a commitment to human rights and their safeguarding for all our citizens. An integral part of the Scotland Act is the embedding of the European Convention on Human Rights within it.
I am genuinely pleased to see the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, in his place. He and I have had our differences of opinion, but I recognise his commitment and the contribution he has made not only to Scots law but to this House. I read the debates on the 1978 Bill, which formed a substantial contribution to the 1998 Act. No doubt we will debate the Supreme Court, but I recognise a degree of common approach from the group of the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, and that of Sir David Edward. I served as a member of the Advocate-General’s expert group. For my part, I think that Clause 17 is about right, but we will no doubt debate that in Committee. I will certainly approach it with an open mind.
Scotland benefits from being part of a state whose overall influence may have waned as the Empire has diminished and is now challenged by new emerging states, but we remain a part of a United Kingdom with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, a permanent seat on the G8/G20 and a commitment to membership of the European Union. Scotland's influence would be substantially diminished if that union were to go.
We also recognise that the union is an economic one. Sometimes we forget that there were substantial economic reasons for Scotland to join the union in the first place: the establishment of a common currency and a customs union. As the commission stated, we have,
“a deeply integrated economic Union”,
with a,
“well-integrated single market in goods, services, labour, capital and knowledge”,
with common institutions that support the structure within which the market operates: the Bank of England, the FSA, HMRC, the Treasury, and so on. Although the commission did not highlight this, there are other parts of the regulatory framework, for example Ofgem in the electricity market.
The commission was united in stating that that single market and the framework and institutions necessary to sustain it should remain. The irony is that we now have a Scottish Government who wish to secede from the union, with all the advantages that it brings, only to embed Scotland even more deeply in another Union—one that would, over time, require Scotland to adopt a different currency from the rest of the UK and in which it would have less influence.
The United Kingdom is also a cultural union. We speak with substantially the same language. There are substantial ties of family and kinship. We belong to cultural, social, professional, scientific and business institutions that operate across the United Kingdom, albeit ones that often appear to have a Scottish face within Scotland. We share a common history. Together we forged an industrial revolution, built an empire and struggled to provide a better future, securing rights for workers and providing a free health service, education and social welfare. We fought two world wars together and have taken part in many more—some ill-advised and wrong, some heroic and right. In all of that, Scotland has made a contribution to the common history well in excess of its size relative to the rest of the United Kingdom.
In recent decades, we have seen new immigrants to Britain. These have contributed substantially to the cultural diversity of these islands and the multiple identities which Britain holds within it. For all the tensions that that sometimes brings, Britain remains a fundamentally tolerant society. The commission recognised that, as it did the cultural institutions, for example the place of the BBC as a public broadcaster—much criticised at times, sometimes flawed. While some change was necessary to ensure a distinct Scottish influence, fundamentally we did not wish to see the break-up of that institution.
There is also a social union. We share assumptions about the provision of social benefits. We sometimes disagree about how these should be delivered. Despite growing diversity in education and health, we remain across these islands committed to free education—at least up until secondary level—and free healthcare at the point of delivery.
I am sorry that these parts of the first report did not perhaps get the attention that they deserve. Together, these factors are substantial arguments in favour of a United Kingdom. The debate thus far has become somewhat sterile. On the one side, we now have the SNP talking of a mixture of independence-lite or devolution-max without any great attempt to define what it means by that and promises to lull us into a sense of false security that not much would happen were a divorce to take place. On the other side, the language has not always been wholly helpful. We have talked incessantly about separation or secession. It is right to warn people of the dangers of secession but we cannot frighten people into supporting a United Kingdom. Until we start talking the language of inspiration and aspiration, we will continue to lose the argument. I hope that, whatever else we do, we start to talk that kind of language and give people a sense of purpose as to why Scotland should remain part of the United Kingdom.
On the issues of financial accountability, I do not intend to dwell long on the details but certain principles were fundamental to our approach. We were given the remit of addressing the issue of improving financial accountability of the Scottish Parliament. We were greatly helped by the independent expert group led by Professor Anton Muscatelli, which began by setting out a series of principles that would guide its work. The commission itself then refined six of those principles into three broad areas.
First, on equity, does a funding system allow levels of funding and hence a distribution of public services generally accepted as fair? Secondly, on efficiency, in both economic and administrative senses, does it impede the efficiency of the system? Thirdly, on accountability, does the devolved body have the autonomy to make spending and taxation decisions for which the electorate can hold it accountable? All of these in my submission are important principles. But there is a balancing act. No solution is ideal, and they will always be traded off, one for the other. We will no doubt debate whether the commission in its recommendation came up with the right mix. I believe it is broadly right because it produces an element of accountability that is not now present, but we will no doubt debate that.
My noble and learned friend Lord Davidson raised the issue of the position of the Lord Advocate, and the suggestion that we should be looking at separating out the role of the Lord Advocate as head of the system of prosecutions from the other functions that he has, perhaps with the appointment of a Director of Public Prosecutions. This of course is not a new idea; it has been around for some time. The role of the Lord Advocate has evolved greatly over the centuries; it is an office that goes back at least until the 15th century. At one time the Lord Advocate effectively ruled Scotland; in the days of Dundas his powers were immense. Sadly, by the time I came into office they had somewhat diminished. But the role of the Lord Advocate did change with devolution, because the spotlight was very much more on the law officers.
I remember when my noble and learned friend Lord Hardie was Lord Advocate—he sat in this House—and I recall in particular a question on search warrants. There had been a number of instances in Scotland where search warrants had been granted by justices of the peace with important pieces missing, and the result was that they were ineffective, and questions were asked about that. The only place where he could be asked questions about them was in this House. That was a pretty ineffective way of holding the Lord Advocate to account, because he was removed from Scotland, and of course this is a House in which only a small minority of Members would have a particular interest in such matters. Suddenly, when we became law officers in the Scottish Parliament, there were 129 MSPs, all of whom had large mailbags full of substantial complaints about the prosecution system. It was, at times, pretty uncomfortable. The noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, helped that process at times, if I may say so, with quite proper concern about, for example, the death of Surjit Singh Chhokar, which he will no doubt recollect. There were other instances, too, where it became extremely uncomfortable to have to answer questions about the prosecution system. When the noble Lord, Lord Steel, who is not in his place, was Presiding Officer, I remember being called to the Scottish Parliament to answer an emergency question on a prosecution matter.
Whatever happens in the future, I believe that that accountability is actually good, although it is uncomfortable. The fact is that I was able, as Lord Advocate, to take through the most far-reaching and profound changes in the prosecution system in Scotland, I have to say with the great help and assistance of the noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General, and more particularly perhaps with the First Minister of the time, my noble friend Lord McConnell. I would not have been able to do that were it not for the accountability that was brought by the Scottish Parliament to those proceedings.
I do not shy away from looking at these issues, but I have to say to my noble and learned friend that my own view is that this is more properly a matter for the Scottish Parliament initially to debate, and for us, the United Kingdom Parliament, to engage with it. That is where the impetus should come from for such a debate, not from the Chamber of this House.
The Scotland Act 1998 was a substantial achievement. The Scottish Parliament got extensive powers. The Canadian provinces have substantially less power in relation to criminal justice than the Scottish Parliament, and that is just one area where the Scottish Parliament has competence. It was, I believe, a considerable achievement but, as the noble and learned Lord said, one of the commission’s conclusions was that devolution had been a success. It had worked for the people of Scotland, it gave people greater access to those who made the decisions and it increased accountability. I believe that the changes in this Bill will strengthen the devolution settlement, make Parliament more accountable for its decisions and strengthen the union.