Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Debate between Lord Bellamy and Baroness McIntosh of Pickering

Report stage
Monday 15th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

I am sorry to speak out of turn, but I entirely support all the amendments in this group. In particular, I endorse the plea of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, on the status of the Lord Advocate. Could the Minister clarify, either at this opportunity or at a later stage of the Bill, the points that the noble and learned Lord made, because it would not be acceptable for the Lord Advocate to be treated differently from any other law officer in the land?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, in view of the fact that the most important and contentious amendment to the Bill, which has been moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is fully agreed and accepted by the Government, and that other amendments are not being moved—although I will deal with the Lord Advocate point—with your Lordships’ permission, I will take this quite shortly, especially having regard to the clock. But that in no way underestimates the importance of the issues we are debating.

First, the Government are extremely grateful to the judiciary and other stakeholders for drawing our attention to the issue of “may” rather than “must”. I am extremely grateful for the dignified and discreet way in which those matters have been resolved to everyone’s satisfaction. The central point that the courts should have the relevant discretion is accepted and, as I say, the Government are pleased to adopt the amendments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope.

As to the remaining amendments in the group, the Government share the desire of the House that the role of the courts should be as simple as possible. We do not consider that the way the Bill is currently drafted drags the courts into some kind of political controversy. I am not able to give the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, the undertaking she seeks that we shall further consider those amendments. Of course, nothing is ever ruled out, but it would be wrong for me to say that it is currently the Government’s intention to propose further amendments to the Bill. I can go into this in more detail one by one and perhaps, if the noble Baroness has a moment, I can explain the Government’s position bilaterally. I am very much in the hands of the House but, as these amendments are not actually being moved, I do not feel that it is right to take up time explaining why the Government take the position that we do. However, the Government’s door is always open to discuss particular points with any noble Lord.

I simply say that the tradition of common law has enabled the law to evolve over centuries, while preserving a reasonable degree of predictability. That technique is well known in the United Kingdom and I have no doubt that it will continue to be honed and progressed in the future.

As to the specific amendments on the powers of the Lord Advocate, I confess to some diffidence in the face of the pre-eminence of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, on Scots law and other matters. At present, the Government do not feel that we should accept the proposed amendments. Amendments 30, 32, 33 and 34 would allow the Lord Advocate to intervene in any case, irrespective of whether the issue was a devolved matter under Scottish legislation or a reserved matter in which the relevant competence is exclusively that of the United Kingdom. That is our understanding of the effect of the amendments. The Government’s position is simply that that change would be constitutionally inappropriate. In our view, references and interventions by the Lord Advocate, a Minister in the Scottish Government, are quite properly restricted to legislative matters within the devolved competence of the Scottish Government. That is the Government’s position on that broad issue.

Finally, Amendment 31 would none the less give the Lord Advocate intervention powers not only in Scottish legislation, which is what the Act is about, but also for certain retained functions of the Lord Advocate. Here I very much bow to others’ more detailed knowledge of what exactly these retained functions are. The Government’s understanding is that they relate mainly to the prosecutorial functions, since it is the Lord Advocate who is ultimately responsible for criminal prosecutions in Scotland. The nearest analogy outside Scotland is arguably to the DPP for England and Wales or the DPP for Northern Ireland.

The Government therefore respectfully oppose this amendment since, first, no similar powers are conferred on the DPPs in England, Wales or Northern Ireland. Secondly, the devolved powers to intervene in relation to the devolved law officers are limited to legislation, as exhaustively defined in the case of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and there does not seem to be any clear reason for treating Scotland differently from the other devolved Administrations.

Thirdly, and again the Government are open to correction, it is difficult to see how, in practice, the amendment might bite in any practical way. Fourthly, any blurring of the line beyond the scope of devolved legislation, as defined in the Bill, is not shown, in the Government’s view, to be sufficiently justified and would be outside the scheme of the Act. So, essentially for those reasons, the Government will not be able to accept the amendments in relation to the Lord Advocate and I respectfully ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, not to press his amendments in that regard.

Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Debate between Lord Bellamy and Baroness McIntosh of Pickering

Committee stage
Monday 6th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

I have listened very carefully, and there is a fundamental flaw in my noble friend’s argument as it relates to Scotland. Scotland has a mixed legal system. I am a non-practising member of the Faculty of Advocates. I chose to go and practise EU law because every reference was either passed down to London or you could practise EU law in Brussels; there were very few opportunities to practise at the Scottish Bar. But my noble friend must accept that the Scottish system—which, I would hazard a guess, has many advantages over the English system—is based on Roman law. It is based on a system of codified law, and what distinguishes it fundamentally from what he has just described about the common-law system is that it is a mixed legal system. I wonder whether he would like to address this in his remarks, given the comments that I made in relation to the amendments that I spoke to—Amendments 81, 82, 84 and 94—and mindful of the fact that I am approaching this from a mixed civil and common-law system.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I thank my noble friend Lady McIntosh for that intervention, and I stand corrected. She is completely right that Scotland is a mixed system, although I venture to suggest much influenced—if I may use that controversial word for a moment—by the common law. As I said a moment ago, Scottish judges have been, frankly, the best common lawyers anyone has ever known. They happen all to be called Reid but that is a coincidence.

Of course, I accept the comment, although I beg to differ as to whether any different conclusion follows. Essentially, the “may”, “must” and other amendments that the noble Baroness has proposed are independent of the exact legal approach one is talking about. It may well be that, in a Scottish situation, there would be a greater willingness not to disturb retained case law than in an English situation. I do not know; maybe these things will come up to the Supreme Court and someone will say “That is what we are going to do”. Maybe the Scottish tradition will prevail; that is perfectly likely. With respect, the Government do not feel that that changes the general thrust of Clause 7.

That was changes of circumstances. The next question is on this word “influence”—whether it has been influenced or determined by European law. I think “influenced” is included simply to give a sufficient degree of flexibility and to avoid deciding what might be quite a difficult point: whether European law was in fact determinative of a particular point or just part of the general context. Very often, it is part of the general context and the influence of the European element on the final outcome.

On that point—I am not sure we picked it up entirely; I may be speaking out of turn—I shall, if I may, at least attempt a reply to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, on the question of principles of interpretation. I think it is relevant to the influence point. It arises in the context of legislation. Many here will know better than me, but the essential difference, as I understand it, is that traditional common law, including the Scottish approach, is a highly textual interpretation: what the meaning of the words is. The European Court’s general approach is a teleological interpretation of the general idea of where the statute is going. Very often, because of the laconic and sometimes completely deficient nature of European legislation, that court is much more prepared to fill in the gaps in the legislation than an English court would be. It is along those general lines; I am sure we can elaborate further as necessary later in these proceedings. So that is the influence point.

I think I have dealt with adding in the factors of settled understanding, legal certainty and so forth. The Government do not support that approach because it would simply bake in the status quo; that is the Government’s essential position. Legal certainty is inevitably something the courts will consider. They considered it in the Warner Music case because they were dealing with an international treaty and there was a desire not to disturb the law—albeit that the law was a right old muddle, as far as one can see, if I may put it colloquially just for a moment. In that case, it was not actually very seriously argued that we should depart from EU law; it was a perfunctory argument that took place in a few minutes at the end of the day, so it was a bit of a non-event.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, fortunately, I think I was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, for only one example, and so I will just give one because it is getting quite late. The example is changes in technology, which are moving very quickly. The Warner case, which has now been mentioned several times, was a case in which a radio station in the US put some music in a hyperlink on its website. Consumers in the UK could click on the link on that website, and the question was whether the UK copyright holders could get a royalty on that even though the UK user was accessing it in the United States—it does not matter if it is the United States, Taiwan or anywhere else. In that kind of area, the technology is moving very quickly. The existing EU decisions are not entirely consistent, and it can be easily envisaged that in some future situation, where some technology that we do not yet understand or know of has come into being, a UK court might take a different view and distinguish previous EU jurisprudence. That sort of situation is more than likely to happen at some stage.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, it has been a lengthy and thorough debate, and I fear it has not gone quite as smoothly as my noble and learned friend the Minister would have wished. I am pleased he has conceded that Scots rule approaches this from a different angle. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has not been able to be present today, and I do not think my noble and learned friend has entirely answered the concerns of either the Royal Society of Scotland or the noble and learned Lord. In particular, my noble and learned friend has not addressed the question of why there is no corresponding restraint on the powers of any other UK law officer—for example, the England or Wales law officer—but only on the Scotland law officer. I would like to understand, perhaps at a meeting before Report, why that is the case. It is quite serious.

My noble and learned friend spoke at length about why retained EU law is historic now, but we are in a situation where court cases may arise. For example, the chemical industry here is going to be covered by the fledgling UK REACH programme, but the industry would also hope to export to the EU and so will have to meet the terms of the EU REACH programme. Does my noble and learned friend not accept that there will be cases that relate to this?

I fear that Clause 7 is an exam question seeking to show that, on appeal, there will be no reliance on retained EU law going forward. I think that was the wrong question to put, as has been adequately set out to such an extent that a distinguished former President of the Family Division, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said it is offensive to treat judges in this way, as did my noble friend Lord Hailsham, in slightly less graphic language.

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for speaking to the amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. I believe that work is not complete on this chapter but, with the promise of a meeting before Report, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.