(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will not rehearse what I said previously about Article 16, but I will see if I can answer the question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley. If you are faced with two instruments that appear to be in conflict—which I think is what we are arguing—the first thing you do is have a detailed analysis of these instruments to see whether there is a provision in them that will enable you to reconcile the difference. The advantage of Article 16 has just been set out by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. You are adhering to the treaty by using a term within the treaty that helps you avoid being in conflict with the other treaty. That is a possible way of doing it.
If I may intervene briefly, I have tried to explain that I had an intense relationship with Article 16 when it was deeply unfashionable in this House. Many times in the last year, I have wanted to argue privately with the Government that it should be applied. The arguments made for it are impeccable and have been for years; that is simply the case. The problem is that this is not conceivably a rational moment. There are complaints about the Bill. Does it matter what the Irish Foreign Minister says? It is said that it does not matter; we are choosing to disregard it. This is a moment when we are negotiating seriously with the EU. Suddenly to come in and say, “By the way”—and the logic is, in general terms, superb—“we are applying Article 16 now”, is bound to be destructive of the negotiations that are proceeding. We must respect the reality of the moment.
But if the consequence of doing so is to embrace a Bill which drives a horse and cart through the procedures and principles by which this Parliament operates, surely that is an inhibition and we should avoid it at all costs.
(2 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am sure the House would not expect me to, or hope that I would, follow that contribution. I apologise for not being able to speak at Second Reading. I was travelling, as it happens, back from the United States and could not get here before the proper time and date to indicate a wish to speak in the debate. However, that travel to the United States prompts me to say this: we ignore at our peril the importance attached on both sides of the aisle, and in both Houses of Congress, to the Belfast agreement. To put it neutrally, this Bill puts a stress and strain on that settlement. For that reason, and for all the others eloquently put forward today, this Bill should at the very least be delayed.
I remind the House that, some time ago, we were presented with a Bill nominally in relation to internal markets. It contained a Part 5, the purpose of which was to create a law whereby the Government would be excused when it broke the law. The Government have form on this matter, and there is a sense in which the Bill we are discussing is simply part of the same kind of thinking. What has been said today has been said with great eloquence; what was said in this House on the internal markets Bill was said with great eloquence and eventually the Government had to abandon it.
My Lords, I rise to speak with some trepidation as, apart from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, this has been a convention of like-minded people, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, put it.
I have just come hot-foot from a Committee A (Sovereign Matters) meeting at the British-Irish Parliamentary Assembly in Cavan. We were addressed by the Taoiseach at some length and by other Irish Ministers. There was much discussion of these matters during the day. However, no Irish Minister said, “Whatever you do, when you get back to London, make sure that this protocol Bill is stopped”. It is simply not a contentious matter in these negotiations. That is a simple fact. A very large percentage of what has been said today about the need for good faith and how dropping this blunderbuss will strengthen our position is, with the kindest of respect, totally irrelevant.
The EU has decided, for its own perfectly good reasons—it is keen to reach this deal; I utterly believe in its good faith—that this Bill will not stop substantive negotiation. What it would do, if the majority opinion in this House were to prevail, is stop the Government’s attempt to bring the DUP back into the Assembly. That will be its only real effect. Neither the Taoiseach nor the other Irish Ministers said a word about it yesterday at Committee A (Sovereign Matters), because this Bill is not central to them. What is central to them is the ongoing negotiation, which is proceeding with good faith on both sides and from which I sincerely hope for a result. It is very important to say that.
A great part of what has been said is, I am sure, very well meant but, to put it bluntly, totally irrelevant. It is not the realpolitik of the moment. That is very important to understand. Dropping this Bill will not transform those negotiations into a better or worse state. They are going on now; they are facing some very difficult problems—I think there may be some progress—and we can certainly hope, as I am sure everybody in the House does, for an outcome on this. But it is simply pointless, bootless and, worst of all, deeply irrelevant to keep arguing and going on about the need to drop the Bill because it would lead to greater faith in negotiation. The negotiations are already in play, in good faith—end of story. However, it would have an effect on our ability to get the DUP back into government.
Both the EU and the UK Government said at a number of points—three at least—that this agreement is designed to protect the Good Friday agreement in all its dimensions. Bluntly, it has not done that. We talk about legal opinion and what the Government’s argument has been. The former Lord Chancellor, in the Commons debate on this, made exactly that point. I read the protocol agreement and what did I see? There is a reference to the Good Friday agreement and the protection of it in all its dimensions. That is not actually happening. Both sides signed up in good faith hoping that was what would happen.
Both sides signed up to the protocol, which says that the UK single market should be protected in its integrity. It might be reasonably expected for that to happen. Do noble Lords think that the current provisions for checks are protecting the UK single market in all its integrity? The idea that we both signed up for stuff is very simple. I could go on forever about how “We both signed up for stuff.” To be absolutely honest, neither side fully understood what it was doing.
In particular, the negotiating history of this is clear. The EU did not understand the Good Friday agreement. Michel Barnier’s memoir is perfectly clear. We cannot make pigs fly. Michel Barnier’s memoir is based on a view of the agreement and the undertakings in it which is based on pigs flying. We cannot do it with the best will in the world and for all our enthusiasm to be loyal to something we signed up for. We cannot make pigs fly. His version of what he was protecting is not what it is—not by a long way. The reason for this is our negotiating defeat in 2017 and Mrs May, having effectively lost an election, desperately getting into talks. We cannot undo that; I am not saying we can. In history, we signed up for stuff and we are trying to find a compromise, but we cannot make pigs fly. We cannot make nonsense be operative. It does not matter how morally committed we are.
I am very grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. Is there not a possible remedy here? If there are conflicting views, should we apply the principle of contra proferentem? Those who argue for a particular view have the onus of establishing that that view is the correct one.
We are in a situation now where in Dublin it is accepted by those involved in the negotiation that they achieved a one-sided appropriation of this agreement. This then flows into the agreement of 2019. It was because of our weakness. We cannot undo it and we signed up for it—I get all that—none the less it is accepted by them that there is a problem. The problem cannot be met by saying “You signed up for it”, “Boris was a fool” or anything like that. It is a real problem at this moment. That is the key thing we are stuck with.
This agreement and the protocol say in numerous places—the former Lord Chancellor said it in the other place, so the Government have argued this very clearly—that it is about protecting the Good Friday agreement and for good measure protecting the integrity of the UK single market. This debate is rather different from the terms it has been couched in. I keep saying that the reality is about the interaction of a prior international agreement and the protocol agreement. There are different views of this.
While we are on this subject—regarding the evidence of Sir Jonathan Jones that was cited earlier—the Attorney-General in 2019 explicitly said in the other place, and it was repeated in this place, that there is a problem: where the protocol conflicts with the Good Friday agreement, the UK reserves the right to operate the existing prior international agreements. Who was working in the Attorney-General’s office then? I am certain there were some quite good lawyers when that happened.
We heard about Professor Mark Goldie’s observations, and they are absolutely true. He is a professor in public law in Cambridge who came to our committee in the Lords. I think Professor Boyle came to both committees. Professor Goldie listened to Professor Boyle, who I am certain does not support this Bill and who is much more open in principle to the arguments regarding international law, that the prior international agreement weighs heavily here. In the interaction of the two of them he personally argued Article 16 should be applied because you cannot demonstrate necessity unless it has been applied. I have often been attracted to that argument, but I am astounded by the number of Peers in this House who are mad keen for Article 16.
I am a historian, not a lawyer. I remember a few months ago when every civilised person was regarding the application of Article 16 and no one was saying “Oh, it’s in the treaty.” I remember the intensity of emotions—that this would be another foul act of disgraceful behaviour by the Government, even though it clearly is in the treaty. I am delighted there are so many converts today. I am not even sure; I think they might be right. It is a fashion change, not an international law change. The mood of the House has changed on this point, and nothing has changed in law.
I am not saying that Professor Goldie supports the Bill; I am certain he does not. As I said, I am not sure that Professor Boyle does either. Professor Goldie accepted the burden of Professor Boyle’s argument that it is very important to have upfront protection of the Good Friday agreement. The story about what international lawyers say—I am certain this will become even more complicated in this Chamber before this Bill finishes its passage—is a little bit more complicated. That is all I want to say. I am not saying that I know. I could not possibly say that sitting on this Bench with two very distinguished lawyers.
I am not making a claim about law but about history and what actually happened, how we got here and the mood on this, because that does rather matter. What I am saying is that the Government would be within their rights to say that there is a debate on this subject and there is a real problem. If you are not even talking—as most speakers today have not—about the interaction between the Good Friday agreement, the prior international agreement, and this agreement, then you are not even in the debate in any realistic way. They would have the right to say that.