Service Personnel (Ukraine)

Lord Benyon Excerpts

Wednesday 25th February 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

As soon as we make a decision on what equipment to supply or to gift, we will of course inform Parliament in the normal way. If the equipment is to be gifted, a minute has to be laid before Parliament and that will be done.

[Richard Benyon (Newbury) (Con)]

Like many people, I take an increasingly bleak view of the situation when we examine the psychology of this aggressor. What measures has my right hon. Friend taken with colleagues across Government to look at the possibility of this happening in other areas on the western boundary of Russia? What work should we be doing now to prepare for requests similar to that that he has received from the Ukrainian Government from countries such as Moldova or, God forbid, a NATO country, as we would be required to respond differently to an attack on one of those countries?

[Michael Fallon]

As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister told the Liaison Committee yesterday, we can now see a pattern of behaviour around the borders of Russia. We have seen it in Georgia and elsewhere. The first thing that we had to do about that was to stiffen up NATO to ensure that we had a rapid reaction force worthy of the name. That was agreed at the NATO summit last September, and we have now agreed our contribution to it. We will be a framework nation in 2017 and we will be seconding staff to the two divisional headquarters, in Poland and Romania. We will also be seconding staff to all six of the forward integration units. We are encouraging other NATO members to make similar commitments in order to reassure the members on NATO’s eastern flank that we are ready to stand by our commitments under article 5.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Benyon Excerpts

Monday 23rd February 2015 Commons Chamber

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)]

13. What recent steps armed forces have taken against ISIL in Iraq; and if he will make a statement.

[Richard Benyon (Newbury) (Con)]

15. What steps his Department is taking to assist Iraqi forces in countering ISIL.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Michael Fallon)]

We are making a major contribution to the coalition. We are conducting infantry training and have trained more than 1,000 Iraqis so far. We are leading on counter-improvised explosive device training and, subject to parliamentary approval, will gift 1,000 hand-held metal detectors. As of Sunday, we have conducted 152 air strikes in Iraq and deployed a range of aircraft to the region, including surveillance aircraft.

--- Later in debate ---

[Michael Fallon]

Our plan in Iraq is very simple: first, to disrupt threats to the UK mainland and to our interests overseas; secondly, as part of an international coalition, to defeat ISIL, including discrediting its violent ideology; and, thirdly, to mitigate the impact of ISIL and other violent extremist groups on the stability of the whole region.

[Richard Benyon]

In Iraq, the Brimstone missile provides the UK with a unique capability that minimises collateral damage. What measures are being taken to integrate it with the Typhoon system?

[Michael Fallon]

Let me pay to tribute to the important work being done at AWE sites in my hon. Friend’s constituency and elsewhere in Berkshire and to the highly skilled personnel working there. I will of course look at his point about integration. We are accelerating the integration of those weapons with Typhoon, which will improve its attractiveness as an export and pick up on some of the lessons we have learnt from the campaign in Iraq.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Dunne]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for asking that question, because he invites me to draw another comparison with the way in which this Government have sorted out the manner of our defence procurement, in stark contrast to the previous Administration. We are undertaking detailed analysis and taking contract negotiations to a much greater degree of granularity before entering contracts so that we know what we are buying and we remove risk from layers of prime contractors, following the model that we introduced in the aircraft carrier renegotiation last year.

[Richard Benyon (Newbury) (Con)]

T6. As civil nuclear developments expand the market for skilled nuclear engineers, what steps is the Minister taking to ensure that we maintain the skills levels of the hundreds of nuclear engineers at the Atomic Weapons Establishment in Berkshire?

[Mr Dunne]

The facility in Berkshire is extremely important—part of it is in my hon. Friend’s constituency—and I have led cross-Government talks to consider how we ensure that demands for nuclear engineering skills across defence and civil sectors are successfully managed by recruiting, training and retaining appropriately skilled engineers. Next week, I will host an event in Downing street to raise awareness of degree courses in nuclear engineering.

Afghanistan

Lord Benyon Excerpts

Wednesday 11th February 2015 Westminster Hall

[Richard Benyon (Newbury) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland (Mr Simpson) on securing the debate. I first came across him at Sandhurst, where he was chairing a debate entitled “This house would rather be dead than red.” It being the Army, I was instructed to propose the motion, regardless of my views at the time.

My hon. Friend spoke with his customary knowledge and intelligence about this difficult issue. He quoted the famous German field marshal, Moltke, who said that no plan survives contact with the enemy, and that was certainly the case in the United Kingdom’s foray into Helmand.

Afghanistan remains the monkey on the back of United Kingdom foreign policy. I recall the Father of the House, my right hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle (Sir Peter Tapsell), talking in 2006 about how difficult it would be to succeed in Afghanistan. He quoted historical precedents, and some Members of the House smiled and laughed at that, but my right hon. Friend was right. He was prescient about the morass of conflicting political agendas in that country; indeed, the Pashtun peoples alone comprise 60 major tribes.

Currently, there is an element of historical revisionism being played out between the political and military leaders at the time of the Helmand deployment, with each perhaps seeking to deflect criticism or to deny shortcomings. Some of this occasionally has the unattractive smell of those at the top drawing on circumstances in which commanders on the ground were found wanting, which is regrettable.

To truly understand the decisions that were made, and whether they were right or wrong, we need to take a more sensible approach. My hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), who spoke so well, and I are on the Defence Committee, which is looking at decision making in defence matters. One of the key decisions we are looking at is the move into Helmand, and I hope the Minister will take our report very seriously, because I think it will inform future operations.

I do not want to stand here like some armchair general and second-guess decisions taken in the teeth of battle. There were difficult decisions to be taken at times, when local Afghan requirements were one thing, the requirements of the international security assistance force and the Afghan Government were another, and the demands of the United Kingdom Government and our constituents were in conflict with both. It is incredibly difficult to assess what happened and what was right or wrong.

However, the first fact of which there should be no doubt—I intend to deal in facts—is that our troops performed magnificently against, in the main, a determined and incorrigible enemy. Like many hon. Members, I have been moved to hear commanders describe with pride how young men and women have performed in the most difficult and testing circumstances. We are told daily in the media about the failings of the young—the PlayStation generation—but we have seen in recent wars how this generation is every bit as brave and resourceful as their grandfathers and great-grandfathers were in a perhaps more heroic age.

One of the groups of men I have in mind is the platoon I once had the honour to command several decades ago—9 Platoon, C Company, in what is now 2 Rifles. In one day, the platoon lost four men, with several more wounded, including the platoon commander. His replacement was severely wounded on his journey to the patrol base to take command. The whole unit was held together by a remarkable man—Platoon Sergeant Moncho. He has since been awarded the conspicuous gallantry cross, and I can do no more than recite a line from his citation:

“His supreme courage in the face of the most testing of circumstances was exemplary and his personal actions steadied all those around him.”

With much of the public and media focus centred on the as yet to be published Chilcot report into Britain’s military endeavours in Iraq, understanding and learning the lessons of a conflict that lasted longer than the first and second world wars combined, and that was Britain’s fourth foray into Afghanistan, should by no means be neglected. It is clear that, between 2004 and 2006, policy makers in Whitehall significantly underestimated the threat posed by the Taliban and the conditions on the ground, which led to the roll-out of inadequate equipment in the early days.

That situation was compounded by huge gaps in our capacity to deliver nation building, and I entirely accept the concerns my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) expressed about that. As a result of opaque directives, the term has now come to be used in a different sense—using an armed force to underpin an enduring transition to democracy, as opposed to making a deliberate effort to construct and install institutions, which was the accepted view before.

What is even more frustrating about this period is that the threats and risks posed in the intelligence picture were clear and present. However, they were misunderstood, ignored or clouded by differences of opinion or conflicting priorities. In 2005, the failure of senior military officials to react to the intelligence picture was exacerbated by the fact that our force was under-resourced and based on best-case and aspirational objectives.

Either the brutal facts were kept from political leaders, or politicians did not ask the right questions. Lord Reid has my respect for pausing the deployment in the early days, but many argue it should have been paused for longer. That was, of course, a double-edged sword, because it allowed the Taliban to organise more determined resistance.

The key point is about the mission. In the Falklands, the mission was simple: to retake the islands. In Afghanistan, one got a different priority depending on which Department, ally or actor in the conflict one spoke to. Put simply, how can one hope to achieve success when success and failure are undefined concepts? Was the mission to defeat the Taliban? Was it to implement an anti-narcotics strategy? Was it to pursue nation building? Was it to introduce education for women or one of the other laudable things that were mentioned in the House? Or was it all of them?

Setting numerous and competing missions, with sub-optimal command and control structures in the UK taskforce, ISAF and the London headquarters, nearly resulted in the campaign failing within the first six months. Those fundamental issues were addressed only following the implementation of a campaign that was redefined with achievable objectives and that saw a surge in Helmand, resulting in a tenfold increase in force levels by 2010. That was supported by structured command and control mechanisms.

Von Clausewitz said war is the continuation of politics by other means. That makes the cessation of war a resumption of politics by normal means. However, nothing is normal in Afghanistan. I supported the Prime Minister’s determination to end our combat role by 2014, for a variety of reasons I will not go into. However, although pulling out by a precisely flagged date may have been a triumph of logistics—I hope those involved in that remarkable piece of logistics are being rewarded—it is questionable whether Afghanistan is ready to survive and progress.

So what are the lessons? Some of the revisionism centres on perceived or actual failings in the chain of command, which meant that commanders on the ground took the wrong tactical decisions, but that is not, in the main, backed up by evidence. Judging by the evidence I have seen and that we in the Defence Committee have seen, the truth is that issues including insufficient resources, ill-thought-through time lines, mission deliverability and the move north were raised from as early as 2005. All politicians and senior military personnel who visited the Helmand taskforce in 2006 received the same briefing with regard to the situation and the huge challenges facing the mission at that time.

The war cannot be viewed in isolation, given the events that unfolded in Iraq, which proved a major distraction with respect to both resources and intellectual analysis—political and military. The hypothesis that the military could deliver its objectives of deploying two medium-sized commitments simultaneously was evidently incorrect.

So what is the main lesson from Afghanistan, besides the obvious one never to be tempted to go there a fifth time? By late 2005, those at the highest levels of government and the military should have asked the strategic question about what we wanted to achieve in Helmand province. They should have had the courage to pause the deployment in advance of the unstoppable momentum, to ensure sufficient resources and appropriate command-and-control structures and measures were in place to achieve deliverable successes. The simple implementation of common sense would have highlighted the fact that better governance, some development objectives and sustainable security were always highly unlikely to be achieved in southern Afghanistan, and that they were never going to be achieved within a set three-year time scale. We forget that that was the time scale.

I look with interest at developing thinking in our armed forces about a smarter, more subtle type of intervention. I think that that is what my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East was referring to in his excellent speech. I applaud the creation of the new 77 Brigade, which I have visited; it is in my constituency. Organisations of that kind will change the way we do warfare—in a way that might actually mean we do not do warfare, because we will achieve different results without using kinetic forces. That is an interesting new development.

I met a young Army officer at a Remembrance day parade. He had a chest full of medals. I said, “You have been busy,” and he replied, “Yes, I have done all of Blair’s wars.” Whether one may refer to them in that way or not, that is the lexicon in the armed forces today. Perhaps we have learned the lessons of “Blair’s wars” and perhaps we have not, but we know that in Afghanistan we undoubtedly paid a heavy price in both blood and treasure.

Trident Renewal

Lord Benyon Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Michael Fallon)]

Today’s debate is about the primary responsibility of any Government: the security of our nation, our freedoms and our way of life. It is not about short-term politics. Whatever the current threats to this country, we cannot gamble with tomorrow’s security. That is why this Government, and all previous Governments for the last six decades, have retained an operationally independent nuclear deterrent, and today this Government are committed to maintaining that credible, continuous and effective minimum nuclear deterrent based on Trident and operating in a continuously at-sea posture for as long as we need it.

We also committed in the 2010 strategic defence and security review to renew our deterrent by proceeding with the programme that Parliament approved in March 2007 by a majority of 409 to 161 to build a fleet of new ballistic missile submarines. For 45 years, Britain has kept a ballistic missile submarine at sea, providing the ultimate guarantee of security against nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. In December I saw that deterrent for myself at Faslane, and let me pay tribute to the crews of Vanguard, Vengeance, Victorious and Vigilant, their families and all those whose support has been essential to Operation Relentless, our continuous at-sea deterrent patrols. It is Faslane that is truly Britain’s peace camp. Whether we like it or not, there remain approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons globally. We cannot uninvent those weapons.

[Richard Benyon (Newbury) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend recall that during the Scottish referendum a number of people said that somehow, because there was a base in Scotland, the rest of England was getting away without having bases related to our nuclear deterrent? It is worth reminding people that from my bedroom window I can see the towers of Aldermaston, Greenham common and the royal ordnance factory at Burghfield. The defence footprint relating to the support of our nuclear deterrent is as important throughout the United Kingdom as it is in Scotland.

UK Armed Forces (Iraq)

Lord Benyon Excerpts

Monday 15th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

What I am sure of, first of all, is that ISIL presents a clear and present danger to us in the United Kingdom. There have been acts of violent extremism on the streets of our capital and elsewhere. This is a very direct threat and there are Britons, sadly, who have gone to fight for the jihadists. There is a direct British interest in ensuring that ISIL is not allowed to capture further territory in Iraq and is thrown back out of it. That is why we are supporting the legitimate Government of Iraq, and why we are acting at their request in considering what further training and support we are able to offer. So far as the base in Bahrain is concerned, we have ships and aircraft permanently present in the Gulf. Having a permanent base there will make deployment much easier.

[Richard Benyon (Newbury) (Con)]

One of the most important things the Defence Committee heard last week was the strong desire by Governments in the region, particularly the Government of Jordan, to “Arabise the narrative”. What more can the UK Government do to support the strong desire that this be seen as an Arab-led initiative against an evil form of extreme Islam and that we in the west—countries such as Britain, the United States and France—be seen as acting in support of those efforts?

[Michael Fallon]

I agree with my hon. Friend. The extent to which our allies in the Gulf accept that they and other regional parties have a regional responsibility to help the Government of Iraq deal with this challenge is encouraging. The recent conference in Kuwait on combating the ideology of ISIL was an important illustration of that. In the end, this has to be dealt with by the legitimate Government of Iraq, with the support of the region and the international community.

Reserve Recruitment

Lord Benyon Excerpts

Monday 17th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Richard Benyon (Newbury) (Con)]

As someone who has visited reserve units, I find increasing optimism among commanding officers and others that they are going to achieve the targets. May I suggest a very small tweak? The emergency service cap on recruits needs to be reviewed. For example, in the Met police a reserve recruitment cap of 0.25% has existed since the cold war. This could be an ideal recruiting ground. Will the Minister look at it?

[Mr Brazier]

I am most grateful for the question from my hon. and gallant Friend, who served in the same regiment as I did, although he was a regular and I was a reservist. He is exactly right. The cap is being addressed. Clearly, the Metropolitan police need to have a cap, but it is much too low at present. There is a discussion going on. A commanding officer I met had lost three military police soldiers from her unit because they had got jobs with the Met and been made to resign because the quota was filled.