(14 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis is a powerful debate with more consensus than I anticipated. It is a privilege to follow so many distinguished contributions.
The steady, incremental and non-revolutionary development of the UK’s constitutional framework sets us apart from other countries. Unsurprisingly, therefore, our system lacks a neat and elegant design rooted in a clear set of principles. The US example offers a contrast, although not one I envy. Our system, for all its untidiness, has great strengths. For me, its critical virtue—although some of your Lordships plainly do not agree—is the ferocious intensity of a near-sovereign House of Commons. Governments will always make mistakes, but in our system they are cruelly exposed. National problems may receive insufficient attention, but eventually in our system they will surface and be addressed.
When, as now, and as in 1945 and 1979, we have to be bold and we can be decisive. I place great value on that. Inevitably, however, our system has had, and still has, many anomalies. We have only just separated our Supreme Court from our legislature. Uniquely among modern democracies, a religion nationalised by a tyrannical king nearly 500 years ago remains firmly embedded in our Parliament. While today’s hereditary Peers would justify a place on merit in any system, the birthright principle should have no place in a modern political system, as others have said.
There are constitution issues on which others have not touched thus far. As more and more power and responsibility are devolved to Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, it is increasingly anomalous that Members of the Westminster Parliament elected from those countries can have a decisive impact on policies that affect England alone, when the converse no longer holds. Moreover, while there continues to be a massive transfer of wealth from England to those nations—in effect, now taxation without representation—there will eventually be a clamour for a Parliament for England.
If the coalition Government are to redirect some of the awesome energy and political capital that they will need to reduce the deficit towards further constitutional reform, I hope that they will either take a truly fundamental look at the arrangements for the United Kingdom as a whole or confine themselves to more traditional incremental reform of the existing system, as most noble Lords have urged. Like others, I support the proposals of the noble Lord, Lord Steel. Whichever direction the Government take, they must address the simple question: what is the optimal role for a second Chamber? Then, and only in the light of that, should they ask what its composition should be.
At the moment, we sit in an essentially advisory Chamber with no significant powers. Provided that the process of appointment is democratically rooted, and provided that it is considered and sound, appointment is a perfectly reasonable means of ensuring that an advisory Chamber has an independent cast of mind and contains appropriate expertise and insight. Maintaining the advisory role but changing the composition whereby the upper House is wholly or largely elected is likely, as others have said, to have unintended consequences. An elected Chamber could never be happy for more than a moment with our limited role and powers, and would soon simply demand an increased role and greater power.
Moreover, a Chamber elected on a more proportional system may forever subvert the power of the Commons and of the Government of the day to act decisively. Such an outcome would be a momentous break with our history and would not be in our long-term national interest. We all appreciate and understand the immediate urge for a more raw form of democracy—just talk to the bright young political activists in all three major political parties—but let us please consider all the consequences with due wisdom before we risk fatally unbalancing our constitution.