Imprisonment for Public Protection

Debate between Lord Bellamy and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Tuesday 16th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, the House will be aware that the Victims and Prisoners Bill reduces the qualifying licence period from 10 years to three, with the presumption of termination at that point, and automatic termination two years thereafter if there is no recall in the meantime. A recent report by His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation found that in none of the cases examined was the recall inappropriate but that, in some cases, further additional support in the community might have avoided the need for recall. That has led to a number of recommendations, all of which the Government have accepted.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, when I served on the Justice Committee in the Scottish Parliament, I recall that Scotland chose a different path from England and Wales when the sentences were introduced by the Labour Government in 2005, and it was right that they were abolished in 2012. The UN rapporteur’s figures make very sobering reading, stating that 97% of those still imprisoned are now two years beyond the tariff and 46% are 10 years beyond the tariff, with rehabilitation having been designed as an integral part of the sentencing. What are the obstacles for the Government in implementing the recommendations of the Justice Committee in the Commons, endorsed by the UN rapporteur, for resentencing and rehabilitation now being put forward? What are the obstacles to this happening, so we can finally put to bed what has been a very sorry exercise?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I think I have explained this matter several times before to your Lordships but, in brief, the situation is this. We have 1,200 prisoners who have never been released. Almost all of those have come several times before the Parole Board, which each time has decided that they are not safe to release. Any resentencing exercise would inevitably either aim at or result in possibly a thousand persons being released who are not safe to release. The cohort includes many violent and sexual offenders, who are particularly difficult to manage in the community. The Government feel that they cannot take that risk and should not raise expectations but manage the situation by preparing the remaining prisoners for safe release.

Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between Lord Bellamy and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness says, there might indeed be issues. Their legislation is a matter for them. The fact that they are members of the Commonwealth which upholds, or seeks to uphold, barest basic standards is a relevant background consideration, as the noble Lord pointed out.

For the reasons I have given, as best I can, the protections in the Bill are adequate to deal with the problems that have been raised. I respectfully say that Clauses 5 and 6 and Schedule 1 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister for his thorough response, and to those who have spoken.

I looked at the reference to the Commonwealth when the Bill and the schedule were published. It is worth noting that 76% of Commonwealth countries are not considered by this Government to be safe, because 76% of the Commonwealth is not in the schedule. That is not us questioning it; that is the Government making their own decision.

The Minister, in his typically emollient way, suggested that we do not really understand these clauses and that if we did we should not be concerned because, as he put it, the legislation will have no practical operability. We are in a situation where the Home Office is doing the reverse of virtue signalling, which is to try to create, as my noble friend Lord Paddick indicated, the most punitive and threatening environment, of which the justice department will have to pick up the pieces. The Minister has been at pains to point out that there are many elements which would mean that there is no practical operability, but we are being asked to legislate for this, and on the basis of a lack of agreements.

On Monday, the Minister said to me:

“I suppose that the direct answer is that one would have to negotiate an appropriate agreement with the country concerned”.—[Official Report, 5/7/23; col. 1229.]


As the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, and others indicated, the Government have not done so, but they are still asking us to legislate. The Minister said that, when we are negotiating some of these agreements in the future, there would be a “force of public opinion” on the agreements and debate. But on the only one that we have, with Rwanda, there was no debate or consultation. We were surprised by it. It was not a treaty that was ratified by Parliament; it was an MoU. The International Agreements Committee forced a debate on the MoU in this House, in which noble Lords took part, and the committee raised the concern expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, about refoulement. Unfortunately, this is the pattern of the Government.

On Monday, the Minister was not even able to confirm to me—he said he would write to me and I am grateful for that—that there are child facilities in the Rwanda agreement, because it was not designed for that in the first place. That addresses the point that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, indicated with regards to those who are children. I referenced 73 children, up to 2022, who would be in the situation of being referred to protection and then on their 18th birthday would receive, under the Bill, a third-country notice, and they would have no idea what that country would be.

Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between Lord Bellamy and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Committee stage
Monday 5th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, I hope I can be relatively brief in introducing a small group of technical amendments to the Bill and perhaps, if I may say so, allow the House to take a short break from the understandably strong feelings generated by the discussion.

The amendments essentially address three issues. The first is to define the term “national” as including a citizen of the relevant country. Thus Amendment 19 inserts a Bill-wide definition of the term “national”. The effect is that any reference to a country of which a person is a national includes a country of which a person is a citizen. In not all countries are citizenship and nationality exactly the same. Similarly, a reference to a person not being a national of a country is to be read as also referring to a person not being a citizen of that country. Amendment 19 ensures that the Bill is consistent in this regard. Amendments 16, 24, 28, 99 and 141 are simply consequential amendments. Amendment 128 makes a similar change to Section 80A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

The second group of technical amendments ensures that the word “court”, where it appears in the Bill, includes a tribunal. That is in relation specifically to Amendment 25A, which refers to the definition of an application for judicial review. The definition of the application for a judicial review in Clause 4(6) is extended so that it covers an application to a tribunal. That will specifically be the judicial review jurisdiction of the Upper Tribunal or the Special Immigration Appeals Commission.

The substantive issues about the scope of judicial reviews—whether they are non-suspensive or not, and the related provisions of Clause 52 and 55—will, I am sure, be debated in due course. The effect of Amendment 25A, and the associated Amendments 115C, 116A, 117A, 123A and 123B, is to make it clear that the relevant provisions in each case apply to tribunal proceedings, especially proceedings in the Upper Tribunal, as they do to proceedings in the High Court or the Court of Session.

Finally, the third group of amendments includes Amendments 29, 31, 32, 33, 34 and 38, which relate to the country to which certain persons who satisfy the conditions in Clause 2 may be removed to. Effectively, they treat persons who hold a passport or an identity document from the country in question as if they were nationals or citizens of that country. If, for example, an Indian national had a French identity document, they could be returned to France, assuming that there were no exceptional circumstances preventing their removal there. In other words, it is simply to treat persons who have obtained an identity document in the same way as they would be treated were they a national or citizen of that country.

I am happy of course to deal with any points that arise, but I do hope that these relatively technical amendments find favour with the Committee, and I beg to move Amendment 16.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I will just ask the Minister for clarification with regard to countries that we do not recognise or areas where there are territorial disputes. Two of the main areas people are coming to the UK from, which the Government wish to stop, are conflict-afflicted areas because of territorial disputes, where the UN has a particular mechanism of providing humanitarian identification.

Is it the government position that all those people will have to come from a state that we recognise? By definition, many of the asylum seekers are seeking asylum because they are being persecuted because they are on one side of a territorial dispute—some of these geographical areas I have visited. The Government in this Bill now seem to be indicating that they will come to a side with regard to which identification documents, either national or citizenship, they will recognise. Why is this the case?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, the proposed amendments are to cover the technical situation where somebody who is not necessarily a citizen or a national happens to hold an identity document of that country, and therefore—almost by definition, but certainly by strong presumption—is clearly someone who has a close relationship with that country. Assuming it is a safe country and that there are no other circumstances that might create an exception, that is a place to which they should normally be returned. If, as I think the question is posing, there are real risks in sending that person back to a particular country, the procedures in the Bill kick in. That would be a question of fact in each case.

Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between Lord Bellamy and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Committee stage
Monday 5th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I wish to probe a little more what the Minister said. I understand his points about certain parts of countries. As I understand it, the Government accept that, in certain parts of countries, the risk to the individual will be such that that person should not be returned or sent to them if they are part of what could otherwise be a safe country. What is our Government’s mechanism to secure a guarantee from that country’s Government that that person would not then be sent to that region?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I suppose that the direct answer is that one would have to negotiate an appropriate agreement with the country concerned. I agree that that may not be enough, and the situation may well be such that it is not appropriate to designate a part of the country. All I am saying is that one should have this power; I am not necessarily saying the circumstances in which one should exercise it. It would still be open to an individual, in a suspensive claim, to say, “I’m still at risk because I might be transferred to the part of the country where it would be too dangerous for me to be sent”. That would be part of the analysis that the tribunal seized of the case would have to make.

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[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, the Government will of course consider that, as we try to consider everything that is said in this House, before Report. I simply reiterate that under Clause 5(3)(d), it still has to be

“a country or territory to which there is reason to believe P will be admitted”—

and that is probably not very likely to be satisfied in the particular countries we are talking about, such as Ghana, for example. Having responded to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the Government will of course consider the position.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

On that very point, what is the point of having Ghana in that schedule? There is no agreement with Ghana at all, so how do the Government know that Ghana would be unlikely to accept someone who is not admissible under the UK scheme? The UK will presumably not necessarily divulge that that person is gay.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I sought to explain earlier that Schedule 1 is an amalgam of all the existing schedules that exist. Ghana was already on a list of countries to which people could be sent, and the present practice is not to send people back to places where they are at serious risk. That practice will continue under this Act when you make a suspensive harm application. It is a historical situation, but it has to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. As I said to the noble Baroness a moment ago, the Government will reflect on what has been said in this debate.

That brings me to deal specifically with the question of Rwanda and the fact that there are currently proceedings pending in relation to Rwanda, as the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, pointed out. So far, the High Court has upheld the position on Rwanda: we will see what the Court of Appeal judgment says. If the case goes further, it will be a matter for judicial decision and we will see how that works out, but we will not take Rwanda out at this stage, while the matter is still pending. I think that is also the answer, if I may say so, in relation to Amendments 43A and 49A on Hungary and Poland. These are ongoing proceedings: let us see what the outcome is and then it can be properly determined whether Poland and Hungary are countries that should remain on the list. That is not clear yet and it depends on the outcome of those pending proceedings.

I think that I am nearly through, except for the very important points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and others, as to whether we should beef up Clause 6(4)(b), which at the moment places certain requirements on the Secretary of State, in deciding on possible new countries and territories. The thrust of the amendment suggested by the noble Lord and supported by others is that effectively there should be a more detailed list of conventions and other international instruments to which the Government should have regard, with a specific obligation of consultation. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and others wanted in particular to enshrine the obligation to follow the decisions of domestic courts and the Human Rights Act.

The Government’s position on this—and of course, as with other things, we will reflect on it—is that these are effectively de facto covered in the existing Clause 6(4)(a) and (b). They provide that the Secretary of State must—it is a positive duty—

“have regard to all the circumstances of the country”

and

“must have regard to information from any appropriate source (including member States and international organisations)”.

That, in the Government’s view, necessarily requires the Secretary of State to have regard to case law, whether it is domestic or European; to have regard to international conventions and obligations; and to have regard to what international organisations say—and they are not exactly bashful when coming forward in this kind of area. The Secretary of State would be seriously at risk of being found to have acted irrationally or found not to have taken into account relevant considerations, if there was a major international organisation, a major convention or a major decision that had somehow been overlooked. So the combination of the normal duties of rationality and duty to take into account all relevant considerations, plus the actual wording of Clause 6(4), in the Government’s present view, covers the situation adequately.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Bellamy and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Report stage
Tuesday 7th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

It is perfectly within the rules of the Companion for noble Lords to seek points of clarification or elucidation from those who are speaking.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I am again extremely grateful to noble Lords for their interventions and, in particular, for the support for the principle behind Clause 89 expressed by the Official Opposition, subject to the point about minor offences, which I will come to in a moment.

As a quick reminder, Clause 89 narrows the range of circumstances in which individuals convicted of specific terrorism offences can automatically receive civil legal aid services. This includes individuals convicted of terrorism offences punishable with imprisonment for two years or more as well as other offences where a judge has found a terrorism connection. It is important to note that this clause modifies but does not exclude legal aid, because there is still the route of exceptional case funding, particularly if convention rights are in issue. One of the fundamental convention rights— I think this at least partially answers the point raised by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—is the necessity for a fair trial, in Article 6. The exceptional case funding route is still available in that regard. Phrases such as “excludes”, “denies”, “debars” and “no legal aid support” are not an accurate summary of what this clause achieves.

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[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify a point from his earlier comments on exceptional case funding. The guidance on this on GOV.UK says:

“You could get legal aid for cases that would not usually be eligible if your human rights are at risk. This is known as exceptional case funding”.


Can the Minister clarify: under the Bill, will anybody who receives any sentence for any terrorism offence now automatically be eligible for exceptional case funding?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

No, that is not the Government’s position. There is a mechanism by way of exceptional case funding to ensure access to justice in an appropriate case.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Then the point that the Minister referred to about the Bill is irrelevant, because the eligibility for exceptional case funding is regardless of whether the Bill is in place.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

It is not entirely irrelevant that exceptional case funding is always available for access to justice. That fact changes some of the comments that have been made about the restrictive nature of the Bill.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Bellamy and Lord Purvis of Tweed

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I can say that the principle is certainly not for the judge to be asking himself, “Should I be protecting the Government or the security services from actions for damages?” I am not drafting the Bill, and I will further consider the matter, but I would imagine that it is something like how far the claimant brought the situation on himself. That would be an ex turpi causa or contributory negligence type of consideration. However, I do not want to pre-empt the discussion any further, standing on my feet thinking aloud, because I hear what is being said: we want further precision as to how the courts are to go about this.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I think the Committee is now in a bit of a bind. The Minister stated a few moments ago that the Bill is now a clear code and explicit, but he is unwilling to tell the Committee even some basic elements of what guidance for a judge might exist. We do not know now how to proceed on the basis of this before Report, especially in the case of the specific question that I asked.

The Minister has also stated, exactly from the Government’s perspective, what the guidance for judges is. He talked at the opening of his remarks about demonstrating that

“the UK is not a soft touch for those involved in terrorist wrongdoing”.

It is very clear from what the Minister said at the Dispatch Box what the intent is. If the judge is not to take into consideration what the Minister stated, we are in a bit of difficulty.

My specific question here, and I hope the Minister can be specific in an answer now, relates to the concern that was raised that the national security factor in Clause 83(3) is broad, and that a foreign power can state that the claimant was involved in terrorist activities in a foreign country. If that is used by a party under the national security factor, my reading of that is that the judge must now take that into consideration. Surely that cannot be right.

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[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, perhaps I can briefly explain, first, the Government’s view of the principle behind the provision, then come later to the detail of how it operates. In the Government’s view, looking at it as a matter of principle, through their actions individuals who commit acts of terrorism seek to threaten and undermine the very democratic institutions that are at the heart of our democracy in this country. It is right that persons who have committed acts of terrorism against democracy should be subject to a different approach when it comes to granting civil legal aid. The different approach is, in this case, that these provisions do not entirely deprive a “terrorist” of civil legal aid, because exceptional case funding remains available. That is granted in around 75% of the cases in which it is applied for, so we have a safety net there. The practical effect of what is proposed is that those with the relevant terrorist convictions follow a different route from others. In other words, the automaticity of legal aid is somewhat different if you have committed a terrorist offence.

Apart from the question of principle—and that is the principle that the Government are advancing—the questions that have arisen in this debate essentially focus on two issues, or sub-issues. First, have we drawn the definition of terrorist offence too widely, catching very minor incidents, such as the graffiti incident put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, or the relatively minor terrorist offences to which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, drew attention? Secondly, are there particular circumstances, of which domestic abuse is one, where there should be some exception to be made, and where it is going too far to have this blanket restriction, and there are obvious cases where there could be a fully justified grant of legal aid on the normal procedure, rather than forcing someone to go for exceptional case funding? On both those points, I shall undertake to reflect and to look at the underlying impact of these provisions—but the general principle is as I have outlined.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

The Minister makes his case as to the general principle but, if that is so strong from the Government’s position, why does it relate only to England and Wales?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

The noble Lord, from a Scottish perspective, asks a relevant question. I shall have to take that under advisement and see, but I suspect that it is because there is a different legal regime in Scotland.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I look forward to the Minister’s letter. This Bill applies to everywhere—but, of course, there is separate legal aid legislation in Scotland, which I scrutinised when I was on the Justice Committee in the Scottish Parliament. If the case is so strong for the whole United Kingdom, I am not sure why this is. If he is writing to me, could he add something on the concern about whether this provision is consistent with the commitments in the Good Friday agreement? Does this provision also apply to Northern Ireland, with regard to the permanent removal for all those who previously were beyond the restrictions before the convictions were made, as in the Bill?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

As far as I know, it is not the intention to apply this measure to Northern Ireland, but I shall write to the noble Lord to confirm the Government’s position.