(4 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, given my five years in the Chair in the other place, noble Lords will not be surprised that I had a closer look at the super-affirmative procedure, where it has been used and where it should be used.
First, we all acknowledge that this is a very important Bill, which is why there is an affirmative resolution procedure in various clauses. We start with that. Secondly, as noble Lords have said, the super-affirmative procedure involves an additional stage of scrutiny where Parliament considers a proposal for a statutory instrument before it is formally presented—what we call laid. This procedure is used for statutory instruments that are considered to need a particularly high level of scrutiny. That is self-evident, I think.
I then checked where they had been used. The statutory instruments used so far usually amend or repeal Acts of Parliament. Examples would include legislative reform orders, localism orders, public bodies orders, regulatory reform orders and remedial orders. Although I have had only a short time to do it, I have not found it within primary legislation—I stand to be corrected, but I have not found it myself. Indeed, listening to my noble friend proposing that this procedure should be used, it seemed to me that it was a sort of grapeshot approach, scattered throughout the Bill, suggesting that all the bits in these amendments are absolutely vital and must be taken specially. I just do not think that stacks up.
Furthermore, because this Bill is important, and because we are dealing with devolved powers who will be consulted and worked with, it will just add further delay. That is not in the interests of Parliament, business, commerce, or the people of the United Kingdom. So quite frankly, I certainly will not be supporting this at all—I think it is almost out of order.
My Lords, in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, the fact that the super-affirmative powers have not been very widely used in the past is really no excuse for not using them where they are an appropriate way of dealing with important statutory instruments and providing a higher level of scrutiny. If the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, doubts the need for more use of the procedure, she should recall all those occasions when we have felt that a statutory instrument should be amended but have had no capacity to do so, and our dislike of a particular feature of it was not sufficient to justify blocking it or turning it down—something, of course, that this House very rarely does. It does address, although not by providing power of amendment, the lack of amendment power which is a characteristic of almost the whole of the statutory instrument system.
An alternative to heckling is the constructive tabling of an amendment, so we should welcome that, and I think that the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, and the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes—this new coalition, the Foulkes-McIntosh group—have done us a service in bringing this matter forward. If you worry, as I have done over many years, about the inadequacy of our procedures for dealing with statutory instruments, especially those which try to change primary legislation, super-affirmative procedure, as its name suggests, is better than ordinary affirmative procedure and better still than negative procedure, because it opens up fresh opportunities for how the matter can be dealt with. Because it takes more time, there should be some caution over which things we think it is right to use it for, but it could be much more usefully employed than it has been in recent years. Of course, it is not a single procedure; it is a category of procedure which is usually spelled out individually in the legislation which employs it, as in this case—and the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, has improved and added to the process in the version of it that is now before us.
The procedure allows for measured consideration. Sometimes measured consideration is impossible because of urgency, but things are not always as urgent as the Government say they are. Usually the urgency has arisen from the fact that the Government have taken too long dealing with it and have brought it to the House at a very late stage. Throughout the coronavirus epidemic we have had all these occasions when the House has suddenly been told that something is very urgent which the Government have been dealing with for weeks, and probably even announced many days previously, but are now giving the House minimum time to address. The Government cannot always claim that there is an inherent urgency in the situation; rather, they have created urgency by delay at their stages of the process.
Where measured consideration is appropriate, the super-affirmative procedures allow for it and allow the House to suggest amendments to a Bill, which the Government can then go back and consider. I think it has advantages and would have advantages for some of the processes in this Bill. So it is not the wild suggestion that the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, seem to think that it is. I think it has many advantages which ought to be deployed in circumstances such as this.
(4 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, who I think has done a service to the House and indeed the country. It was interesting to hear what he said about advice from the Public Bill Office. However, Amendment 27, which is the one that took my eye, is precautionary and by definition refers to the coronavirus pandemic and, therefore, one hopes it is time-limited. I thank him for raising this absolutely crucial issue and yet giving the Government the facility to act as they feel appropriate.
I would not normally intervene on a Bill when I had not taken part in its earlier stages, but noble Lords will know that my earlier absence was because of the illness and death of my wife, who contributed so much to this House and had friends in all parts of it.
I speak as a member of the Constitution Committee to underline its concerns about fast-track legislation and, to some extent, the way they have been dealt with as the Government have brought forward the amendments in this group. Fast-tracking tends to limit parliamentary scrutiny and discourage necessary amendment of Bills. It also tends to increase confusion about what is the law, what is guidance, what is advice and what is merely a proposal. During the whole of the coronavirus epidemic, this has been a besetting failure, leaving those who have to enforce the law uncertain as to what it is and is not. Fast-track legislation should not be drafted widely, loosely and without clarity.
These government amendments appropriately limit the worrying power to extend the time limits on what is supposed to be temporary legislation dealing with an emergency—admittedly one whose duration none of us can be certain about. Had we passed the Bill in its original form, we would be enacting sunset clauses in a land where the sun never sets—as people used to say about the British Empire—because they can be extended for no purpose connected to the coronavirus. This might have been challenged in the courts, but it would have been a long and complicated case.
The new drafting makes Parliament’s intention in allowing these powers of extension clear: it is to allow them only to the extent necessary to deal with the effects of the coronavirus. I note that the wording deals with the effects and not merely the virus itself; we are clearly talking about the economic consequences as well. I welcome the fact that the Government have brought these amendments forward, and they significantly improve the Bill.