(3 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, some time ago when the Hillsborough matter was before this House, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, I think, and I put forward a suggestion that the coroner in an inquest should have power to allow a public authority, or an authority with resources, to put forward a defence using lawyers for that purpose, and that a condition of granting such permission should be that the authority is responsible for providing the necessary funding for the relatives of the deceased to be represented. The choice of who they would use, of course, would be for the relatives, but the provision of the necessary money would be a matter for the authority—at the level at which the authority wanted to do it—so that there would be obvious equality of arms.
I think it is a much better solution than legal aid. Needless to say, I have had, some time ago, some experience of dealing with legal aid. I had the authority as Lord Chancellor to grant legal aid in specific cases that I thought required it, but I think it is much better, fairer and less burdensome to the public, that this should be the rule. It seems to me this is quite easy to systematise when you have more than one of these authorities. Hillsborough is a good example of what happened when there was no proper representation for some of the relatives. This is a suggestion that goes along with the spirit of the first amendment the noble and learned Lord has put forward, and I venture to think that it is an effective point of view.
I am glad to see that the noble Lord, I referred to has returned because I think he will probably remember that he and I were pretty well agreed about what should be done. Needless to say, the Home Office said it would be reviewed when the details of Hillsborough, the prosecutions and so on, were finished. Of course, that happened some time ago, but I see no sign of any kind of innovation from the Home Office, until it agrees with this amendment in spirit.
We have always been able to rely on the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, for ingenuity when difficult problems have to be resolved. This one seems to have got lost in the Home Office somewhere. That is a pity because the problem that these amendments raise is long-running and serious. It is open to discussion, whether the amendments are the best way of dealing it, but I do not think we can go on ignoring it or failing to deal with it in any adequate way.
(4 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I would like to say a word or two about the two amendments in which I had an interest. I am sorry that my voice is not quite up to it, but it is better than it was yesterday.
I am very glad that the situation now is that Parliament can act and get on with what is required. Clause 26 is the one I am interested in. Your Lordships will remember that the noble Lord, Lord Beith, moved an amendment to take out the provision which required a selection of courts to be made in a statutory instrument. I had understood that the Prime Minister had said that he wanted all courts to be able to deal with this matter in some way. By a majority of around 100, those in the House of Commons preferred that situation to what he said—that must be a matter of some interest. So far as I am concerned, I was extremely anxious to uphold what the Prime Minister said in his answer during the election.
Those in the Commons do not say that my amendment is unsuitable, but that it
“does not deal appropriately with the issue of domestic courts departing from the case law”.
But they do not say that their own provision is necessarily suitable either. I am sure that I, and all my noble and learned friends who spoke on these amendments, would be very willing to offer any help that may be required when it comes to promoting this statutory instrument.
I wonder if I might be allowed to follow the noble and learned Lord, since we are discussing the amendments to Clause 26. He made such a bold and ingenious attempt to provide the Government with a reasonable platform on which they could deal with this problem.
I am faced with words from the House of Commons that my amendment would not leave an appropriate means of dealing with
“the issue of domestic courts departing from the case law of the European Court after IP completion day”—
but nor does the Bill as it stands. It relies on the use of a regulation-making power, under which any or all courts could be included, including lower courts which do not have the capacity to bind other courts and therefore can make many inconsistent decisions. It still leaves the Government with the power to, effectively, impose a different, unspecified test.
This is a very unsatisfactory situation, but the best thing that the Government can now do, since they have failed to accept either my amendment or that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, is think very carefully before proceeding, because there is already sufficient statutory provision in place in the 2018 withdrawal Act, under which the Supreme Court and the High Court of Justiciary can do the job of deciding to depart from European case law. Should the Government wish to extend that to some other courts, perhaps to appeal courts, they will probably find sympathy and support in the House, but should they try to bring forward proposals by way of regulations of the kind that were widely discussed by very experienced colleagues around the House, they will meet resistance at that stage.
(4 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise to move Amendment 12. This amendment will not delay Brexit. It will not even delay this Bill, which is going to the Commons in any case. However, it will avoid a great deal of legal confusion and safeguard the independence of the judiciary. It reflects concerns held by the Constitution Committee, several members of which have taken part in the debates, including of course our chair, the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor. The background is that European Court of Justice case law will be relevant in interpreting retained European law. We recognised that in the 2018 withdrawal Act and made provision for it to be dealt with, so that the Supreme Court and the High Court of the Justiciary would be able to depart from EU case law when they thought it right to do so.
Clause 26 of this Bill gives Ministers very wide regulation-making powers to decide which courts can depart from CJEU case law. It could be any court, right down to the magistrates’ court, the county court or the sheriff court. Through unamendable statutory instruments, Ministers could decide what test the courts should apply when considering whether to depart from EU case law. Ministers could effectively direct the courts to disapply case law in specified circumstances. Bear in mind that lower courts cannot bind other courts, so we will have conflicting interpretations and a lot more litigation as a result.
These are not appropriate powers to be exercised by regulation. They open the way to ministerial interference with the courts. If any of this needs to be done, it should be done in primary legislation. I would have been happy to see provision in the Bill to extend the powers in the 2018 Act to the Appeal Court and the Inner House of the Court of Session, for example. However, I have tabled these amendments on Report because last week’s proceedings in Committee were inconclusive. I said then that when such serious concerns are raised by so many noble and learned Lords, including those with a lifetime of experience in interpreting the law, Ministers need to think again and respond.
I encouraged the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, to use his skills when he spoke in the debate to think of ways in which we could get through this and to encourage Ministers to do so, which he certainly has. Amendment 14, his valuable amendment in this group, would be very helpful. It does not do all the things I sought to do by deleting some of these powers, but it would very much clarify the situation I am worried about, of lower courts making rulings which conflict with those of other courts. If the noble and learned Lord decides that he wants to press his amendment to a vote, in circumstances which I will refer to in a moment, I would be happy to make way by withdrawing mine in due course to enable him to do so. I hope he can make it clear to us when he explains his amendment whether that is the course of action he wishes to take.
I said that reconsideration was necessary. I believe that such reconsideration had taken place and that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, was ready to move an amendment at Third Reading which would have met all our concerns. I have a copy of that draft amendment. The noble and learned Lord was expected to wind up this debate, but is no longer doing so. That seems very significant to me. I think he knows full well that the Bill as it stands would be a source of legal confusion and would lead to this danger of Ministers having the power to impose an unspecified new legal test on the courts, a test which could not be amended by Parliament. Parliament is about to make bad law which Ministers know to be bad. I am afraid that my conclusion is that No. 10 Downing Street is in a sulk because this House carried an earlier amendment to the Bill. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, is an entirely honourable man who serves the House very well and is always a man of his word. I think his absence from the debate at this stage indicates that some exchanges in the Government have led to this House being asked to make law that it knows to be bad. I beg to move.
My Lords, when we debated this clause in Committee, we looked at two key provisions: which courts should be able to look at this matter, and what the test should be. I was particularly concerned about saying what the test should be, because I regarded that as an interference with judicial independence—and I still regard it as such. If Parliament sets out the test, as it did in the 2018 Act, for the Supreme Court and the High Court of the Justiciary, that is the law and the courts can therefore take it and act on it. However, it seemed to me and a number of your Lordships that it was not proper for a Minister to deal with the judiciary in these circumstances. Having the Minister set what the test should be by regulation really should not happen. That was the conclusion of the debate in Committee, generally speaking.
When I thought over that, I concluded that we were blocking altogether what the Government were seeking to achieve. I therefore felt strongly that it was my responsibility, along with others, to see whether there was some other way of dealing with this problem. I have thought about it a good deal and, as I understand it, the Prime Minister said that he was in favour of every court being able to deal with this matter. I was anxious that my proposal should achieve that, if at all possible, because he had said that in good faith as part of his election campaign. Therefore, I felt that I should try to think up an amendment which gave that power. Amendment 14 does that because it allows any court in the United Kingdom to consider this matter and make a judgment on it. However, because of the nature of the judgment, there is a requirement that it be referred to the Supreme Court, which should have a power to grant the result, on condition that it has a power not to hear it if it feels that the application was not very substantial or very good, as it has for many appeals in the ordinary course of events.
I can see that having that sort of burden on the Supreme Court might be rather disagreeable. Therefore, it was quite reasonable to think of giving that power, the result of the reporting power, to the Court of Appeal in England—I think Wales and Northern Ireland would also be covered by that—and to the Inner House of the Court of Session in Scotland, which is its equivalent. The High Court of Justiciary would of course also have that responsibility in criminal cases. I am very open to negotiating how this should happen, but I venture to think it important that we consider this issue carefully. I hope that your Lordships may feel that we should pass this amendment.
My Lords we are no further forward at all on which courts it is intended shall acquire the power; on what the test they will be required to carry out is; or on any reliable process by which we can ensure that Ministers do not get involved in specifying the circumstances in which courts, at any level, can depart from existing case law. The beauty of the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, is, as he explained, that it seeks to satisfy the Government’s objective—as restated now by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan—that any court in the land should be able to engage in this process. This is not a very wise thing to do but, if it is going to be done, it should be done with the protection suggested by the noble and learned Lord: that it should involve a reference process which the Supreme Court can take up if it sees reason to do so. On that basis, and knowing in what high regard the noble and learned Lord is held, I am content to seek the leave of the House to withdraw my amendment, so as to facilitate him pressing his.
It would be right for the noble Lord, Lord Beith, to continue with his two amendments, because I am proposing the option in my amendment in the event of his disappearing. I think I am right in saying that. I may be wrong; I stand to be corrected. I understood from the Public Bill Office that I did not need to put my name to Amendments 12 and 13—in fact I could not, because there were four there already. It may be that those amendments should just stand.
The consequence of my amendment, if it was carried, would be that the amendment in the name of the noble and learned, Lord, Lord Mackay, could not then be taken, because the words upon which it bites would have been removed. I would be content to divide on my amendment, to test the opinion of the House.
(5 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am supportive of Amendments 5 and 13, which outline the sort of assistance that is very much required. For Amendment 13, my preference is that the particular agency should be in some way connected with the Courts & Tribunals Service so that judicial supervision is available in respect of it. One institution that strikes me as very useful in this connection is the law centres, which were recipients of legal aid in my time. They are an economic way of providing legal assistance—much more economic than the expensive lawyers to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, referred. Of course, it is not very good to have recourse to the inexpensive and cheap lawyers, because you are apt to spend more in the end. This is an excellent idea and requires the Minister to think quite hard about how it should be done.
This brings me to my Amendment 14, which is a slightly different matter. There are various skills available in electronic matters. You may have recourse to the internet and yet not be very sure what you have reached when you get there. There is a risk—it may not be large, but there is a risk—that if there is a court portal for certain things, you may find yourself on a website which is supposed to be the court portal but is actually run by people with a more private interest in litigation than the courts would have. I suggest Amendment 14 for consideration, which would require the Lord Chancellor to make arrangements to try to secure as far as possible that this does not happen to the rather inexpert people who may be using the internet, of which I regard myself as one.
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord has reminded me that it is well known that the application system for the US ESTA visa waiver scheme has a number of such sites which exact charges, to which people are not liable because of the very modest charge on the official site itself. I will simply point out that HM Courts & Tribunals Service is already working on this sort of thing. There are 18 locations in which it is providing face-to-face digital support, or at least is said to be providing it. The Government have been working this up on the pilot schemes, so it seems to me another ideal opportunity, which the Minister should not neglect, to accept that the Government are actually on the right lines on this.
It would be rather more reassuring if the Bill contained some obligation to provide this kind of support. If it is not there, the Bill will be open to the charge from many people that it is creating a new system without ensuring that people can use it. The means are beginning to be developed by the Government, so I hope that they provide some statutory basis for them.
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will not add to the exposition of the amendment and the reasons for tabling it, which have been so clearly set out by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The committee felt that we ought to see whether we could get a more secure place for retained European law in the hierarchy of law as it would be viewed by the courts in this country. There will probably be difficulties in this area and we are probably persuaded that they cannot be resolved by the kind of declaratory amendment that we have tabled on this occasion.
There are further difficulties which the Minister might refer to, which have been pointed out by Professor Alison Young, who was referred to earlier. For example, constitutional statutes are not subject to the doctrine of implied repeal in the same way as other legislation. What will be the position if an item of retained European law is considered to be constitutional in character and appears to be in conflict with subsequent legislation passed post exit day, when the supremacy principle has fallen away and this has to be resolved?
In passing an earlier amendment which removed a discretionary power from Ministers to, in effect, decide whether matters could be put before the courts, we wanted to assert that, wherever possible, we should protect the courts and the legal system from having to be the subject of individual ad hoc ministerial decisions in particular cases. That was part of the motivation for what the committee sought to do in this case. But clearly it cannot be solved in the way that we first suggested.
My Lords, this is an important question. It is just possible that Clause 8 could be used by the courts in a situation arising under this particular amendment to extend the provisions of Clause 8 by analogy, where that seemed suitable. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, mentioned, fitting this to everything is quite difficult. On the other hand, for a court faced with a single problem, this way of solving it might be possible. Anyway, I am entirely in support of what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said about Ministers determining this sort of matter; I do not believe that that can be right. However, I do not think the court would fail, if faced with this problem, in deciding something about it.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, first, I hope that “appropriate” will disappear in any event, and that it will be replaced with “necessary”. This clause appears to be drafted especially to deal with a situation where, once the withdrawal Bill is passed, a number of important things have to be done before exit day. I hope that the House of Commons will have the opportunity to consider these. The reference here is quite clearly to something that is required in implementing the withdrawal agreement. We have only to listen to the amendments that were dealt with this morning to know the tremendous complexity that this withdrawal Bill is bound to have—I only hope that it will have it and that we will have an agreement that will be incorporated in a withdrawal agreement Bill, which will deal with these complications. However, if they are dealt with, it is quite obvious that quite a number of things will have to be dealt with speedily that will be brought into effect on exit day. For example, where the authority controlling a particular line of business is no longer effective because of the withdrawal agreement, it may be necessary, to preserve that, to have some form of regulation that sets up an alternative, so that there is a control; for example, with regard to the things that were mentioned this morning, food safety.
It is therefore possible that in some situations the regulations will require modification of existing Acts of Parliament. The substance of this clause is therefore of importance, and we may have to consider it in a bit more detail. I hope that the Minister, when she comes to reply, will be able to give us some examples of the kind of thing that can happen. However, it would be dangerous not to make provision in case that kind of thing happens. The withdrawal agreement Bill will be complicated enough, so if we can make some preparation for it, that would be of benefit.
I am sure the noble and learned Lord is right, but the Government cannot do any of these things until the withdrawal agreement Bill has been passed; therefore the kind of provision he is talking about might more appropriately be made in that Bill than this one.
I can see that. On the other hand, it is sometimes wise to be prepared if you can foresee a thing that is required and have it ready. We also have the scope to discuss it in this Bill, whereas I imagine the discussions on the withdrawal agreement Bill will be pretty complicated—I assume the latter will be a good deal more complicated than this Bill, and if it is going to require the sort of consideration that this Bill has had it will take some time. There is something to be said for trying to prepare, but of course it is necessary to ensure that the preparations are adequate—that is what the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, deals with.
I am conscious that we may be trying to regulate the House of Commons a bit. I have never had the honour of being a Member of the House of Commons, as so many of your Lordships have, but my impression is that the House of Commons has plenty of powers to control what the Government do. Of course, if necessary, it has a very extreme power in that connection.