The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Howell of Guildford)
My Lords, let me begin by joining in the congratulations to the noble Lord, Lord Browne, on promoting this short debate and on his work with his colleagues in the so-called top-level group, which tackles these issues. The profundity of his questioning is a very good way of promoting the debate in a context that is not replicated anywhere else. The only sadness I have to note is that although much wisdom has been put into one hour’s debate, the media coverage is unlikely to be dramatic because they have a shallower and shorter range interest beyond these vital and profound issues. However, this is a valuable moment. I shall not, of course, be able to satisfy completely the aspirations of the noble Lord, Lord Browne, and his colleagues for the longer term, or those of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, because that is not the posture that the deterrence and defence posture review took up. However, there are some very important questions, which are in a stage of evolution and development and which I would like to comment and respond on as clearly as I can.
We know that the review was agreed at the last NATO summit in November 2010. It was commissioned to examine the multiple and complex threats that the alliance faced in the 21st century—so it was a forward-looking intention—and to ensure that NATO’s range of capabilities are fully appropriate to the political and security context in which we live today, here and now, and in which we are likely to live in future. The review was agreed and published by alliance Heads of State at the Chicago summit last week. It is not too long, so for those who have not read it is not too time-consuming a read. It sets out the role that NATO’s defensive capabilities play in collective deterrence, burden sharing and reassurance.
The review concludes that NATO’s “existing mix” of nuclear and conventional capabilities is appropriate to meet the threats of today and tomorrow. In that sense, it can be asserted that it confirms and consolidates the status quo, but, as I shall try and show, it also has an evolutionary and ongoing element that is realistic in that we have to meet the here and now but think about tomorrow. It lays the ground for future work in NATO on its nuclear posture and on supporting non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control. The British Government were closely involved in the development and negotiation of the review, together with our 27 allies in NATO, so it is fairly obvious that I will not say anything but that we endorse the conclusions, approach and thrust of the review.
First, let me address the points that the noble Lord, Lord Browne, makes, with some tone of disappointment in his voice, about a perceived lack of progress in reducing NATO’s short-range nuclear weapons. It is worth noting that, since 1991, NATO has reduced the types and numbers of its short-range nuclear forces by over 8%. There is a strong long-term record on disarmament in the alliance, which cannot be completely brushed aside.
However, let me also make it clear why 28 allies have agreed in this review on the maintenance of NATO’s short-range nuclear forces. I will make four points on this. First, the presence of US nuclear forces based in Europe provides an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the alliance. Secondly, the B-61 nuclear weapon forms an important element of those nuclear forces and the national US life-extension programme for the ageing bombers, which incidentally is paid for entirely by the United States, will ensure that it continues to be a safe, secure and credible nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing. That is an important benefit, or condition, of the LEP.
Thirdly, at the same time, the participation of non-nuclear countries demonstrates alliance solidarity, a commitment to maintaining collective security and the widespread sharing of burdens and risks. Most of your Lordships, and many outside, would agree that we need to encourage a burden of sharing as much as possible. Fourthly, as the review makes quite clear, future decisions must also take into account the far greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area. It would not be right for NATO unilaterally to disarm, nor to disarm by, as it were, default—in other words, by not modernising the essential equipment. Future steps must be taken in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia. NATO as an alliance, and individual allies, will continue to work towards this common and worthwhile goal. I will say a little more about Russia in a moment, in the light of the comments of my noble friend Lord Jopling and others.
As the noble Lord, Lord Browne, noted, the review reiterates its long-standing principle that to face the ultimate threats to our collective defence, however remote the contemplation of nuclear weapons, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist. It also reiterates that the alliance is resolved to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. The alliance’s nuclear posture must evolve—this is the point that I made in my opening remarks—to meet current and anticipated threats and wider geopolitical developments, as it always has done and must continue to do.
In this context, it is worth noting that the review sets out what NATO can do to help create the conditions in which further reductions are possible, in line with our shared long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons. While it is legitimate to say that the review stands on the status quo at the moment, it opens up the creation of the conditions in which further reductions are possible. That is important. It underlines the alliance’s role in supporting wider international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, and announces the establishment of a new committee to focus the alliance’s contribution in this important work. In that sense, it is part of the evolving process, as it has been and must continue to be.
These efforts have been an inseparable part of NATO’s contribution to security and stability since the late 1960s. The review takes this further, not least in setting out for the first time in an alliance context the declaratory policies of its member states. Of course, my noble friend Lord King was absolutely right in his wise contribution that the US and Russia in particular, with their still enormous arsenals, must go considerably further.
The missile defence issue was mentioned by several of your Lordships. The noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, mentioned it. He also raised a point about Georgia, which I just have time to comment on. NATO partners agreed in Bucharest in 2008 that Georgia will one day become a member of NATO. Georgia’s path to NATO is a matter for agreement between NATO and Georgia, and no other country has a veto on this. We welcome the progress that Georgia has been making, and point out that NATO’s ongoing enlargement process poses no threat to any country. It is aimed at promoting stability and co-operation, and building a Europe whole and free and united in peace, democracy and common values.
On missile defence, the alliance and the UK remain committed to a positive NATO-Russian relationship. Although this obviously has its challenges, good practical co-operation is in fact taking place on a range of mutual security issues, including Afghanistan, counter- terrorism and theatre missile defence. The review considered how co-operation, transparency and, I emphasise, reciprocity with Russia can help Euro-Atlantic security.
NATO will continue to develop its partnership with Russia. We are committed to continuing our dialogue on missile defence. The United States in particular has been clear with Russia that NATO missile defence is neither intended nor designed to undermine, nor is capable of undermining, the Russian strategic deterrent. The best way of allaying Russia’s concerns is for it to work with NATO through dialogue and practical co-operation in the context of the need for the defence of Europe as a whole. This sort of co-operation also requires a functioning conventional arms-control regime, in which Russia must play a full part in offering transparency and political will. It means reciprocity and confidence-building measures as we look to future reductions in short-range nuclear weapons.
In response to, and as a reinforcement of, the points made by my noble friend Lord Jopling, I should say that all sorts of reassurances have been offered to Russia. Those reassurances are not about the legal requirements that the ambassador is writing about in today’s newspaper—that is not possible for the obvious reason that it would never get through Congress in the United States—but are all sorts of other reassurances of a detailed kind, and we are now entitled to look for a response from Russia: that is, a commitment to joint defence, as my noble friend Lord Jopling put it. This is something that we should press for and try to create the atmosphere for by elucidation, illumination and constructive dialogue rather than by some of the more negative and rigid response that have emerged.
The threats that we must be ready to counter come from many different directions and in many different forms. The capabilities available to us have certainly broadened. The DDPR has presented a timely opportunity to reassess NATO’s defence and deterrence capabilities to ensure that they are able to respond to the modern, multipolar world. That means not only where they have come from and where we are now, which is the realistic moment that we live in, but the future as well.
Publishing the review at the NATO summit in Chicago demonstrated to the world the alliance’s commitment to the collective defence of all alliance members through a mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence; to sharing the responsibilities and risks of delivering those capabilities; and to addressing new threats together. This outward-facing resolve and renewed demonstration of alliance solidarity remains critical to NATO’s effectiveness and unity, which has been one of the underlying drivers in the whole of this operation.
The Government fully share with your Lordships and a much wider audience a desire to make progress on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. However, in doing so we must be clear about the reality of the evolving security environment of the 21st century and the wider political context, both of which are full of dangers, some of which are outside the immediate security area but often have major potential security repercussions. NATO needs to provide strong defence and deterrence in challenging times, while being open to ways in which we can reduce both the risks and challenges that we face together as an alliance.
I thank noble Lords for their contributions to this debate and the noble Lord, Lord Browne, for raising some challenging questions. I hope that the challenges will continue. I have stated the Government’s view in response to these challenges, but it is an open-minded response that allows for continuing debate and examination as the uncertain future unfolds before us.