Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill

Lord Bishop of Guildford Excerpts

Wednesday 10th July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, I too have put my name to this amendment. After two such full speeches by the noble Lord, Lord Alli, and the noble Baroness, Lady Howe of Idlicote, it would be a waste of your Lordships’ time for me to say anything more than that I agree with both of them, but I also believe in the art of the possible. That is why I very much hope that manuscript Amendment 84A, or some form of it, will be agreed by the Government, because in that way we will have some hope of getting real change.

[The Lord Bishop of Guildford]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Alli, has already spoken of some support from these Benches for his amendment. I will not repeat what I said at an earlier stage, but I wish to support him again, and also, as the noble Lord, Lord Lester, has just said, to support the device of regulation as a practical way forward.

[Baroness Noakes]

My Lords, my heart is completely with Amendment 84 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Alli, but I have trouble in my head to completely agree with the amendment, mainly because we are opposing a retrospective burden without any evidence of what that impact might be. I completely understand the case for the individuals who are affected. We do not know where the cost will actually be borne. The cost is low overall, but it is not correct to compare it to the amount of assets under management, as was done in Committee, because the instance might be in very small pension schemes. It might be the instance of a relatively small scheme with a relative small number of members, one highly paid member with a civil partner—or married in a same-sex couple—who is very much younger. That would have a very disproportionate impact on the actuarial valuation of the liabilities in that small scheme, which could be a charity or a small business. I would be much more comfortable if we knew what the impact was. We may still, knowing the impact, go ahead, and that is why I strongly support Amendment 84A but have a little difficulty with Amendment 84.

Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill

Lord Bishop of Guildford Excerpts

Wednesday 10th July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brinton]

My Lords, I support the comments made by the noble Lords, Lord Alli and Lord Pannick, particularly the compliments paid to the right reverend Prelate and the most reverend Primate for their work on this issue. I want to raise a slightly different issue. The right reverend Prelate referred to the difficult balance that faith schools have to strike between complying with the tenets of their trust deeds and having due regard to the directions of the Secretary of State. I absolutely understand that. It may be helpful to quote an Oral Question of Monday 8 July on the new sex and relationships curriculum. I asked about academies, but the answer that I was given refers to all schools. I asked about academies not having to provide sex and relationships education. The noble Lord, Lord Nash, replied:

“My noble friend is quite right that academies are not obliged to teach sex education, although, if they do, they have to have regard to the Secretary of State’s guidance on these matters. I repeat the point that Ofsted inspects for all social, moral and cultural provision in schools, and we will be ensuring that it focuses on this point”.—[Official Report, 8/7/2013; col. 6.]

I raise that point because I see a distinct parallel for faith schools with the way that religious education is taught, whereby the schemes of work that the Church of England has for covering a range of other faiths are sensitive and educational but do not promote those faiths. I absolutely see that parallel here, in that faith schools are not required to promote same-sex marriage but merely to educate pupils about it. Often we get bound up in the idea that SRE is taught only in sex and relationship education classes. However, young pupils will ask about this at peculiar times. Therefore, a school needs a policy. I have seen many faith schools’ policies on SRE that recognise that fact and all staff are empowered in that regard. Therefore, I hope that the right reverend Prelate does not press the amendment because I believe that schools of a religious character can find the protections that they need in the existing Education Act.

[The Lord Bishop of Guildford]

My Lords, this debate has moved into a different manner of speech by virtue of the gracious response of the noble Lord, Lord Alli, to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leicester. Indeed, if I may say so, there was graciousness on both sides. I hope that, irrespective of whether the amendment is pressed, and whatever the result of the Division might be if it is pressed, we can have an assurance from the Front Bench that the possible conflict between trust law and the directions of the Secretary of State, to which schools have to have due regard, will be given further attention. If that happens, I believe that we could have a way forward along which we could all walk. I look to the Front Bench to be given an assurance in that area, if that is possible, given the positive exchanges between the noble Lord, Lord Alli, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leicester.

[Lord Eden of Winton]

My Lords, I know that this amendment refers to all faith schools but I hope that I may be forgiven if I concentrate my remarks on the only faith schools about which I know anything at all—the Church of England schools. In doing so, I am encouraged to some extent by the report that I read of what the Prime Minister told the national parliamentary prayer breakfast, which took place recently in Westminster Hall. I wish to quote briefly from the article in the Times of 26 June this year, which reported that the Prime Minister said at that prayer breakfast:

“It is encouraging that Christianity still plays such a vital role in our national life. It has had an immense historic influence in the development of our culture and institutions and it motivates British people to wonderful acts of service and self-sacrifice. We are a country with a Christian heritage and we should not be afraid to say so”.

Throughout our debates on the Bill, frequent reference has been made to freedom of speech and equality of treatment and esteem and to the fact that marriage is seen and acknowledged to be the building block of society. Family life and the bringing up of children is one aspect of marriage that will change as a result of this Bill becoming law, though its importance must remain a significant feature in our life. Ideally, the family includes a mother and father, maybe siblings, maybe uncles and aunts and, I hope, grandparents. Grandparents have a significant role in the nurturing and upbringing of children. The aim of a family should be to provide a stable and secure environment for the nurturing of children.

Church schools—and this goes for schools of all faiths—can help families by providing moral guidance and a set of standards that they seek to have upheld. This is of increasing significance in our life today when the pressures on children and family life are so enormous. We have recently had several references in this House to video games and other pressures to which children are subjected. The more we can hold on to standards that are enshrined in the values of faith schools, the better it will be for the nurturing of children. Because of the change in the definition of marriage that will inevitably follow the passing of this Bill, it is very desirable that, notwithstanding the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, these words form part and parcel of the Bill: church schools should be encouraged to teach the tenets of religion,

“concerning marriage and its importance for family life and the bringing up of children”.

Those words need emphasis over and over again because there are many, many people beyond this House who are afraid that those principles of married life will be undermined by this Bill.

Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill

Lord Bishop of Guildford Excerpts

Monday 24th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Alli]

My Lords, this amendment is about addressing an inequality in pensions in relation to survivor benefits that will affect a small number of people in a very unfair way.

Let me try to explain. The Equality Act allows occupational pension providers to ignore the service and contributions of gay employees prior to 2005 when it comes to paying out survivor benefits to civil partners. This stemmed from an original exemption in the Civil Partnership Act that I argued against at that time. This Bill would see the same thing happen to same-sex spouses.

I will say from the outset that the majority of occupational pension schemes have ignored this provision and pay out fully to survivors. They do this because they believe it to be fair and I recognise that and thank them for it. However, there are those that do not. Their reason is mostly cost. This is odd, as the Office for National Statistics calculates that it would cost only £18 million to the private sector.

In a past career, I was the publisher of a magazine with the snappy title of Pensions. In case your Lordships are interested, I also published Planned Savings, Insurance Age, The Savings Market and a statistical compendium called Rateguide. So I am pretty confident that no pension provider can accurately predict how many individuals within a pension scheme will be gay, how many will marry under this Bill when it becomes law or become civil partners and how many will outlive their partners, husbands or wives by a significant period. I am also pretty confident that for the one-third of schemes that do not pay out, the actuaries who run the numbers probably have already built in the additional costs associated with this amendment. Pensions actuaries—and I have met many of them—deal constantly in uncertainties around the length of life, the possibility of illness, the number of scheme members who are likely to marry and many more issues. Given that two-thirds of schemes already do, I do not understand why we cannot insist that the rest treat same-sex couples who marry in exactly the same way as heterosexual couples who marry. They have all paid in the same pension contributions.

I know from the other place that the Government think that this is a matter for the schemes themselves. However, in debating amendment after amendment we have discussed the rights of those who disagree with same-sex marriages to be able to do so, and we have resisted giving public servants the right to pick and choose what services they will give to whom based upon their deeply held beliefs. That is effectively what we would be doing here with employers and pension scheme trustees—we would be allowing pension fund trustees who genuinely believe same-sex marriage to be wrong to have the right to create two classes of spouses in their schemes. This legislation would permit it.

If we were not dealing with pensions, which are boring and complicated, but some other form of service, we would not allow this to happen. The cost to the Government is nothing. These changes were made for the public sector in 2004. I ask the Minister not to let the subject matter perpetuate an injustice into this Bill that is completely unnecessary. It is not a huge issue—£18 million does not set the world alight, but it is a kindness that we can give to a few people at the most difficult time in their life. I cannot demand that the noble Baroness do something about it; I can only ask, with the sincerity of those who have asked me to take up this issue, to take it away and see if we can do something about it. We should have solved this issue in 2004. The party opposite probably should have done so in 2010. People have waited far too long for the compassion that they deserve. I hope that we might find that in this Bill. I beg to move.

[The Lord Bishop of Guildford]

My Lords, I speak with some sympathy for the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Alli. For once, these Benches are able to say that we put our money where our mouth is. With civil partnership arrangements, the Church of England pension scheme has done exactly as the noble Lord, Lord Alli, has suggested. I think that that is the right way forward and I hope that the Government might give this amendment consideration.

Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill

Lord Bishop of Guildford Excerpts

Wednesday 19th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Garel-Jones]

As I say, I am not the best person to be advising churches on how to handle the like. However, religions evolve and have, over the centuries, evolved along with society. I would suggest that they might be wise to do so.

In conclusion, I say to the Minister that I very much hope that she will be able to give consideration to this matter. I recognise that we are attempting to slipstream behind the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill, which I strongly support, and which has been strongly supported both in this House and in the other place. We also know—I think we all know this—that even with a piece of legislation of this kind, which is non-party and free vote, officials look to their Ministers for guidance. I have no doubt that if my noble friend the Minister and the Secretary of State in the other place were to suggest to their officials that they would like to find a way of accommodating humanist marriage within the Bill, they could and would do just that. I very much hope that the Government will move such an amendment on Report.

In the mean time, if I may paraphrase a lyric from Hymns Ancient and Modern, I can assure the House that we in the humanist movement,

“will not cease from mental fight”,

until we have achieved full recognition in the law for humanist marriage.

[The Lord Bishop of Guildford]

My Lords, I greatly appreciate both the humour of the noble Lord, Lord Garel-Jones, and the courtesy of the noble Lord, Lord Harrison, and the noble Baroness, Lady Massey. Conversations have just been referred to. There has indeed been a conversation, as the noble Lord, Lord Harrison, said, but it was only a few days ago and it was just with officials. There is not yet, I think, a formal Church of England view on this matter. Your Lordships should take account of that in hearing what I have to say.

Personally, I am open to this proposal. Nevertheless, I have a serious question as to whether it is right—to use the phraseology of the noble Lord, Lord Garel-Jones—to slipstream this into this Bill, which is about same-sex marriage. I have three reasons for seeking to avoid confusion at this point.

First, as has been recognised already, this amendment would intrude a celebrant-based recognition, or at least a partly celebrant-based recognition, into the marriage law of England and Wales. I declare an interest: according to the law of England and Wales, I am one of the persons in this Chamber who can and do solemnise marriages in the Church of England, in parish churches and, with the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury’s special licence, anywhere at any time, which is more than civil marriage allows; that is an aside. There is nothing wrong with the celebrant system—

[Baroness Thornton]

I thank the right reverend Prelate for allowing me to interject on the subject of the celebrant-based system. This amendment is not about introducing a celebrant-based system into the arrangements for humanist marriages. It is quite important that the right reverend Prelate does not develop an argument about the celebrant-based system when actually this amendment does not seek to do that. It seeks to follow the Scottish arrangements for humanist weddings.

[The Lord Bishop of Guildford]

I am grateful for that point of information and I accept that clarification.

The other issue I was going to put before the House is the professional quality of our registrars, and a very significant change in breaking what is a monopoly of either clergy of religious faith communities or our registrars. That sort of change needs more consultation than has taken place thus far on this issue. I repeat that I am actually open to the issue in principle but I do not think it is right to put it into this Bill.

I must confess some confusion—even Church of England bishops can be confused sometimes—at the way in which many humanists wish to have what seems to be a non-religious church. I see that the noble Lord, Lord Garel-Jones, is assenting. For me, that is, in the words of Alice, “curiouser and curiouser”, but it will be for the House to decide whether or not to slipstream this in. There is a question mark on this Bench.

[Baroness Brinton]

My Lords, I would like to pick up on the right reverend Prelate’s last point about the curious distinction between a humanist celebration of marriage and one for those of us of faith. I refer back to the very important point made by the noble Lord, Lord Harrison, about those of us of faith who have been very moved by humanist funerals, where without the liturgy and the solemn elements that are very important to those of us of faith, it has been possible to absolutely capture in a particular style and format that is relevant—in the case of a funeral, for the family and friends of the bereaved, and, we hope in the future, in the case of a marriage, to the absolute wishes of the couple—in a form that is almost like liturgy. I suspect that the humanists would not like that word but it gives a sense of the importance of the act that the couple are about to go through.

The case studies that the British Humanist Association has sent through have drawn the distinction very clearly between the clinical process that can happen in a civil registry office versus the extremely moving ceremony that a humanist celebrant can create with a couple to mark the day in the way that they want. I would regret it if we picked up the French style of having to have two ceremonies. In France, of course, they celebrate both in style; weddings go on for whole weekends there, it is never just one event. But I have been very moved by the accounts in these case studies where it is absolutely apparent that the handfasting and the words that the couple have chosen mean as much to them as the marriage ceremony means to me as a Christian. If this Bill is about the coalition’s commitment to equality, and indeed the previous Government’s commitment to equality, now is the time to address this and accept that this organisation should be considered an approved organisation.

To reassure the right reverend Prelate, I know the Watford Area Humanists quite well—I suspect that the noble Lord, Lord Garel-Jones, does as well—and I am constantly assured of their sincerity and seriousness in not just the debate they engender locally but in understanding the role that they are performing for the rites of passage within our community for those who do not have a faith. I can think of no better organisation to be able to celebrate a marriage and I really hope that, despite the Government’s concerns, it can be looked at.

Wearing my Liberal Democrat hat, I would like to add that the party has been very clear for some time that this is something we would like to see.

Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill

Lord Bishop of Guildford Excerpts

Wednesday 19th June 2013 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[The Lord Bishop of Guildford]

39: Schedule 4, page 26, line 32, leave out paragraph 2

[The Lord Bishop of Guildford]

My Lords, it is agreed on all sides that parents make the most fundamental contribution to the flourishing and development of children, and that there are many aspects of parenthood and many kinds of parenting in such a complex society as ours. There are many forms of being a family, as was illustrated earlier this evening by the example given by the noble Baroness, Lady Farrington, from her school.

We have a common-law presumption that a child born to a woman during her marriage is also the child of her husband. Paragraph 2 of Schedule 4 says that the common-law presumption does not apply in the case of a woman who is married to another woman—for obvious reasons. This is a probing amendment and the question is whether simply leaving matters there is sufficient. I argue that it is not because, in all the debates on the Bill here and in another place, and during the consultation process, there has not been enough concentration on children. Tonight, as briefly as I possibly can, I want to stress a more child-centred approach to the question of children in marriage—all kinds of marriages and especially same-sex marriages.

Currently and in future, in a marriage between a man and a woman any child born to the woman is presumed to be the child of her husband. As her husband, he bears a responsibility for that child, not least if something should happen to its mother. I am concerned that in the Bill there is no equivalent or automatic provision made for children brought up by a married couple of the same sex. If a woman in a same-sex marriage has a child, there is of course a biological father somewhere but, regardless of whether or not the father is in an ongoing relationship with the couple and their child, there is at present no responsibility on the mother’s spouse’s side for that child.

Helpfully, it has been suggested in the Explanatory Notes that the other party to a marriage will be treated as the child’s parent by virtue of amendments that the Bill is making to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act. These provide, under certain conditions, for the same-sex partner of a mother who gives birth to a child as a result of artificial insemination or the placing of an embryo in her womb to be treated as the parent of that child. I am sorry for this rather technical intervention at this point in the evening.

However, not all children born to mothers in a same-sex marriage will necessarily be born as a result of treatment to which the HFE Act applies. Such a child might be conceived in the conventional manner by a woman who is married to another woman. In such a case it would be possible for the mother to register the child’s father when she registers the birth, with the effect that he would have parental responsibility for the child. The complications of that are quite interesting. Alternatively, she might not do so and her same-sex spouse might become the adoptive parent of the child. If neither of these things were done, the child would have only one person with parental responsibility for it—this is the point.

There is thus a contrast with a child born to a mother in an opposite-sex marriage and there is a real possibility of children born to a mother in a same-sex marriage being disadvantaged as compared to children of opposite-sex marriages. This is not to say that children always have to have two parents—that is often sadly not possible. Moreover, sometimes a child brought up by a single parent or same-sex parents is actually better cared for than a child brought up by dysfunctional heterosexual parents. I give praise to couples who give love and care to children in same-sex partnerships and eventually in same-sex marriage. However, given the intention of the Bill to extend marriage and to provide equality, why should children of a same-sex marriage— some of them, at least—be at a potential disadvantage in some cases? This is a probing amendment and I ask the Government to consider this question very carefully indeed.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, has asked me to speak on his behalf to Amendment 39A, which picks up exactly the same point as the right reverend Prelate’s. The noble Lord is not terribly happy with the wording that he has produced. It is, again, a probing amendment and it raises quite clearly the issue of parental responsibility. I am not sure that it is necessarily appropriate to delete paragraph 2 in Part 2 of Schedule 4 but the Government need to look at the point made by the right reverend Prelate that there will be children born to one partner in a same-sex marriage who will be the only person with parental responsibility although in every other way she and her partner will be married and, were they of opposite sexes, both would have parental responsibility. It is quite an important point. You might say, “Get a residence order”, but in the Children and Families Bill residence orders are going to be abolished. Consequently, I do not consider arrangements made for when parties are in dispute to be appropriate for those who are in harmony. Therefore, I ask the Minister to have a look at this question of how appropriate parental responsibility can be achieved for the female partner of a woman who gives birth during their marriage.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 40 and 41. This is a sensitive issue and we are speaking, of course, at an extremely late stage. It is an issue that also produces embarrassment in some and humour among others of those who hear what is said. I am, however, entirely serious about this matter and I wish to present it to your Lordships even at this late stage.

My early practice at the Bar was against the background of defended divorces, and the matrimonial offence of adultery was treated very seriously. There were allegations of collusion and condonation to try to avoid a finding of adultery. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, which caused dramatic changes to divorce law, retained adultery in Section 1 as the first ground, together with irretrievable breakdown, and it remains the law today. Adultery may not be seen as such a serious matrimonial offence today as it was in earlier times, but that, in my view, is a mistaken approach.

Adultery remains a fundamental breach of the trust of those who make the commitment of marriage, and I have no doubt that there will be an equal commitment between same-sex couples, many of whom demonstrate long-term, stable relationships, so the behaviour of one party to a marriage who breaks the commitment to the other by engaging in a relationship with someone outside marriage strikes at the root of marriage and can be a devastating blow to the injured partner. The suggestion has been made that the injured person in a same-sex marriage could petition for unreasonable behaviour as an alternative ground for divorce, but that is not the answer. In current marriages, if one spouse commits adultery, that is the ground upon which the other spouse can pray in the divorce petition. It therefore demonstrates in family legislation the importance of both spouses remaining faithful to each other during the continuance of the marriage.

According to Part 2 of Schedule 4, following the Civil Partnership Act, the same-sex relationship excludes a ground for divorce available to those spouses who have an adulterous husband or wife. They have the opportunity, but the same-sex couple do not. This is inequality, both to erring husbands or wives, who can be sued for divorce on a ground that would not occur if same-sex partners were in the same position. However, more importantly, it is profoundly unjust to the partner who has suffered the trauma of the failure of the marriage through the sexual misbehaviour of an erring same-sex partner and the breach of the commitment of fidelity. Had I been a Member of this House during the passage of the Civil Partnership Bill, I would have made exactly the same point.

I consider it profoundly unsatisfactory and, more importantly, profoundly unjust that adultery is not a ground for same-sex divorce. It undermines the value of same-sex marriage. Why is this the case? I assume that it is because there has not so far been a definition of consummation of a sexual relationship other than between couples of the opposite sex. This is a failure to come to terms with more than one type of sexual relationship and a broader definition of the consummation of a relationship.

The criminal law includes the rape of a male as well as a female. It has been so ever since the Sexual Offences Act 1956. I will read just one sentence from the Sexual Offences Act 2003, from Section 1(1):

“A person … commits an offence if he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another person … with his penis”.

That goes part of the way with same-sex marriages. Rape requires proof of consummation, and so far 12,000 men have been identified as victims of rape.

I cannot understand why there can be a definition of rape—a recognition of the sexual act of consummation required to prove rape in criminal law—but a seeming inability or reluctance by the previous or the present Government to give it the same recognition in the context of family law. The failure to find a definition of consummation in civil and family law works, as I have said, as a real injustice. It makes a mockery of the so-called equality that is the bedrock of this Bill. If marriage is to be equal for all those who get married, an embarrassed or ineffective approach to this inequality and brushing aside the matrimonial offence of adultery will not do.

Whether it is a religious or civil marriage, promises and commitments are made by one partner to the other in the marriage ceremony. Is the concept of being faithful to one another during marriage a promise to be kept by opposite-sex couples but not by same-sex couples? How can this be? For those not brave enough to recognise different forms of sexual activity, a possible alternative to a revised definition of adultery might be to describe the matrimonial offence as one similar to adultery.

Amendment 41, which looks at the inequality in the matrimonial law of voidable marriages in this Bill, raises the issue of non-consummation. In current nullity law there are two grounds of voidable marriages: inability and wilful refusal to consummate the marriage. A nullity suit on either of these grounds is nowadays unusual. However, the question of inequality and possible injustice arising from the difference in two types of marriage raises the same point as my comments on adultery. If this Government are, as they should be, strong enough to provide a revised definition of consummation and non-consummation, they should deal with voidable marriages as well as adultery. This is not a homophobic point. On the contrary; this is an injustice to innocent partners in a same-sex marriage, who do not have the same rights as innocent partners in an opposite-sex marriage and do not have the specific right to divorce a faithless same-sex partner. I beg to move.

[The Lord Bishop of Guildford]

Again, I support a probing amendment. I am concerned that marriages between people of the same sex should enshrine the same standard of fidelity as marriages of heterosexual couples. As it stands, the Bill does not quite deliver this. Indeed, the Bill enshrines a very important inequality in the way that the virtue of fidelity is manifested in relationships. Marriage between people of the opposite sex is partially defined by the fact that sexual infidelity—adultery—is a recognised and long-standing ground for divorce, as has been expounded very eloquently by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. This is not found in the Bill.

Faithfulness is intrinsic to the promises a married couple make to one another. I feel very strongly that, as we go forward in our scrutiny of the Bill, this House must find some way of including that faithfulness equally for all married couples, if we are looking to something that has been described as equal marriage. On the grounds of equality that is an omission and in terms of the social significance of faithfulness, which is central to marriage, this omission diminishes the status that couples of the same sex stand to receive from being married. As the Bill stands, such same-sex marriages could be accused of being of a lesser standard in terms of faithfulness than heterosexual marriage unless this point is attended to.

[Lord Alli]

I thank the noble and learned Baroness for bringing forward this amendment. I have listened to what she said most carefully and I can see the point she raises. Unfaithfulness is understandably a cause for which many people seek divorce but I do not think that anything in this Bill will prevent people divorcing their partners for unfaithfulness. In my view, marriage is a contract that varies in its nature, understanding and commitment from couple to couple. The issue and the importance of fidelity is one that, equally, varies from couple from couple, but it is fair to say that fidelity is a cornerstone of most religious marriages. I think the same should be said of civil marriage, too.

The definition of the sexual act that defines fidelity for heterosexuals is outdated and, in my view, very cumbersome. The noble and learned Baroness is very brave to bring the issue to this House. When one looks at penetration as part of that definition, or we try to import the definition of penetration from rape into this, it does not deal with lesbian couples, for example. So much of our sexual law is defined by the male and not by women that a complete class of marriage is ignored by what the noble and learned Baroness is trying to do. If we had had more and broader discussions on the Civil Partnership Act and over the Bill, we may find common ground, but simply importing the definition of penetration—anal, vaginal or oral—into this would leave lesbians at a complete disadvantage regarding fidelity. While I completely understand what is behind this, we come back to the definition of fidelity. I think the Government’s position has been not to disturb the current arrangements as far as possible, to avoid tampering with existing legislation. It is a much wider question, which I certainly welcome. There is no way anyone can accuse the noble and learned Baroness of being homophobic in her amendment.