(10 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move amendment (b), at the end of the Question to add,
‘, as a contribution to securing a negotiated two state solution.’
I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Grahame M. Morris) on bringing this debate to the House. I also pay tribute to the extraordinary and very moving speech by the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Sir Richard Ottaway), which, as I think we all appreciated, was a very difficult speech to make.
As the House will note, the amendment has wide, cross-party support. Its purpose is very simple. It is based on the belief that the recognition of the state of Palestine alongside the state of Israel will add to the pressure for a negotiated two-state solution, and may help to bring that prospect a little closer to fruition.
The “Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” was promulgated at the end of April 2003 under the auspices of the Quartet—the UN, EU, US and Russia. Though, palpably, much of the progress presaged by the road map has been confounded by events, crucially, by the road map the Government of Israel were signed up to there being a separate and independent state of Palestine. One part of the road map anticipated that Quartet members, which include the UK, could
“promote international recognition of a Palestinian state, including possible UN membership”
as a transitional measure, well before any final status agreement. The Government of Israel disagree. They claim that recognition of Palestine as a state should be at the conclusion of any successful peace negotiations. But such an approach would give the Government of Israel a veto, even over whether such a state should exist.
I understand what the right hon. Gentleman is trying to achieve by his amendment, but how does he think the passing of the motion would encourage either Hamas or the Israelis to change their approach to negotiation, which has been so unfruitful so far?
It is the Palestinian Authority that is part of the negotiations, not Hamas. I believe that the fact of the Israelis’ intemperate reaction to the very prospect of the House passing this resolution is proof that it will make a difference. The only thing that the Israeli Government understand, under the present demeanour of Binyamin Netanyahu, is pressure. What the House will be doing this evening will be to add to the pressure on the Government of Israel. That is why they are so worried about this resolution passing. Were it just a gesture, as the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) implied, they would not be bothered at all. They are very worried indeed because they know that it will have an effect.
(13 years ago)
Commons ChamberAs a preliminary, I wish to draw the House’s attention to the fact that against my name on the amendments relating to referral fees there is an R, which indicates that I have a declarable interest. It arises from three engagements that I undertook for fees on matters relating to referral fees and the motor insurance industry generally. They were on 28 September, 12 October, and earlier today. In respect of the first two, I have made a declaration to the Registrar of Members’ Financial Interests, who told me that because I have not yet received payment, the time for these is not yet running. The declaration for my engagement this morning will be made tomorrow.
I tabled amendments to new clauses 18 and 19 and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) indicated, in the absence of a sudden Pauline conversion from the Government Front Bench between now and when the question is put, I shall press amendment (e) to new clause 18 to a vote.
According to the AA, over the year to March 2011, there has been a 40% increase in motor insurance premiums. In many areas of the country, mine included, although it is by no means the worst, the increase has been even higher. As a number of colleagues of all parties have pointed out, that has very severe social consequences.
May I say that I am extremely grateful for the wide support that my Motor Insurance Regulation Bill has had throughout the Chamber? Motor insurance is the only insurance affecting an individual that is compulsory, and in certain areas and for certain categories, particularly younger drivers, premiums are now so high as to place motor insurance out of reach altogether. A driving licence is often a necessary qualification for taking a job. In any case, people in areas that are not blessed with a high level of public transport, which means most places outside inner urban areas, need a motor vehicle to go about their business. The increase in premiums, and the fact that they are much higher in some areas than others, is leading to some people not being able to work or move around.
The increase is also unquestionably leading to an increase in criminality, both through people going around uninsured and, increasingly, through people deciding to borrow a friend’s address with a lower-premium postcode. People also fail to disclose relevant information about themselves, to enable them to become insured. It cannot serve any public purpose that we have ended up with such a dysfunctional system.
I readily concede that that has happened because of a nexus of factors going back a number of years. The operation of the conditional fee system was introduced in the Access to Justice Act 1999 for good a reason: it was thought that it would improve access to justice. To some extent that has certainly been true, but as we all know, it has had the unintended consequence of generally —I am not talking the Trafigura case or one or two others—creating an imbalance in the equality of arms between parties on either side of a legal action. It has gratuitously encouraged the so-called compensation culture.
That, in turn, has been compounded by the costs of the road traffic accident electronic portal being too high. In a recent statement, the Minister said that the figure that was introduced when I was Secretary of State had been agreed in the Civil Justice Council. It was agreed to by both sides, which was why I did not interfere with it. I believe there is now widespread agreement that the current fee, of at least £1,200 for claims under £10,000, is at least twice as high as it should be. It is leading to lawyers advertising as two firms at the end of my street in Blackburn do: they have great banners across their windows saying, “Bring your claim in here, we’ll pay you up to £650 in cash for it.” They can do that and still make a profit out of the £1,200, because the actual costs of running the portal are about £100.
Claims for whiplash, which I have described as an invention of the human imagination, undiagnosable except by dodgy doctors employed by claims management companies, have got completely out of control. The level of whiplash claims is not related to the level of accidents or physical injuries. Accidents are reducing, as is the possibility of being injured in an accident, because cars and road engineering are much safer. It is related principally to the density of claims management companies operating in a particular area. The evidence of that is incontrovertible.
I concede to my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) that the regulators have acted properly on claims management companies in some ways, but the regulatory system established under the Compensation Act 2006, during our Administration, has not had sufficient resources to control the trebling in the number of claims management companies that has taken place in recent years.
Another change that took place was in the 2004 solicitors conduct rules, which allowed solicitors to pay referral fees that were previously banned. I will come back to that point when we deal with the enforcement of a ban on referral fees.
I very much welcome all the effort that the right hon. Gentleman has put into this matter. I hope that in talking about referral fees, he will recognise that although he has devoted a lot of his effort to motor insurance, the same problems affect the cost to consumers in numerous other areas, such as employment law, conveyancing and divorce—all areas in which quite large sums change hands.
The hon. and learned Gentlemen may have noticed that I need to research that point, but I have in the back of my mind a number of cases where breaches of regulations are dealt with both by the regulator and in criminal proceedings. He is experienced in the law and will know that plenty of criminal offences are also civil wrongs of some kind in common law or by regulations.
The right hon. Gentleman has an arguable case on the merits of a back-up criminal offence, but will he concede that the system proposed by the Government can be made to work, because it combines the regulatory framework with the criminal offence behind it, particularly if there is a custodial sentence? The data protection offence, which lies behind the Government’s proposal, is already a criminal offence.
Christopher Graham, the distinguished Information Commissioner, made the point that one reason why the penalty for breach of section 55 of the Data Protection Act needs to be increased—as it is by sections 77 and 78 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 to a maximum of two years imprisonment or an unlimited fine—is to send a message to people in those industries that they could end up in prison if they go in for an egregious breach. Of course, other breaches of data protection rules could mean that an organisation loses its licence, but in extremis, we need criminal proceedings for a criminal offence.
My view is that the same must apply in respect of breaches of the law banning referral fees. My amendment (e) would produce exactly the same penalty—it is entirely proportionate—as applies under sections 77 and 78 of the 2008 Act, which I hope the Government bring into force quickly given that they are already on the statute book. With that, and because I know that many others wish to speak, I thank Members on both sides of the House for the support that they have given to my campaign, and commend the amendment to the House.
(13 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberI need to make progress, but I will give way to the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) a bit later.
Rather, the problem has arisen because of the judicial activism of the Court in Strasbourg, which is widening its role not only beyond anything anticipated in the founding treaties but beyond anything anticipated by the subsequent active consent of all the state parties, including the UK.
In his major lecture two years ago, to which reference has already been made, Lord Hoffmann spelled out in eloquent detail the difficulties that the situation was causing, including for the UK judiciary. He said that the Strasbourg Court
“lacked constitutional legitimacy”
in intervening in matters
“on which Member States…have not surrendered their sovereign powers”.
He added well-founded criticism of the highly variable quality of its judges and administration.
Where the Court has given judgment against the UK in respect of fundamental human rights, successive Home Secretaries and UK Governments have readily complied, whether on specific cases, such as terrorist deportations, or on matters such as the need for proper regulation of phone-tapping and the intelligence agencies—and so has this House, whether or not it agreed with what the Court was saying, because we have voluntarily and readily accepted its jurisdiction.
Various states will from time to time think that the Court has overstepped its limits and taken too broad a view of its powers. Are they all entitled at any stage to disregard its judgments, and what does that mean for the convention?
No, they are not, and I will come on to that. The fundamental distinction to be drawn is this: all of us, as I have just spelled out, are required to respect and observe decisions of the Court on fundamental human rights, because it was in respect of those that we and other countries signed up.
(14 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI should also tell hon. Members that if they were to read section 3 of the 1998 Act, they would find that if, for example, the First Minister is voted out by a simple majority and after 28 days no new First Minister has been voted in, an election has to take place. That is done by a simple majority, so the only effect of this provision is to delay matters by requirements relating to a simple majority and 28 days. There is no parallel, whatsoever, in these arrangements, and the hon. Member for Wyre and Preston North knows it.
Is the right hon. Gentleman’s real view that the Prime Minister’s unfettered power to call a general election at a time of his choosing should be retained and that we should not have fixed-term Parliaments, or is he proposing an alternative mechanism, be it the Scottish Parliament’s combination of a 66% threshold and a one-month rule or some other mechanism?
I do not understand. Either this has been done for partisan reasons—[Hon. Members: “Answer the question!”] Of course, I am going to answer the question—I always do—but I am allowed to answer the question in my own way. The right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) and I have been debating this for long enough. I say to him that either this has been done for the most crude of partisan reasons, or the Government have simply misunderstood how they can establish fixed-term Parliaments and take away the right of the Prime Minister to recommend Dissolution before then. It is very straightforward. We can legislate for fixed-term Parliaments—our view is that we ought to go for four-year, not five-year, Parliaments—and we can also legislate to take away the power of the Prime Minister to recommend Dissolution before then, but what we should not do is legislate to take away the power of the House of Commons to remove a Government. I am afraid that they are doing that on some curious and spurious arithmetic.
In the same speech in which he talked about the 1832 reform Act, about which I have had to correct him, the Deputy Prime Minister also said:
“We are not taking away Parliament's right to throw out Government; we’re taking away Government's right to throw out Parliament.”
That is utter nonsense. It is casuistry in the extreme. We are talking about the Government’s right to throw out Parliament and we are talking about Parliament’s right to throw out the Government.
I remind the House of an excellent article in The Daily Telegraph, inserted by the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), in which he says that the 55%-majority plan will “taint” the “New Politics” and that to
“introduce such a measure in this way is simply wrong.”
He goes on to say:
“The requirement for a 55 per cent majority to dissolve parliament, and thereby dismiss a government, dramatically reduces the ability of Parliament to hold the executive to account. It is a major constitutional change, possibly one of the greatest since 1911.”
He also draws attention to what would have happened in 1979, which some of us will recall, when the Government of the day lost their majority by one vote. The then Leader of the Labour party and the Government said that there would have to be an election—it followed like night follows day. People talk about having a period of looking at a coalition in such a situation, but what do they think was being done in the days leading up to that vote but searching for a coalition? It was precisely because one was not available that the Government ran out of numbers and the vote was lost. In that situation, when there had been a vote of no confidence in the Government, the Labour Government could have carried on—they might no doubt have wished to—until the following October, because the 55% threshold would not have been achieved. If that had happened, they would have been in the ludicrous and wholly undemocratic position—