Police: Armed Officers

Lord Blair of Boughton Excerpts

Wednesday 8th June 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

In light of the incident in Paris, the Government have undertaken to provide an additional £143 million over the course of the spending review to provide an uplift in armed policing capability. That will include armed response vehicles and 1,000 additional armed police. To deal with the risk of a marauding firearms terrorist attack, as it is sometimes termed, we have developed a police-led capability that involves the option of large-scale military assistance. Clearly, I will not address details of operational capacity.

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, perhaps I should explain to the House that I am not sure how safe it is; I too was a police marksman, and that probably puts me in a firefight position with the noble Lord. The Question is interesting but it is not the real meat of the subject. The meat of the subject is the distribution of armed police across the country. No doubt the Metropolitan Police has a major capacity, as do the West Midlands, Manchester, Liverpool and the great conurbations. Does the Minister agree that services beyond those major cities are inadequate?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The noble Lord is right to observe that there is a concentration of authorised firearms officers in the London metropolitan area; indeed, there are more than 2,000. Beyond those areas, however, more collaborative arrangements have developed, with authorised firearms officers working on a regional basis rather than simply within individual forces.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Blair of Boughton Excerpts

Wednesday 27th April 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is not necessary to be on either side of the wrong question. The position is simple: encryption is effected by means of an algorithm, which is sometimes called an encryption key. If you sequence an encryption key, you encrypt; if you reverse the process, you decrypt. This Bill will not give any party access to the encryption key, which will be held by the provider.

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

Would the Minister agree with me when I say that I can find no moral justification for Apple’s refusal to open its own equipment, when it had been used by a dead terrorist?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I note what the noble Lord says, but the Apple case was one of some complexity. The court order that was eventually granted was in fact superseded because a third party came forward and provided the Federal Bureau of Investigation with access to the relevant material. The Apple case of course raised very real questions about the scope of responsibility of communications providers, and that is what this Bill seeks urgently to address. The providers have responsibilities to the public—not just the public to whom they provide their initial services.

Litvinenko Inquiry

Lord Blair of Boughton Excerpts

Thursday 21st January 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, I am not entirely sure that I should declare this as an interest, but this appalling crime took place during my term as Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. I endorse the Home Secretary’s Statement and I am very conscious that the implications of Sir Robert Owen’s report are far wider than having anything to do with the police. However, I would like the Minister further to acknowledge something which appears to have been omitted from the Home Secretary’s Statement. I would like the Minister to take note of the fact that this investigation was into a homicide by a method never seen before in the history of the world. It presented a unique and immensely dangerous challenge to the investigators themselves. In these days, when the Metropolitan Police faces sustained criticism over a number of unrelated matters, this investigation was in the finest tradition of that organisation. It was not only exemplary but innovative, intelligent, unstinting and astonishingly brave.

Identity Documentation

Lord Blair of Boughton Excerpts

Thursday 14th January 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, for introducing this debate. I take the view that ID cards are an idea whose time has come and I support exactly what the noble Lord, Lord Harris, said about an increasing number of people—a more and more rapidly increasing number of people—living a lot of their lives online and being quite prepared to give up information freely online. ID cards—state ID cards—are a natural extension of this process. My expertise, such as it is, is in security, and it will be on that aspect in the main that I will talk briefly.

False identities are an absolutely staple terrorist tactic. In answer to the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, in these troubled times it is not so much about the prevention of terrorism but its investigation. The police and the security services have an increasingly desperate concern in long-term inquiries, and sometimes in emergency inquiries, to establish the identity of individuals.

[Lord Scriven]

Is it not the case that, following the two major terrorist attacks in the UK, particularly the one in London, of the 99 recommendations given, quite a lot of those were about people already known and the security forces not acting on the data that they knew? It was not about a lack of data.

[Lord Blair of Boughton]

I am sure there were some recommendations like that, but perhaps when I have finished the noble Lord might see the opposite side of the coin.

It is this search for identity that lies behind the troubled development of the DNA database. The same reason lies behind the coming forward of the investigatory powers Bill and the question of ID cards.

I remind the House of two names: Kamel Bourgass and Manfo Asiedu. Bourgass was convicted in 2003 of the murder of Detective Constable Stephen Oake in Manchester. He was sentenced for that and other terrorist offences to 25 years in prison. Manfo Asiedu was the fifth bomber in the failed London attacks of 21 July 2005. He ran off across Wormwood Scrubs, throwing his device to the ground. He received 33 years’ imprisonment as a sentence. The thing that connects these two men is that at the time of their conviction we did not know who they were. As far as I can accept, we still do not know who they are. We know that the names they have given are not their right names. This is simply absurd. The links that we might have been able to establish to other plots and other people had a system of ID cards been in place are pretty obvious.

I need to make one issue clear, and here I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham: nobody I know in the police or security services who has considered this seriously sees a need for people compulsorily to carry identity papers in the street. This is not a question of a police officer demanding papers from somebody walking down the road. However, in the case of serious crime and terrorism, the police need, as soon as possible, to establish identity. These days, it would not be difficult to create a system that would not be intrusive but would be of huge assistance in those inquiries.

As the Foreign Secretary said today, speaking about Jakarta, these are troubled times. These troubled times are on our very doorstep. I speak now to the Minister: I never understood why, as far back as the 2005 general election, the Conservative Party resisted the idea of ID cards. After Paris, after Istanbul, after Jakarta, I do not think the public will understand why the Conservative Party is still resisting the idea. It is an idea whose time has come.

Prüm: UK Opt-in

Lord Blair of Boughton Excerpts

Wednesday 9th December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, outlined, although the UK was previously party to the agreement, because this Government decided to opt out of all criminal justice co-operation with European partners in May 2014 and were ill-prepared to opt back in to it when opting in to many other criminal justice measures in November 2014, we are only now considering this measure. The right honourable Keith Vaz MP said in the other place:

“Think of the number of criminals we could have caught, or potential terrorists we could have found if only we had joined a year ago”.—[Official Report, Commons, 8/12/15; col. 924.]

Previously the Liberal Democrats had serious concerns about sharing fingerprint and DNA data because the police were retaining the fingerprints and DNA profiles of innocent people, some of whom had not even been arrested, let alone charged or convicted of an offence in the UK under legislation passed by the previous Labour Government. Because of the actions of the Liberal Democrats in the coalition Government, the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 made the holding of fingerprints and DNA profiles of innocent people illegal, save in exceptional circumstances. Having deleted innocent people’s records from the databases, we are far more relaxed about information contained within UK databases being shared with our European partners. Of course, there will be profiles of those arrested and still awaiting charge, or awaiting court cases on the database, so we also welcome the fact that only the subsets of the database containing the profiles of those individuals convicted of recordable offences will be shared with other EU countries.

We also welcome the fact that the higher UK scientific standards to ensure far more accurate fingerprinting and DNA matches will be adopted, and that there is instant notification if there is a DNA or fingerprint match, but details of the person identified are shared only once a manual request for that information has been made and once both sides are satisfied that the relevant criteria have been fulfilled. The Prüm decisions will also allow instantaneous checking of foreign registration vehicle marks, as the Minister said.

I have some sympathy for the Home Secretary, who finds herself in a bit of a dilemma on this—on the one hand, apparently positioning herself as the leadership candidate of the right of her party, and, necessarily if she is to maintain that position, to be Eurosceptic, but on the other hand apparently claiming that UK citizens are safer within the EU. She said yesterday in the other place:

“Recent events in Europe, particularly in Paris, have highlighted a very real need to co-operate with other countries in order to keep citizens safe and to hunt down criminals and terrorists”.—[Official Report, Commons, 8/12/15; col. 914.]

Can the Minister confirm what the Home Secretary said yesterday: namely, that the exchange of information that opting into the Prüm decisions enables will make UK citizens safer, that the Prüm decisions are a European Union initiative and, therefore, that the Government believe that the UK is safer as part of the EU than it would be outside?

With the additional safeguards that the Government are proposing, we support the opting in to the Prüm decisions.

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, I think this will be the shortest speech I have ever made. It is absolutely clear that the majority of the law enforcement community in the United Kingdom has been outraged by the decision of the Government not to be in Prüm. If we are to come back into Prüm, that is fine. It will save lives. End of.

[Lord Boswell of Aynho (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, this has been a short but illuminating debate, and I had not intended to participate. I rise first to thank the Minister for his generous apology about the misunderstandings that have arisen. They are not the first ones with his department but we hope that we will now have a better basis for understanding. Particularly on a matter on which we are entirely at one with the Government, it is helpful to have that confirmation in good order. The by-product of this rather accelerated procedure was that I had to take, on behalf of the Select Committee, executive action to approve it in order to facilitate this debate and get the Government’s timetable met as it needed to be. I regretted having to do that because we might have had more time for consideration of the issue. Of course, the merits speak for themselves in my view, perhaps subject to the safeguards that have rightly been called for.

Before making two other comments, I shall say, first, in generosity to my sub-committee chairman, that the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, has devoted a great deal of attention to this matter. It is highly technical and the House should be grateful to her and her colleagues for their input, and for that of the staff to this. It is not a simple matter that comes off the page. I have two other simple points. First, as a lay person, I understand that this will really allow for information to be available automatically and in real time to police officers who may be going about their business catching criminals. Frankly, if they have to wait months for that information they might as well not bother, so it will make a critical difference to their operational effectiveness in being able to see where there is a potential problem, and build that in just as they have access to the police national computer for UK-registered vehicles. It is particularly sensitive in relation to the Irish land border, where I know this has been highlighted.

My second point, which I make advisedly, is that this may be very useful to the UK—which is a proper motivation—but it is also, subject to safeguards, very useful for our colleagues in other member states of the European Union in terms of meeting information requests for their own criminal activities and their own law enforcement. My own rather simple view after recent events is that the more we can do together to ensure the safety and security of our continent as a whole, the more it will be to our mutual benefit.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bates]

These are not easy issues. As the noble Lord will know, the Labour Government signed up to this in 2007 and did not even put pen to paper between 2007 and 2010 on the Prüm decisions. This is not straightforward. It is not as if we have not been doing anything. We have the ECRIS criminal records information-sharing scheme with our European counterparts. We have Eurodac, which is about border security. Of course, we have also signed up to the Schengen information-sharing system, Schengen II. These are all elements which further build the case, I am happy to say to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for how a key part of our security comes from working closely with our European colleagues. Sharing information of this nature will make us all a great deal safer. The fact is that we can do that in a European context, whereas when it comes to Interpol there are 189 members. The prospect of perhaps exchanging DNA-sharing databases with the Russians or one other member might be a little more difficult for us to propose in your Lordships’ House. The reality is that there are safeguards there and we are working with our European colleagues. We believe that the system being proposed—

[Lord Blair of Boughton]

I am immensely in favour of the decision that the Government have taken, but is it reasonable to say that it will take another two years? I really do not understand that decision. If the Minister was able to do so, I would like him to write to me and to others to say why it will take two years from now. He was talking about late 2017. We have seen the events in Europe. Why cannot the Government now advance this at speed? Two years is simply an unsupportable position.

[Lord Bates]

I hear what the noble Lord says. I would be very happy to set up a meeting with officials from the Home Office technology team who are working on this to explain the complexities. They are in part technological but are also to do with how we interact on devolved matters with other parts of the United Kingdom, where there are some particular sensitivities and agreements to be reached, for example with the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Police Service of Scotland. That is one reason why both those parties will be present on the oversight board. Rather than going into it here, it might be helpful to all concerned if that meeting were to be arranged. We could then hear and understand a bit more about the complexity of the task, which I am in no doubt is significantly complex.

We have set out in the Command Paper some of the processes that need to be gone through from a technical point of view but I am happy to set up a meeting so that we can assure ourselves that everything is being done, once the decision has been taken to implement this as quickly as possible. The European Commission also needs to undertake inspection visits to ensure that we are capable of meeting those stringent criteria so that that can happen. With all that, I am grateful none the less for the home affairs sub-committee’s support. I am grateful for the contributions of Members of your Lordships’ House and very happy to continue a dialogue on this, as we move forward to something which we all agree will improve the safety of the people of the United Kingdom and of Europe.

Police: Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life

Lord Blair of Boughton Excerpts

Monday 23rd November 2015 Grand Committee

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Earl for bringing forward this debate. I declare my interests in policing and as the drafter of the first police code of ethics in 1991.

The report is extremely good and I read it with great interest. I agree with many of its conclusions. The three that I would particularly note are the call for a mechanism for removing police and crime commissioners, of which there is not one; the weaknesses of the police and crime panels, especially to acquire information; and the call regarding chief constable selection processes. There is also something in the confusion of roles between the PCC and the chief officer. One of the most interesting places that that occurs—it is obvious that it is occurring—is around who talks to the press after a major incident. In some places it is the PCC; in some places it is the chief constable. One of these days, the PCC is going to find themselves caught up in an inquiry because of what he or she said at a press conference. That is just a general point.

What I looked for in the report and did not find is the issue of the power of the PCC to dismiss a chief officer. I want to elaborate on that in my short speech. Mechanisms are clearly laid out in statute for the dismissal of a chief officer found guilty of gross misconduct. That is a pretty obvious requirement in any disciplinary process. But what is missing is the understanding of how it is possible to remove a chief officer merely by making a public statement. That is the crucial point. In other words, a public statement by a PCC to say, “I have lost confidence in this officer”. That is what has happened on more than one occasion.

It is exactly the same as—and I will put this in the most objective manner I possibly can—my slight disagreement with the current Mayor of London. If you look at what was then the Greater London Authority Act, you will see that there were pages and pages on how to remove a commissioner or deputy commissioner, but that was not the route that Boris chose. He chose to threaten that he would have a vote and declare a vote of no confidence, as he put it, “because I have the numbers”.

I merely say that it seems to me that the Government—in concert perhaps with the National Police Chiefs Council and the Chief Police Officers Staff Association, if it still exists—should produce some guidance that actually says that a chief constable can only be publicly called upon to step down after a disciplinary sanction and only with the prior consent of a police and crime panel. That is prior consent, not subsequent. The reason for saying “public” is because in any organisation the person in charge has the right to wander into the room, sit down with somebody and say, for instance, “Gordon, it is time to go”. That is a private conversation which continues, “I think that this is getting worse and it is time for you to go”. I have no qualms about that—but if someone stands in front of the town hall saying, “I have no confidence in the chief constable”, that leaves the chief constable with absolutely nowhere to go. The problem with that is the implications.

The implications are that, for the very first time in England and Wales, a chief constable answers to one person, and one person alone. That would make you pretty cautious. Are you going to be cautious about things where you make a professional judgment but the PCC wants something very different? How many times are you going to argue with the PCC, and then insist on your operational independence, before you start getting a cold feeling between your shoulders? This is a terribly important issue. A chief officer, like any other chief executive, is appointed to do things that he or she believes in, and they should be able to pursue them after rational debate, even against the views of the PCC. At the moment, there is a danger that they might not. They also might decide not to investigate the friend or relative of a PCC. When I was commissioner, we investigated the Prime Minister. There is a freedom which it is necessary for the police to have, and one-to-one relationships require even more care than when answering to a committee or a police authority.

The second point I want to add is this. What is the long-term effect of this on the young men and women who are currently passing through the strategic command course at the Police Staff College? I think that some of them might be on it right now. They face an average period of seven or eight years before they become chief constables, and they will pass through the ranks of assistant and deputy chief before doing so. They are now going into that knowing that, for the next seven or eight years, they will watch how their chief operates with the PCC. My fear is that over those years they will watch chief officers make less good decisions because they are afraid of losing their jobs. They are afraid of losing their jobs not over a matter of discipline but because of how a decision is taken by the PCC to remove the chief without just cause. That is potentially a very worrying thought. What will be the mindset of aspirant chief constables in eight years’ time if they are brought up in a place where they are vulnerable?

The reason that this is particularly difficult is that to some degree the model for it comes from the United States. The most famous example is Bill Bratton being sacked by the mayor of New York for appearing on the front cover of Time magazine as the man who saved New York, whereas the mayor thought that that was his job. The difference is that in America people move from police force to police force after having been removed in that way. There is no detriment and Bill Bratton is back. That is not possible over here. If you lose your job, you lose your reputation and your pension.

Police: Officer Offences

Lord Blair of Boughton Excerpts

Thursday 19th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

Certainly for individual forces there can be a great cost of that. That is one of the reasons why we need better systems of central reporting. For example, from next year the annual data return will collect misconduct and conviction numbers. That can be done centrally and therefore there will not be a greater need for freedom of information requests. That will be better all round.

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, I think that this is actually a problem of recording rather than having convicted officers still in the force. The reason for that is that they will have been charged in a police station and that fact will have gone to the professional standards department and the chief constable. If they are convicted, they will be put on a discipline hearing, which has the power to dismiss if someone has been convicted of an offence. The problem is not that we will have lots of people wandering around wearing blue uniforms who have been convicted of violence and dishonesty but that we do not know how many have been convicted. That is still a problem, but it is not the same as the hideous idea that there are lots of people with serious convictions inside the police service.

[Lord Bates]

On that point the noble Lord is absolutely right. The number who have been struck off, which I gave to the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, was 444 out of 127,000 serving police officers. It is absolutely right that the vast majority behave to the highest possible standards of integrity.

Draft Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Blair of Boughton Excerpts

Wednesday 4th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

I am grateful to my noble friend. Of course, I recognise the work that he undertook, not only as chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which led a lot of the work on this area, but thinking back to those heady days earlier this year when we were taking through the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, which is now on the statute book. He is right about the urgency. DRIPA has a sunset clause of December. Sometimes I think that the House is at its best when its mind is focused. I think there is a general consensus that we need to get this in place so that those powers continue to be available and that they are strengthened and made more accountable. I believe the timetable that has been set out is quite achievable but it will require a lot of focus.

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, I echo the words of the noble Lord, Lord King, about the Minister. I am very glad that he is here. He has heard all the arguments before; he is familiar with the pressure from people who have been involved in these sorts of operations. The issue that the House will have to be absolutely clear on is the matter of trust. Do the public trust the idea that these data about internet access are safe? The worst thing that could happen is that those data could be penetrated and leaked. When we and the various committees come to consider this, that aspect of the security of the data that are being retained by the state or the internet service providers will be crucial in defining whether or not the public trust what the Government, the agencies and the police are doing. Without that public trust, we fail.

[Lord Bates]

The noble Lord is absolutely right, of course, and brings his wealth of experience to this area. That is why David Anderson was absolutely right when he titled his report, which has been so influential on our thinking, A Question of Trust. He said that that went to the heart of it. It is also worth noting that, on page 33 of that report, David Anderson reflected some opinion poll data, which showed that there was a very high level of public trust when it came to prioritising,

“reducing the threat posed by terrorists and serious criminals”—

71% supported the initiatives that were being taken. However, we cannot take that support for granted. The transparency and openness of the process through this stage of the legislation will be important in strengthening it.

Police: Cuts

Lord Blair of Boughton Excerpts

Wednesday 28th October 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

The noble Baroness is right when she talks about crime changing. It is changing and policing must change in response to it. On the specific comment made by Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, earlier this year we had Operation Strong Tower, which tested the resilience of the capital to terrorist attacks. Following that, Sir Bernard said:

“With events like today we are committing around 1,000 people to exercise our plans and make sure that should the worst happen we are ready. And we will be”.

In other words, he was saying that he felt that there was a resource available to protect the capital. Of course, we are in the midst of a very difficult spending round and set of discussions. There is a new policing formula on which we are consulting at this very moment. The outcome of that will be known in November and we will respond further then.

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, I rise more in sadness than in anger. I have asked the Minister on a number of occasions in this House what the national strategy for policing is. The Minister, courteous as he is, has always answered, “Reducing crime”. Unfortunately, this week we know that, as we all suspected, crime has not reduced; it has just moved to the internet. What is the strategy for policing now, and what is the current strategy for the policing that supports counterterrorism? If you are faced with a 40% cut but you still have the same amount of crime to deal with, what is the strategy? Is it amalgamating forces? Is it more private sector involvement? Is it more volunteering? What is the national strategy for policing? I ask that because there does not seem to be one.

[Lord Bates]

As the noble Lord will be aware, there is a National Crime Agency, an ongoing security and defence review of our capabilities, and a policing college, which is sharing best practice. In terms of what we believe, we share the view of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, which found that significant further savings were still to be made by reorganising the way in which services are delivered—by getting more co-operation between the blue line services and sharing back-office functions. There are ways of protecting the front line while making significant savings in administration. That is what the Inspectorate of Constabulary found and we agree with it.

Investigatory Powers

Lord Blair of Boughton Excerpts

Wednesday 8th July 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, I was not present yesterday because I was taking part in a number of the commemorative events for 7/7. The day provided a poignant counterpoint to the debate. Like other speakers, I welcome the debate and warmly welcome the report by David Anderson QC. I welcome his observation of the current laws being in a patched and confused state and I agree with his recommendation of a completely new, comprehensive legal framework. I intend to look most closely at his chapter 9 on law enforcement.

In the last 100 years, there have been only three major technological breakthroughs in law enforcement: fingerprinting; the discovery and exploitation of DNA; and phone and email analysis. They are all vital. Each requires an effective and, as far as is possible, transparent legal framework. In paragraph 9.22, Mr Anderson notes that in 26 recent terrorism prosecutions, of which 17 ended in a conviction, 23 could not have been pursued without access to and analysis of communications data. In 11 cases, the conviction depended on those data. I am not at all surprised.

In paragraph 9.8, Mr Anderson notes that,

“the public would not accept the existence of physical no-go zones in towns and cities”—

for the police, he means—

“so they expect the police to have the capacity, in appropriate cases and when … authorised, to trace any kind of communication”.

I thoroughly agree, as I do with paragraph 9.31, in which Mr Anderson notes the use of the phrase “digital witness” for the first time to indicate that, just as the public expect the police to seek the human witnesses to a crime,

“they would be failing in their duty were they not to seek the digital evidence that relates to a crime or other allegation”.

As many speakers have said, digital is the new normal. The police have to be able to find it. Through the technological changes that Mr Anderson notes in his chapter 4, the use of services such as Skype, which use a system known as Voice over Internet Protocol or VolP, and the increasing private access to encryption, the police are losing that ability as we speak. The digital world is growing dark.

I now turn to one point of detail, which is the law enforcement and CPS request for data retention to last for 12 months. Mr Anderson is on top of his case here, too. At paragraph 9.45, he notes that, first:

“Conspirators become more guarded in their use of communications as the moment of a crime approaches”,

and, secondly, that the major players, rather than the actual operatives, are more likely to be traceable at the beginning of a conspiracy than at the end. They are no fools, my Lords.

I turn to the way forward. Mr Anderson’s report states that its purpose is,

“to inform the public and political debate on these matters, which at its worst can be polarised, intemperate and characterised by technical misunderstandings”.

I could not agree more. I do not often shout at the radio but I did when I heard, during a discussion on the previous data communications Bill, a senior and well-respected Liberal Democrat MP—now, I am afraid, a former Liberal Democrat MP—say that he was against the Bill because it would allow the police to read every email, text and social media exchange of every UK citizen and examine details of which websites they had visited. A moment’s thought would recognise the simple absurdity of that suggestion. Again, Mr Anderson catches it very well in paragraph 10.23, in the chapter dealing with the intelligence agencies, in a quotation from the Intelligence and Security Committee. The report states:

‘“Our Inquiry has shown that the Agencies do not have the legal authority, the resources, the technical capability, or the desire to intercept every communication of British citizens, or of the Internet as a whole: GCHQ are not reading the emails of everyone in the UK’”.

When we finally come to debate whatever legislation emerges from the Government, I hope that we will do so on that understanding, and that whatever appropriate and necessary safeguards are erected are put forward to combat misuse or arbitrary decision-making, not to prevent a mass conspiracy of agents of the state to do something which is simply impossible and implausible.

I will finish with a real story. Noble Lords may remember that on the night Gordon Brown became Prime Minister in June 2007, terrorists packed two cars with explosives, left them in the Haymarket, one outside a nightclub called Tiger Tiger, and the other parked in an area where the responding emergency services would have been likely to assemble. Despite their best efforts, the terrorists failed to set off the bombs. Their next appearance, as far as the public were concerned, was when they crashed a large vehicle into the front of Glasgow Airport. As I understand the case, they were able to do that because of Loch Lomond. The Metropolitan Police monitoring their phones were about 20 minutes behind them when the signals disappeared in the Loch Lomond area, which is notorious for poor signal coverage. The suspects were lost. In that space, they had turned round and they went back to Glasgow. By the time the police were able to reconnect their signals, it was too late. I suggest that this is a metaphor for us to bear in mind—the Loch Lomond effect. If we do not take action and implement David Anderson’s recommendations, that kind of lost capability will become more and more common—not because of signal strengths but because of technological change. Quite simply, as on 7/7, people will die. There is no time to waste.