NATO

Lord Bishop of Oxford Excerpts

Tuesday 29th May 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harries of Pentregarth]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, for the opportunity to debate this rather neglected but extremely important subject. I want to touch briefly on three very different areas.

First, I want to emphasise what lay behind the setting up of the review in the first place, namely the crucial importance of NATO having a clear and consistent understanding of deterrence and defence—one which, granted that there are real differences of emphasis and approach between the nations that make up NATO, is as harmonised as is humanly possible in the cause of collective security.

As I am sure we are all aware, the success of a deterrence policy depends on it being both clear and clearly understood by any potential enemy. Mixed and confused, let alone contradictory, messages tempt potential aggressors to chance their arm. We saw this with the Falklands, and we saw it with the total failure of European nations to agree on how to respond to the break-up of former Yugoslavia. Both the review and the statement from Chicago show that this area still needs a huge amount of work, as the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, emphasised. In particular, more work needs to be done on the relationship between missile defence and deterrence. Does the Minister really think that missile defence will enhance deterrence for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Addington, emphasised? As for tactical nuclear weapons, is it not high time for these to be withdrawn from European soil, as the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, emphasised?

The only justification for a deterrence posture that relies in part on nuclear weapons is a belief that it will indeed deter and that it will be more successful than any other in averting war. Its success depends in significant measure on potential aggressors perceiving that it is rooted in a clear and unified resolve. Despite what was said in Chicago, this area requires continuing close attention.

Secondly, we should constantly remind ourselves that the possession of nuclear weapons remains morally problematic. During the Cold War, I was, with spiritual fear and moral trembling, a supporter of nuclear deterrence. The reason why we should remain troubled is not the weapons in themselves but the difficulty of seeing how they can be used in a way which is both discriminate and proportionate. For deterrence to work, the threat has to be believed, and that means that there must be possible uses that are not either intrinsically immoral, by directly attacking civilians, or immoral as a consequence of their side-effects being disproportionate. I accept that targeting must be kept secret—I am not a great believer in declaratory policies—but we should not have a debate such as this without reminding those in the Ministry of Defence who are responsible for targeting policy that this is an area of crucial moral concern. This brings to mind once again how much we still miss the late Sir Michael Quinlan, the architect of British nuclear policy both in its strategic and ethical dimension—which he never forgot. Nuclear weapons remain morally problematic and we need to keep the ethical as well as the strategic dimension alive; indeed, they are inseparable.

My third and final point is rather different. As I am going to Georgia tomorrow to take part in its European week, I cannot forget that Russian forces are still on its soil and refusing either to leave or to loosen their grip on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. I agree with the noble Lords, Lord Addington and Lord King, that we want to do all we can to maintain good relationships with Russia, but we cannot rest content with the situation that prevails in Georgia and we need to continue to use every diplomatic means, both ourselves and with our European partners, to recover Georgia’s territorial integrity. Georgia wants to be fully integrated into NATO, a policy which causes Russia to be extremely alarmed and hostile towards it. Perhaps the Minister will feel able to say something about Georgia in relation to NATO policy within our overall attitude towards Russia.