European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, we are now looking again at the principle of supremacy and status. I agree with a great deal—in fact, almost all—of what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said. However, in the various amendments I have sprinkled around, I differ with him on one fundamental point: I always wish to preserve the rights of individuals and businesses to have legislation struck down. That is their current position in that they can have EU law struck down. I put forward my alternative plan in Amendment 32A; I will explain how I got to it.

Broadly speaking, there are three baskets of EU laws. In basket 1, there are the treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which have to be followed by the European court. They are not revocable, as I am sure noble Lords know, and it is a big procedure to change them. In basket 2, I put legislative acts, meaning regulations and directives that set policy. To be precise, they can be identified by the article of the procedure in the treaty that they were made under. In the Lisbon treaty—the TFEU—it would be Article 289. The important point for noble Lords to hold in their minds is that these regulations and directives set policy. Basket 2 legislation can also be struck down by the European court—including on an action from individuals and businesses—for being incompatible with the treaty or the charter. A recent example is the data retention regulation that was ruled disproportionate in cases brought by Digital Rights Ireland and others. In basket 3, I put the implementation of Acts and delegated Acts and their predecessors. In the Lisbon treaty, that comes under Articles 290 and 291. These can be struck down by the European court for being incompatible with the treaty or the charter, as well as for being incompatible with the powers and instructions that were delegated to it in the legislation on which it depends.

If we take rights as our guide—by which I mean the right of an individual or business to challenge the validity of a bad law—then we get to the categorisation that the EU gives to law: that it is all secondary, except for the treaties and the charter. It is quite easy to accept that retained EU general principles—corresponding to basket 1, as I called it—should have primary status. Once converted under Clause 7, it would be wrong if they were changed or revoked other than by an Act of Parliament.

Basket 3 regulations are very close to statutory instruments in the way that they are made based on delegated powers, including an all-or-nothing single vote in the Council or Parliament to turn the whole lot down. There is also similarity in the ways they can be invalidated in court. That is quite easy to map on to our statutory instrument. Basket 2 is harder. The policy content and procedure of making the law look a lot like the making of an Act of Parliament; that leads some—I think Professor Craig was one of them—to conclude that it should map on to primary legislation. But then, if primary, it cannot be quashed under the general principles, so the rights of individuals and businesses are lost. Of course, if noble Lords look at Schedule 1—as we will later today—it can be seen that the Government’s intention is that there is no right of action on a failure to comply with the general principles of EU law. That is wrong. Treating legislation as primary carries the same cost that the Constitution Committee accepts. As it says in paragraph 48 of its report:

“Treating retained direct EU law as primary legislation for all—including”,


Human Rights Act,

“purposes is not without constitutional costs”.

I consider that cost to be too high because I give more weight to maintaining status quo rights and the reasonable expectations of individuals and businesses than making judgments easier or fewer.

We have to address that question several times in the Bill. Each time, I come down on the side of the people’s rights. No manifestos have ever said, “We want to take back control, including your right to challenge bad law”. However, the secondary legislation nature of basket 2 may require some further protection from overly easy change and revocation by statutory instruments, especially once things are no longer pinned in place because we are not part of the EU. In the EU, this was not made by a statutory instrument-type process, nor is it amendable in that way, so basket 2—although of secondary legislation status—could be deemed amendable in life after Clause 7 only by an Act of Parliament. This idea is similar to the one we debated regarding Amendment 21 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. Such treatment means that there is a special category for these laws, but we are in an unusual situation. The fact is that basket 2 is an intermediate, piggy-in-the-middle category. It is secondary legislation-plus, or primary legislation-minus. It could be replicated more or less by secondary legislation plus amendment protection, or the other way round as primary legislation but challengeable as to validity, although that is a bit more controversial.

The piggy-in-the-middle nature shows up in other ways. Basket 2 legislation actually contains within the individual documents a great deal of detail that in the UK domestic system would be done in delegated secondary legislation. It is the same with directives: a greater level of detail is there than in the lean and mean UK Acts of Parliament. That is even more the case after implementation for the secondary legislation made under the European Communities Act. For example, look at the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill, which recently received its Third Reading in this House. The money laundering regulations 2017, based on the fourth anti-money laundering directive, are some 112 pages plus a glossary. They were replaced in the Bill by one clause of 28 lines, including the headings and a three-and-a-half-page schedule listing delegated powers. It has been much amended and improved, but the contrast in content is much the same. If we made secondary legislation transposing directives into primary legislation, there would be a great deal of detail on which I would not wish to say I gave the sovereignty of Parliament a totally unchallengeable status.

There are three parts to my amendment. The first would reword the supremacy principle. I intend it to do the same thing and I am not precious about the wording. In fact, I just modified the Constitution Committee’s idea and stole the idea that you allocate precedence as if it were primary legislation, but in my plan the only bit of primary legislation it gets is the precedence. The second part would allocate secondary status to basket 2 retained legislation, and indeed to basket 3—everything except for Acts, because where we have Acts they already are and look like Acts. I then allocate primary status to EU general principles. As I have indicated, for life after Clause 7, basket 2 could be made so as to require amendment by primary legislation. Possibly that belongs in Clause 7 or somewhere else.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Bowles has identified a problem that goes beyond what the committee sought to solve in its proposal, and proposed an ingenious way of trying to deal with it. The committee’s proposal seeks to protect the important bits of that legislation from the degree of vulnerability provided by the repeal of statutory instruments under our present procedures. It is an intriguing point in some ways, because I expect this to be a shrinking area of law over time. If we leave the EU, one assumes that much of this legislation will in time be replaced by new legislation bringing that area of law up to date, not because it is EU law but because things move on and there is a need to do so.

That reminds us of the danger that the committee set out at paragraph 103 of its report. It said:

“If the ‘supremacy principle’ were to continue to feature in the Bill, clause 5(3) would need to be amended to clarify the extent to which retained EU law can be modified while retaining the benefit of that principle, and to clarify in what circumstances the modification of pre-exit domestic law would be such as to turn it into post-exit domestic law that is no longer vulnerable to the operation of the ‘supremacy principle’”.


We chose not to go down that road or try to define it because it seemed an extremely bad situation to get into. One other problem that I will add to the list so well adumbrated by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, occurs in paragraph 87 of the report, which points out that Clause 5 would also need to be amended,

“to provide courts … with suitable guidance for the purpose of determining whether a rule of the common law should be taken to have been ‘made’ before or after exit”.

If that is not done then the procedure that the Government have chosen will yet again promote and continue uncertainty. In both cases it would be better to go for some version of what the committee proposed.