Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between Lord Bellamy and Lord Kerr of Kinlochard

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I entirely accept the point my noble friend makes and thank him for it.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

The noble and learned Lord is so reassuring, and his manner is so friendly, that one is tempted to believe that this might all be as good as he says. On the two-part process, he says that the list sets out possible destinations, but that the Secretary of State would make a judgment about the individual and whether the individual should not be sent to a particular country for reasons particular to the individual. If it were the noble and learned Lord making these decisions, I would be very reassured; unfortunately, it is the Home Secretary.

I am sorry to press the Minister but he has not really answered my question. He says that the list is based on history, but in the past we have not sent people compulsorily to go through an asylum process in another country—so there is something new here. Further, we have not been sending people to countries where there is no asylum process but we are insisting that they must seek asylum there. I do not think the noble and learned Lord has addressed that point.

I would also be grateful if the Minister would construe for us the language in the first paragraph of Clause 6, which addresses “in general” and “a part”. I have not heard his answer to my question as to why it is all right that a country should not in general contravene the human rights convention—implying that if in particular it does, we do not care—and, secondly, why it refers to part of a country or territory. I do not understand how we can get an international agreement with a counterpart. If I am a negotiator, how do I persuade him to accept that there are parts of his country that are unsafe and parts of his country that are safe? Surely the agreement has to be with the other country in respect of the full territory of the other country, not in respect of part of the territory.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, in relation to the latter point, I repeat the point I made on Monday that this is precautionary. There is no reason to deprive oneself of the possibility of providing for “a part”. With an enormous country such as India, it may be that up in Nagaland or somewhere there are some disturbances, but that does not prevent us saying that India is a safe country. That is the Government’s answer to the first point.

Our answer to the second point is that the words “in general” have—I am open to correction and I will correct myself if I am wrong—stood for 20 years on the statute book without difficulty and do not preclude, in an individual case, an application being made to oppose removal on the grounds of irreparable harm. It is the combination of a general view that the country is safe with the possibility of individual protection. Those are essentially the answers I gave on Monday.

I entirely accept the noble Lord’s point that this is new, but, for the reasons I have tried to explain, it is a workable and, I submit, balanced approach to a very difficult problem which the Bill is trying to solve.

Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Debate between Lord Bellamy and Lord Kerr of Kinlochard

Committee stage
Monday 6th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, the courts are always astute. They sort of intuitively know where they have to stop and where Parliament has to take over. That is a process that has been honed and refined for the past 100 years at least, but it does not prevent the courts moulding, refining and developing the common law. There comes a point where you cannot go further, but quite often in a court you can, especially when you have existing jurisprudence. It is quite early on in the development of a new technology. In the Warner case, we were talking about hyperlinks, graphic interfaces and all sorts of high-technology things with which I am sure your Lordships are extremely familiar, but it is a new area of law, and the courts, generally speaking, work with that until they find that they have gone as far as they can as a court and then Parliament takes over. With respect, I would not completely accept the observation of my noble friend Lord Hailsham that this is usurping Parliament.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

I think I understand the Minister’s argument about “proper” in new paragraph (c) in Clause 7(3), but is the wording of this not prejudicial because it assumes that retained EU law restricts the proper development of domestic law? It does not say that the court should consider whether and to what extent retained EU law restricts the proper development of domestic law. It says that it should consider the extent to which it does, assuming that it does. Would it not be better to go for non-prejudicial language, as well as, I hope, including the balancing language in Amendments 83, 85 and 88?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

As far as I know, this is not intended to be prejudicial, but it presupposes a case where there is a tenable argument and it is put to the court that a retained EU law has that effect. Then the court will decide whether it does and what would be the proper development going forward. Taking that intervention on the hoof as it were, I am not sure at first sight that one is convinced that it would be better to change the wording. Let me reflect further.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I am sorry. I was saying that this is a structure that gives the UK law officers power in relation to UK competence and the devolved Governments power in relation to their competence. That is the structure of it all.

Amendment 101, on the question of incompatibility orders, is described as a probing amendment. Again, this has precedence in other parts of the statute book. The Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 has a similar power. If there is a point of incompatibility, the courts are given a power to manage that; it would probably mean deferring making an order for six months until the Government could fix it, as did the Court of Appeal in the Open Rights Group v The Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport: we have found a problem, and we are going to give you time to come up with solution, whether it is legislative or otherwise. In that particular case, the power was said by the Court of Appeal to derive from EU powers, but this is giving the court power under domestic legislation. I hope it is a sensible process for making the compatibility mechanisms work properly if incompatibility is found, which is likely to be a fairly rare event. I hope I have covered most points, if not all.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for the skill with which he is trying to explain to a layman like me abstruse points of law. Could he give us a worked example, please? I was struck by what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, said about the potential cost to the country of a loss of clarity. Take his example of the copyright law of the United Kingdom, which, he said, was virtually exclusively based on EU law. What changes of circumstances do the Government envisage that the courts should be considering when they consider cases that are tried under the present British copyright law? The only change of circumstances I can think of is if the Government were to pass new legislation on copyright. I do not think that is the plan, but if they do not, what are the courts supposed to do? What change of circumstances would they have to consider?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, fortunately, I think I was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, for only one example, and so I will just give one because it is getting quite late. The example is changes in technology, which are moving very quickly. The Warner case, which has now been mentioned several times, was a case in which a radio station in the US put some music in a hyperlink on its website. Consumers in the UK could click on the link on that website, and the question was whether the UK copyright holders could get a royalty on that even though the UK user was accessing it in the United States—it does not matter if it is the United States, Taiwan or anywhere else. In that kind of area, the technology is moving very quickly. The existing EU decisions are not entirely consistent, and it can be easily envisaged that in some future situation, where some technology that we do not yet understand or know of has come into being, a UK court might take a different view and distinguish previous EU jurisprudence. That sort of situation is more than likely to happen at some stage.